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THE PURCHASE OF FLORIDA 



THE PURCHASE 
OF FLORIDA 



ITS HISTORY AND DIPLOMACY 



BY 

HUBERT BRUCE FULLER, A. M., LL. M- 



WITH MAPS 



CLEVELAND 

THE BURROWS BROTHERS COMPANY 

1906 



a 



COPYBIGHT, 19«6 

BT 

HUBERT BRUCE FULLER 



nKPUBLICAN PniNTING COMPANY 
CEDAR RAPID6, IOWA 



TO THE MEMORY 

OF 

MY BELOVED FATHER 

ROBERT B. FULLER 



CONTENTS. 



Page 



Preface 
Chapter 
Chapter 
Chapter 
Chapter 



Chapter V. 



9 

33 
76 



I. Early Relations with Spain 
II. To the Treaty of 1795 . 

III. The Purchase of Louisiana . 

IV. West Florida between the Mobile 
and the Mississippi , . 122 

West Florida and Later Negotia- 
tions ..... 146 
Chapter VI. Florida During the War of 181 2 182 
Chapter VII. Resumption of Diplomatic Rela- 
tions . . . . . 213 
Chapter VIII. Jackson's War with the Seminoles 240 
Chapter IX. Adams versus De Onis . 271 
Chapter X. The Treaty of 1819 . . 298 
Chapter XI. The Florida Treaty . . 323 
Appendices — 

A. Vol. VI, Instructions, p. 137 . . 333 

B. Annals of Congress (January, 1819), p. 515 337 

C. Vol. VIII, Instructions, p. 257 . . 340 
^' 1795 — Treaty of Friendship, Limits, and 

Navigation ..... 359 

E. 1 8 19 — Treaty of Amity, Settlement, and 
Limits ...... 

Bibliography , . . . . 



F 

Index 



371 
381 

383 



P R E F AC E. 

THE acquisition of Florida, our early relations with 
Spain, and the struggle to secure New Orleans and 
the Mississippi, are critical and interesting chapters in 
American history. Their importance and magnitude are 
but slightly considered by many of wide culture, and are 
but vaguely appreciated even by those who have made a 
special study of the history of the nation. 

In connection with post-graduate work at Yale Univer- 
sity, where this essay was awarded the George Washington 
Eggleston Prize in American History, in 1904, the author 
became aware of the poverty of historical writing devoted 
to these significant matters in the diplomatic history of the 
United States, and was impressed with the advantages which 
might accrue to students of American history, from an 
unprejudiced and accurate account of the acquisition of 
Florida and our early entanglements with the Spanish 
nation. Through the courtesy of the late Hon. John Hay, 
then Secretary of State, and of Assistant Secretary Adee, 
the diplomatic correspondence of the period in question was 
placed at the disposal of the writer. 

Some idea of the importance of the questions involved 
and the attention they received from our national officials 
may be inferred from the fact that the author was obliged 
to examine some fifty volumes of official manuscript in order 
to secure the necessary data for a proper treatment of the 
subject. The original correspondence, all carefully exam- 
ined and compared, included Instructions to United States 



10 Preface 

Ministers in Europe, Domestic Letters, Notes to Foreign 
Legations, Letters of Foreign Ministers in the United States 
to the State Department, Letters from our Ministers Abroad 
to the State Department, and the Personal Letters of the 
various Ministers of the United States to Spain, France and 
England. Vols. XII and XIII of the Domestic Letters, 
and Vol. I of Notes to Foreign Legations were lost at the 
time of the British occupation of Washington in 1814, and. 
have never been recovered. 

The letters now extant in the State Department, many 
in French and Spanish, and not heretofore translated, reveal 
much of the inside history of our early national life. This 
mass of correspondence and notes, for the most part, 
furnishes the authority for the statements of fact made 
in the following pages. The conclusions derived have been 
drawn in an earnest effort to be fair and to avoid prejudice; 
national vanity and a mistaken patriotism have misled many 
authors. 

The province of the historian is to present facts ; to be 
correct rather than pleasing; to criticise, if occasion require, 
yet always justly. Fortified by the results of fullest research, 
he should state truly what has happened, and be guided in 
conclusions by the laws of evidence. He should seek to 
accomplish the complete subjection of personal, political and 
patriotic prejudices. The narrative should be based prim- 
arily upon an examination and appreciation of original 
documents. Personal memoirs, contemporary chronicles, 
and biased biographies and diaries are not to be ignored, 
but they must be subordinated to documents of acknowl- 
edged validity — such as authentic dispatches, original in- 
structions, executive decrees and legislative enactments. 
Such gaps in history as cannot be filled should be bridged 
with great care. 

If the author has criticised government officials and 



Preface il 

officers of the army, or their conduct of affairs, it has been 
done solely to subserve the ends of historical accuracy. 

Acknowledgment must be made to Mr. Andrew H. 
Allen, the Librarian of the Department of State, and to 
Mr. Pendleton King, Chief of the Bureau of Indexes and 
Archives of that department, and to Mr. P. Lee Phillips of 
the Congressional Library, for their uniform courtesy and 
valuable assistance; to Professor Arthur M. Wheeler of 
Yale University, for his kindly criticisms, valuable sugges- 
tions and friendly encouragement; and also to Professor 
Theodore S. Woolsey and Professor Edward G. Bourne of 
Yale University; the Hon. Hannis Taylor, of the Spanish 
Claims Commission and one time Minister to Spain ; Pro- 
fessor Charles C. Swisher of George Washington Univer- 
sity ; Justice David J. Brewer of the United States Supreme 
Court; and Mr. T. Fletcher Dennis of Washington, D. C, 
for assistance and advice always graciously afforded, and 
most gratefully received. 

Hubert Brucd FuIvIvKr. 
Cleveland, Ohio, 

February, 1906. 



DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE 
PURCHASE OF FLORIDA 



CHAPTER I. 

EARLY RELATIONS WITH SPAIN. 

FLORIDA — the land of the fountain of youth, of fabled 
riches, of unrivaled beauty, was the central figure of the 
romance and tradition of the sixteenth century. But her his- 
tory was more a tragedy than a song. Here explorers, 
brave knights, soldiers of fortune, lured by the siren songs 
of wealth and the hope of glory, suffered and died and the 
world knew them no more. Here were armies sacrificed to 
satiate the vengeance of European monarchs — massacred 
by savage redskins or other vengeful enemies, with every 
refinement of cruelty that an ingenious mind could conceive 
or an experienced hand execute. Here Spanish and French 
and English all contributed something to the horror-laden 
history of colonial conquest, each in turn learning the 
awful penalties of the law of retribution. 

Army after army buried itself in these swamps and 
forests — their bones left to bleach in the woods after being 
torn asunder by wild beasts or cruel natives to whom 
the whites had brought only the gospel of hate. And in 
these primeval forests, in a fruitless endeavor to explore the 
world of fabled romance, many a brave cavalier found the 
grave of his ambition. Bound by the thraldom of stupid 
traditions, they pursued the fateful errand of death and 
failure ; no city of gold was their reward, no treasure-mine 
offered remuneration ; only misery and death and the 
immunities of a forgotten grave. 



1 6 The Purchase of Florida 

But these expeditions wer€ not of exploration and 
avarice alone; they were also of holy mission; for the 
adventurer and priest were companions, the one seeking 
the reward of gold, the other the nobler reward of souls 
won to Christianity. But their methods were much the 
same ; fire and sword served them in place of argument and 
conviction. The beautiful picture of self-sacrificing priests 
gone into a wild country to carry salvation to an unfortunate 
race, was not without its darker shadows. For they brought 
the inquisition with its horrors, and the fagot showed to a" 
lurid heaven that even untutored savages can die for their 
convictions and for principle. 

After the early period of discovery and settlement had 
passed, the American colonies became entangled in the wars 
of the continent. In 1666, again in 1719, and in 1725 
various attacks on Florida had been made by the southern 
colonists entailing a bitterness of feeling between these 
provinces, which was destined to endure and bear fruit for 
more than a century. Fire and sword, famme and disease 
visited the colony in rapid and ruinous succession. 

By the treaty of Paris in 1763, Florida was ceded to 
Great Britain in return for Cuba, and a new life was opened 
to this province — the fairest, yet the bloodiest of our 
domain. For Spain has ever viewed her colonists as slaves 
whose blood and tears might well be shed to advance her 
own proud ease and splendor. 

With the change of title the Spanish people quite 
generally emigrated from the country which had been under 
the Castilian flag for two centuries. Two hundred years of 
disappointment and sorrow they had been. Outside the 
garrisoned walls little had been accomplished, for the 
Spanish were soldiers not civilians, gentlemen not agri- 
culturists. 

Under the English the province increased in population 



Early Relations with Spain 17 

and wealth ; commerce flourished and friendly relations were 
established with the southern colonies. But when in 1775 
the first guns of freedom were fired, they awakened no 
response in the hearts of the people of Florida. The other 
southern colonists might cheer the heroes of Lexington 
and Bunker Hill and call the minute-men patriots, but to 
Florida they were traitors, for Florida alone remained loyal. 
It was too new a possession and the people too well governed 
to feel the keen dissatisfaction and unrest which breed 
revolution. For to them English misgovernment seemed a 
blessing after the wrongs they had endured from the 
Spanish. And further, many colonists were the recent 
beneficiaries of the generous land-grants of the English 
king. No bells and bonfires in Florida proclaimed the 
Declaration of Independence ; no liberty poles arose in her 
public squares. On the other hand when news of the events 
of July 4, 1776, reached St. Augustine, John Hancock and 
Samuel Adams were hanged and burned in effigy by a 
cheering crowd of loyalists. 

Naturally this proud city, which had been called by her 
former monarchs ''the faithful city of St. Augustine,*' 
became, during the war, a depot and point d'appui for the 
British in their operations against the southern states and 
large forces at times were stationed there. Incursions were 
made from time to time into Georgia to be followed by 
counter-incursions into Florida. In the summer of 1778 
two bodies of armed men marched from St. Augustine into 
Georgia, where after laying waste a part of the country 
about Sunbury and the Ogechee River they were forced to 
retreat. The Americans numbering some two thousand, 
under General Robert Howe, this same year of 1778 
attempted to reduce St. Augustine. The British abandoned 
Fort Tonyn at the mouth of St. Mary's River, where so 
many privateers had been fitted out, and withdrew into the 



1 8 The Purchase of Florida 

walls of St. Augustine which must have soon fallen had 
not the deadly insects and a wasting sickness attacked the 
colonists. 

In that year alone nearly seven thousand loyalists from 
the southertt' colonies emigrated to Florida. For the Georgia 
legislature had attainted with treason the refugees, and their 
property was declared forfeited to the state and ordered to 
be sold. Georgia's position was a most difficult one; for 
close to her was not only a loyal colony whose bitterness 
and effective ^strength had been increased by these Tory 
fugitives, but also the most powerful tribe of aborigines on 
the continent, hostile and revengeful. 

In short, Florida had become a haven of refuge for the 
king's troops and Tories, and these marauding expeditions, 
citizens, Tories, Scopholites, Minorcans and Indians, were 
banded together under the name of Florida Rangers. , With 
all the withering desolation of civil war the struggle went 
on; Ranger and Liberty Boy, Florida and Georgia, per- 
chance brother and brother, or father and son — such is 
the sad tale the historian must record. To old St. Augus- 
tine, particularly after the fall of Charleston, the cartel 
ships brought their loads of prisoners and here were con- 
fined many Americans of prominence in the Revolutionary 
struggle. 

When the war was ended the planters returned to their 
fields, the artisans to their trades. Many loyalists who had 
refused allegiance to the new government came to Florida 
to live again under English colors or await the time when 
bitterness and prejudice might disappear from their former 
homes. The province, under the impetus of British govern- 
ment, took on new life and added prosperity. But one day, 
in 1783, a ship arrived in the harbor of St. Augustine and all 
was changed; the darkness and despair of ruin settled upon 
the province. For the king of England and the king of 



Early Relations with Spain 19 

Spain had indulged in a g-ame of chess : they had traded 
pawns ; Spain took the Floridas and Jamaica went to Eng- 
land. Florida was well nigh deserted; for the English 
subjects, bidding farewell to their old homes, with tears 
and lamentations, parted from brother and sister, mother 
and father. It was the scene of Grand Pre repeated ; many 
found ruin and want on the shores of Jamaica while others 
returned to the now United States, there to experience the 
injustice of successful foes. 

The cross of St. George was superseded by the Spanish 
flag, Spanish troops manned tlie forts and Spanish grandees 
dispensed the laws. And with their return industry and 
agriculture were suspended and commerce blotted out, while 
poverty and desolation took their place. The revolted col- 
onies were a nation, loyal Florida a Castilian province. 

The Declaration of Independence had hurled defiance 
at Great Britain and announced to the world the birth of a 
new nation, which was viewed with ridicule and contempt 
by many of the European countries, while others watched 
the scene in wonder, speculating whether here, at last, 
might be the weapon with which to hum'ble an ancient 
enemy. 

Those early years were fraught with perils that made 
our national existence precarious. The sinews of war were 
wanting and success was possible only with the alliance and 
aid of the ancient monarchies of Europe. Ambassadors — 
among the grandest men of the infant nation — were sent 
abroad, there on suppliant knee to seek the material and 
not alone the moral support without which the new-born 
must perish. To Madrid was dispatched the diplomatic 
and well-born Jay, to seek some aid for the new republic 
from the old Castilian rulers whose name had ever been 
synonymous with all things anti-Republican, who above all. 
stood for the divine right of kings. Spain was not for- 



20 The Purchase of Florida 

getful of the lost Armada, nor was she unmindful of the 
numerous scores against England, and while she might view 
with intense satisfaction the loss to that country of her 
fairest possessions, yet that alone would not move her to 
action. 

At first she viewed with alarm the prospect of a new 
nation in North America .so near her own. It was not 
America free that Spain desired ; it was America dependent, 
but disaffected. For thus both the colonies and Great 
Britain would be unable to pillage Spanish America. At 
first then Spain gladly contributed, so far as she could — 
without exhausting her already embarrassed treasury or 
causing a public rupture — to maintain the colonies in this 
state of permanent disaffection. 

But the Revolution progressed. The American arms 
held their own and the issue looked toward actual inde- 
pendence. Would Spain actively assist in a movement 
which might prove so seductive to her own colonies : would 
she thus help build up a power founded upon political prin- 
ciples in hostility to her own theories and traditions? 

Montmorin, the French minister of Madrid, wrote to 
Vergennes : "I have no need to tell you, sir, how much 
the forming a republic in these regions would displease 
Spain, and in fact, I believe that would neither suit her 
interests nor ours." 

Mirales, who came to Philadelphia from Spain in 1780 
on a mission of inquiry, was so far imbued with the preju- 
dices of his principals as to be incapable of giving in return 
a fair account of American affairs. The more he saw, the 
more he was appalled at the spectacle of the United States, 
not merely wresting the Mississippi Valley from Spain, but 
inciting Spanish South America to revolt.^ 

With prophetic foresight Vergennes declared that if 

1. Wharton's International Law, Vol. I, p. 442 ; Bancroft's Hist, 
of the U. S., Vol. V, p. 301. 



Early Relations with Spain 21 

the United States won a place among the independent 
nations, having fought to defend its hearth fires, it would 
next desire to extend itself over Louisiana, Florida and 
Mexico, in order to secure all the approaches to the sea. 

Actuated by these ideas and with elusive and adroit 
Castilian diplomacy, the Spanish met the American repre- 
sentatives with mingled feelings of annoyance, displeas- 
ure and alarm. This was the second stage of the Spanish 
attitude toward the American Revolution. 

By force of circumstances she was hurried on to the 
third stage. ' Unconsciously and irresistibly drawn by the 
logic of events into the whirlpool of that war which France, 
in the name of the colonies, was waging against Great 
Britain, Spain found solace and encouragement in the 
thought that at last was come the opportunity to avenge her 
wrongs ; to wrest Gibraltar from the hands of the hated 
intruder, and on the successful issue of the war to rise again 
to the position of a first-class power. 

The possibility of a Spanish alliance had long been gi 
pleasing and fruitful topic of debate in the continental 
congress, and in 1778 suggestions were repeatedly made in 
that body as to what might be offered as an inducement to 
this coveted arrangement. Finally the different ideas were 
crystallized in the form of a motion offered September 10, 
1779, by Mr. Dickinson: "That if his Catholic Majesty 
shall determine to take part with France and the United 
States of America, in such case the minister plenipotentiary 
of the United States be empowered in their name to con- 
clude with the most Christian and Catholic Kings, a treaty 
or treaties, thereby assuring to these States Canada. Nova 
Scotia, Bermudas and the Floridas, when conquered, and 
the free and full exercise of the common right of these 
States to the fisheries on the banks of Newfoundland and 
the other fishinsf banks and seas of North America, and 



22 The Purchase of Florida 

also the free navigation of the Mississippi into the sea." ^ 
But in this grant of the territory of the Floridas it was 
always provided, "that his Catholic Majesty shall grant to 
the United States the free navigation of the Mississippi into 
the sea and establish on the said river at or somewhere 
southward of 31° north latitude, a free port or ports," for 
all merchant vessels, goods, wares and merchandise belong- 
ing to the inhabitants of the States. The United States 
might well be thus generous in her terms, for her enemy and 
not herself was being despoiled. With these terms as a 
basis, Jay was directed to conclude a treaty of comity and 
alliance at the court of Madrid. These offers, however, 
did not coincide with Spanish ideas, and counter-proposi- 
tions were made : these are shown in a communication of 
the French minister to congress, February 2, 1780, on the 
"Terms of Alliance proposed by his Catholic Majesty," 
setting forth, "certain articles which his Catholic Majesty 
'deems of great importance to the interests of his crown, 
and on which it is highly necessary that the Unite'd States 
explain themselves with precision and with such moderation 
as may consist with their essential rights. That the articles 
are: 

" ( I ) A precise and invariable western boundary of the 
United States. 

"(2) The exclusive navigation of the River Missis- 
sippi. 

"(3) The possession of the Floridas; and 

"(4) The lands on the left or eastern side of the River 
Mississippi. 

"That on the first article it is the idea of the calDinet 
of Madrid that the United States extend to the westward 
no farther than settlements were permitted by the royal 
proclamation of 1763. On the second that the United States 



1. 'Wliarton, Vol. Ill, p. 311. 



Early Relations with Spain 23 

do not consider themselves as having any right to navigate 
the River Mississippi, no territory belonging to them being 
situated thereon. On the third that it is probable that the 
king of Spain will conquer the Floridas during the course 
of the present war. On the fourth that the lands lying on 
the east side of the Mississippi are possessions of the crown 
of Great Britain and proper objects against which the arms 
of Spain may be employed for the purpose of making a per- 
manent conquest for the Spanish crown." ^ 

A certain faction were willing to barter away our 
right to the navigation of the Mississippi, if thereby they 
might secure so promising an alliance, but the statesmen for 
the most part insisted that this must never be the price of 
any treaty, no matter how beneficial. 

In a letter to Jay, Benjamin Franklin wrote, "Poor as 
we are, yet, as I know we shall be rich, I would rather 
agree with them to buy at a great price the whole of their 
[Spanish] right on the Mississippi than to sell a drop of its 
waters. A neighbor might as well ask me to sell my street 
door." 2 But Spain, insistent on exclusive right to the 
navigation of the river from its source to the gulf, would 
listen to no propositions which did not guarantee her this. 
In 1780 we find her demanding the Mississippi as the con- 
sideration for the loan of one hundred thousand pounds 
sterling. The Spanish asserted with warmth that the king 
would never relinquish the navigation of the Mississippi, 
and that its exclusive ownership was the sole advantage 
they would obtain from the war. ^ 

The colonies insisted that there need be no fear of 
future complications over this waterway, for it was the 
boundary of several states in the Union, and that the cit- 



1. Wharton, Vol. Ill, p. 489. MSS. State Department. 

2. Dated Passy, Oct. '2, 1780. Wharton, Vol. IV, p. 75. 

3. Conference between Jay and Count de Florida Blanca Sept. 
25, 1780. 



24 The Purchase of Florida 

izens of these states, while connected with Great Britain, 
and since the Revolution, had been accustomed to the free 
use of the stream in common with the Spanish subjects and 
that there had been no trouble. Spain by the treaty of 
Paris had ceded to Great Britain all the country to the 
northeastward of the Mississippi; the people inhabiting 
these states while subject to Great Britain and even since 
the Revolution, had settled at various places near the Mis- 
sissippi, were friendly to the Revolution, and, being citizens, 
the United States could not consider the proposition of 
assigning them over as subjects of another power. ^ 

So far from granting the navigation of the Mississippi, 
Jay was directed to seek an arrangement by which, if Spain 
should capture the Floridas, the United States could share 
the free navigation of the rivers which traversed these prov- 
inces and emptied into the Gulf of Mexico. Americans be- 
lieved that the Mississippi had been planned by the Creator 
as a natural highway for the people of that upper country 
whose extent and fertility had already attracted tlie eye of 
the frontiersmen. They (believed that this country would be 
quickly settled, that there was neither equity nor reason 
in compelling the inhabitants to live without foreign com- 
modities and lose the surplus of their productions, or be 
compelled to transport them over forbidding mountains and 
through an immense wilderness to the sea, particularly when 
at their very door was the most magnificent higliway of the 
continent. ^ Spain maintained that the present generation 
would not want this right of navigation and that future gen- 
erations could well dispose of the question when it should 
become a live one. The king of Spain considered the 
ownership of the Mississippi River far more important to 
his dynasty than the recovery of Gibraltar, and the maxims 
of policy adopted in the management of the Spanish col- 

T Instructions to Jay in Congress, Oct. 4, 1780. Wharton, Vol. 
IV, pp. 78, 79. 

2. Jay to President of Congress, Nov. 6, 1780. Ibid., p. 167. 



Karly Relations with Spain 25 

onies required that only the CastiHan banner should appear 
on the Gulf Waters. ^ But the colonies insisted upon their 
moral and legal right to this outlet. True, it was a question 
which belonged largely to the future, but they were unwil- 
ling to thus hypothecate that future and retard their own 
development. Further, the treaty of alliance of 1778 with 
France, had guaranteed to that country the free navigation 
of the river. European complications, however, forced 
Spain into the contest, not as an ally of the colonies, but 
of France. ^ 

Yet for the accomplishment of the general purposes of 
the war, America became an essential ally. A large part 
of the British naval force was located in American waters, 
engaged in blockading as well as in more active service, and 
the situation demanded all the land force which England 
could command. Spain, however, did not yield to the per- 
sistent representations of France and America until an offer 
of mediation on her part had been curtly rebuffed by the 
British minister. 

Still she constantly refused an alliance with America 
except upon what were felt to be the preposterous terms 
she had already offered, and a small wonder is it that con- 
gress felt that, as the price of a treaty, she was seeking to de- 
spoil an ally. Now that she was actually a party to the war, 
the necessity for a treaty became less urgent, ^or was she not 
at war with England as effectively for her own objects as 
she would be for ours, and why donate to her the valuable 
Mississippi? Doubtless the effect of a Spanish-American 
alliance on England and other nations would be favorable 
to the United States, but the price was exorbitant. Jay 
remarked : "The cession of this navigation will, in my opin- 
ion, render a future war with Spain unavoidable and I shall 



1. Carmichael to Committee on Foreign Affairs, Nov. 28, 1750. 
Wharton, Vol. IV, p. 167. 

2. By secret convention of April 12, 1779, with France. 



26 The Purchase of Florida 

look upon my subscribing to the one as fixing the certainty 
of the other." ^ But Spain proceeded to accomplish by 
force of arms that which she had been unable to secure by 
diplomatic arrangement with the struggling colonists. De- 
clining to recognize any right of the colonies to the Mis- 
sissippi or any land bordering thereon, either to the east or 
west, she found thus a fruitful field for her arms and her 
valor. In January, 1781, an allied Spanish and Indian 
force set out from the town of St. Louis of the Illinois and 
captured the post of St. Joseph. In the name of his Cath- 
olic Majesty they took possession of the tovv^n and surround- 
ing country with impressive formality. Thus had the 
American struggle for liberation become also a Spanish war 
of conquest. The capture of St. Joseph caused ill-concealed 
alarm among the American leaders. Speaking of this con- 
quest, Franklin, in a letter to Livingston, said : "While they 
decline our offered friendship, are they to be suffered to 
encroach on our bounds and shut us up within the Appalach- 
ian Mountains? I begin to fear thev have some such pro- 
ject."2 

Montmorin, writing to Vergennes of a conversation 
with Count de Florida Blanca in 1782. says: 

"I thought right. Monsieur, to report these incidents 
to you, in making you observe the condition of things and 
understand the absolute carelessness, or even repugnance of 
Spain to the establishing the independence of America. If 
it is so marked now, what will it be when Spain succeeds 
in taking Gibraltar? Then the war will have no other 
object than that same independence which she now regards 
with so much indifference, and perhaps fear. 

"I confess. Monsieur, that this idea torments me. Re- 
member, Monsieur, that the system of M. de Florida Blanca 
has always been to make Spain mediator between England 

1. Jay to Congress, Got. 3, 1781. V^Hiarton, Vol. IV, p. 743. 

2. Dated Passy, April 12, 1782. VvTiarton, Vol. V, p. 300. 



Early Relations with Spain 27 

and her colonies. He has followed that system with pertin- 
acity. He has never wished to declare himself openly for 
the United States, and even now he seems to draw himself 
away from them still more. This conduct seems to me to 
announce very evidently the desire that England should 
address herself to Spain to obtain a modification to the inde- 
pendence of America, that will make the sacrifice less 
hard." 1 

In 1 781 when negotiations for peace oetween Great 
Britain and the United States were seriously considered, the 
question of the western boundary of the new nation became 
of paramount importance. Should England retain that por- 
tion of the United States bordering on the Mississippi, as 
it seemed likely that she might, the neighborhood of her 
possessions would be immediately dangerous to our peace. 
Should she also retain Canada and West Florida or even 
Canada alone, by applying herself to the settlement of that 
country and pushing her trade with vigor, a new nursery 
for her marine would be speedily established. 

From the confidence that the western territory lay 
within the United States, the British posts were reduced 
and the American government exercised in that section. 
Large bounties of land had been promised to the already 
discontented and mutinous army, and the couritry was 
furthermore relied on as an important source for discharg- 
ing the debts piled up in eight years of war. By the sur- 
render of this tract to Great Britain a large number of 
people, men, too, not behind their eastern brothers in zeal 
and suffering for the cause of liberty, would be thrown 
back within her power. 

To the absurd and dangerous Spanish proposition that 
the western boundary be a line one mile east of the Missis- 
sippi, the objection was 'made that the only principle which 



1. Madrid, March 30, 1782. Wharton, Vol. V, p. 287. 



28 The Purchase of Florida 

could justify such a limitation, would also justify mu- 
tilations of an immense extent. ^ Deserted by their allies 
and opposed by their enemies, the colonies had much to 
fear from the peace negotiations. England was reluctant 
to acknowledge the independence of her "rebellious sub- 
jects." Spain, at length, reconciled to their freedom, sought 
to circumscribe and weaken them. France, though seek- 
ing their freedom, feared the reconciliation and possible 
future alliance of the old Anglo-Saxon nation with the new, 
and so sought to place the late colonies in a position of 
tutelage to her. Friend and foe alike feared their strength. 
Nor did the subsequent history prove the French and 
Spanish fears to have been without reason. For the Amer- 
ican example in a few short years inspired the French 
Revolution, and pointed out the way to struggling South 
American colonies to emerge from their cruel tyrannies. 
Count de Florida Blanca's fears were not unfounded ; for 
the United States has turned its guns on both the allies of 
its early days. 

As the final date of the peace convention approached 
it became more evident that a determined effort was to be 
made to shut in the new nation by the Appalachian Mountain 
Ranges, and congress adopted a series of instructions to 
guide the American commissioners in their task. 

It was not to the interest of our French allies that an 
amicable treaty, such as would inspire m.utual confidence 
and friendship, should be consummated between England 
and the colonists. Their purpose was to plant such seeds 
of jealousy and discord in the pact as would compel our 
subservience to them. They sought to keep some point 
in contest between America and England, to the end of the 
war, to preclude the possibility of our sooner i-eaching an 
agreement, to keep us employed in the war, to make us 



1. Secret Journal of Foreign Affairs, p. 153. August, 1782. 



Early Relations with Spain 29 

dependent on them for supplies, and, even after the treaty, 
to compel us to look to them for protection and support. 
These considerations inspired France in her purpose to make 
England formidable in our neighborhood, and to leave us as 
few resources of wealth and power as might be consistent 
with our national integrity and independence. ^ 

In a conference between Jay and the Count d'Aranda, 
the Spanish diplomat insisted on two principal objections 
to our right to the Mississippi River. First, tliat the 
western country had never been claimed as belonging to the 
ancient colonies. That previous to the last war (1763) it 
belonged to France and after its cession to England re- 
mained a distinct part of her dominions until by the con- 
quest of West Florida and certain posts on the Mississippi 
and the Illinois rivers, it became vested in Spain by right 
of conquest. Secondly, that, supposing the Spanish right of 
conquest did not extend over all that country, still it was 
possessed by free and independent nations of Indians whose 
lands we could not consider as belonging to us. In accord- 
ance with his views thus expressed, Count d'Aranda sent 
Jay a map with the proposed western boundary line marked 
in red ink. It ran from a lake near the confines of Georgia, 
but east of the Flint River, to the confluence of the Kan- 
awha with the Ohio, thence round the western shores of 
lakes Erie and Huron, and thence round Lake Michigan 
to Lake Superior. ^ 

Jay seems to have been thoroughly convinced from the 
conferences with Count de Vergennes, the French min- 
ister of foreign affairs, and his private secretary, M. de Ray- 
neval, that France would oppose our boundary pretensions, 
that they would oppose our extension to the Mississippi, and 
our claim to the free navigation of that river. They would 
probably support the English claims to all the country above 

1. Letter from Jay, Nov. 17, 1782. "Wharton, Vol. IV, p. 48. 

2. Jay to Livingston, Nov. 17, 1782. V^arton, Vol. VI, pp. 22-23. 



30 The Purchase of Florida 

31° and certainly to all the country north of the Ohio. And 
that in case we refused to divide with Spain in the manner 
proposed, she would aid that country in negotiating for the 
territory she wanted east of the Mississippi and would agree 
that the residue should remain to England. ^ 

The good faith of France in the preliminary negotia- 
tions of 1782 has been a fruitful source of discussion 
among historians, and while the Bourbon dynasty was with- 
out doubt guilty of treachery to America, there is not suf- 
ficient proof to sustain all the suspicions of Jay at this junc- 
ture. La Fayette, while passionately disclaiming any love 
or partiality for Spain, still insisted that she was earnestly 
desirous of maintaining harmony and living in friendship 
and neighborly union with the United States. ^ 

In the final peace provisions Florida was allotted to 
Spain without any remonstrance by the United States. The 
conviction, prevailing as far back as 1777, that the inde- 
pendent sovereignty of the new nation would necessitate 
sooner or later the absorption of Florida and the Mississippi 
valley, may consistently explain why the United States made 
no objection to Florida's going to Spain from whom it could 
be more readily obtained than from England. Time, without 
treaty, so argued Luzerne in a dispatch to Vergennes, will 
in forty years fill the valley of the Mississippi with the pop- 
ulation of the United States and if so there is no use in 
hazarding peace for a stipulation which without being ex- 
pressed is one of the necessities of the future. ^ 

By the final treaty of 1783 the free navigation of the 
Mississippi was given to the United States. The Spanish 
ministry vigorously protested that the navigation of the 
river could not be ceded by the king of England, and that 



1. abetters of Jay to Living-ston, Paris, Nov. 17, 1782. 

2. La Fayette to Livingston, Bordeaux, March 2, 1783. Wharton, 
Tol. IV, p. 269. 

3. Wliarton, Vol. I, p. 358. 



Early Relations with Spain 31 

his cession could have no real force unless the Catholic 
king should think proper to ratify it. This question caused 
an acrimonious discussion, which, not settled until 1795, 
threatened at various times to plunge the two countries into 
war. The Spanish arms, they insisted, had conquered and 
possessed two harbors of the river on the day the treaty 
between Great Britain and the United States was concluded 
— the 30th day of November, 1782 — hence England could 
not dispose of it. ^ 

In the final treaty the southern boundary of the United 
States and the northern boundary of the Floridas was fixed 
at 31°. north latitude. Here were the germs of another 
controversy with Spain. During the British occupation of 
the Floridas the boundary had been 32° 28'. The boundary 
of 31° was based on the charter of Georgia given by George 
II, which he had no right to grant since it embraced terri- 
tory that then belonged to Spain. She refused to evacuate 
that portion of West Florida which lay between 31° and 
32° 28', basing her refusal on the ground that she had driven 
the English out of this province before the treaty of Paris, 
and England had no right to cede lands which belonged to 
Spain by the unquestionable title of conquest. This ques- 
tion, like that of the Mississippi navigation, remained a sub- 
ject of contention for twelve years. 

The American envoys contended that England had the 
undoubted right to fix the line wherever she pleased, the 
provisional articles of her peace with the United States hav- 
ing been signed and also ratified before the signature of the 
Spanish preliminaries in 1783. 

In the treaty with the United States there was a sep- 
arate article as follows : 

"It is hereby understood and agreed that in case Great 
Britain at the conclusion of the present war, shall recover, 

1. Secret Journal of Foreign Affairs, Vol. Ill, p. 517. 



32 The Purchase of Florida 

or be put in possession of West Florida, the line of north 
boundary between the said province and the United States, 
shall be a line drawn from the mouth of the river Yassous 
where it unites with the Mississippi due east, to the river 
Apalachicola." 

Does not this clause raise some question as to the integ- 
rity and sincerity of the two contracting parties? By the 
cession of Florida to Spain, and the independence of the 
United States, the concern of Great Britain with the Flor- 
ida boundaries terminated, and it now becomes a Spanish- 
American issue. 



CHAPTER II. 
TO the; treaty of 1795. 

THE boundaries established by the Proclamation of 1763, 
irregular and manifestly unsatisfactory, were adopted 
by the treaty of Paris which gave us a place in the brother- 
hood of nations. 

The southern boundary, particularly, seemed likely to 
cause grave complications, partly from its irregularity and 
partly from its arbitrariness, for the barrier of an unseen 
and imaginary line is unable to withstand the resistless logic 
of national and racial history. From the Mississippi River 
it followed the 31st degree of latitude to the Chattahoochee 
River, then down that stream to the junction with the Flint; 
thence in a straight line to the source of the St. Mary's 
River and, following that stream, to the Atlantic Ocean. It 
seemed but natural that with the unity, growth and expan- 
sion of the young republic, new boundaries would become 
essential. Spain and England maintained their hostile posi- 
tions on our different sides, vultures poised in the air ready 
to swoop down and devour the carcass of the nation whose 
dissolution seemed imminent. Nor did France seem likely 
to hold back at such a crucial moment. Our representa- 
tions to those countries were met with contempt, our pro- 
tests with mirth, our threats with ridicule. Anarchy raised 
high its head throughout the land. War and a common 
danger had brought union and friendship ; peace and tran- 
quillity proved but the forerunners of a disunion and jeal- 



34 The Purchase of Florida 

ousy whose ravages were scarcely less devastating than 
those of fire and sword. Cold type fails adequately to de- 
scribe the conditions existing in those states which had 
driven from their confines the proud armies of the haughty 
Briton, but could not now cope with the insignificant and 
contemptible rebellions of demagogues, fanatics and whis- 
ky distillers — the aristocracy of the disreputable. On all 
sides the European countries proceeded to acquire by fraud 
and cunning what they had failed to secure by treaty. The 
British still retained the northern line of forts which they 
were pledged to evacuate and even pushed them farther 
south until they were in the region of the present city of 
Cincinnati. 

Spain imitated the example of our northern neighbor. 
Nor were the Spanish claims entirely without merit. She had 
a measure of right to the boundary of 32° 28', for she had 
conquered that, and, even more, had carried her flag to the 
Great Lakes. She occupied and garrisoned the posts of 
Natchez and Walnut Hills. The boundary of 31° had its ori- 
gin in the grant of Carolina by Charles I, but this was then 
understood to be the latitude of the St. John's River. When 
Oglethorpe planted his colony of Georgia he attempted 
to acquire possession of the land down to the St. John's 
River. In 1763 the line between Georgia and Florida was 
fixed at St. Mary's River, and the northern boundary of 
West Florida at 31°. In 1765 a commission to the gov- 
ernor of Georgia extended that province to the Mississippi. 
This jurisdiction was revoked two years later by the terms 
of the commission given to Governor Elliott in which West 
Florida was extended northward to 32° 28'. The region 
north of this was reserved during the period of most exten- 
sive British control for the Muskogee Indians. Thus Spain 
had repudiated the right of England to fix the southern 
boundary of the United States at 31° and proceeded to for- 



To the Treaty of I^QS 35 

tify the Mississippi as far north as the post of New Madrid. 
Chickasaw B'luff (now Memphis) and Walnut Hills (now 
Vicksburg) were included in the zone of Spanish fortifica- 
tions. In June, 1784, at Pensacola, the capital of West 
Florida, a treaty of amity and commerce was concluded be- 
tween the representatives of the Seminole Indians and the 
ofificers of the Spanish government, whereby the subscrib- 
ing savages bound 'themselves and their peoples to obey the 
orders to be communicated from Louisiana and Florida and 
to "expose for the royal service of his Catholic Majesty 
our lives and fortunes," and to give special trade and com- 
mercial rights to the Spanish traders. These Indians were 
mostly domiciled in the territory claimed by both Spain and 
the United States. 

Meanwhile the course of society was moving irresis- 
tibly onward, pushing back the virgin forests and the un- 
tamed savages ; the frontiersman and the pioneer, the fear- 
less scouts of civilization, had crossed the mountains, and 
were beginning to form settlements along the Ohio and its 
tributaries. Though the Alleghenies had not served to dis- 
courage their migration, they presented a formidable barrier 
to any extensive traffic or intercourse between the new 
country and the old, the West and the East, the trans- 
mountain and the seaboard peoples. Their natural outlet 
was in another direction. The Ohio, the Mississippi, and 
the Gulf of Mexico were the successive links in the water- 
way which could furnish them an easy and natural com- 
munication with the outer world. The free navigation of 
the Mississippi they felt to be theirs by moral right, by legal 
right, and by treaty right. Thoroughly inured to the dan- 
gers and hardships of the forests — natural difficulties they 
could tolerate. But of artificial restraint, the dictates of 
treaty, or of law, they were intolerant. Soon restive and 
rebellious under the treatment accorded them by the "down- 



36 The Purchase of Florida 

river Spanish" they began to show them that ill-concealed 
hatred and contempt which had been their heritage from 
the days of Drake and the Armada. 

These Westerners whose life was a constant, bitter and 
terrible struggle with the very elements of nature, were 
in poor frame of mind to respect the dictates of laws and 
treaties which meant only added hardship. Patriotism, 
maintained at the cost of terrible suffering, and stunted by 
injustice and oppression, can never attain the luxurious 
growth of unwavering devotion. And Spain was not slow 
to take advantage of this unrest in our Western country. 
In 1786 and 1787, she was insidiously laboring on our south- 
western border to divert the allegiance of the trans-Alle- 
gheny settlers who had become particularly inflamed over 
a project lately pending before congress, to barter our Mis- 
sissippi rights for certain commercial privileges mainly ad- 
vantageous to the North and East. 

In the spring of 1786, Gardoqui, the Spanish minister, 
wrote to Jay requesting him to lay before the continental 
congress the question of a treaty with Spain which should 
settle the boundary dispute and the claim to the navigation 
of the Mississippi. Jay was informed that his Catholic 
Majesty "will not permit any nation to navigate between the 
two banks belonging to his Majesty." Further, that Spain 
refused to be in any way bound by the western and south- 
ern boundary lines fixed by the treaty of peace between 
England and America. The Spanish minister also requested 
the immediate payment of the principal of the debt con- 
tracted by the United States in Spain during the Revolution, 
warned them of the danger of losing the Spanish trade in 
case no treaty were concluded, and, by way of inducement, 
reminded Jay of the influence of the king of Spain with 
the Barbary powers, which the king might use in the inter- 



To the Treaty of IJQS XI 

ests of America, i£ a satisfactory treaty were secured.^ 
There were many in congress at this time wiUing to make 
a treaty with the CastiHan king, fixing the Florida line at 
32° 28' and these same legislators consented to give Spain 
the full control and navigation of the Mississippi River for 
a period of twenty or thirty years. But the Spanish prop- 
osition of a western boundary line was nowhere viewed 
seriously in this country and we are inclined to doubt if it 
were even in the palaces where it originated. 

But Gardoqui refused in any event to consent to any 
article declaring our right to the Mississippi in express terms 
and stipulating to forbear the use of it for a given time. ^ 
Gardoqui, now cognizant of the secret article of the treaty 
of 1783, although soon willing to drop the contention for 
a cis-Mississippi boundary, insisted upon a treaty giving to 
Spain the line of 32° 28' and the exclusive navigation of the 
Mississippi. Stronger counsels prevailed in congress 
and no agreement was reached. The feeling that a new 
form of government would soon displace the confederation 
caused a suspension of negotiations until the new regime 
had been established. ^ 

Soon after the close of the Revolutionary War, Spain 
began to forward to the United States complaints of the con- 
duct of those Americans who had settled within the Spanish 
lines, or along their borders. There was a suspicion and 
dread of American "conquest by colonization;" nor do the 
fears of the Spanish seem to have been entirely ground- 
less. With a surprising lack of ordinary foresight, Spain 
had issued an invitation to emigrants to settle in her coun- 
try — both in the Floridas and in Louisiana. Further, 



1. Gardoqui to Jay, May 25, 1786. MSS. State Dept., letter No. 
126, Negotiation Book, pp. 26-31. 

2. Jay to Congress, April 11, 1787, letter No. 124, Neg-otiation 
Book, p. 127. 

3. Congressional Resolution, Sept. 16, 1788, letter No. 125, Ne- 
gotiation Book, p. 170. 



38 The Purchase of Florida 

this invitation was a few years later made more attractive; 
one thousand acres of land gratis to every American who 
would remove to West Florida — and four hundred dollars 
for every hundredweight of tobacco which he might raise 
and deliver at New Orleans, exemption from all taxes and 
military service, and extravagant prices for all provisions 
and farm products. These same terms were offered settlers 
upon the western banks of the upper Mississippi. Gen- 
eral John H. Mcintosh, an officer in the Revolutionary army 
and a defender of Sunbury, accepted the invitation and 
occupied land near Jacksonville, and for two years held office 
under the Spanish regime. Then, detected in plots to over- 
throw the Spanish authority, he was sent to Havana and 
imprisoned in Moro Castle. 

Georgia proceeded to entv^r into treaties with the Creek 
Indians for the establishment of a boundary and the pur- 
chase of certain of their lands, without regard either for the 
rights of Spain or the United States. It seems inaccurate 
to dignify by the name of a treaty an agreement made 
between Americans and helpless Indians, amid a scene of 
drunkenness, debauchery and fraud, disgraceful alike to the 
commissioners who were concerned in it, and the state which 
sought to enforce it. The treaty of Galpinton (1785) 
between Georgia and the Creeks was one of this character: 
The Creeks claimed, with justice, that in this and other 
agreements the contracting Indians were either drunk, or 
without power, or induced by fear or fraud. In private 
sales similar methods were pursued. The trader or settler 
meeting a stray Indian indulged with him in a bottle of 
"fire water" and the victim the next day found to his sur- 
prise and indignation that his pale-faced host possessed a 
deed to all his property. Small wonder that the Indians 
complained of all this "pen-and-ink work." Nor did the 
settlers pretend to respect the treaty limits secured even in 



To the Treaty of IJQS 39 

this disreputable manner. General Henderson called back- 
woodsmen in general "a set of scoundrels who scarcely 
believed in God or feared the devil." The tribes, gradually 
yielding to superior force, retreated, followed, or rather 
attended, by those inseparable parasites, Indian traders, a 
species of the white race that has never found a panegyrist 
or deserved one; a crew of whom nothing good has ever 
been said, though a few probably do not deserve the stigma 
which has blackened the name. This swarm of traders with 
its long train of pack-horses and apprentices thus kept pace 
with the slow and uncertain movement of the redskins. 
This constituted the primary stratum of civilization or 
society in that, as in most, sections ; but "civilization" is a 
term which can hardly belong to such a mongrel horde. 

Under the leadership of the astute and diplomatic half- 
breed, McGillivray, the Creeks were disposed to peace, dif- 
ficult as it was to secure. Skillfully arraying interest 
against interest, he sought to husband the strength and 
resources of his peoples, by a strict neutrality without giv- 
ing cause for offense to either neighbor. But the Georgians 
continued their incursions and even the authority of McGil- 
livray was barely sufficient to repress the hostile passions 
of his followers. In 1785, we find that the Georgians had 
made incursions into Florida which congress, by a resolu- 
tion of October 13, 1785, felt called upon to expressly dis- 
avow. Again on the eleventh of September, 1786, a reso- 
lution of congress was passed deprecating "the conduct of 
some people in that state towards the Spaniards," with the 
warning that "such measures will be taken as may prevent 
the like in the future." 

In 1785 the Georgia legislature organized the territory 
lying between their western boundary and the Mississippi 
River, opened the lands for general sale (thus precipitating 
the infamous Yazoo land frauds), and appointed as gov- 



40 The Purchase of Florida 

ernor one Thomas Green. Some of the points comprised 
within these demarcations were fortified and garrisoned by- 
Spanish troops and the greater portion was included within 
the area claimed by the Spanish as conquered by their arms. 
Thomas Green had settled within this disputed territory near 
the fort of the Natchez, in 1782, as a subject of the Span- 
ish king, but he seems to have been clandestinely plotting for 
the subversion of the Spanish rule — another example of 
the familiar "conquest by colonization." Congress replied 
to the representations of Gardoqui by asserting that, though 
they claimed and insisted on their title to this territory in 
question,, yet they disavowed the act of the state. ^ Georgia 
and the Carolinas, together with their western territories, 
were undoubtedly full of adventurers constantly conspiring 
against Florida and neighboring Spanish possessions. 

Secretary Knox, in his letters and reports to congress, 
is repeatedly led to speak of "the most unprovoked and 
direct outrages" against the Indians of the South "dictated 
by the avaricious desire of obtaining the fertile lands possess- 
ed by the said Indians." Colonel Sevier figures as the leader 
of many expeditions against the Spanish and Indians whom 
he slaughtered without discrimination of age or sex. A 
bloody page of our history, these avaricious and unprincipled 
men were writing. Whole villages were put to the torch 
and their inhc^bitants either forced to flee to the forests, there 
to experience the horrors of starvation and exposure, or to 
be more mercifully offered up as sacrifices to the white man's 
cruelty and greed. Yet the Indians seem to have honestly 
sought a treaty of peace with the United States, full well 
realizing that any armed resistance on their part must mean 
national or tribal extermination. - The patriotic American 
must feel the flush of shame as he reads of the most 



1. Gardoqui to Congress, Sept. 23, 1785, letter No. 12,5, Negotia- 
tion Book, pp. 23-25. 

2. Letter No. 150, MSS. State Dept. 3, pp. 405-407. 



To the Treaty of 1 7 95 4i 

cruel, unwarranted and blood-thirsty manner in which 
peaceable Indians were murdered in their fields and robbed 
of their lands. ^ 

The settlers robbed the Indians, avoided war with them 
by a treaty, and then, directly violating the treaty, seized more 
lands. At times they sought to provoke the Indians to 
a general war that they might thus deprive them of all their 
lands. In such a condition of affairs it is not surprising that 
many innocent settlers on both sides of the Florida line 
were pillaged by the lawless element of both Indians and 
whites, nor is it surprising that many negro slaves took 
advantage of the opportunity to escape to the Spanish ter- 
ritories and thereby add another element of ill feeling and 
hostility to that already engendered. 

The Articles of Confederation did not grant power to 
congress to control Indian tribes in the limits of any state. 
Therefore the United States was unable to interfere in the 
dispute between Georgia and the Indians, for though the 
Creeks were an independent nation, they were within the 
boundaries over which the state of Georgia exercised leg- 
islative control. Secretary Knox recommended that con- 
gress persuade Georgia and North Carolina to cede their 
western lands to the United States, for thus the affair 
with the Creeks, Choctaws, Chickasaws, and Cherokees 
would become national and the United States could enforce 
the treaties which the Indians claimed had been violated.^ 
Small wonder is it that these Indians thus harried and pil- 
laged should turn to the Spanish for counsel and assistance. 
The settlers could scarcely have been unaware that the cer- 
tain consequence of their lawless outrages would be a ter- 
rible carnage on their frontier. To them, Indians were 
without rights and might be killed as indifferently as veno- 
mous snakes. 



1. Letter No. 150, MSS. State Dept. 3, pp. 349, 362 and 373. 

2. MS'S. State Dept, letter No. 151, pp. 275-282. 



42 The Purchase of Florida 

Constant rumors reached the sensitive ear of the ready 
Gardoqui, that plots and counterplots were being hatched 
against the Spanish territories to the south and west. In 
1787 a letter from one John Sullivan, a deserter from the 
American Revolution, and an ordinary example of crank 
and soldier of fortune, aroused the fears of the Spanish 
minister who brought the matter to the attention of con- 
gress. The letter was an open one, published in a southern 
paper of that year, and was written in the bombastic style 
which easily betrayed the character of the author. He had 
doubtless heard something of an anti-Spanish expedition 
and, with the self-conceit and importance of the harmlessly 
insane, had made himself a constituted organizer and leader 
of "this host of Myrmidons" who, as an "overwhelming 
inundation," were preparing "to pour down along the waters 
of the Mississippi into the Bay of Mexico." ^ Further 
complaints were made of sinister meetings at North Fort 
in North Carolina, for the purpose of conspiring against 
New Orleans and the Mississippi. ^ While Gardoqui was 
often misled by vague rumors, the spirit of the Western 
settlers was such that hostile expeditions were without doubt 
secretly planned and openly threatened. 

The reports that congress intended to barter away 
the rights of the United States to the Mississippi tended to 
increase the hostility of the Westerners and incite them to 
seek their own salvation by the strong arm. In 1787 and 
1788, Kentucky openly proposed to declare her indepen- 
dence not alone of Virginia but also of the United States, 
which had shown such an utter contempt for her rights and 
interests. Spanish agents were at work sowing seeds of 
discontent but at no time did the Kentuckians turn a will- 
ing ear to the Castilian blandishments. Unfettered by 
diplomatic and treaty restraints, Kentucky felt that, inde- 

1. Letter No. 125, Negotiation Book, pp. 146, 14S, 154. 

2. IMd., p. 171. 



To the Treaty of IJQS 43 

pendent, she could more easily accomplish her purpose of 
securing New Orleans and the Mississippi River, and so the 
Spanish appeals and manifestos fell upon barren soil. The 
vicious public-land system then in vogue did much to ren- 
der intolerable the position of the Western settlers. The 
method of selling those domains to land and settlement com- 
panies had little to recommend it, for the lands were held 
at a forbidding figure. They should have been given to 
settlers for homestead claims after the manner of later years. 
This would have encouraged emigrants to settle between the 
Mississippi and the Wabash and by increasing their num- 
bers would have made more difficult the machinations of 
the Spanish on the south and west, and the English on the 
north. 1 

Couriers from the Western settlements brought such 
disquieting reports that in the fall of 1787 the secretary of 
war addressed instructions to General Harmar, comman- 
dant on the frontiers, directing him to ascertain what plots, 
if any, were being formed, the number, names and char- 
acter of the participants, their equipment and armament, 
their object, and, if necessary, to employ force to repress 
any hostilities. After an investigation General Harmar re- 
ported that no plot hostile to any foreign nation had been 
discovered. ^ 

Jay, the secretary of foreign affairs, seems to have 
more thoroughly grasped the true situation and appreciated 
the necessity for a treaty with Spain which would remove 
all points of dispute. He sought to impress upon his fel- 
low officials the fact that Spain would be our best country 
for trade and that the United States had much to hope for 
from that country in a commercial treaty. Further, he 
appreciated the fact that France and Spain were on friendly 
terms through marriage alliances, that in case of a Spanish- 

1. (Letter No. 150, MSS. State Dept. 3, p. 519. 

2. Letter No. 125, Negotiation Book, pp. 163-168. 



44 The Purchase of Florida 

American rupture France would assist her Bourbon neigh- 
bor and not us ; and that the Spanish influence with the 
Barbary powers was of no small moment. In an address 
to congress, August 3, 1786, he declared, "We shall, I think, 
either find her in America a very convenient neighbor or a 
very troublesome one." To all of Jay's representations 
Gardoqui's concluding answer was that his king would 
never consent to any compromise on the question of the 
Mississippi River : that it was a maxim of Spanish policy to 
exclude all mankind from their American shores. Jay in- 
sisted that the adjacent country was fast filling with people 
and that the time must surely come when they would not 
peaceably submit to being denied the use of the natural 
highway to the sea. Gardoqui replied that that question 
could be diplomatically adjusted at such future time as it 
might arise, for, at most, it was a remote and highly im- 
probable contingency, as, in his mind, the rapid settle- 
ment of that country would be so injurious to the older 
states that they would find it necessary to check it. 

Appreciating the advantages to be gained by a treaty, 
and, feeling that the Mississippi navigation was not of pres- 
ent importance, a forbearance to use it, while we did not 
desire or need it, could be no great sacrifice. Jay advocated 
a treaty limited to twenty-five or thirty years, the United 
States giving up the river for that period. Spain excluded 
the subjects of the United States from the river and held 
it with a strong hand ; she refused to yield it peaceably and 
therefore it could be secured only by an appeal to the arbit- 
rament of war. But the United States were unprepared for 
war with any power and many of the eastern and northern 
states would have refused to supply troops at that time 
for the purpose of securing a right which they felt in no 
way concerned them. Thus Spain would continue to ex- 
clude us from the river. Would it not then be best to con- 



To the Treaty of IJQS 45 

sent, and for a valuable consideration, to forbear to use 
what it was not in our power to use, at any rate? From 
the temper manifested in many of the papers published in 
the Western country it was apparent that the United States 
must shortly decide either to wage war with Spain or settle 
all differences with her by a treaty on the best terms in 
their power. 

To quote Jay in his able presentation of the case: 
"If Spain and the United States should part on this 
point, what are the latter to do? Will it, after that, be 
consistent with their dignity to permit Spain forcibly to 
exclude them from a right which at the expense of a bene- 
ficial treaty they have asserted? They will find themselves 
obliged either to do this and be humiliated or they must 
attack Spain. Are they ripe and prepared for this ? I wish 

I could say they are Not being prepared for war I think 

it to our interest to avoid placing ourselves in such a sit- 
uation as that our forbearing hostilities may expose us to 
indignities. It is much to be wished that all these matters 
had lain dormant for years yet to come, but such wishes are 
vain — these disputes are agitating — they press themselves 
upon us, and must terminate in accommodation, or war, or 
disgrace. The last is the worst that can happen, the sec- 
ond, we are unprepared for, and therefore our attention and 
endeavors should be bent to the first." 

If we should not secure the treaty, 

"The Mississippi would continue shut — France would 
tell us our claim to it was ill-founded. The Spanish 
posts on its banks and even those out in Florida, in 
our country, would be strengthened, and that nation 
would bid us defiance with impunity, at least until the 
American nation shall become more really and truly 
a nation, than it at present is, for, unblessed with an efficient 
government, destitute of funds and without public credit 



46 The Purchase of Florida 

either at home or abroad, we should be obliged to wait in 
patience for better times or plunge into an unpopular and 
dangerous war with very little prospect of terminating it 
by a peace either advantageous or glorious."^ 

In Jay's report to congress the following year the same 
subject is discussed at length. ^ He says: 

"Your secretary is convinced that the United States 
have good right to navigate the river from its source to 
and through its mouth and, unless an accommodation should 
take place, that the dignity of the United States and their 
duty to assert and maintain their rights, will render it 
proper for them to present a memorial and remonstrance 
to his Catholic Majesty insisting on their right, complain- 
ing of its being violated and demanding in a temperate, 
inoffensive, but at the same time in a firm and decided man- 
ner, that his Majesty do cease in future to hinder their 
citizens from freely navigating that river through the part 
of its course in question. Your secretary is further of 
opinion that in case of refusal it will be proper for the 
United States then to declare war against Spain. There 
being no respectable middle way but peace and war, it will 
be expedient to prepare without delay for one or the other : 
for circumstances which call for decision seem daily to 
accumulate. 

"With respect to prescribing a line of conduct to our 
citizens on the banks of the river our secretary is embar- 
rassed. If war is in expectation then their ardor should not 
be discouraged, nor their indignation diminished, but if a 
treaty is wished and contemplated, then those people should 
be so advised and so restrained as that their sentiments 
and conduct may as much as possible be made to quadrate 
with the terms and articles of it He (your secretary) 

1. Jay in a speech to congress, Aug. 12, 1787, Letter No. 125, 
Negotiation Book, pp. 40-56. 

2. April 12, 1787. 



To the Treaty of IJQS 47 

also takes the liberty of observing that a treaty disagreeable 
to one-half of the nation had better not be made, for it 
would be violated — ■ and that a war disliked by the other 
half would promise but little success, especially under a 
government so greatly influenced and affected by popular 
opinion." 

Spain absolutely declined to make a treaty for a lim- 
ited period or one which in any manner recognized any 
right or claim of the United States to the Mississippi River. 
Thus the question remained no nearer a solution — though 
demanding immediate arrangement — at the installation of 
the federal government and inauguration of Washington. 

In the meantime Spanish authorities were actively en- 
gaged in stirring up the spirit of unrest in the West. They 
promised the free navigation of the Mississippi in return 
for the acceptance of Spanish sovereignty by Kentucky and 
the Tennessee and the Cumberland settlements. 

The Westerners were gravely impressed with the effec- 
tiveness of the mountain barrier dividing them from the 
coast states. Scarcely were they to be blamed if loyalty to 
the Union rested lightly with them, and even if a strong 
separatist feeling prevailed. The value of the Union to 
them was measured only by the scale of its efficiency in pro- 
tecting them from the Indians and securing them the Mis- 
sissippi. A rope of sand, what protection could the con- 
federation offer, to win support or inspire respect? For the 
type of life displayed on the seaboard the frontiersman had 
little sympathy and less regard. To the "fierce inhabitants 
of the West" there was little love for a government that 
levied taxes without giving return, whose seat of power 
was an impossible two months' journey, and whose posts 
of honor and influence were monopolized by the self-seek- 
ing politicians of the effeminate East. 

The thirteen states as independent bodies were con-r 



48 The Purchase of Florida 

sidering the question of ratifying the constitution. The 
Western settlements quite naturally were inclined to decide 
their own allegiance at the same time and by the same 
manner. Some favored complete independence, some would 
have willingly returned to England. Some were desirous 
of connecting themselves with Spain — for that meant New 
Orleans and the world beyond. With true human instinct 
they balanced rewards and penalties. Yet as a whole they 
preferred the Union, 

General Wilkinson, Judge Sebastian, Colonel Sevier, 
the redoubtable George Rogers Clark, and even the hon- 
ored Robertson showed distinct Spanish proclivities, and 
went so far as to accept pensions, or douceurs, from Spain 
for their support. Daniel Boone, still the forerunner of civ- 
ilization, growing restless under the approaching tide of 
humanity, pushed across the upper Mississippi, and in a 
newer and wilder region became a Spanish official. New 
Madrid was settled by Americans, colonists accepting the 
sovereignty of Spain. 

The defeat of the Spanish intrigues in the West was 
really compassed — though Spain did not and could not 
realize it until later years — when the new constitution 
was ratified, and a strong power was substituted for what 
out of generous charity we may call the government of 
the confederation. As the United States grew stronger, 
Spain, weakened by the French Revolution and the Na- 
poleonic wars, gradually lost her former prestige and could 
hope to gain only through intrigue that which had been 
denied her arms. Instead of Spain annexing portions of 
the United States, this country took advantage of Spain's 
weakness and forced from her one after another of her 
fairest provinces. 

Foreign emissaries in this country were firmly con- 
vinced that the politics of the Western communities were 



To the Treaty of 1 795 49 

rapidly approaching a crisis, and could terminate only in 
an appeal either to Spain or England, who were playing 
their analogous parts on our unstable frontiers. It seemed 
probable that an independent confederacy under the pro- 
tection of some European power might be the outcome of 
the needs of the West and the impotency of the East. 
Jefferson grasped the true inwardness of the situation when 
he insisted that we must either reconcile ourselves to the 
loss of the West or wrest what we needed from Spain. 

Troubles along the southern border between the Creeks 
and white settlers increased and war seemed the probable 
outcome. Washington, soon after assuming ofiQce, ap- 
pointed commissioners to treat with the Indians and fix a 
satisfactory boundary line — one that might insure peace 
and tranquillity in that section. But the mission was a 
failure, as had been the previous one constituted during the 
period of confederation. As a last resort Washington 
determined upon a personal interview with McGillivray the 
Creek chief, who in June, 1790, set out for New York City, 
at the head of thirty Indian chiefs. On the road these 
aborigines were greeted with continuous and enthusiastic 
ovations and their reception at the temporary capital partook 
of the homage generally paid those of distinguished rank 
and birth. New York City on the day of their arrival 
presented a gala appearance. Tammany Hall, even then a 
powerful and historic institution, turned out in full regalia, 
and the national congress in a body waited on the visitors, 
by this time thoroughly impressed with the warmth and 
sincerity of their reception. A treaty was negotiated by 
which the Oconee lands — which had been the principal 
ground of dispute — were ceded for an annual payment of 
$1,500 and a distribution of merchandise. The question of 
tKDundary was settled, at least until the whites should desire 
more — the Indians had not then learned the futility and 



50 The Purchase of Florida 

faithlessness of treaties — the Indian territory was guar- 
anteed against further encroachment — a hollow mockery. 
A permanent peace was provided for. The Creeks and 
Seminoles placed themselves under the jurisdiction of the 
United States and renounced their right to make treaties 
with any other nation. Such was the open treaty. 

Then a secret treaty was negotiated between McGilliv- 
ray and the United States which stipulated that after two 
years the Indian trade should be turned to points in the Unit- 
ed States — clearly a violation of certain articles in the Span- 
ish-Indian treaty of a few years before. McGillivray was 
appointed Indian agent of the United States and, in imitation 
of continental methods, was given the rank of brigadier 
general, with annual pay of $1,200. The treaty was bitterly 
criticised and the Indian chief was much maligned for his 
part in it. The Indians claimed that their choicest lands 
had been surrendered for an inadequate consideration ; yet 
the only alternative was a war in which the Creeks must 
have been crushed. Further the United States was pledged 
to keep the Indian territory inviolate — history had not then 
shown how little that meant. The treaty was manifestly 
unfavorable to the Spanish, and in violation of rights which 
they had secured in 1784. Nor would they quietly submit 
to the loss of the Indian trade and consequent bankruptcy of 
the trading house of Panton and Company, the chief proprie- 
tors of Spanish sovereignty in those parts. Spanish emis- 
saries increased the dissatisfaction of the Indians who 
sullenly determined to oppose the running of this new 
boundary against which even McGillivray had protested at 
New York, insisting that he could not guarantee it. This 
Indian chief has been greatly berated for his trickery and 
double dealing but his course seems to have been the only 
one possible, for by thus balancing America against Spain 
and avoiding war v/ith either nation he prevented the extinc- 



To the Treaty of IJQS 5^ 

tion of his tribe. His was a hard task and that his tribe 
continued to exist from year to year was his vindication. 

General WilHam Augustus Bowles, an American 
deserter of the Revolutionary army, with the aid of a band 
of adventurous settlers and disaffected Indians, whom he 
had won by fair promises of unlimited booty, in 1789 
made an abortive attempt to capture Florida from the 
Spanish. Such incursions across the borders — at this time 
quite the order of the day — served only to increase the 
general disorder and bitterness of feeling already existing 
in that section. Settler pitted against Spaniard in an effort 
to win the Indian favor; mercenary speculators grasping 
after Indian territory ; and Spanish intrigue — the only sub- 
stitute for the force of the Americans — stimulating savage 
passions. Small wonder that shocking atrocities were 
committed. The federal government was doubtless sincere 
in its wish to secure the establishment of well-defined bound- 
aries, the protection of the frontier, and peace among the 
southern tribes. 

The treaty of 1790 in New York ignored the Geor- 
gian treaties and thus (bitterly incensed the Georgia 
settlers. Owing to the "double dealing" of the chief, Mc- 
Gillivray, the freebooting settlement of General Elijah 
Clarke, seeking every opportunity to overthrow the Florida 
government, the intrigues of the trading house of Panton 
and the Spanish emissaries, and the indignation of the 
Georgians at the manner in which their wishes had been 
disregarded and overruled, the stipulations of the New 
York treaty were never carried out ; and the horrors of a 
border warfare loomed darkly over the southern horizon. 
Secretary Knox in a report to Congress had insisted that 
an expedition against the Creeks would require a force of 
twenty-eight thousand men and the cost of such an expedi- 
tion would be at least $450,000. He had a profound respect 
for the fighting qualities of the Creeks and in comparing 



52 The Purchase of Florida 

them with the Wabash tribe, said they "are not only greatly 
superior in numbers but are more united, better regulated 
and headed by a man whose talents appear to have fixed him 
in their confidence." ^ 

Immediately after the inauguration of the new govern- 
ment the question of a Spanish treaty was taken up by the 
department of state with the determination to push it to a 
successful issue. Realizing the intimate relations between 
the courts of France and Spain, Jefferson sought to secure 
the French support. Accordingly Jefferson instructed Wil- 
liam Short, our minister to France, to secure the assistance 
of La Fayette and M. de Montmorin at the court of Spain, 
and impress upon them "the necessity, not only of our 
having a port near the mouth of the Mississippi River 
(without which we could make no use of the navigation at 
all) but of its being so well separated from the territories of 
Spain and her jurisdiction as not to engender daily disputes 
and broils between us." For, continues Jefferson, 

"It is certain that if Spain were to retain any jurisdic- 
tion over our entrepot, her officers would abuse that juris- 
diction and our people would abuse their privileges in it : both 
parties must foresee this and that it will end in war : hence 
the separation. Nature has decided what shall be the geo- 
graphy of that in the end, whatever it might be in the 
beginning, by cutting off from the adjacent countries of 
Florida and Louisiana, and enclosing between two of its 
channels a long and narrow slip of land called the Island of 
New Orleans. The idea of ceding this could not be haz- 
arded to Spain in the first step : it would be too disagreeable 
at first view, because this island with its town constitutes 
at present their principal settlement in that part of their 
dominions, containing about ten thousand white inhabitants 
of every age, and sex: reason and events however, may by 



1. Letter No. 151, MSS. State Dept., p. 359. 



To the Treaty of IJQS 53 

little and little, familiarize them to it. That we have a right 
to some spot as an entrepot, for our commerce may be at 
once affirmed — the expediency too may be expressed of so 
locating it as to cut off the source of future quarrels and 
wars. A disinterested eye looking on a map will remark 
how conveniently this tongue of land is formed for the 
purpose : the Iberville and Amit channel offering a good 
boundary and convenient outlet on the side for Florida and 
the main channel an equally good boundary and outlet on 
the other side for Louisiana : while the slip of land between 
is almost entirely morass or sand bank : the whole of it lower 
than the water of the river in its highest floods : and only its 
western margin (which is the highest ground) secured by 
banks and inhabited : I suppose this idea is too much even 
for the Count de Montmorin at first, and that therefore you 
will find it only in general terms a port near the mouth of 
the river with a circumjacent territory sufficient for its sup- 
port, well defined, and extraterritorial to Spain, leaving the 
idea to future growth." 

In 1790 the probability of a war between England and 
Spain presented a favorable opportunity for pressing our 
claims at the Castilian ccfurt. In a special set of instruc- 
tions, Mr. Carmichael, our minister to Spain, was directed 
in meeting the Spanish secretary to 

"Impress him thoroughly with the necessity of an im- 
mediate settlement of this matter and of a return to the field 
of negotiation for this purpose : and though it must be done 
delicately yet he must be made to understand unequivocally 
that a resumption of the negotiation is not desired on our 
part, unless he can determine in the first opening of it to 
yield the immediate and full enjoyment of that navigation. 
. . . There is danger indeed that even the unavoidable delay 
of sending a negotiator here may render the mission too 
late for the preservation of peace : it is impossible to answer 
for the forbearance of our Western citizens. We endeavor 



54 The Purchase of Florida 

to quiet them with the expectation of an attainment of their 
rights by peaceable means, but should they in a moment of 
impatience, hazard others, there is no saying how far we 
may be led : for neither themselves nor their rights will ever 
be abandoned by us. But should an accommodation take 
place, we retain indeed the same object and the same resolu- 
tions unalterably : but your discretion will suggest that, in 
that event, they must be pressed more softly and that patience 
and persuasion must temper your conferences till either these 
may prevail, or some other circumstance turn up which may 
enable us to use other means for the attainment of an object 
which we are determined in the end to obtain at every 
risk."i 

Owing to the prospect of an English-Spanish war it 
seemed likely that Great Britain would seize New Orleans. 
To England, Jefferson directed John Adams to intimate that 
we could not look with indifference upon the acquisition by 
that nation of Louisiana and Florida, for, he declared, "a 
due balance on our borders is not less desirous to us than a 
balance of power in Europe has always appeared to them." 
He insisted to Washington that rather than see Louisiana 
and Florida added to the British Empire, the United States 
should join actively in the general war then supposed to be 
pending. Circumstances, however, did not take the favorable 
turn hoped for and nothing came of this attempt at arbitra- 
tion. But at home matters rapidly assumed serious propor- 
tions. The Western settlers became more and more restive 
and inclined to replace the rules of international law with 
the judgment of force, while in the South the lawless element 
held high carnival : and complaints were constantly made by 
Spanish and American officials of frequent and wanton 
violations of territory. ^ War seemed imminent. In 

1. Letter No. 121, Foreign Letters, p. 376. Jefferson to Carmich- 
sel, Aug. 2, 17'90. Treecott's Diplomacy of Washington and Adams's 
Terms, p. 226. 

2. Carondolet, writing of the settlements beyond the Allegheniee 



To the Treaty of IJQS 55 

1791 statements persistently appeared in the newspapers 
that hostilities between the United States and Spain were 
inevitable, and that preparations for a resort to force were 
being made by both nations. These reports were given full 
credit abroad. ^ 

Spanish officials continued to guard the Mississippi 
River, imprison all Americans captured thereon, and confis- 
cate their goods. Each seizure added another element of 
danger to the situation already felt to be most critical. 
Jefferson fully appreciated the acuteness of the situation, 
and directed Carmichael to push negotiations to a deter- 
mination. "An accident at this day," he wrote, "would 
put further parley beyond our power : yet to such accidents 
we are every day exposed by the irregularities of their 
officers and the impatience of our citizens. Should any 
spark kindle these dispositions of our borders into a flame, 
we are involved beyond recall by the eternal principles of 
justice to our citizens, whom we will never abandon. In 



declared: "This vast restless population, progressively driving the 
Indian tribes before them and upon us, seek to possess themselves 
of all the extensive regions which the Indians occupy — at the same 
time that they menacingly ask for the free navigation of the Missis- 
sippi. If they achieve their object, their ambitions would not be 
confined to this side of the Mississippi. Their writings, public papers, 
and speeches all turn on this point, the free navigation of the Gulf 
by the rivers .... which empty into it, the rich fur trade of the Mis- 
souri, and in time the possession of the rich mines of the interior pro- 
vinces of the very kingdom of Mexico. Their modes of growth, and 

their policy are as formidable for Spain as their armies Their 

roving spirit and the readiness with which they procure sustenance 
and shelter facilitate rapid settlement. A rifle and a little corn meal 
in a bag are enough for an American wandering alone in the woods 
for a month. .... With logs crossed upon each other he makes a 

house and even an impregnable fort against the Indians Cold 

does not terrify him and when a family wearies of one place, it moves 
to another and settles there with the same ease. If such men come 
to occupy the banks of the Mississippi and Missouri, or secure their 
navigation, doubtless nothing will prevent them from crossing and! 
penetrating into our provinces on the other side, which being to a 
great extent unoccupied, can oppose no resistance." 

1. Short to Jefferson, July 24, 1791. Vol. I, Instructions, MSS. 
State Dept., p. 101. 



^6 The Purchase of Florida 

such an event Spain cannot possibly gain, and what may 
she not lose ?" ^ 

M. Gardoqui, the Spanish envoy, was impressed with 
what he felt to be the local aspect of the Mississippi question 
and so reported to the court of Madrid. The navigation 
of the Mississippi, he felt, was only demanded to pacify the 
Western settlers and that the eastern or maritime states 
were not only indifferent but probably even hostile to the 
idea. While to a limited extent this had been the feeling, 
it had given way to a strong sentiment in favor of securing 
our demands in that quarter even at the cost of war. The 
Spanish court was more likely to trust the reports of Gar- 
doqui, who had now returned home, than the representations 
of the American minister, whose interests demanded that 
this behef be completely eradicated. "The very persons to 
whom M. Gardoqui alluded are now come over to the opinion 
heartily that the navigation of the Mississippi in full and 
unrestrained freedom is indispensably necessary and must 
be obtained by any means it may call for." 

In the light of a hundred years Jefferson's argument 
for persuading Spain to cede New Orleans and Florida and 
grant us the navigation of the Mississippi shades on the 
humorous. As a neighbor, he declared, the United States 
wrould be safer for Spain than would England, for conquest 
was inconsistent with our principles of government and our 
theories of right. Further it would not be to our interest 
for ages to come, to cross the Mississippi or maintain a 
connection with those who should. 

But nothing more, worthy of record, was done until 
the administration received an intimation from the Spanish 
government that it would resume negotiations at Madrid. 
War clouds were lowering over Europe. The wild excesses 
of revolution and anarchy had awakened the continent. 



1. Vol. I, Instructions, p. '26. Jefferson to Carmichael, April 11, 
1791. 



To the Treaty of IjgS ^7 

Peace a'broad was necessary that the nations might suppress 
resistance at home. Washington in December, 1791, nomin- 
ated Carmichael, then charge d'affaires in Spain, and Mr. 
Short, then charge in France, commissioners plenipoten- 
tiary to negotiate and conclude a treaty with Spain. The 
question of the Florida boundary and the navigation of the 
Mississippi were to be settled. In addition the treaty should 
provide for certain commercial advantages in the Spanish- 
American possessions. The commissioners were instructed 
along the lines already developed, but were cautioned that 
the treaty should neither expressly nor by implication con- 
cede any claim of Spain to the Mississippi : that this should 
be taken as a right and not as a grant from Spain : neither 
should any compensation be given for the navigation. If 
this was insisted on, it should be set off by the duties already 
paid at New Orleans and the claims for the detention of 
American shipping at that port. The commissioners did not 
meet at Madrid for a full year after their appointment. 

At that time history was being made with incredible 
rapidity. The French, mad with the enthusiasm of liberty 
and license, and particularly hostile to the reigning houses 
of Europe, had started on their mission of carrying freedom 
to the oppressed and founding republics in all lands. As a 
likely field for this work the Spanish-American possessions 
did not long escape their attention and, further, had not 
Spain invited their loss by uniting with legitimate Europe 
to overthrow republican France? It came to the ears of 
Jefferson that France proposed to send a strong force early 
in the spring of 1793 to offer independence to the Spanish- 
American colonies beginning with those bordering on the 
Mississippi. To prevent any hostile feeling or demonstra- 
tion on the part of the United States, she did not object to 
an arrangement by which the Spanish holdings on the east 
side of that river should be received into our confederation. 



^8 The Purchase of Florida 

"Interesting considerations," writes Jefferson to Carmichael 
and Short, "require that we should keep ourselves free to 
act in this case according to circumstances, and consequently 
that you should not by any clause of treaty bind us to guar- 
antee any of the Spanish colonies against their own inde- 
pendence nor indeed against any other nation. For when 
we thought we might guarantee Louisiana on their ceding 
Florida to us, we apprehended it would be seized by Great 
Britain, who would thus completely encircle us with her 
colonies and fleets. This danger is now removed by the 
concert between Great Britain and Spain and the times will 
soon enough give independence and consequent free com- 
merce to our neighbors, without our risking the involving 
ourselves in a war for them." ^ For Louisiana or the Floridas 
to fall into the possession of hostile England, it had been 
felt, would be ample ground for actual intervention on the 
part of the United States. In the hands of decadent and 
paralytic Spain it was thought that in time they would 
certainly gravitate into American possessions. 

The commissioners met at Madrid about the first of 
February, 1793, but in the kaleidoscopic change of events 
circumstances were now vastly different from those which 
had induced their appointment. The ministerial power of 
Spain which had been transferred from Count d'Aranda, 
had again been shifted, and was now held by Godoy, the 
notorious libertine and paramour of the Spanish queen. 
The difficulty between England and Spain was settled and 
had been superseded by most friendly relations. The concil- 
iatory attitude which Godoy had adopted towards France in 
the hope of saving the unfortunate King Louis was rudely 
destroyed by his decapitation. This change was soon fol- 
lowed by a French declaration of war against Spain, and 



1. Vol. I, Instructions, p. 260. Jefferson to Carmichael and Sliort, 
March 23, 1793. 



To the Treaty of IjgS 59 

the American commissioners were thus deprived of the 
support upon which they had fondly relied from the only 
power in Europe able and willing to facilitate the negotia- 
tions. Even worse, the inevitable tendency of events led to 
an alliance between Spain and the combined enemies of 
France at whose head stood, hated and hating, England. 
The relations between England and the United States were 
most unfriendly and, at this very period, war between these 
two countries was considered imminent. Spain quickly con- 
cluded an alliance offensive and defensive with England, 
whose terms fully covered any contingency of hostilities with 
the United States. The commissioners realizing the unfor- 
tunate state of affairs wrote to Jefferson : "We cannot help 
considering it unfortunate that an express commission 
should have been sent to treat here." Surely circumstances 
had not conspired to give any hope of success. 

Gardoqui, late Spanish minister to the United States, 
was appointed to conduct the negotiations. While here he had 
been thoroughly impressed with our weakness and the divid- 
ed feeling on the Mississippi question, and was impervious to 
all arguments. The commissioners wisely determined not 
to press their case, and found this course quite agreeable to 
the ever dilatory and procrastinating policy of Spain. In- 
structions from Philadelphia directed them to proceed. They 
managed to reach Godoy but were unable to make any 
headway on the main points of their mission. They laid 
before him, however, certain complaints on the Spanish 
interference with the Indians along the southern border, 
and secured his promise, of whatever value they might 
have considered this, that Spain would not interfere in case 
the United States should declare war against the refractory 
redskins. Continued failure induced the dissolution of the 
commission, and Carmichael took his departure leaving 
Short at Madrid credited as charge. He found much 



6o The Purchase of Florida 

difficulty in being either received or acknowledged, even in 
that capacity. 

In the meantime the troublesome and autocratic Genet 
had landed in America and was proceeding in that auto- 
cratic and insulting course which ended in the demand for 
his recall. Taking every advantage of the popular enthus- 
iasm then existing in favor of the French cause, he pro- 
ceeded in defiance of international law and American sove- 
reignty to fit out privateers and enlist volunteers for the 
French service. The French government had imposed upon 
him the double character of accredited diplomat and revolu- 
tionary propagandist. Intrigue in Kentucky and the South, 
and the conquest of Louisiana were the prime objects of his 
mission — a point generally ignored in the treatment of this 
interesting character and his turbulent career in the United 
States. Arriving at Charleston in April, 1793, he energeti- 
cally set about his prescribed tasks. 

Ignoring Washington's proclamation of neutrality. 
Genet carried things with a high hand, confident of his 
success in an appeal to the people, if that became necessary. 
He approached Jefferson who, forbidding any attempt to 
involve American citizens, expressed indifference as to what 
insurrections might be excited in Louisiana, and even 
declared that a little spontaneous invasion would promote 
the interests of the United States. 'Expecting that America 
would soon be at war with Spain, our secretary of state may 
have deemed it wise not to cut himself off from an acquain- 
tance with Genet's designs against the Spanish colonies, 
particularly since the movement was represented as nothing 
more than a plan to give independence to Louisiana. 

Genet had two anti-Spanish projects on foot, one for a 
military expedition, to be organized in South Carolina and 
to rendezvous in Georgia, for the invasion of Florida, the 
other for a like expedition against New Orleans and Louis- 



To the Treaty of IJQS ^i 

iana, to be set on foot in Kentucky. French emissaries were 
freely employed, and for the Florida enterprise Governor 
Moultrie of South Carolina, General Elijah Clarke of Geor- 
gia, Samuel Hammond, and William Tate, all men of honor 
and standing in the South were speedily enlisted. The 
expedition under the command of General Clarke, according 
to the prospectus, was to be supported by the French fleet. 

Plans for the conquest of Louisiana had been presented 
to the French authorities when the relations between France 
and Spain became strained, after the outbreak of the French 
Revolution, but the plan of expedition here attempted seems 
to have been proposed by George Rogers Clark, who had 
distinguished himself during our Revolutionary war by the 
conquest of the Illinois country, but who was now reduced 
to an equivocal position from the combined influence of 
intemperance and pecuniary embarrassment. In 1788, he 
had offered his services to Spain, for a land-grant, and was 
now even more ready to expatriate himself for France. 
Genet's agents and Clark, in Kentucky, actually undertook 
the procuring of supplies and boats and sought to interest 
the discontented Kentuckians in the scheme for securing the 
freedom of the Mississippi by replacing Spain at its mouth 
by the French Republic. 

Unquestionably there existed in Kentucky highly in- 
flammable materials. Her allegiance and patriotism had 
already been severely tested, and the refusal by Spain of the 
free navigation of the Mississippi was regarded as a great 
grievance and suspicions were generally entertained that no 
proper efforts had been made to secure it. George Rogers 
Clark declared that he could raise fifteen hundred men 
and the French at St. Louis, with the Americans at 
the Natchez would eagerly join his command. With 
the first fifteen hundred all Louisiana, beginning at St. 
Louis, could be won for France, and with the aid of two or 



62 The Purchase of Florida 

three frigates at the mouth of the Mississippi, he would 
agree to capture New Orleans and the rest of Louisiana. 
And only a little further assistance would be* needed to 
secure Pensacola and even Santa Fe and the rest of New 
Mexico. By July, Genet wrote home that he was arming 
Kentucky and preparing a general insurrection in the 
provinces adjoining the United States. 

But Genet's disregard for our national authorities served 
as a boomerang; he lost his most powerful friends and 
popular sentiment proved fickle. His plottings, however, 
aroused the Spanish governor Carondolet, whose force of 
sixteen hundred men was strung along six hundred leagues 
of river navigation. Urgently demanding reinforcements 
from home, in the anxious moments of despair he wrote to 
the English in Canada for assistance. 

At the moment when success seemed assured Genet's 
career was terminated by the fall of the Girondist party in 
France. Genet was recalled and a new minister, Fauchet by 
name, arrived with instructions to terminate an expedition, 
which, had not Washington refused his connivance, must 
have been a success. An advance by the United States on 
the debt due to France, on which Genet relied, would have 
enabled him to proceed with these plans as well as the mari- 
time war against England on the American coast. But he 
failed to support the project with efficient organization and 
financial resources and it collapsed under the hostility of the 
federal authorities. Only about two hundred men had been 
under arms, but many others awaited the call to war. 

In one of its aspects the movement was a continuation 
of the efforts of the Westerners to expel the Spanish from 
the Gulf of Mexico — efforts which found later expression 
in Jackson's expedition, and in the Mexican and Cuban 
wars. In another of its aspects it was a phase of the 
repeated designs of France to recover her control of Louis- 



To the Treaty of IJQS 63 

iana, for it is a mistake to suppose that this design dates 
from the efforts of Napoleon and Talleyrand in 1799 and 
1800. 

If the Clark expedition had been more efficiently man- 
aged it was not so chimerical as it now appears. Its ulti- 
mate design was the conquest of New Orleans, Louisiana, 
and New Mexico. Considering the weakness of Spanish 
rule in Louisiana, the attitude of leading Westerners, the 
excited feeling in the West against Spain and the Federal 
authorities, the expectation of statesmen like Jefferson that 
a war with Spain was inevitable, and the widespread sym- 
pathy for France in the United States, such a proposal as 
Clark's was not without hope of success. The details of 
its inception and progress reveal the inchoate condition of 
national feeling in the West and the many hazards which 
beset our control of the Mississippi Valley. 

Genet had found an active lieutenant in General Elijah 
Clarke, an officer of prominence in the Revolution, who had 
for some time been an active disturber of the peace on the 
Florida border. ^ First a leader in unwarranted violations 
of the McGillivray Indian treaty of 1790, he had made war 
on the Indians and the Florida Spanish. Under Genet's 
advice and assistance he formed a party in Georgia, called 
the Sans Culottes, based on hatred of the Spanish, and 
sympathy for the French control of the Spanish-American 
possessions. He was guilty of the grossest violations of 
neutrality and repeatedly attacked the Spanish posts. At 
the head of a band of adventurers with whom Georgia 
abounded, he invaded Florida and established a post on the 
St. Mary's River. This enterprise he was soon compelled 
to abandon. And with some measure of justice the Spanish 
minister complained that the American officials in that 



1. For the Genet-Clarke correspondence see the Annual Report of 
the American Historical Association of 1896, Vol. I, page 930. 



64 The Purchase of Florida 

quarter were in sympathy with these marauders, if they 
did not actively countenance and assist their plans. Clark 
had set an example which others of his ilk were not slow to 
follow, to the consternation of the Spanish authorities of 
that section. As an inducement and reward for his work 
he, together with George Rogers Clark, was commissioned 
a major general in the French service.^ The bold and 
unblushing manner in which Genet conducted his operations 
induced many to believe that he had at least the secret if not 
the open connivance of the federal government. - The 
French designs against Louisiana continued unabated even 
after Genet's recall. His work was not without its results, 
and, under his encouragement and advice, there were num- 
erous violations of Spanish sovereignty by American citi- 
zens. The Spanish representative, M. Jaudenes, repeatedly 
called the attention of this government to these matters in 
his correspondence in 1793 and 1794. 

At the close of 1793 the bitter warfare between 
Hamilton and Jefferson had reached a climax and upon the 
resignation of the latter, Edmund Randolph, the attorney 
general, was transferred to the state portfolio and to him 
fell the task of directing the Spanish negotiations. By 
midsummer of 1794 it had become clear to the administration 
that Spain was tired of the English treaty and sought an 
arrangement with France. It was felt that this might offer 
a good opportunity to win Spanish gratitude and a Spanish 
treaty by a friendly mediation in the quarrels from which 
Spain wished herself extricated. Apparently the time was 
not yet come for that. The danger of a Spanish-American 
war became more threatening. The spirit of Kentucky was 
growing daily more bitter and defiant, and the acts of the 



1. 'See Boston Sentinel, Nov., 1793, Jan., 1794. Congressional Docu- 
ment's, ajid Vol. V, Domestic Letters, pp. 319-321, Jefferson to the Gov- 
ernor of Kentucky. 

2. Vol. II, Instructions, p. 63, Randolph to Short, March 16, 1794. 



To the Treaty of IJQS 65 

settlers more bold and warlike. The government dreaded 
each stage from the West, lest it bring news of some fresh 
overt act which would precipitate hostilities. For it was 
felt that at this time a declaration of war would mean a 
conflict, not alone with Spain, but also with her ally Great 
Britain. Writing in cipher to Short in August, 1794, Ran- 
dolph directed him to "counteract the impressions which the 
unlicensed violence of our Western citizens may make upon 
the Spanish court." Short was further directed 

"To ascertain as soon and as certainly as possible — 

"i. Whether Spain counts upon the Union of Great 
Britain in maintaing the exclusive right to the Mississippi ? 

"2. What overtures have passed between them on this 
subject? 

"3. Supposing the war with France to be settled, and 
the French Republic established, what douceur could Spain 
afford to England for entering into a war with the United 
States ? 

"4. Do the progress of the ardor for liberty and arm- 
ing of the Spanish peasantry develop no reason to apprehend 
a convulsion in Spain? 

"5. Will not the distress of the Spanish government 
for money compel them to such a resort to the people as will 
■awaken the sense of their real efficacy in all governments 
and enable them to urge demands of reform, to which an 
indigent prince dependent upon his subjects for supplies, 
will always be exposed? 

"6. Is there any mode in which our influence with 
France could be used that would accomplish for us the 
navigation of the Mississippi? 

"7. In what parts and through what means is Spain 
most vulnerable in South America — and to what part are 
her suspicions directed? 

6 



66 The Purchase of Florida 

"8. What force by land or sea could she send to any- 
foreign country in case of war? 

"9. In what particular is it supposed in Spain that the 
United States if at war with her could be the most injurious 
to her? In short you perceive from these questions, that 
the mind is driven into an anticipation of a painful possi- 
bility and therefore whatever else belongs to this subject, 
although not comprehended in the above questions, you will 
be so good as to communicate. But notwithstanding these 
inquiries you may never hesitate to give the most unqualified 
assurances, that we deprecate the most distant interruption 
of our harmony."^ 

Spain now thoroughly weary of the unnatural alliance 
into which Godoy had been forced by popular clamor, sought 
a way to withdraw from a war more honorable to the 
bravery and patriotism of her troops than it had been 
successful. It was supposed that the relations between 
England and the United States were growing more hostile, 
and with France were improving under the able hand of 
Madison. In view of these circumstances the Spanish 
government made advances to France through the Ameri- 
can minister at Paris and took the necessary steps to resume 
direct negotiations with the United States, broken off by 
Carmichael's departure and the Spanish refusal to receive 
or recognize Short. 

On August 16, 1794, Jaudenes. in a commun- 
ication to the secretary of state, expressed his regrets that 
so little progress had been made in the negotiations between 
the two countries and stated that His Majesty desired to 
renew the negotiations, provided commissioners be sent who 
should have unrestricted powers for a general treaty and 
not be bound by secret instructions which would defeat it. 
The powers which had been given to Carmichael and Short 



1. Edmund Randolph to Short, Aug. 18, 1794. 



To the Treaty of IJQS 67 

were not ample, he complained; nor were those two com- 
missioners personally satisfactory. "The lack of decorum" 
and "well known misconceptions" of Carmichael were com- 
mented upon ; and the "want of circumspection in conduct" 
of Short had made him personally undesirable. A man of 
"character, conduct and splendor" was desired by the Span- 
ish government. By "character" was meant a "diplomatic 
grade invested with full powers for all objects;" by "con- 
duct," a "proper attention to the court and a proper behavior 
in the management of the negotiation;" by "splendor" a 
"personal dignity and self-respect." In short the rank of 
Carmichael and Short, both charges had not flattered the 
Spaniards. Nor was the idea of returning the same com- 
missioners wholly pleasing to them. In consequence of 
these intimations the president, in November, 1794, appoint- 
ed General Thomas Pinckney, then minister at the court of 
St. James, minister plenipotentiary with full powers to 
conclude a treaty with Spain. Thomas Jefiferson having 
been offered this special mission had declined. Pinckney 
did not however reach Madrid until the summer of the 
following year. 

The instructions to Pinckney sought to impress upon 
him the impatience and hostility of the Kentuckians and the 
necessity for a prompt determination of the Mississippi 
question. If Spain should refuse this, the United States, it 
was felt, ought to be immediately apprised of the fact, that 
they might prepare for the alternative of war. Yet Pinck- 
ney was warned not to give the Spanish minister any reason 
for supposing that we had determined upon hostilities, for, 
writes Randolph in a cipher dispatch, "if we break off in 
ill humor, we in some degree lose the choice of peace or war. 
If we show no symptom of ill temper we are not debarred 
from resorting to any expedient which we approve. It is 
not impossible too that in the settlement of peace with 



68 The Purchase of Florida 

France some opportunity may be presented if we should be 
disappointed now. If any hint of this sort should be capable 
of improvement you will doubtless communicate your ideas 
to our minister at Paris. Our reputation with the French 
government is on a strong footing. It is of immense im- 
portance for us to know, if it can be ascertained, whether 
Great Britain is under no engagement to Spain, to support 
her in the retention of the Mississippi." ^ 

By this time a new question of dispute had arisen for 
diplomatic adjustment, or if that should fail, for the decision 
of the sword. The vessels of the United States were being 
constantly seized by Spain, as well as by others of the allied 
powers of Europe, upon the most frivolous and unwarrant- 
able pretexts. The seizure of one vessel in particular, the 
Dover cutter, had been the subject of continual diplomatic 
representations by this government to the Spanish officials. 
Built in Havre de Grace, it had been seized by a Spanish 
governor in the Western Islands for the use of the Spanish 
government, nor had any compensation been made for it. 
The complaint for this outrage had been forwarded to 
Madrid by Jay in the spring of 1786. Of late, more seizures 
had aroused the United States and to Pinckney was com- 
mitted the further question of the spoliation and vexation of 
our commerce and a full power given him to treat upon this 
as well as the other subjects. ^ These encroachments upon 
our commerce had been accompanied by further encroach- 
ments by the Spanish posts on the Mississippi River. Gov- 
ernor Guioso, the Spanish intendant, had recently estab- 
lished a fort at what was called Chickasaw Bluff — above 
the 35° of latitude. 

At this time, owing to the European complications, 
Spain feared a break with the United States, partly because 



1. Vol. II, Instructions, p. 245, Randolph to Pinckney, Nov. 18, 
1794. 

2. Ihid., p. 294, Randolph to Thomas Pinckney, Dec. 25, 1794. 



To the Treaty of IJQS 69 

of the entente cordiale existing between this country and 
France, and partly from fear of another war which, she 
felt, must multiply the misfortunes which she had suffered 
in her alliance with England, when the French armies had 
overrun her mountain districts and established themselves 
upon her soil. In fact Spain was desirous of an alliance 
with this country. 1 The three campaigns against France, 
after the English-Spanish alliance — more creditable to the 
valor of the Spanish troops than to their military ability — 
had been most unfortunate. The combination between the 
Castilian and the Saxon had been a forced one — of the 
head rather than the heart — without that sympathy and 
unity from which alone can come success. Randolph had 
said, "My conviction is (firm that the courts of Madrid and 
London are cordial in nothing but a hatred of the United 
States and a determination to harass them through the 
Indians." ^ But he might have added that they were no less 
cordial in their hatred of revolutions, especially of the 
French variety, for this it was that had induced the alliance. 
But, constantly humiliated on the field of battle, the Cas- 
tilian soon tired of an alliance with those for whom, with 
their mother's milk, they had imbibed a bitter hatred. They 
looked with fond eye toward the triumphant militarism of 
a people with whom they had always had much in common 
and to whom they were bound by the ties of gratitude and 
of blood. 

The internal changes in French politics opened the 
prospect of a more stable and conservative government 
for that country, and the peace of Basle (April 5, 1795) 
proclaimed the defection of Prussia, the keystone of the 
continental combination. In the meantime Spain, having 
deserted England, grew suspicious of her. She feared and 
suspected an Anglo-American arrangement. England, she 

1. Vol. II, Instructions, p. S2, Pickering to Short, Aug. 31, 1795. 

2. lUa., p. 185, Randolph to Monroe, Sept. 25, 1794. 



70 The Purchase of Florida 

thought, was endeavoring to excite the United States against 
her, and she anticipated a concert of measures between these 
two powers against her American possessions. This sus- 
picion was founded upon the Jay treaty with England — the 
extent of which was not yet fully understood at Madrid — 
and was confirmed by letters from the Spanish charge 
d'affaires at Philadelphia. ^ This danger must be met by 
a Spanish-American treaty. Writing in March to our 
secretary of state Mr. Short said: "The rapid successes 
of the French armies in Holland — the desire of this court 
to find out some means of pacification ■ — the close friendship 
Tjetween the United States and France combme to show the 
importance of the present moment. The minister would 
willingly make use of me as the means of sounding the 
French government and ascertaining their dispositions as 
to peace — but the stumbling block of the unsettled state 
of our affairs with Spain constantly presents itself." ^ 

After Jay's treaty with England the whole diplomatic 
situation in respect to the Mississippi Valley was changed. 
The United States bought a peace with England by sacri- 
ficing the friendship of France. The possession of Louisiana 
offered to France the opportunity to injure England and 
render the United States more subservient to her policy. 
Fauchet was convinced that Louisiana would furnish France 
the best entrepot in North America for her commerce and 
raw material, and a market for her manufactures, a mon- 
opoly of the products of the Mississippi territories, and a 
means of pressure on the United States. He declared that 
unless a revolution occurred in Spanish policy the force of 
events would give Louisiana to the United States. It now 
became more than ever a cardinal point of French policy 
to secure this province from Spain. 

An active alliance with the United States was what 



1.. Letters of Wm. Short No. 193, Vol. IV. 
2. Wm. Short to Jefferson, March 3, 1795. 



To the Treaty of Ijg^ 71 

Spain earnestly desired at this time, and she expected the 
new American envoy to be provided with powers and 
instructions to conclude an alliance as well as terminate 
the troublesome questions then pending. To secure 
this alliance, Spain was willing to pay a high price on other 
points. But the United States wisely declined to entangle 
themselves in the mad delirium of war by any such con- 
nection. 1 On the 22nd of July, 1795, a treaty was concluded 
between Spain and France. In return for this peace Spain 
ceded to the revolutionary republic the Spanish half of 
San Domingo. Humiliated and infuriated at this defection, 
England declared war upon her late friend. It was now 
rumored in Spain that England intended to take possession 
of a Spanish harbor, land an effective army, compel Spain 
to fight against France and to further attack the Spanish 
possessions in America. Ignorant of the Jay treaty, France 
earlier in the year sought to aid a Spanish-American con- 
ciliation, but nothing had come of this attempt. 

In midsummer, Thomas Pinckney at length reached 
Madrid, where, sent as he had been at the instance and 
invitation of the Spanish minister, he expected rapidly to 
conclude a treaty. The differences to be settled by the 
commissioners shaped themselves into three groups. First 
was the subject of commerce, but Spain refused to discuss 
this point despite Pinckney 's protest that the mission was of 
Spanish origin. The Spanish charge at Philadelphia had ex- 
pressly stated that Spain was "ready to treat upon the points 
of limits, Indians, commerce and whatever may conduce to 
the best friendship between the two countries." Pinckney 
therefore intimated that he had a right to expect an arrang-e- 
ment of the commercial interests of the two countries. But 
as the United States were not willing to force themselves into 



1. Wm. Short to Jefferson, March 3, 1795. 



72 The Purchase of Florida 

connection with a reluctant people, he would not press what 
he could not but consider his right. 

The second point concerned the navigation of the 
Mississippi. Spain, while admitting that its navigation 
should be free to both nations, objected to the arrangement 
suggested by the United States for a commercial depot at 
New Orleans. Spain further insisted that the language of 
the article conveying the right should be of a strictly exclu- 
sive character, restricting the navigation to the subjects of 
Spain and to the citizens of the United States. This, of 
course, could not be considered, as it would violate our 
treaty obligations to England, if not to France. 

As to the third point, that of reclamations, Spain 
insisted that all captures should be divided into two periods 
— the one preceding April 6, 1795, in which the rule of 
decision should be the maritime regulations of Spain then 
at war with France ; and the other, following that date, in 
which the decisions should be upon the usual grounds of 
international law. To such a division Pinckney positively 
and unequivocally refused his assent. Conformably with 
the traditional quibbling and procrastination of Castilian 
diplomacy, the negotiations dragged their weary course, 
varying only with the fluctuation of European and Spanish 
politics. Wearied and indignant at the apparent lack of 
faith and their persistence in maintaining their position, 
Pinckney at length demanded his passports on the 24th day 
of October. 

This show of spirit and determination on the part of 
the American envoy arouse.d the Spanish minister to the 
necessity of action. Having thrown herself into the arms 
of England 'she had been despoiled of her territories by the 
French armies. Now deserting her former mistress and 
cultivating a French amour, Britain had turned upon her 
and was driving her fleets off the sea. Dreading an Anglo- 



To the Treaty of IJQS 73 

American alliance, or a separate declaration of war by the 
United States, badgered at all points and fearing greater 
humiliations, Spain consented to a compromise of the 
difficulties and at San. Lorenzo el Real, October 2'j, 1795, 
a treaty of friendship, limits, and navigation was signed in 
behalf of Spain by Godoy. 

This treaty was decidedly f avora:ble to the United 
States. It established as boundaries East and West Florida 
on the south and, above latitude 31°, the middle of the 
Mississippi River. Illegal captures made by Spain during 
her late war with France were compensated for, favorable 
rules were prescribed for neutral commerce, and Indian 
aggressions on either side, together with the arming of 
privateers, were discountenanced. But the chief diplomatic 
exploit was in gaining Spanish recognition of the right, so 
long and so strenuously asserted by the United States, to 
the free navigation of the Mississippi River ; to which was 
added a three years' privilege of deposit at the port of New 
Orleans, free of duty. Thus was paved the way for that 
magnificent internal commerce so soon to become fabulous 
in its value, which has made that river the m'ost crowded 
highway of domestic trade in the world. The claims com- 
mission provided for in the treaty met in Philadelphia, ter- 
minating their duties December 31, 1799, after having made 
awards to the amount of $325,440 on account of the Spanish 
spoliations. It is not unlikely that the conclusion of the Jay 
treaty with England strongly influenced Spain to agree to a 
treaty at this time. For our arrangement with Great Britain 
destroyed all hopes of a concerted action between Spain and 
that nation against our Western country. Since the treaty 
of 1783 Spanish agents in North America had made frequent 
advances to the Canadian authorities for a joint English 
and Spanish policy against the Americans, all of which 



74 The Purchase of Florida 

found expression m the tortuous Indian relations they had 
pursued. 

The treaty of 1795 marked the first step in our terri- 
torial expansion. Jefiferson wrote as early as 1786, from 
Paris : "Our confederacy must be viewed as the nest from 
which all America, North and South, is to be peopled. We 
should take care, too, not .... to press too soon on the 
Spaniards. Those countries cannot be in better hands. My 
fear is that they are too feeble to hold them till our popu- 
lation can be sufficiently advanced to gain it from them 
piece by piece. The navigation of the Mississippi we must 
have. This is all we are as yet ready to receive." Voy- 
ageurs, like Brissot, had prophesied the secession of the 
West; Washington had dreaded it; Western leaders, Wil- 
kinson, Sevier, Robertson, Clark, Butler, ihad sold their 
services to secure it; and Spain and England had nego- 
tiated to that end. Had the United States failed to secure 
free navigation it would have withdrawn, and for the want 
of sea power to protect its commerce passing from the 
mouth of the Mississippi through the Gulf, it must have 
allied itself with a foreign power. 

Firmness rather than skill, determination rather than 
finesse, were required for the negotiation of the instrument. 
Political circumstances had compelled Spain to yield to the 
demands of the United States. She had made concessions 
which except for extraneous forces might have been post- 
poned for years. The treaty and the ministers who nego- 
tiated it were similarly applauded in both countries. As a 
recognition of his diplomatic success, Thomas Pinckney, on 
his return home, was named by the Federalists as the asso- 
ciate of Adams on the presidential ticket. The treaty of 
Basle and that with the United States were hailed by the 
corrupt court of Spain — one of the worst in her national 



To the Treaty of IJQS 75 

history — as great triumphs, and Godoy as a reward received 
the title of Prince of Peace. ^ 

The country of Charles V. was at this time under the 
absolute rule of Godoy who, as a young lieutenant in the 
army, had become the paramour of the faithless queen and 
through her favor had been named prime minister. Under 
his regime the price of office had been such as to exclude 
men of any nobility either of mind or character — they Aver e 
the rewards of those willing to submit their wives and 
daughters to the embraces of this libertine. Miserable 
Spain, dishonored in the shame of her queen, and ruled by 
men the most contemptible, willing for paltry office thus to 
sell their own honor ! 



1. In his memoirs Godoy felicitates himself on the American treaty 
and claims that he secured "unexpected advantag-es" though of what 
nature we cannot conjecture, for he virtually yielded all the demands 
of his adversary. 



CHAPTER III. 

Tut PURCHASE of IvOUISIANA. 

THE treaty of 1795 provided that the contracting parties 
should name commissioners to run the boundary line 
between Florida and the United States. As the American 
linesman was sent one Andrew EHicott, who immediately re- 
paired to the post of Natchez on the Mississippi. A vain man 
whose pretensions and bombastic manner made him an abject 
of ridicule, he reached the Spanish post with an idea that he 
was a sort of ambassador or envoy extraordinary rather than 
a mere astronomer or surveyor. Naturally irascible, his 
frequent toasts to the health of his country and himself 
scarcely tended to sweeten his disposition. 

In his imaginary capacity of a diplomat accredited, or 
commanding general on the field, he sent daily and often 
hourly letters and remonstrances to the Spanish governor, 
Gayoso. He proceeded to stir up trouble among the settlers 
of this region, though they are represented to have been 
thoroughly contented under the mild rule of the Spanish. 
For nominal fees they had received liberal grants of land. 
They had paid no taxes, had been exempt from military 
service, had been allowed free access to the market at New 
Orleans, and had been paid a liberal price for their tobacco. 
Prior to the advent of the meddlesome Ellicott and his tem- 
pest in a teapot, no discontent seems to have existed. ^ 



1. Lowry's History of Mississippi, p. 148. 



The Purchase of Louisiana JJ 

By the second article of the treaty it was stipulated 
that the garrisons found to be above the line of demarcation 
— that of 31° latitude — should be withdrawn. The line 
had neither been run nor had the garrisons been withdrawn. 
Some of the Spanish posts were undoubtedly above this 
line — but their garrisons were not removed. In response 
to the American representations on this matter, the Spanish 
minister, D'Yrujo, replied : 

"It appears that the first operation ought to be to draw 
this line in order to know which were the garrisons which 
were to be withdrawn according to the article cited and 
although the Natchez and some other Spanish posts are 
probably situated above the said line of demarcation the 
formality and delicacy which one government owes to 
another required that Mr. EHicott should not pretend to take 
possession of the territory until the said demarcation should 
be made : and the more so as he had been informed officially 
that the Spanish engineer M. Guillemard was already on his 
way to fulfil this part of his commission. Mr. Elliott not 
attending to these just observations immediately, began to 
wound the feelings of the Spanish commander by hoisting 
the American flag on a territory before having jointly made 
the astronomical observation for ascertaining the course of 
the line. Not content with this he began to exercise an 
authority which was unlawful for the same reasons : to-wit, 
that of recruiting for the United States in a place which 
was then under the jurisdiction of the Spanish government. 
These imprudences which can admit of no excuse gave rise 
to a personal resentment from which there is little to hope 
with respect to harmony between the commissioners in the 
future." 

In a proclamation issued in 1797 by Carondolet, the 
governor of Louisiana, the delay in transferring the posts 
was excused because of an apprehended expedition by the 



yS The Purchase of Florida 

British from Canada: a belief that the advance of the 
American troops was with a hostile design of surprise, and 
in the expectation of an immediate rupture between France 
— the intimate ally of Spain — and the United States. The 
United States should either leave the posts in the hands of 
Spain, the proclamation declared, or secure her against an 
article of the British treaty which exposed them to be 
pillaged. 

Probably the real reason for this delay was the expecta- 
tion of a breach between France and the United States 
wihich might furnish an excuse for the non-fulfillment of the 
treaty. There is little doubt that Spain, then under the 
influence of France, either to protect her own possessions 
or with a view of ceding them to that nation, had determined 
to defeat the execution of the treaty. 

At New Orleans it was confidently believed that the 
French would soon own Louisiana and the Floridas. But 
Spain was not yet ready to cede them ; her present purpose 
was to alienate the Western country from the Union and 
establish over it a government under her own influence. 
Considerable trouble in regard to the delivery of the posts 
was occasioned by the uncertainty as to the meaning of the 
treaty provisions therefor. The United States contended 
that they should be delivered in the condition in v/hich they 
then stood while Carondolet insisted that it could never have 
been the intention of his Catholic Majesty to deliver up any 
fortifications on which he had expended great sums of money 
and which through political vicissitudes might perhaps be 
one day prejudicial to his subjects. ^ Ellicott felt called 
upon to secure them by force or strategy. Governor Gay- 
oso having discovered these hostile intentions of the engin- 
eer, minister plenipotentiary and ambassador extraordi- 



1. Letters to iSecretary of State, Vol. I, p. 1. D'Yrujo to Secre- 
tary of State, Jan., 1797. 



The Purchase of Louisiana 79 

nary, took such measures for the defense of the fort at 
Natchez as to foil any attempt to capture it by surprise. 

However much the treaty of 1795 may have been ap- 
plauded by both parties as a diplomatic victory, the cor- 
respondence of the ensuing years shows how utterly it had 
failed to smooth the ruffled waters. The Chevalier d'Yrujo 
repeatedly complained to Pickering of the violation of Span- 
ish territory by the inhabitants of Georgia. Slaves had 
escaped from their masters and, reaching the border, had 
found safety in the wilds of Spanish Florida. Failing to 
secure their return by peaceable methods the Georgia settlers 
had taken the matter in their own hands and recaptured the 
fugitives in joyful contempt of all restraints of international 
law. ^ 

In the meantime England and Spain, recent allies, had 
become embroiled in a war whose echoes were heard on 
this continent. With a view to attacking the Spanish pos- 
sessions in the Floridas, overtures were made by the English 
to General Elijah Clarke of Georgia, whose intrigues against 
these same regions we have already noted. The Spanish 
minister further took occasion to complain to our secre- 
tary of state of aid given by officials in those regions to 
some measures set on foot by the British to attack Amelia 
Island. 2 

In June of this year (1797), President Adams sent a 
communication to the senate complaining that the Spanish 
in Louisiana were interfering with the demarcation of the 
boundary line. Feeling had become so strong on this ques- 
tion that war was feared. As a justification or an excuse 
for not giving up the posts on the Mississippi, D'Yrujo 
advanced the clause in the Jay treaty with England giving 
that power certain rights and privileges on this waterway 



1. Domestic Letters, Vol. X, p. 13. 

2. imd., pp. 35-57. 



So The Purchase of Florida 

inconsistent with and even in violation of the provisions 
of the Spanish treaty which undertook to confine the nav- 
igation to the United States and to Spain. ^ 

It was evident that the Spanish would use force, if 
necessary, to prevent our making an establishment at 
Natchez — one of the posts in dispute about forty miles 
north of 31° latitude. Added to these difficulties were the 
still troublesome Indian questions. In answer to the Amer- 
ican claims that the Spanish officials were inciting the In- 
dians in the southwest, D'Yrujo made the counter-claim that 
the Americans were really inciting the redskins in the hope 
that under the cover of an Indian war they could seize more 
land and possibly capture some of the Spanish territory. 
The correspondence, diplomatic more in name than in fact, 
rapidly grew bitter and acrimonious, each party to it insin- 
uating that the other was guilty of misrepresentation. 2 
Pickering, whose manner of conducting such a correspon- 
dence partook more of the- nature of the cross sword with 
its heavy swinging blow than the rapier with its keen, grace- 
ful thrust, was scarcely the equal of the skillful and diplo- 
matic D'Yrujo, who was particularly fitted for such contest 
though later guilty of grave indiscretions. 

Among the papers transmitted to congress by the pres- 
ident was a letter connecting Colonel William Blount, a 
senator from Tennessee, with an attempt to incite the In- 
dians of that section for the purpose of forwarding a scheme 
for invading the Spanish territories with the connivance and 
assistance of the British. Upon the basis of this letter, the 
house of representatives presented articles of impeach- 
ment. 

In brief, Blount's scheme was to transfer New Orleans 
and the neighboring districts to the British by means of a 
joint expedition, England to furnish a naval force, and a 



1. Domestic Letters, Vol. X, pp. 58, 77, Sis. 
i2. Jbid., pp. 111-134. 



The Purchase of Louisiana 8 1 

co-operating force of backwoodsmen and Indians to be 
raised on the western frontier of the United States. Heavily 
involved in land speculations in Tennessee and wishing to 
organize an English company for the purchase of his prop- 
erty, Blount dreaded the consequences of a transfer to the 
French, a military and not a commercial nation, of the 
outlet of the Mississippi. He believed that it would be for 
the best interests of the Western people, as well as for his 
own personal benefit as a land speculator, that Louisiana 
should pass into the possession of the English. 

As it was too late for a trial at that session, the senator 
was meanwhile sequestered from his seat. In December, 
1798, when Congress assembled for the third and final ses- 
sion, the senate, after this long delay, resolved itself into 
a high court of impeachment to try the alleged conspirator 
for high treason. Meanwhile, having been elected to the 
state senate of Tennessee and chosen its president, Blount 
declined to appear in person before the United States sen- 
ate to answer the charges in the articles of impeachment. 
His counsel, for he had taken the precaution of being repre- 
sented, pleaded to the jurisdiction of the senate court on 
two grounds : 

(i) That senators are not "officers," who, in the 
meaning of the constitution of the United States, were liable 
to impeachment. 

(2) That, having been expelled from that body. Col- 
onel Blount was not now subject to trial even as a sen- 
ator. 

This plea to the jurisdiction was sustained by the sen- 
ate, though it is difficult to state whether on one or both of 
the grounds alleged. Suffice it to say that, unfortunately, 
the case was never reviewed and decided on its merits and 
thus by a legal technicality ended the first as did most of the 
later federal impeachment trials. The historian must la- 



82 The Purchase of Florida 

ment this termination of a proceeding which, had it been 
carried through, would have resolved the questions then in 
dispute with Spain and left to future generations some light 
on the murky intrigues which w.ere so frequent at that time 
and in that section. To the layman an acquittal on a 
technicality, then as now, was an added proof of the defen- 
dant's guilt. Else why should he not rather court than 
flee from an investigation which would exonerate and re- 
move all stain or doubt? Colonel Blount, notwithstanding 
this somewhat undignified termination of his senatorial 
career, became a popular leader in his own state where what 
was looked upon as a martyrdom for a popular cause en- 
deared him to the hearts of his fellow people. 

D'Yrujo sought to justify the action of the Spanish 
officials in Louisiana in refusing to deliver up the posts along 
the Mississippi and in resisting a present survey of the boun- 
dary line upon the very basis which had been disclosed in 
Senator Blount's letter — that of hostile intrigues against 
Florida and Louisiana aided by Great Britain. Spain sin- 
cerely apprehended that if the Natchez and other Mississippi 
posts were evacuated a clear road would be opened for the 
British into Louisiana. This representation upon the part 
of D'Yrujo seemed to Pickering but a miserable sub- 
terfuge of Spanish policy. We were not likely to submit 
patiently at the hands of that country to the indignities we 
had suffered from England when she, pursuing what ap- 
peared to be a similar policy in defiance of treaty obliga- 
tions, had maintained for four years a series of forts upon 
our northern frontier. But the revelations of Blount's letter 
bearing out the accusations of a British intrigue against 
Florida justified Spain not only in her refusal to surrender 
these posts but in actually strengthening her fortifications 
in that territory as well as in Louisiana and along the Mis- 
sissippi — as a measure of defense in short. 



The Purchase of Louisiana 83 

With more of childlike simplicity than diplomatic skill 
Pickering immediately turned the Spanish ambassador's let- 
ter over to Liston, the British minister, demanding an ex- 
planation with something of an intimation at the same time 
that D'Yrujo's accusations were not taken seriously by the 
United States. Liston admitted that certain individuals had 
proposed such a plan of action to him — ^that the English 
should invade Florida and the neighboring Spanish territory 
by sea and then rely upon the assistance and co-operation 
of American citizens — but that he and his government had 
refused to countenance the scheme for the reason that it 
would arouse the Indians and violate the neutrality of the 
United States. In view of the English record in inciting 
our northern Indians at this and later periods and her no- 
torious contempt for that American neutrality, for which 
she here professed such a respect, we are inclined to doubt 
the merit and veracity of England's reply, especially since 
Liston abruptly declined to furnish further particulars. But 
his denial suited our desires and so it was accepted. The 
Spanish minister, however, insisted upon his original accu- 
sations and rightfully took exception to Pickering's undiplo- 
matic method of approaching the English representative. 

D'Yrujo here foolishly resorted to a newspaper state- 
ment. Pickering retorted likewise through the agency of 
the press and sent copies of this letter to his political friends 
that they might rejoice with him in his undignified course. 
Fisher Ames, in a letter congratulating the secretary of state 
upon the merits of his published reply to "the little Don," 
wrote, "You have not left a whole bone in his skin." Picker- 
ing more than once expressed his contempt for "the Spanish 
puppy" to whom he constantly imputed dishonorable mo- 
tives. Without in any sense meaning to defend all of the 
actions of D'Yrujo, Pickering's attitude toward him, based 
mostly on prejudice and preconceived ideas, was unfair 



84 The Purchase of Florida 

and conspicuously out of place, in one holding the office of 
secretary of state. While there exists no real opposing evi- 
dence to the truth of Liston's disclaimer, one of the letters 
in the published correspondence signed "Robert Liston," 
seems inconsistent with that minister's representations. The 
contrast between Pickering's contemptuous attitude toward 
D'Yrujo and his deferential manner toward Liston was 
most marked. 

D'Yrujo in the meantime received further information 
which confirmed him in his suspicions' of an English attack. 
This plan was to attack upper Louisiana and surprise the 
posts of St. Louis and New Madrid, by a descent of the 
Mississippi, through either the Fox or Ouisconsin or Illi- 
nois rivers or other parts of the territory of the United 
States, which the Americans were not in a position to de- 
fend. ^ Senator Blount's letter, the Spanish minister felt, 
vindicated him in his accusations and he hastened in the 
name of his Catholic Majesty to request for the suspended 
senator a satisfaction proportioned to so scandalous a crime 
and all the pains and punishments which the laws of the 
country dictate for such offenses.^ Nor was D'Yrujo's indig- 
nation soothed by Blount's acquittal upon the mere legal 
technicalities which his counsel were able to raise. 

At the same time the troublesome Ellicott and the 
American commander in that section, Percy Smith Pope, 
were engaged in an abortive attempt to stir up hostility to 
the Spanish about Natchez and the Nogales. ^ During this 
year D'Yrujo addressed a complaint to Pickering on the vio- 
lation of Spanish territory and a request for due reparation 
and punishment for the participants in what appeared to be 
a slave raid into Florida. As was natural along this na- 



1. Vol. I, Foreign iMlnisters to Secretary of State. D'Yrujo to Sec- 
retary Pickering, March 2, 1797. 

2. Ihid., D'Yrujo to Pickering, July 6, 1797. 

&. Vol. I, Domestic OLetters. Oayoso to Pope, June 13, 1797. 



The Purchase of Louisiana 85 

tional boundary line, slaves constantly escaping- from their 
masters on either the one side or the other made their way 
into Florida or Georgia; these slaves had formerly been 
reciprocally delivered up to their rightful owners by the 
Georgia or Spanish officials and serious trouble thereby 
averted. On one occasion some five slaves escaping from 
their Spanish owners in Florida made their way into Georgia 
where the officials declined to surrender them and met with 
the reply that the governor of Florida would in the future 
decline to return any more escaping from the United States, 
This bit of reciprocity inspired by Georgia herself aroused 
much feeling and the settlers determined to take matters 
into their own hands. William Jones and John Knoll were 
the leaders in a particularly offensive raid to recapture fug- 
itive slaves. These repeated and contemptuous violations 
of her territory, arousing Spain to the real humiliation and 
helplessness of her situation, brought energetic protests from 
D'Yrujo. There is abundant proof that the preparations for 
this expedition were known and connived at by the people 
of Georgia and even by the American commandant of that 
region. 

Nor were Pickering's attacks the only onslaughts 
against which the Castilian minister was forced to contend. 
The year 1797 was for D'Yrujo full of untoward incidents 
and he must have fully realized what a thankless task it 
is to serve a master unpopular in the country to which he is 
accredited. The American press, especially at Philadelphia, 
subsidized by the different parties, had of late increased in 
malignity and bitterness. The Federalists largely patron- 
ized a paper known as Porcupine's Gazette, published by 
William Cobbett, an able but scurrilous writer who, in his 
effusions, frequently went under the euphonious name of 
"Peter Porcupine. "^ Ostensibly the mouthpiece of the ultra- 



1. William Cobbett, a British journalist born in 1762, had in his 
younger days a strange career of romance and adventure, first in the 



86 The Purchase of Florida 

Federalists, of whom Pickering was an excellent example, 
the paper served as a means of propagating British opinions 
of a deeper design. 

D'Yrujo having protested to the United States against 
the Jay treaty as hostile to his Catholic Majesty, Porcupine's 
Gazette proceeded to abuse him and his master in terms the 
most bitter and disgusting. In at least three different edi- 
tions of his paper during the month of July, in letters signed 
"Philip Fatio," D'Yrujo had been thus addressed. A few 
examples of the phrases found therein serve to show their 
general tenor and justify D'Yrujo's protests to our govern- 
ment. "Don de Yrujo was another Quixote." "It gives 
his story the lie." "The posts are never to be given up, the 
line is never to te run. No such things are intended." 
"But indeed what notions of honor can reasonably be ex- 
pected from the representative of a power who, for the 
sake of imaginary security, has deserted and treacherously 
turned his arms against his ally." ^ "From a tawny pelted 
nation which Americans have ever been taught to despise." 
"You are the only nation on earth who can vie with the 
French in perfidy and cruelty." ^ "But because I know it 

army and later in Paris. The anarchy and excesses of the Revolution 
drove him from France and he emigrated to Philadelphia. Here he 
advocated the Federalist cause in a newspaper which he set up. 
He also attacked Dr. Benjamin Rush for his system of treating yellow 
fever and other dangerous maladies by wholesale bleeding. Although 
Dr. Rush secured a verdict for $5,000, Cobbett succeeded in overthrow- 
ing this barbarous theory. In 1800 Cobbett returned to London and 
published the "Wtarks of Peter Porcupine" which had an immense 
sale. He soon became obnoxious to the government and was often 
prosecuted for libel. In one case he was fined £1000 and sentenced to 
Newgate for two years. In 1816 he established the "Twopenny Trash," 
which had so large a sale and so aroused the workingmen as to in- 
spire the active hostility of the government. After being forced to 
leave England for two years, he was elected to Parliament in 1832. 
He was the author of many books and with an extraordinary com- 
mand of English he established a reputation as a satirist second only 
to that of Swift and Junius. The inveterate foe of humbug and 
tyranny he nevertheless wrote with much justice and good sense. 

1. Gtazeitte of July 14, 1797. 

2. lUd., July 15. 



The Purchase of Louisiana 87 

is your office to dress up the sweepings of Don Carlos' brains 
and render them less disgusting to public view." "In- 
stead of a stupid, vain, insolent, half Carmagnole, half don- 
like composition." "Your dear, natural, atheistical, cut- 
throat allies have sunk us almost to a level with yourselves: 
under their bare influence Americans are fast descending 
to that last degree of degeneration at which the Knights of 
Castile have already arrived." ^ 

With righteous indignation at this abused and abusive 
liberty of the press D'Yrujo requested that the author be 
properly punished. The attorney general laid the matter 
before the grand jury of the federal circuit court and Cob- 
bett was bound over. McKean, the able chief justice of 
Pennsylvania, whose daughter D'Yrujo shortly afterw'ards 
married, issued a warrant charging the editor with having 
published "certain infamous libels on the king of Spain, the 
Spanish nation and the Spanish minister." But such was 
the political condition of that time that no indictment was 
returned against the malefactor either in the federal or state 
courts, despite an able and effective charge by McKean upon 
the law of libel as applicable to the case at hand. As Cob- 
bett was already under bond to keep the peace, for hav- 
ing too freely indulged his desire for vituperation in former 
cases, his recognizance was declared forfeited. The incident 
scarcely served to expedite the settlement of the questions 
at issue and the memory of these insults long rankled in the 
mind of D'Yrujo. Surely a nation, even though the free- 
dom of the press be one of its vital principles, owes to for- 
eign representatives full protection against such base and 
unwarranted insults. 

By this time the United States was actively engaged 
in preparation for war with France. By a treaty of 1796 
France and Spain had mutually guaranteed each other's 



1. Gazette of July 19, 1797. 



88 The Purchase of Florida 

territory in the Old and New World. With this as a basis, 
or more likely as an excuse, designs similar to those be- 
trayed by Blount's letter were being secretly considered 
by a group of ultra-Federalists of whom the secretary of 
state was at the head, though King and Hamilton were 
high in the councils. Our minister at London was to ap- 
proach the English government with the design as a mutual 
undertaking against the common enemies. In furtherance 
of this plan we find Pickering conducting the Spanish cor- 
respondence in such a manner as to invite or force a quar- 
rel, while he sought to promote an alliance with England. 

The complete project of these conspirators has never 
been understood by posterity, if indeed it ever reached the 
point where even its promoters were clear as to its provi- 
sions. But as a factor in the general scheme a joint expedi- 
tion under the surveillance of England and the United States 
was to be undertaken against the Spanish-American colonies 
to incite or enable them to throw off Spanish rule. Pitt 
had planned some such undertaking in the Anglo-Spanish 
crisis of 1790 and the present Spanish alliance with France 
now offered the opportunity for its trial. Miranda, a South 
American by birth, one of those soldiers of fortune of whom 
in that day there was a superabundance and who today are 
not unknown, secretly sought the ear of the English min- 
istry, using the well-known disaffection in the Spanish col- 
onies as an inducement. As was eminently fitting the Eng- 
lish were to furnish the navy, the United States the army. 

Following the traditional lines of such plots, a division 
of the spoils was agreed upon ere the scheme was hardly 
under way. The West Indies as a South American market 
for her manufactures, together with rights across the Isth- 
mus, was to be England's share, while to the United States 
was set apart the Floridas and all Spanish territory east of 
the Mississippi. It is impossible to state just how many 
of the Federalist leaders were in on the ground floor, so to 



The Purchase of Louisiana 89 

speak, of this vast international bubble. Washington, we 
may be sure, was not. Adams had been approached by- 
Miranda himself, but gave little encouragement to the 
scheme, partly from his dislike for Hamilton, who was a 
leading figure. Robert G. Harper, of South Carolina, the 
administration leader in the house, was naturally in favor 
of the plan, for any anti-Spanish project readily found favor 
with the South at that time. In fact, in 1797, Harper had 
suggested both to congress and his constituents the idea 
that a conquest of the Mexicos and the Floridas ought to 
furnish a sufficient consideration for an Anglo-American 
league against the two Latin nations. But Harper, with his 
inability carefully to guard a secret, was not received into 
the innermost chaml^ers of the high temple of the plotters. 

Pickering and King were engaged in conferences on 
the subject before the departure of Pinckney and Marshall 
for France. Great Britain, realizing the dangers of her 
own isolation and the prospect of a French invasion, had 
given Liston sufficient powers to arrange such agreements 
with the United States. The "X. Y. Z." correspondence hav- 
ing been displayed to the anxious public, Pickering ap- 
proached Hamilton with a project for capturing Louisiana. ^ 
Having already, between April and August, received several 
letters from the leader, Miranda, Hamilton, carefully con- 
cealing their contents from his patron, Washington, forward- 
ed a reply to our minister at London to 'be delivered or de- 



1. The French g-overnment, enraged with the United States be- 
cause of the Jay treaty and the election of the Federalist John Adams, 
resorted to depredations on American commerce, and ordered our 
minister to leave Paris. In an effort to arrange matters amicably, 
Adams sent to France a commission consisting of Charles Pinckney, 
John Marshall, and Elbridge Gerry, but the notably corrupt govern- 
ment refused to receive them. However emissaries from Talleyrand 
approached them secretly with the suggestion that if the United 
States should bribe certain members of the French government with 
liberal sums of money, the attacks upon American shipping would be 
stopped. These letters, signed "X. T. Z." have always been known 
as the "X. Y. Z. dispatches." 



90 The Purchase of Florida 

stroyed at his discretion. The scheme was such as might cap- 
tivate and dazzle the brilliant Hamilton with his all-consum- 
ing thirst for military glory. The seducing panorama before 
his hungry eyes was the battlefield of South America where 
he might win an immortal halo, as the liberator of the 
Spanish colonies, the Washington of the South. Hamil- 
ton's answer approved the scheme, provided the United 
States should have the principal agency and furnish the en- 
tire land force in which event he, of course, would play the 
leading role. Hamilton declared, as early as 1793, that we 
must have the Floridas and Louisiana as soon as possible. 
Spain he considered a constant source of annoyance and 
he insisted that the sooner we drove her off the continent 
the better — and before Great Britain should expel her. To 
unite the American hemisphere in one great society of com- 
mon interests and common principles was his aim. 

Preparations were speedily completed across the water 
and in October Miranda wrote to Hamilton, "All is ready 
for your president to say the word." But the word was 
never said and one of the greatest men of whom we have 
either the memory or the tradition, sorrowfully but unv/ill- 
ingly saw slip from his hands what he felt to be the grand 
opportunity of his life. In fact Adams had not been initiated 
into the real secrets. He, like Washington, was to be grad- 
ually drawn into the net. In the last efforts of despair we 
find Hamilton later approaching Gunn and Otis on the sub- 
ject, loathe to be deprived of this opportunity for fame and 
glory. "Tempting objects are within our power," he writes 
to Otis, and even in June of. the following year we see him 
urging upon the reluctant members of Adams's official fam- 
ily the completion of our provisional land forces in the hope 
that some chance might yet secure these "tempting objects" 
to him. "Besides the eventual security against invasion," 
he argued as a reason for his contention, "we ought cer- 



The Purchase of Louisiana 91 

tainly to look to the possession of the Floridas and Louis- 
iana, and we ought to squint at South America." Thus 
passes into oblivion a scheme at first apparently so pregnant 
with glory, but now so full of mystery and uncertainty. 
The whole matter seems to have been successfully hidden 
from Spain. ^ 

But new troubles were preparing for the unhappy 
D'Yrujo. Having been persuaded of the absolute liberty, or, 
more properly, license of the press in this country, the Span- 
ish minister proceeded to contribute to its columns and in 
one of the Philadelphia gazettes appeared D'Yrujo's last let- 
ter to the secretary of state, together with additional "de- 
famatory strictures" of the official in question. 

This indiscretion on the part of D'Yrujo, for such the 
Spanish secretary of state admitted it to be, resulted in a 
request to the Spanish government for his recall. More- 
over, the secretary of state complained that D'Yrujo's letters 
to him were "insulting and indiscreet." A letter was dis- 
patched to D'Yrujo from Spain informing him that his con- 
duct in the matter had been improper and was not approved 
at home. But that nation showed no desire to comply with 
our request for the recall of its faithful but possibly too 
ardent official. Various specious reasons were alleged for 
delay in the matter. The desire for a special letter from the 
president of the United States requesting D'Yrujo's recall, 
the impossibility or difficulty of finding a suitable person for 
the place, and stress of business preventing due considera- 
tion of the matter, were among the reasons cited for post- 
poning his recall. Humphreys, our minister to Spain, in a 
letter to the secretary of state, stated the real reason to be 
D'Yrujo's connection with certain leading men in Spain in 
the profits of an exclusive flour trade between the United 
States and the Spanish colonies and that his presence in 



1. iSchouler's History of the United States, Vol. I, pp. 4i22-424, 4'38, 
450. 



92 The Purchase of Florida 

America was necessary to conduct that 'business. ^ The de- 
mand for D'Yrujo's recall seems to have been a part of Pick- 
ering's bellicose attitude toward that official in seeking to 
force a breach with Spain and promote an English alliance. 
But D'Yrujo remained and continued to represent his coun- 
try's interests and conduct the flour trade. 

In the summer of 1798 D'Yrujo addressed a note to 
Pickering complaining that an armed force of Americans 
consisting of about one thousand men with considerable 
artillery and a few armed boats were gathering in the dis- 
trict of Natchez. "I cannot avoid inquiring from you," he 
writes, "in what light is Spain to view this considerable col- 
lection of forces upon her frontiers." Pickering, with 
mock indignation, denied the existence of any such 
armaments and branded D'Yrujo's complaint as an excuse 
for delay in delivering up the posts. In fact, however, the 
posts had already been evacuated, the Spanish moving from 
Natchez March 30, 1798, and from the Walnut Hills (now 
Vicksburg), a few days later. 

During the v/inter of 1799 and 1800 D'Yrujo repeatedly 
complained of the preparations of an American adventurer, 
by the name of William Bowles, to commit hostilities against 
the Floridas by inciting the Indians within the limits of 
the United States — and requested the United States either 
to help capture him or expel him from their territories. In 
March, 1801, D'Yrujo wrote to Levi Lincoln, Pickering's 
successor, that certain letters of Bowles had been secured in- 
criminating several prominent citizens of Georgia in an 
attempt to incite the Indians. and settlers to war and under 
this cover attack the Spanish possessions. "It is now time," 
said D'Yrujo, "to restrain these unquiet spirits who, since 
the discovery of Blount's project, have been continually 



1. Letters of David Humphreys, 1790-1801. MSS. State Dept., Aug 
6, 1799. 



The Purchase of Louisiana 93 

projecting plans of this nature," — apparently utterly uncon- 
scious of the fact that the late secretary of state and many 
Federalists high in the councils of the nation were among 
those of whom he wished made "an example of severity" 
that would perhaps "quell the turbulent spirit." 

In 1802 the Western country was thrown into a tur- 
moil of excitement by the news that the port of New Or- 
leans had been shut against the commerce of the United 
States from the ocean into the Mississippi and that the 
right of deposit had been prohibited, in direct and gross 
violation of the terms, as well as the spirit, of the treaty 
of 1795. James Madison, Jefferson's secretary of state, 
addressed a severe remonstrance upon the subject to 
D'Yrujo, requesting him to use his influence to have the 
order rescinded and notifying him that "the United States 
will claim indemnification for all losses occasioned to Amer- 
ican citizens through this matter." ^ At the same time our 
minister at Madrid was directed to present a strong protest 
to the Spanish ministry upon the subject. 

The port not having been opened in the spring of the 
following year, Madison addressed an even stronger com- 
munication to the Spanish minister. It was found that not 
only had the right of deposit been rescinded but that this 
had been followed by a "vigorous prohibition of the ordinary 
hospitalities between the citizens of the United States and 
the Spanish inhabitants." The season of the year hav- 
ing arrived when this outlet for the produce of the Western 
citizens became essential, D'Yrujo was requested to employ 
every expedient to hasten an adjustment of the wrong that 
had been done. That in this critical posture of things, a 
regard for the good faith of the Spanish sovereign and a 
prudent attention to the heavy indemnifications with which 



1. Vol. XIV, Domestic Relations, p. 112. Madison to the Chevalier 
D'Yrujo, Nov. 25, 1802. 



94 The Purchase of Florida 

the responsibility was threatened, demanded that D'Yrujo in- 
stantly "resort to such peremptory injunctions as may re- 
claim the intendant from his errors and by giving to the 
violated treaty its due effect, rescue from immediate danger 
the confidence and good neighborhood, which it is the inter- 
est of both nations to maintain." ^ The reason for this 
action upon the part of the intendant seems never to have 
been fully explained. At any rate D'Yrujo made no attempt 
to justify it, and the whole matter seems to have embar- 
rassed the Spanish minister who, however, sought to mollify 
the American wrath while waiting to see whether the order 
emanated from Madrid. The losses suffered by thus closing 
the port of New Orleans became a troublesome point of 
controversy in the ensuing Spanish negotiations. The 
Westerners were determined to regain the port even at the 
point of the sword and war must surely have followed had 
not the Spanish intendant soon opened the river, now choked 
with waiting vessels. 

It seems certain that the closing of the Mississippi and 
the port of New Orleans was the act of the intendant — that 
the governor of that province did not concur in it. In Feb- 
ruary of 1803, D'Yrujo, in a letter to the secretary of state, 
expressly disclaimed the act of that official both for him- 
self and the Spanish government. ^ Charles Pinckney, now 
minister at Madrid, was requested to present the matter 
strongly to the Spanish ministry and acquaint them with the 
feeling aroused among our Western citizens. 

"The Mississippi is to them everything," writes Madi- 
son. "It is the Hudson, the Delaware, the Potomac and 
all the navigable rivers of the Atlantic states, formed into 
one stream. The produce exported through that channel 
last year (1801) amounted to $1,622,672 from the districts 
of Kentucky and Mississippi only, and will probably be 

1. Vol. XIV, Ekunestic Letters, Madison to D'Ynijo, March 10, 1803. 

2. 'D'Yrujo to Secretary of State, Vol. I, Feb., 1803. 



The Purchase of Louisiana 95 

fifty per cent more this year, from the whole Western coun- 
try. Kentucky alone has exported for the first half of this 
year (1802) $591,432 in value, a great part of which is now, 
or shortly will be, afloat for New Orleans and consequently 
exposed to the effects of this extraordinary exercise of 
power — should he (the intendant) prove as obstinate as 
he has been ignorant or wicked, nothing can temper the 
irritation and indignation of the Western country but a per- 
suasion that the energy of their own government will obtain 
the most ample redress." ^ 

In 1800 John Marshall, then secretary of state under 
President Adams, had requested Humphreys to lay before 
the court of Spain the protests of the United States for the 
spoliation of our commerce. 

"i. The capture of our merchant vessels by privateers 
manned in whole or in part by Spaniards and fitted out in 
Spanish ports. 

"2. The merchant vessels of the United States prose- 
cuting a peaceful and lawful commerce have been, when cap- 
tured and carried into the ports of Spain, condemned with 
their cargoes, as good prizes to the captors." ^ 

France, in her war against the United States, taking 
advantage of her domination of the peninsula, had fitted out 
privateers against American commerce in Spanish ports, 
and had there established courts for adjudging prizes. 
Humphreys was directed to make such representations to 
the court of Madrid as would put a stop to these irregular 
methods, and to insist on payment for all seizures in the 
past, as well as a convention for the adjustment and payment 
of these claims. The secretary further complained that 
Spain had not promptly and fairly met the awards under 



1. Vol. VI, Instructions, MSS. State Dept., p. 62. Madison to 
Charles .Plnckney, Nov. 27, 1802. 

2. Ihid., Vol. V, p. 358. John Marshall to David Humphreys, 
Sept. 8, 1800. 



96 The Purchase of Florida 

the indemnity clause of the treaty of 1795. The illegal 
seizure of American vessels was continued "under pretext 
that Gibraltar is being blockaded." ^ 

Poor Spain, harassed on all sides in Europe and Amer- 
ica, bankrupt and bleeding, became, year by year, more 
deeply enmeshed in the toils by her ally, who did not hesi- 
tate to despoil friend and foe alike. A pretty question of 
international law is presented when we come to consider the 
liability of a country whose forms of law and instruments 
of government are made the tools of another country in 
prosecuting wars against enemies toward whom the first 
nation is neutral. Though Spain might be liable, the pen 
must note a sigh of regret as it sums up her unwilling crimes 
and records the judgment of impartial law against her. 

In the spring of 1802 Pinckney was requested to ar- 
range with Spain a convention for the payment of the 
claims of the United States, falling into several groups, 
viz : — 

1. Those by capture of vessels. 

2. Attachment of property of citizens of the United 
States by Spain for supposed breaches of her fiscal regula- 
tions. 

3. Unjust and ruinous prosecutions against our citi- 
zens upon criminal allegations. 

4. By the tender laws, whereby our citizens have been 
paid in a depreciated medium for specie contracts. ^ 

Pinckney was further directed to sound Spain upon a 
cession of New Orleans and the Floridas and, if that propo- 
sition did not meet with favor, to treat for the navigation of 
the Mobile, Chatahoochee and other rivers running through 
Florida, for the citizens of the United States, supporting our 



1. Vol. IV, Instructions, MSS. State Dept. Madison to Pinckney, 
Oct. 25, 1801. 

2. Ibid., p. 21. Madison to Pinckney, Feb. 5, ISO^. 



The Purchase of Louisiana 97 

claim to that right by the same arguments put forward to 
secure the navigation of the Mississippi. ^ While unsuc- 
cessful in his diligent attempts to conclude an arrangement 
for the cession of the Floridas, Pinckney succeeded in se- 
curing a convention for the settlement of our various claims. 
This convention, concluded August 11, 1802, provided 
for the appointment of a board of five commissioners 
to adjust the claims "for indemnification of those who 
have sustained losses, damages, or injuries in conse- 
quence of the excesses of individuals of either nation dur- 
ing the late war contrary to the existing treaty or the laws 
of nations." Ratified by the president of the United States 
January 9, 1804, the Spanish persistently refused to ex- 
change ratifications until December, 1818, and as the con- 
vention was annulled by Article 10 of the treaty of 1819 
it never went into effect. ^ 

With the delay in revoking the order of the intendant 
which closed the Mississippi, representations expressing the 
peculiar sensibility of the Western country poured into 
Washington. From every quarter of the nation came 
protestations that our rights of navigation and boundary 
must be maintained. The only difference related to the de- 
gree of patience which ought to be exercised during the 
appeal to friendly modes of address. The Western irrita- 
tion daily increased and many advocated an immediate re- 
dress by force of armis. The house of representatives 
passed a resolution explicitly declaring that the stipulated 
rights of the Mississippi would be inviolably maintained. 
The disposition of many members was to give to the resolu- 
tion a tone and complexion still stronger. ^ The dark clouds 
of war lowered, a storm seemed about to break. D'Yrujo, 



1. Vol. VI, Instructions, p. 2 7. 
i2. Treaties and 'Conventions, 1S19, p. 1015. 

3. Vol. VI, Instructions, MSS. Stete Dept., p. 70, Madison to 
Charles Pinckney, Jan. 10, 1803. 

7 



98 The Purchase of Florida 

still representing his government at Washington, called the 
attention of Madison to the reports that a certain Wilson 
with fellow conspirators was endeavoring to rouse the peo- 
ple of western Pennsylvania, and to arm a band of adven- 
turers with the hope that they would be joined by others 
of the western states in attacking Louisiana. He requested 
that these conspiracies be suppressed lest they lead to more 
serious difficulties, "whilst from the prudent measures of 
this government and the justice of the king, the most prompt 
and complete satisfaction may be expected for the impru- 
dent measure of the intendant of New Orleans." ^ 

We now come to treat of the first steps actually taken 
by the United States to secure a settlement of the trouble- 
some questions arising in the west and southwest by a 
cession of the territory in that section. As early as Feb- 
ruary, 1797, rumors had reached the ear of Pickering, of 
an agreement on the part of Spain and an earnest desire 
on the part of France for a transfer of Louisiana. In fact 
one of the French ministers in this country, Mr. Adet, had 
avowed to Mr. Randolph, the former secretary of state, 
that such was the wish of his government and that the ces- 
sion of Louisiana to France was a preliminary to be insisted 
on in a negotiation with Spain. France had sought in 1796 
to secure Louisiana by offering to join Spain in the con- 
quest of Portugal. 2 There were obvious reasons why such 
a cession would be an object of grave solicitude to this 
country. The border and mouth of the Mississippi in the 
control of a virile, militant nation, strongly aggressive, was 
a different proposition, from possession by a weak monarchy 
out of whose palsied hand the rich prize must soon 
fall. Further, the French were at that period openly hos- 
tile to the United States and their power to work injury upon 

1. Vol. I, Ministers to Secretary of State, D'Yrujo to Madison, Feto., 
1803. 

2. Vol. IV, Instructions to United iStates Ministers, p. 1. Pick- 
ering to David Humphreys, Feb. 1, 1797. 



The Purchase of Louisiana 99 

this country if stationed at the mouth of the Mississippi, 
was unlimited. Humphreys at that date was directed to use 
cautiously every means within his power to prevent the 
proposed cession, by impressing upon Spain the great value 
of Louisiana and the necessity for her to retain possession 
of that province for the security of her other American 
dependencies. "The Floridas are mentioned as compre- 
hended in the cession to France," continued Pickering. 
"This is also highly interesting to the United States to pre- 
vent." ^ A year later Pickering wrote to Humphreys in a 
cipher dispatch that on very reliable information he under- 
stood "that the French government have been pressing that 
of Spain to cede Louisiana to France and that the pressure 
is so urgent as hardly to admit of longer resistance — and 
that if the former peremptorily demands the cession the lat- 
ter will not risk the consequences of a refusal." " 

It became a matter of much importance to know the 
terms of any such cession and to learn just what was com- 
prehended by it and whether New Orleans and the Floridas 
as well, had changed hands. Charles Pinckney, at Madrid, 
had been instructed to open negotiations for the transfer to 
this country of New Orleans and East and West Florida — ■ 
in short, all the Spanish dominions to the east of the Mis- 
sissippi River. Writing to the secretary of state in 1801 
Pinckney said, "I believe it will be found that the Floridas 
are not included in the cession of Louisiana or considered so 
by Spain : New Orleans is, and it will remain for you 
to have the goodness to say whether I am to move further 
in this business or whether the Floridas will still be consid- 
ered as a desirable acquisition." ^ 

"I am moving with great caution," writes Pinckney, a 



1. lUd. 

2. Vol. IV, Instructions, p. 277, Pickering to Humphreys, April 19, 
1798. 

3. Vol. VI, United States Ministers to Secretary of State, Pinckney 
to Secretary of State, Nov. 19, 1801. 



lOO The Purchase of Florida 

few months later, "and preparing the best and most prob- 
able means of obtaining, if possible, the Floridas." ^ Signs 
were not wanting to show that Spain soon repented of the 
treaty by which she had thus parted with so vast a part of 
her colonial possessions. Uriquijo, the minister who had 
negotiated the treaty, had been retired in disgrace and the 
ntw minister sought to conclude an arrangement with 
France for its repurchase. 

But there were many reasons which united to make 
it doubtful whether we could push our negotiations to 
a successful issue. If the object of France was to 
obtain Louisiana in order to bridle the conduct of our 
Western country and hold a check over their commerce 
they would oppose any cession of Florida to us, for that ces- 
sion would defeat her real purpose. Further, France was 
herself most anxious to secure the Floridas, and the Span- 
ish ministry viewed with alarm a cession which would give. 
to this country ports on the Gulf of Mexico so near Cuba 
and their American possessions. France had persuaded 
Spain of the desirability of having that nation as a barrier 
between the United States and the Spanish colonies. 
The proposition for the cession of the Floridas tended to 
verify the French predictions. But there remained one 
hope — the bankrupt condition of the Spanish treasury — a 
purchase and sale held out some slight chance of success. ^ 

On March 24, 1802, Charles Pinckney, in a long 
and able letter formally addressed Don Pedro Ceval- 
los, the Spanish minister of state, on the subject of such 
a cession. The able and diplomatic presentation of the mat- 
ter is sufficient justification for a lengthy excerpt therefrom. 

"The extent of territory and uncommon rise and prog- 
ress of the United States within the last eighteen years can- 

1. Vol. VI, United States Ministers to Secretary of State, Pinckney 
to Madison, Nov. 24, 1802. 

2. Ihid., Pinckney to Madison, March 20, 1802. 



The Purchase of Louisiana loi 

not be unknown to your Excellency. In this time the increase 
of her inhabitants, commerce, strength and revenue have 
been such as are unequaled in the rise and settlement of any 
nation. It has, as it were by magic, placed a country, a 
short time since scarcely known, among the first in point of 
commerce, I may perhaps be warranted in saying that she 
is now the second or third commercial nation in the world. 
Above one-half of her territory is situated on the Mississippi 
and the rivers and waters running into it. This territory has 
been some time since divided into new states, some of w^hich 
are .already from their population become members of the 
American Government, and others already organized only 
await the short period of their attaining a certain num- 
ber of inhabitants to be admitted to participate in our leg- 
islative councils. Your Excellency must at once perceive 
that not only to the rights and interests but to the wants 
and convenience of so considerable and growing a portion 
of the American people, it is peculiarly the duty of their 
government to attend. To this portion of our citizens the 
first and greatest object is the free and secure navigation of 
the Mississippi and waters running into it. In order, how- 
ever, to secure still farther this right and to remove every 
possible danger of inconvenience or difference in opinion 
and to fix forever such a great natural boundary between 
the dominions of their good friend his Catholic Majesty 
and the United States .as will leave no possible room for 
differences hereafter with a nation for whom the United 
States cherish so much affection : The undersigned is ex- 
pressly charged by his government to open a negotiation 
with his Majesty for the purchase and cession of East and 
West Florida : and should the cession have finally taken 
place as is reported of that part of Louisiana lying on the 
east bank of the Mississippi, the undersigned in the name of 
his government most earnestly entreats to be informed of 



I02 The Purchase of Florida 

it officially in order that his government may be enabled to 
take the same friendly measures and make the same sincere 
and affectionate proposals to their good friend-s, the French 
Republic, for the small part of Louisiana on the east bank 
of the river as they now do to their good friend his Catholic 
Majesty for the Floridas. 

"In wishing this small increase of territory the United 
States have no object but that of securing the navigation 
of the only outlet so great a body of their citizens have for 
the produce of their labors and enterprise and of fixing so 
valuable and great a natural boundary between them and 
their neighbors. Their politics being those of peace and 
their pursuits agriculture and commerce, they wish to re- 
move forever all room or chance for differences on points 
so essential as the navigation of this river and its waters 
and their boundaries and good neighborhood with their 
present friends. 

"The enlightened councils of his Majesty having a 
perfect knowledge of the situation of this country, must at 
once see that these are the pressing but the only reasons. 
Our government being without ambition never wishing to 
extend its territory except in so singular a case as this and 
never having the least idea or desire to possess colonies or 
more territory than they own, except in this singular in- 
stance, they trust that his Majesty will, on this occasion, 
consent to the sale and transfer upon such reasonable terms 
as may be agreed upon by the two governments. ^ 

"They are emboldened to be hopeful of this, not only 
from the desire they believe his Majesty always possessed 
to oblige them, but also from the knowledge he has. that 
as colonies for production and advantage, the sterility of 
the soil of the Floridas and particularly the eastern, make 



1. In the light of a century this is a naive and remarkable state- 
ment. 



The Purchase of Louisiana IG3 

them a yearly loss to the Spanish government and if, as 
appears by the treaty lately published at Paris between 
France and Spain, Louisiana is finally ceded to the former, 
then certainly the retaining of the Floridas cannot be of 
much value to the latter In this proposition re- 
specting the sale of the two Floridas the undersigned is 
hopeful his Majesty will see nothing but the most earnest 
desire on the part of the United States to prevent forever 
any misunderstanding between them and their neighbors, 
on the subject of the right to navigiate the Mississippi, a 
right so essential to the great and growing territory of the 
United States, situated on its waters that its future com- 
merce, navigation and prosperity must entirely depend on 
its undisturbed exercise. A situation unequaled in any 
other part of the world where, perhaps, it will be difficult 
to find so vast a country altogether depending on the out- 
let of a single river. The United States fear that if at 
any future period the government or governments which 
may possess the banks on both sides of its mouth should 
unhappily, from mistaken views, become disposed to dis- 
turb their right that it may be the means of kindling flames 
the extent and consequences of which cannot at present be 
foreseen, or the manner in which they may afifect the powers 
having the most important possessions in that quarter of 
the world. 

"It is for this reason and to preserve to all the blessing 
of tranquillity and undisturbed commerce that the United 
States, the sincere and firmly attached friends of his Majesty, 
wish to obtain from him a fair and friendly cession of the 
Floridas, or at least of West Florida, through which several 
of our rivers, particularly the important River Mobile, empty 
themselves into the sea, and from their good friends, the 
French, such portion of Louisiana (if deeded to them) as 
will answer the important end the United States have in 
view on this subject, namely: the securing the navigation of 



I04 The Purchase of Florida 

a river with which and the streams running into it, more 
than five-eighths of the whole territory of the United States 
are watered, and on those terms of friendship and sound 
and Hberal policy which will be likely to ensure forever the 
attachment and tranquillity of the respective governments." ^ 

It became rumored in this country that Spain was about 
to disown the French treaty of cession. Should the cession 
fail for this or any other cause and Spain retain the title to 
New Orleans and the Floridas, Pinckney was directed to 
employ every effort to obtain an arrangement by which 
"the territory on the east side of the Mississippi including 
New Orleans may be ceded to the United States and the 
Mississippi made common boundary with a common use 
of its navigation for them and Spain." ^ For the sake of 
securing such a "precious acquisition to the United States 
as well as a natural and quiet boundary with Spain," Pinck- 
ney was directed besides the inducements suggested in his 
original instructions, to transmit a proposition of "guar- 
anty of her territory beyond the Mississippi as a condition 
of her ceding .... the territory including New Orleans on 
this side." ^ 

Meanwhile instructions were dispatched to Robert Liv- 
ingston, our minister at Paris, to undertake to dissuade 
France from her purpose of securing Louisiana, not know- 
ing whether the treaty of cession had definitely been con- 
cluded. But if the cession had already been made, Living- 
ston was directed to ascertain whether it included the Flor- 
idas as well as New Orleans, and if so, to learn the price 
at which these would be transferred to the United States. ^ 



1. Vol. VI, Letters from Charles Pinckney to Don Pedro Cevallos, 
March 24, 180i2. 

2. Vol. VI, Instructions, MSS. iState Dept., p. 40, Madison to 
Charles Pinckney, May 11, 1802. 

3. lUd. 

4. Ibid., p. 35, Madison to Robert R. Livingston, May 1, 1802. 



The Purchase of Louisiana 105 

If it is possible "to obtain for the United States on 
convenient terms," writes Madison, "New Orleans and Flor- 
ida, the happiest of issues will be given to one of the most 
perplexing of occurrences." ^ The United States govern- 
ment seems to have definitely concluded that the Floridas 
were a part of the French cession but yet directed our min- 
ister at Madrid that, although at present the cession wished 
by this country must be an object of negotiation with the 
French government, the good disposition of Spain in rela- 
tion to it, must be cultivated, both as they may not be en- 
■•drely disregarded by France, and as in the turn of events 
Spain might possibly be extricated from her engagements 
to France and again have the disposal of the territories in 
question. 2 While still pressing the subject of a cession to 
the United States, Pinckney was unable to secure an answer 
as to the ,sale from Cevallos, who employed the traditionally 
Spanish method of diplomacy, delay and procrastination. ^ 
At any rate, Pinckney was convinced that much more de- 
pended upon France than Spain, even if the Floridas had 
not been ceded to that nation. Priding themselves as they 
did upon the extent of their empire, Pinckney expected his 
proposition to fall upon deaf ears and, although not hopeful 
of success, felt greatly encouraged that the Spanish min- 
istry was willing to even receive the proposition. 

Livingston meanwhile, obedient to his instructions, had 
been pressing the matter with Talleyrand at Paris. "Flor- 
ida is not .... included in the cession," he reported to Madi- 
son. ^ And in November he writes, "I have obtained ac- 
curate information of the offer to Spain : it is either to sell 
them Parma for forty-eight million livres or to exchange it 
for Florida. You see by this the value they put on Florida. 



1. Vol. VI, Instructions, p. 56, Madison to Livingston, Oct. 15, 1802. 

2. Ibid., p. 52, Madison to Pinckney, July 26, 1802. 

3. Pinckney's Letters, Pinckney to Madison, Aug. 30, 1802. 

4. Letters of Robert Livingston to .United States, Nov. 2, 1802. 



io6 The Purchase of Florida 

I fear Spain will accede to their proposition." ^ In all his 
letters to Talleyrand, Living'ston speaks of the Floridas as 
entirely apart from Louisiana and containing the Mobile 
and Pensacola rivers. 

Jefferson now determined upon a special mission to se- 
cure a settlement of the difficulty and selected Monroe to 
be joined with Livingston in a commission extraordinary to 
treat at Paris and with Pinckney at Madrid. "The object of 
Monroe's instructions," writes Madison, "will be to pro- 
cure a cession of New Orleans and the Floridas to the 
United States and consequently the establishment of the 
Mississippi as the boundary between the United States and 
Louisiana." ^ In order to draw the French igovernment into 
the agreement, a sum of money was to constitute a part of 
the proposition, to which should be added such regulations 
of the commerce of that river, and the others emptying into 
the Gulf of Mexico, as ought to be satisfactory to France. 

From news recently received by Jefferson it was in- 
ferred that the French government was not averse to nego- 
tiating on the grounds suggested. And Livingston was 
cautioned to use the utmost care in repressing extravagant 
anticipations of the terms to be offered by the United States, 
particularly of the sum of money as a bonus. 

Speaking broadly it may be said that two considerations 
moved Napoleon in his purpose to sell Louisiana to the 
United States. First, the increasing jealousy between Great 
Britain and France and the known aversion of the former 
to seeing the mouth of the Mississippi in the hands of the 
latter and the imminence of a Franco-English war wherein 
England, with her superior navy, would promptly seize the 
province. In the second place the First Consul desired 
to build up a power on the western continent, which should 



1. Letters of Robert Living'ston to United States, Nov. 14, 1802. 

2. Vol. VI, Instructions, p. 71, Madison to Pinckney, Jan. 18, 1803. 
Ibid., p. 73, Madison to Livingston, Jan. 18, 1803. 



The Purchase of Louisiana 107 

balance England and hold that nation in check. ^ Of lesser 
note but largely included in the considerations already 
named, was the state of things produced by the breach of 
our deposit at New Orleans ; the situation of the French 
islands, particularly the important island of San Domingo, 
and the unsettled posture of Europe. 

An order from the board of health of Spain for the 
exclusion of all vessels from the United States, at this 
juncture inspired a strong protest from the United States. 
This unreasonable order together with the closing of the 
port of New Orleans tended to bitterly increase the hostile 
feeling toward that nation. 

Again in February Pinckney addressed the Spanish 
secretary of state in a strong plea for a cession of the 
Floridas and New Orleans because, 

"The government of the United States from many cir- 
cum'Stances as well as from the conduct of the intendant feel 
themselves every day more convinced of the necessity of 
their having a permanent establishment on the Mississippi, 
convenient for the purposes of navigation and belonging 
solely to them. To obtain this they have authorized me to 
say that, should his Majesty be now inclined to sell to the 
United States his possessions on the east side of the River 
Mobile agreeably to the propositions inclosed, the United 
States will make to his Majesty, and I do now in their name, 
make the important offer of guaranteeing to him and his 
successors his Dominions beyond the Mississippi." His 



1. It is commonly supposed that Bonaparte sold Louisiana for the 
purpose of raising money from the necessity of replenishing a depleted 
treasury. This is a mistake. It was a cardinal principle of Napoleon 
to make war support war. Pursuing this theory he resolved war into 
a game of loot, and he played the game well, robbing, pillaging, 
and practicing the most outrageous and extravagant extortions upon 
his fallen enemies. He virtually lived on plunder. It is true that at 
this time he was anticipating an extensive war and that money 
would be useful — yet that cannot be accurately considered as one of 
the principal motives that induced him to part with Louisiana. 



io8 The Purchase of Florida 

Majesty should consider well "the immense importance of 
this offer to the Spanish crown and to reflect how far it may- 
be in the power of any other nation to make an offer so 
truly valuable and precious as this is to Spain. One that 
the United States would never have made but from a con- 
viction of the indispensable necessity of their possessing a 
suitable establishment on this River and which this territory 
can alone furnish." ^ 

In a conference between these two officials held at the 
end of Alarch the Spanish minister informed Pinckney "that 
Louisiana had been ceded to the French including the town 
of New Orleans," a statement which by the ordinary rules 
of construction can only mean that Louisiana as ceded to 
France comprised the territory to the west of the Mississippi 
besides the city of New Orleans. This question became the 
subject of bitter dispute in later years. 

Spain realizing the danger of breaking with the United 
States and thus driving us to join England, the time for 
securing such a cession seemed most propitious. While 
our representatives were too late to prevent the cession oi 
Louisiana they were largely instrumental in saving the Flor- 
idas from going the same wa/. ^ The Chevalier d'Yrujo, 
in a letter to the secretary of state in the summer of 1803, 
definitely stated that Spain must decline to cede the Flori- 
das because to do so would excite complaints from Euro- 
pean maritime powers, that it would injure the reputation 
of his Catholic Majesty thus to dismember his states and 
because "this compliance would be offensive to France who 
was desirous of having the cession of the Floridas, offering 
advantageous terms : and nevertheless his Majesty did not 
accede to it notwithstanding the ties and considerations 
which unite us with that power." ^ 



1. Vol. VI, Pinckney to Spanish Secretary of iState, Feb. 4, 1803. 

2. Vol. VI, Letters of Charles Pinckney, April 12, 1803. 

3. D'Yrujo to Madison, July 2, 1803. 



The Purchase of Louisiana 109 

Cevallos, the Spanish minister, in a letter to Pinckney, 
similarly demurred to the proposition. "The system adop- 
ted by his Majesty," he writes, "not to dispossess himself 
of any portion 'of his states deprives him of the pleasure 
of assenting to the cessions which the United States wish 
to ohtain by purchase, as I have intimated for their infor- 
mation to the Marquis de Casa Yrujo. By the retroces- 
sion made to France of Louisiana, that power regains the 
said province with the limits it had saving the rights ac- 
quired by other powers. 'The United States can address 
themselves to the French government to negotiate the acqui- 
sition of territories which may suit their interest." ^ 

An analysis of the instructions to Livingston and Mon- 
roe discloses the views held by our government with regard 
to the desired cession and the French control of New Or- 
leans and Louisiana proper. Jefferson felt that there was 
"on the globe one single spot, the possessor of which is our 

natural and habitual enemy. It is New Orleans 

France placing herself in that door, assumes to us an 
attitude of defiance." 

The new master of the mouth of the Mississippi was 
not a person whom an eloquent dispatch could intimidate. 
Spain held Louisiana merely on sufferance and it could be 
obtained from her at any time we might care to force the 
issue. But Napoleon would not be content with a couple 
of trading posts in a territory which could easily be trans- 
formed into an empire. The object was to procure a ces- 



1. Cevallos to Pinckney, May 4, 1803. 

"El sistema adoptado por S. M. de no desprenderse de porcion alguna 
de sus estados le priva del gusto de condescender a las cesiones que 
por compra quieren obtener los Estados Unidos segun tengo manifes- 
tado para intellgencia de estos al Marques de Casa Trujo. Por la 
retrocession hecha a la Francia de la Luisiana recotoro esta Potentia 
decha Provincia con los limites con que la tubo y salvos los derechos 
adquiridos por otras potencias. La de los Estados Unidos podra 
derigirse al Gubierno Francese para negociar la adquisicion de Ter- 
ritorias que convengas g, su interns." 



no The Purchase of Florida 

sion to the United States of "New Orleans and of West 
and East Florida or as much thereof as the actual proprietor 
can be prevailed on to part with." It was not clear just 
what France had acquired. It was understood that she 
had secured New Orleans, as part of Louisiana, and if the 
Floridas had not been included in the cession it was con- 
sidered not improbable that they had since been added 
to it. 

The danger of war with France was alluded to. If 
she held New Orleans, continued conflicts and hostilities 
were certain ; and in such an event the United States would 
ally herself with Great Britain. The low ebb of French 
finances might persuade that country of the desirability of 
making a sale. The motives of France in securing Louisi- 
ana were then discussed. 

1. The eastern states favoring Great Britain, by hold- 
ing Louisiana and the key to the commerce of the Missis- 
sippi River, France might be able to command the interests 
and attachments of the western states and thus either also 
control the Atlantic or seduce the western states into a 
separate government and a close alliance with herself. 

2. The advancement of the commerce of France by an 
establishment on the Mississippi. 

3. A further object with France might be the forma- 
tion of a colonial establishment having a convenient relation 
to her West India Islands and forming an independent 
source of supplies for them. The cession of the Floridas 
was particularly to be desired as obviating serious contro- 
versies that would otherwise grow out of the regulations, 
however liberal, which she might establish at the mouths 
of those rivers. The right of navigation to those rivers 
was indispensable to procure the proper outlets to foreign 
markets ; this was a claim so natural, so reasonable, and so 
essential tliat it must take place and in prudence ought to 



The Purchase of Louisiana in 

be amicably and effectually adjusted without further delay. 

In a plan of treaty embodied in the instructions the first 
article read : 

"France cedes to the United States forever the territory 
east of the River Mississippi, comprehending the two Flor- 
idas, the Island of New Orleans, and the islands lying to the 
north and east of that channel of the said river which is 
commonly called the South Pass, together with all such 
other islands as appertain to either East or West Florida, 
France reserving to herself all her territory on the west 
side of the Mississippi." The commissioners were author- 
ized as the highest price to offer fifty million livres tournois, 
about $9,250,000, this sum to be applied to the claims of 
the citizens of the United States and the remainder to be 
paid to France. This price was to be the consideration for 
the cession of "the Island of New Orleans and both the 
Floridas." But should France be willing to dispose of only 
some parts of those territories the commissioners were in- 
structed that "the Floridas together are estimated at one- 
fourth the value of the w'hole Island of New Orleans, and 
East Florida, at one-half that of West Florida." If France 
refused to cede the whole Island of New Orleans, the com- 
missioners were instructed to buy a place sufficient for a 
commercial town on the bank of the Mississippi and to 
secure suitable deposits at the mouths of the rivers passing 
from the United States through the Floridas, as well as the 
free navigation of those rivers by citizens of the United 
States. 1 

By supplementary instructions the commissioners were 
authorized to treat with Great Britain for an alliance against 
France, if France should decline to treat with the United 
States. War seemed not unlikelv. For, if France denied 



1. Vol. VI, Instructions, pp. 81-95. Madison to Livingston and 
Monroe, March 2, 1803. 



112 The Purchase of Florida 

t'O this country the free navigation of the Mississippi, hostil- 
ities could not be avoided. ^ 

Our minister to Great Britain, Mr. King, had been 
informed by the British minister, Addington, that in the 
event of war between Great Britain and France, England 
would in all likelihood seize New Orleans. The commis- 
sioners were therefore directed in no event to guarantee 
to France the territory 'west of the Mississippi, as, should 
Great Britain conquer it, the United States would be placed 
in a most embarrassing position. ~ 

At the time the negotiations for the purchase of Louis- 
iana were closed, Barbe-Marbois, the French minister, orally 
stipulated that France would never possess the Floridas, 
that she would relinquish all her rights and would aid us 
to procure them. ^ Cevallos in an interview with Pinckney 
expressed the greatest surprise at the cession of Louisiana 
to this country, since France, in receiving it from Spain, had, 
promised never to part with it. The entire Spanish min- 
istry shared this feeling of chagrin and disappointment, real- 
izing how much better it would have been had Spain kept 
the colony and sold it directly to the United States. * 

The Duke of Parma, son-in-law of the king of Spain, 
was desirous of securing for himself the succession to the 
Grand Duchy of Tuscany that he might be raised to the 
dignity of king and have his dominions enlarged by the 
addition of Tuscany. France having promised these dis- 
tinctions and enlarged territory in Italy, Spain, by the 
treaty of San Ildefonso, October i, 1800, agreed to cede 
Louisiana which she had held for thirty-eight years. These 
terms of the treaty had not been carried out by France. 



1. Vol. VI, Instructions, p. 113. Madison to Livingston and Mon- 
roe, April 18, 1803. 

2. Vol. VI, Instructions, p. 131, Madison to Livingston and Monroe, 
May 28, 1803. 

3. Livingston to Secretary of State, No. 74, April 13, 1803. 

4. Vol. VI, Binckney to Secretary of State, June 12, 1803. 



The Purchase of Louisiana 113 

She had also agreed to secure the recognition of Russia and 
Great Britain for the king of Tuscany. This she had not 
accomplished. Furthermore she 'had agreed never to alien- 
ate the province to any nation except Spain. 

On the fourth of September, 1803, and again on Sep- 
tember 27th and October 12th of the same year, D'Yrujo 
protested against the cession to this country on the ground 
that France could not, in consonance with the treaty, dispose 
of the province and, further, that the consideration for the 
cession between Spain and France had failed. 

There can and should be no other way to judge of the 
acts of a nation than by applying to them the same rules 
that we consult in passing judgment upon the acts of men. 
Let us frame a case in municipal law, fitting the conditions 
as nearly as possible to those which existed in the relations 
between Spain, France and the United States with regard 
to the Louisiana purchase. 

A enters into a contract to transfer to B a piece of 
property, in consideration of B's securing to him certain 
rights. B, 'however, does not perform his part and the 
consideration of the contract thus fails. The contract is 
thereby rendered void. B takes steps to transfer tlie prop- 
erty to C. A, learning of this, notifies C that B does not 
possess and cannot pass a good title. Even if C be a 
purchaser for value from B his title will not stand as against 
A. It is a rule of universal application that if a person 
acquiring either a legal or equitable estate has, at the time 
of acquisition, notice of an existing interest or estate in the 
subject matter possessed by a third party, he will be held 
to have acquired only such an interest or estate as the 
owner could honestly transfer. A court of competent juris- 
diction would, in the case supposed, not hesitate to restore 
full title and possession to A. Further let us suppose that 
B expressly contracts never to alienate the property except 
to retransfer it to A. Ignoring any irrelevant question, 



114 -^^^ Purchase of Florida 

whi'ch might arise as to whether such a contract violated the 
rule against perpetuities or was in restraint of trade, A's 
rights would be enforced by the courts, and title and pos- 
session restored to him were B to alienate the property to 
a purchaser with notice. 

These were practically the conditions which existed in 
the history of the Louisiana acquisition. France had guar- 
anteed to Spain, as consideration for the transfer of Louis- 
iana to herself, to secure the recognition of the king of 
Tuscany by Great Britain and Russia. This France had 
not done, and the consideration having failed, the treaty 
was null and void. She had further agreed as part of the 
consideration never to alienate the province except to Spain. 
The United States was undoubtedly a purchaser with notice, 
for Spain on the fourth and twenty-seventh of September, 
and the twelfth of October, 1803, had served notice upon this 
country and protested against the sale. And fully as signifi- 
cant from the standpoint of municipal law is the fact that 
France, when she sold Louisiana to the United States, had 
not entered into possession, nor did she do so until December, 
1803. 

If we might suppose the dreams of the theorists real- 
ized and a court of international jurisdiction established, 
Spain as a litigant, applying the principles of municipal 
law, could have secured a decree compelling the United 
States to restore Louisiana to her; or had she so desired, 
she might have sued France for the original consideration 
and accompanying damages. The United States would 
have had recourse on France to secure the return of the 
purchase price. The author cannot believe that there are 
any two rules of right, one for nations and another for men. 
Nowhere does our religion teach two systems of ethics, but 
only one unalterable code, applicable alike to individuals and 
to nations. The only way to justify many of our national 
acts is to insist that there exists one code of morals by which 



The Purchase of Louisiana 115 

we shall judge of men and another by which we shall judge 
of nations. The answer of course is that all nations do the 
same — which is true to a large extent and also very dis- 
graceful. But custom does not make right or excuse wrong. 

Many writers claim that Spain was estopped from pro- 
testing against the transfer of Louisiana to the United 
States, by the letter of Cevallos to Pinckney of May 4, 1803, 
wherein the following statement occurs : "The United 
States can address themselves to the French government 
to negotiate the acquisition of territories which may suit 
their interest." In the first place was the letter anything 
but an effort on the part of Cevallos to 'be rid of a persistently 
importuning minister, feeling as he did that Spain was 
protected by her treaty with France? Further the letter 
was undoubtedly written when Cevallos still expected Na- 
poleon to carry out the stipulations of the treaty of San 
Ildefonso. Later it became clear that the treaty was null 
and void for want of mutuality, and then Spain served 
notice on the United States who could not be considered 
an innocent purchaser. 

A stronger nation, England for instance, would beyond 
doubt have appealed to the sword, but poor Spain, realizing 
her own helpleSiS position and the futility of stronger repre- 
sentations, could only protest. She knew she could do no 
rnore, she knew that a resort to arms could only increase 
her humiliation and her losses — and the United States 
knew it too and treated her protests with silent contempt — 
and Louisiana became ours. When we realize the helpless- 
ness of Spain buffeted and kicked around by first England 
and then France, and our boot was in it too, we see in fact 
how little chance there was for her to secure any redress. 
Had she been a more virile power, and less hampered by 
misfortunes, she might have considered our acquisition of 
Louisiana, in spite of her representations, a casus belli. 

The present time seemed most propitious for pushing 



ii6 The Purchase of Florida 

the Spanish g-overnment for a sale of the Floridas. War 
'had been declared between Russia and France and there 
was every indication that by spring it would involve the 
entire continent. General Bournonville, the French am- 
bassador at Madrid, assured Pinckney that he had received 
directions from his government to promote a disposition in 
Spain to sell the Floridas to us. To French influence it 
was believed was due our failure to secure the coveted 
territory before. ^ 

"The Floridas are not included in the treaty, being, it 
appears, still held by Spain," wrote Madison to Pinckney. 
Although it was true that Spain had refused to alienate any 
part of her colonial possessions yet, "at the date of this 
refusal," continued the secretary of state, "it was probably 
unknown that the cession by France to the United States 
had been or would be made. This consideration with the 
kind of reasons given for the refusal and the situation of 
Spain resulting from the war between Great Britain and 
France lead to a calculation that at present there may be 
less repugnance to our views. . . . But considering the 
motives which Spain ought now to feel for making the 
arrangement easy and satisfactory, the certainty that the 
Floridas must at no distant period find a way into our hands, 
and the tax on our finances resulting from the purchase of 
Louisiana which makes a further purchase immediately less 
convenient, it may be hoped as it is to be wished that the 
bargain will be considerably cheapened." ^ Pinckney follow- 
ing instructions, continued to address overtures to Cevallos, 
dwelling on the danger that Florida, from her position, 
might cause a rupture between Spain and the United States ; 
that in reality the Floridas were a financial burden to Spain 
costing far more than they returned ; and that the United 
States desired them from no spirit of aggrandizement or 



1. Vol. VI, Pinckney to Secretary of State, Aug. 30, 1803. 

2. Vol. VI, Instructions, p. 135, Madison to Pinckney, July 29, 1803. 



The Purchase of Louisiana iij 

dictate of ambition but merely to fill out the boundary and 
insure against future disputes. 

Monroe after the close of the negotiations for the pur- 
chase of Louisiana proceeded to London rather than to 
Madrid, considering the time unfavorable for a Spanish 
treaty. The strong protest and ill humor of Spain due to 
the cession of Louisiana were the principal reasons against 
attempting, at that time, to procure from the Spanish gov- 
ernment the residuum of territory desired by the United 
States. Indeed Spain presented so bold a front at this 
juncture as to induce the belief that she had an under- 
standing with some powerful quarter of Europe. 

Writing to Pinckney, Madison discussed at some length 
the Spanish motives in opposing the transfer and the folly 
of such a course even if successful. In part he said: 

"If it be her aim to prevent the execution of the treaty 
between the United States and France in order to have for 
her neighbor the latter instead of the United States, it is not 
difficult to show that she mistakes the lesser for the greater 
danger against which she wishes to provide. Admitting, 
as she may possibly suppose, that Louisiana as a French 
colony would be less able as well as less disposed than the 
United States to encroach on her southern possessions and 
that it would be too much occupied with its own safety 
against the United States, to turn its force on the other 
side against her possessions, still it is obvious in the first 
place that in proportion to the want of power in the French 
compared with the power of the United States, the colony 
would be insufficient as a barrier against the United States, 
and in the next place, that the very security which she pro- 
vides would still be a source of the greatest of all dangers 
she has to apprehend. The collision between the United 
States and the French would lead to a contest in which 
Spain would of course be on the side of the latter ; and 
what becomes of Louisiana and the Spanish possessions be- 
yond it, in a contest between powers, so marshaled? An 
easy and certain victim to the fleets of Great Britain and the 
land armies of this country. A combination of these forces 



Ii8 The Purchase of Florida 

was always and justly dreaded by both Spain and France. 
It was the danger which led both into our Revolutionary war 
and as much inconsistency as weakness is chargeable on the 
projects of either which tend to reunite, for the purposes of 
war, the power which has been divided. France returning 
to her original policy has wisely, by her late treaty with the 
United States, obviated a danger which could not have been 
very remote. Spain will be equally wise in following the 
example and by acquiescing in an arrangement which guards 
against an early danger of controversy between the United 
States, first with France then with herself, and removes to 
a distant day the approximation of the American and Span- 
ish settlements, provides in the best possible manner for the 
security of the latter and for a lasting harmony with the 
United States. What is it that Spain dreads ? She dreads, 
it is presumed, the growing power of this country and the 
direction of it against her possessions within its reach. Can 
she annihilate this power? No. Can she sensibly retard 
its growth? No. Does not common prudence then advise 
her, to conciliate by every proof of friendship and confidence 
the good will of a nation whose power is formidable to her ; 
instead of yielding to the impulses of jealousy and adopt- 
ing obnoxious precautions, which can have no other effect 
than to bring on prematurely the whole weight of the calam- 
ity which she fears?" ^ 

L-ouisiana then having become, by the ratification of the 
French treaty, a part of the United States, steps were im- 
mediately taken for the transfer of the province to its new 
owner. Claiborne, the governor of the Mississippi territory, 
was named as "governor of Louisiana and commissioner to 
receive the province from the French representative." Re- 
cent occurrences, particularly the protests of the Spanish 
minister against the cession, made it necessary to provide for 
such a contingency as the refusal by the Spanish authorities 
at New Orleans to give up tlie country according to her 
engagements with France. It must be borne in mind that 
although Spain had ceded Louisiana to France in Octc^ber, 



1. Vol. VI, Instructions, p. 149, Madison to Pinckney, Oct. 12, 1803. 



The Purchase of Louisiana 119 

1800, she had never actually delivered possession of the 
province ; Spanish troops still manned the garrisons at New 
Orleans and Spanish grandees and nobles still dispensed 
law and justice in that city. Jefferson determined to be 
prepared for all emergencies and to make good our title even 
by employing force, an act of congress having duly author- 
ized this course. General Wilkinson was named as com- 
mander of these troops. The first question was whether 
our troops near New Orleans with the aid of well disposed 
inhabitants could dispossess the Spanish authorities. Gov- 
ernor Claiborne was instructed to communicate with M. 
L^aussat, the French envoy, whose sanction and co-operation 
were particularly desired. Should it be decided that a coup 
de main was necessary, General Wilkinson should not hesi- 
tate. His forces were to consist of the regular troops near 
at hand, as many of the militia as might be requisite, and 
could foe drawn from the Mississippi territory, and such 
volunteers from any quarter as could be picked up. To 
them would be added five hundred mounted militia from 
Tennessee who had been already requisitioned. In order to 
"add the effect of terror to the force of arms" word was 
given out that measures were in train for sending on from 
Kentucky and elsewhere a large force, sufficient to over- 
whelm all possible resistance. ^ 

At a conference between the Spanish and French offi- 
cials the method of transfer was agreed upon. With the 
Spanish troops drawn up in solemn procession, in the 
presence of a large concourse of people, the commissioners 
representing France and Spain played their parts. The 
French commissioner presented to the Spanish commissioner 
the order of the king of Spain for the surrender of the 
province, dated more than a year previous, and with this 
the order of Napoleon to receive possession in the name of 



1. Vol. XIV, Domestic Letters, Madison to Governor Claiborne, 
Oct. 31, 1803. 



I20 The Purchase of Florida 

France. The Spanish governor then surrendered the keys 
of the city and with the lowering of the Spanish and the 
raising of the French colors, amid the booming of artillery 
the authority of King Charles gave way to that of Napoleon. 
For the brief space of twenty days, the French administered 
the province; then the formal delivery was made to the 
United States as, with bands playing and colors flying, the 
American troops marched into the city. Again the cannon 
boomed and again Louisiana had changed hands. 

For the crowd that witnessed the ceremonies on that 
twentieth day of December, 1803, Claiborne's promise that 
this transfer would be the last, fell on incredulous ears. 
Within a century, nay within the 'lifetime of men then living, 
Louisiana had six times changed rulers. Ninety-one years be- 
fore when but a thousand white men had ventured within her 
limits, Louis XIV had farmed Louisiana to Antoine Crozat, 
the merchant monopolist of his day. Crozat in 1717 made 
it over to John Law, director general of the Mississippi 
Company who, in 1731, surrendered it to Louis XV. By 
treaty in 1762 it passed to the king of Spain; and Spain 
by the treaty of San Ildefonso had re-ceded it to France, 
who in 1803 sold it to the United States. The general im- 
pression prevailed among the American emigrants who 
crossed the Mississippi while Louisiana still belonged to 
Spain, and as early as 1793-95, that shortly the country 
would be annexed to the United States. It had been the 
policy of Spain to encourage American emigration into up- 
per Louisiana. The distance to New Orleans was great 
and the intervening country was a vast wilderness penetrated 
only by a river difficult of navigation. The Spanish were 
in constant fear of a British and Indian invasion from Can- 
ada, and the Americans they knew to be naturally hostile to 
the British and thus ready to protect the , country. 

There was soon apparent in the city of New Orleans 
a strongly marked opposition to American sovereignty. 



The Purchase of Louisiana I2i 

This antipathy, strong among the people, was still further in- 
creased by the emissaries of the old regime. By the terms 
of the treaty, the Spanish troops continued to hold the 
barracks, the magazines and the hospital and daily mount 
guard in New Orleans. Meanwhile American soldiers oc- 
cupied redoubts about the city and in the tents along the 
marshes contracted poisonous fevers while their govern- 
ment at extravagant prices hired buildings for the storage 
of provisions, implements, tents, baggage and arms, powder 
and guns and hospital stores. Not until April, 1804, did 
the first detachment of three hundred Spanish troops depart 
for Pensacola. 

For more than a year the principal commissioners, the 
commissary of war, the paymaster and treasurer of the army, 
the late intendant, the revenue and custom house officials, 
surgeons, chaplains, regimental officers of every rank lin- 
gered in New Orleans and openly boasted of the day not far 
distant when the trans-Mississippi territory would again be 
Spanish territory. Though the Americans might insist that 
the cession was a permanent one, yet why these Spanish 
officials ? Was not their presence, so long after they should 
have departed or been ejected, proof that the recovery of 
the province was seriously contemplated ? So prevalent was 
this belief that many feared even to show a decent respect 
for the territorial government lest, when the retrocession 
s'hould come, they be made to suffer for their disloyalty. 
Much less could men be induced to accept office ; and when 
October arrived and the government was about to organize 
five of the legislative council, appointed by Jefiferson, refused 
to serve. 



CHAPTER IV. 

WKST li'LORIDA BETWEEN THE MOBILE AND THE MISSISSIPPI. 

FOR $15,000,000 the United States had purchased a 
province and a quarrel. 
In the early spring of 1804 congress passed an act, "For 
laying and collecting duties on Imports and Tonnage within 
the Territory ceded to the United States by Treaty of April 
30, 1803, between the United States and the French Repub- 
lic, and for other purposes." The eleventh section of this 
act read : "And be it further enacted that the president be, 
and hereby is, authorized, whenever he shall deem it exped- 
ient to erect the Shores, Waters and Inlets of the Bay and 
River Mobile and of the other Rivers, Creeks, Inlets and 
Bays emptying into the Gulf of Mexico, east of the said 
River Mobile and west thereof to the Pascagoula, inclusive, 
into a separate District and to establish such place within 
the same, as he shall deem expedient, to be the Port of Entry 
and Delivery for such District and to designate such other 
Places within the same District not exceeding two, to be 
Ports of Delivery, only. Whenever such separate District 
shall be erected, a collector shall be appointed to reside at 
each of the Ports of Delivery which may be established, etc." 
The indignant D'Yrujo, Gazette in hand, penned in burning 
words a letter to Madison on what he had at first believed 
to be an "atrocious libel against the government of this 
country," but which he now unhesitatingly declared as "one 
of the greatest insults which one power can be guilty of 



West Florida 123 

towards another" — words scarcely diplomatic but full of 
feeling withal. "How could I expect," he wrote, "that the 
American government which prides itself so much on its 
good faith, which is so zealous in the preservation and de- 
fense of' its own rights would have violated with all the 
solemnity of a legislative act those of the king,, my master, 
by usurping his sovereignty ? ^ . . . What would have been 
the sensations of the people of America if, soon after the 
treaty made by Spain with the United States, in the year 
1795, by which the boundary line between the territory of 
the two powers was fixed at the 31° of latitude, the king, 
my master, had authorized any of his chief officers in Amer- 
ica to divide a part of Georgia into districts and to establish 
custom houses in various points of them, simply because it 
was imagined that the territory in which he chose to place 
them belonged to that portion which would remain to him 
according to the boundary line which had not then been 
drawn ? 

"The right which the United States arrogate of legis- 
lating in the territories mentioned in the said eleventii section 
is not better founded than would be that of his Catholic 
Majesty to have made laws in the former instance for a 
great part of Georgia. But even if the treaty of the thir- 
tieth of April had given any ground or appearance of found- 
ation for the establishment of such pretensions it v/as natur- 
al that the United States from a 'Sentiment of justice, of deli- 
cacy and of that decorum and respect which nations owe to 
each other, should have proceeded by the ordinary way of 
negotiation to clear up their doubts and to establish their 
conduct upon a basis which would not be in contradiction 
to their principles. 

"The congress however, so far from observing the 
established usages in cases of this nature, proceeds at once 
to a decision and not only authorizes the president to exe- 

1. Vol. I, D'Trujo to Secretary of State, Marc)a 7, 1804. 



124 -^^^ Purchase of Florida 

cute certain acts in West Florida which indisputably belongs 
to the king, my master, but expresses this in such vague 
and indefinite terms that the president may consider himself 
authorized by the said act to annex a part of East Florida 
to the district of which mention is made in the eleventh 
section and to place a collector of the customs in Apalache 
or Pensacola. . . . The authority given to the president is 
unlimited, east of the River Mobile, and comprehends indi- 
rectly the power of declaring or rather making war since it 
is not to be presumed ,that any nation will patiently permit 
another to make laws within its territories without its con- 
sent. 

"If the act on the part of the United States of legis- 
lating in the possessions enumerated in the above mentioned 
section be a real insult towards the king, my master, even if 
there could exist any doubts as to the true limits of Louis- 
iana acquired by the treaty of the thirtieth of April last, how 
much greater must that offense appear when there does not 
exist any well-founded reason by which the United States 
can establish any pretensions to West Florida." 

The right to West Florida and the merits of the respec- 
tive claims of the United States and Spain to that province 
have been an academic question for a century — even after 
its practical settlement by the treaty of 1819 — nor does the 
issue seem to have been satisfactorily determined, though 
one hundred years have rolled by since first it arose. It 
may be permissible then to take up and weigh the various 
arguments which have been presented, in an effort to reach 
the truth of the matter or rather to ascertain the merits of 
the case. 

When, under Washington, the matter was first broached, 

.the desideratum of this nation was the Floridas and New 

Orleans — the territory east of the Mississippi and south of 

our then southern boundary. And when Jefferson opened 

the negotiations with Napoleon for a purchase, it was not 



West Florida 125 

the province of Louisiana but rather New Orleans and the 
Floridas that he wished to secure. The fact that Spain had 
not ceded the Floridas was only later known to the United 
States. The correspondence of Jefferson clearly shows that 
his idea was that hy securing New Orleans and the Floridas 
the United States would possess a well rounded national 
domain east of the Mississippi. Therefore, we must con- 
clude that Jefferson began the negotiation with the idea 
that the territory of West Florida extended to the Missis- 
sippi with 31° latitude for its northern boundary, as settled 
in the Spanish- American treaty of 1795. Had it been un- 
derstood that West Florida extended only to the Perdido, 
Jefferson should and would have given instructions to 
negotiate for the purchase of both Floridas, New Orleans 
and that part of Louisiana east of the Mississippi and be- 
tween that river and the Perdido. 

We will further recall that Napoleon made several 
unsuccessful attempts to persuade Spain to cede the Floridas 
to him after he had secured Louisiana by the treaty of San 
Ildefonso and a minister, General Bournonville, was sent 
to Madrid for that express purpose. Among other things 
the duchy of Parma was offered in exchange, but to the 
United States was attributed the failure of the negotiation. 
From the extent of the seacoast, 'the number of good har- 
bors and the situation of the Floridas, France, owning 
Louisiana, was anxious also to possess those provinces, ^ 

No definite limits had been stated in our treaty of pur- 
chase because they were not known. But the United States 
construed the treaty in the manner most favorable to itself 
— a disposition as natural among nations as among indi- 
viduals. At the time of the delivery of the province of Louis- 
iana at New Orleans, orders were obtained from the Spanish 
authorities for the delivery of all the posts on the west side' 



Vol. VI, Instructions, p. 226, Madison to Livingston, March 31, 1804. 



126 The Purchase of Florida 

of the Mississippi as well as the island of New Orleans. 
With respect to the posts in West Florida orders for the 
delivery were neither offered to nor demanded by our 
commissioners. The defense of our side of the dispute 
together with a statement of our claims is clearly and 
succinctly given in a letter from Madison to Livingston. 
We can do no better than to quote therefrom at length. 

"This silence on the part of the executive was deemed 
eligible — first because it was foreseen that the demand 
would not only be rejected by the Spanish authority at New 
Orleans which had in an official publication limited the 
cession eastwardly by the Mississippi and the island ot 
New Orleans, but it was apprehended, as has turned out, 
that the French commissioner might not be ready to sup- 
port the demand and might even be disposed to second the 
Spanish opposition. Secondly because in the latter of these 
cases a serious check would be given to our title and in 
either of them a premature dilemma would result between 
an overt submission to the refusal and a resort to force. 
Thirdly because mere silence would be no bar to a plea at 
any time that a delivery of a part, particularly at the seat of 
government was a virtual delivery of the whole, whilst in 
the meantime, we could ascertain the views and claim the 
interposition of the French government and avail ourselves 
of that and any other favorable circum.stances for effecting 
an amicable adjustment of Spain. . . . 

"The territory ceded to the United States is described 
in the words following, 'the colony or province of Louisiana 
with the same extent that it now has in the hands of Spain, 
that it had when France possessed it and such as it ought 
to be according to the treaties subsequently passed between 
Spain and other states.' 

"In expounding this threefold description, the different 
forms used must be so understood as to give a meaning to 
each description, and to make the meaning of each coincide 



West Florida 127 

with that of the others. The first form of description is a 
reference to the extent which Louisiana now has m. the 
hands of Spain. What is that extent as determined by its 
eastern Hmits? It is not denied that the Perdido was once 
the east Hmit of Louisiana. It is not denied that the terri- 
tory now possessed by Spain extends to the River Perdido. 
The River Perdido we say then is the Hmit to the east extent 
of the Louisiana ceded to the United States. 

"This construction gives an obvious and pertinent 
meaning to the term 'now' and to the expression 'in the 
hands of Spain/ which can be found in no other construc- 
tion. For a considerable time previous to the treaty of 
peace in 1783 between Great Britain and Spain, Louisiana 
as in the hands of Spain was Hmited eastwardly by the 
Mississippi, the Iberville, etc. The term 'now' fixes its 
extent as enlarged by that treaty in contradistinction to the 
more limited extent in which Spain held it prior to the 
treaty. 

"Again the expression 'in the hands or in the pos- 
session of Spain' fixes the same extent, because the expres- 
sion cannot relate to the extent which Spain by her internal 
regulations may have given to a particular district under 
the name of Louisiana, but evidently to the extent in which 
it was known to other nations, particularly to the nation in 
treaty with her, and in which it was, relatively to other 
nations, in her hands and not in the hands of any other 
nation. It would be absurd to consider the expression 'in 
the hands of Spain' as relating not to others but to herself 
and to her own regulations ; for the territory of Louisiana 
in her hands must be equally so and be the same whether 
formed into one or twenty districts or by whatever name or 
names it may be called by herself. 

"What may now be the extent of a provincial district 
under the name of Louisiana according to the municipal 
arrangements of the Spanish government is not perfectly 



128 The Purchase of Florida 

known. It is at least questionable whether even these ar- 
rangements have not incorporated the portion of Louisiana 
acquired from Great Britain with the west portion before 
belonging to Spain, under the same provincial government. 
But whether such be the fact or not the construction of the 
treaty will be the same. The next form of description refers 
to the extent which Louisiana had when possessed by 
France. What is this extent? It will be admitted that for 
the whole period prior to the division of Louisiana between 
Spain and Great Britain in 1762-63 or at least from the 
adjustm.ent of boundary between France and Spain in 1719 
to that event, Louisiana extended in the possession of 
France to the River Perdido. Had the meaning then of the; 
first description been less determinate and had France been 
in possession of Louisiana at any time with less extent than 
to the Perdido, a reference to this primitive and long con- 
tinued extent would be more natural and probable than to 
any other. But it happens that France never possessed 
Louisiana with less extent than to the Perdido ; because on 
the same day that she ceded a part to Spain the residue was 
ceded to Great Britain and (Consequently as long as she 
possessed Louisiana at all, she possessed it entire, that is in 
its extent to the Perdido. It is true that after the cession 
of West Louisiana to Spain in the year 1762-63, the actual 
delivery of the territory by France was delayed for several 
years, but it can never be supposed that a reference could 
be intended to this short period of delay during which 
France held that portion of Louisiana without the east por- 
tion, in the right of Spain only, not in her own right ; when 
in other words she held it .as the trustee of Spain ; and that 
a reference to such a possession for such a period should be 
intended rather than a reference to the long possession of 
the whole territory in her own acknowledged rig-ht prior 
to that period. 

"In the order of the French king in 1762 to Mons. 



West Florida 129 

d'A'bbadia for the delivery of West Louisiana to Spain it 
is stated that the cession by France was on the third of 
November and the acceptance by Spain on the thirteenth 
of that month, leaving an interval of ten days. An anxiety 
to find a period during which Louisiana, as limited by the 
Mississippi and the Iberville, was held by France in her own 
right may possibly lead the Spanish government to seize 
the pretext into which this momentary interval may be 
converted. But it will be a mere pretext. In the first 
place it lis probable that the treaty of cession to Spain 
which is dated on the same day with that to Great Britain 
was like the latter a preliminary treaty, .consummated and 
confirmed by a definitive treaty bearing the same date with 
the definitive treaty including the cession to Great Brit- 
ain, in which case the time and effect oi each cession 
would be the same whether recurrence be had to the date 
of the preliminary or definitive treaties. In the next place 
the cession by France to Spain was essentially made, on 
the third of November, 1762, on which day, the same with 
that of the cession of Great Britain, the right passed from 
France. The acceptance by Spain ten days later, if nec- 
essary at all to perfect the deed, had relation to the date 
of the cession by France and must have the same effect 
and no other, as if Spain had signed the deed on the same 
day with France. This explanation which rests on the 
soundest principles, nullifies the interval of ten days so as 
to make the cessions to Great Britain and Spain simultan- 
eous, on tbe supposition that recurrence be had to the 
preliminary treaty and not the definitive treaty, and con- 
sequently establishes the fact that France at no time pos- 
sessed Louisiana with less extent than to the Perdido, the 
alienation and partition of the territory admitting no dis- 
tinction of time. In the last place, conceding even that 
during an interval of ten days, the right of Spain was 
incomplete and was in transition only from France or in 



130 The Purchase of Florida 

another form of expression that the right remained in 
France subject to the eventual acceptance of Spain; is it 
possible to believe that a description which must be pre- 
sumed to aim at clearness and certainty, should refer 
for its purposes to so fugitive and equivocal a state of 
things, in preference to a state of things where the right 
and the possession of France were of long continuance 
and susceptible of neither doubt nor controversy? It is 
impossible. And consequently the only possible construc- 
tion which can be put on the second form of descrip- 
tion coincides with the only rational construction that can 
be put on the first, making Louisiana of the same extent, 
that is, to the River Perdido, both 'as in the hands of 
Spain and as France possessed it.' 

"The third and last description of Louisiana is in these 
words 'such as it ought to be according to the treaties sub- 
sequently passed between Spain and other states.' 

"This description may be considered as auxiliary to 
the two others and is conclusive as an argument for com- 
prehending within the cession of Spanish territory eastward 
of the Mississippi and the Iberville, for extending the 
cession to the River Perdido. The only treaties between 
Spain and other nations that affect the extent of Louisiana 
as being subsequent to the possession of it by France, are, 
first, the treaty in 1783 between Spain and Great Britain and 
secondly the treaty of 1795 between Spain and the United 
States. 

"The last of these treaties affects the extent of Louis- 
iana as in the hands of Spain by defining the northern 
boundary of that part of ■ it which lies east of the Mis- 
sissippi and the Iberville. And the first affects the extent 
of Louisiana by including in the cession from Great Britain 
to Spain the territory between that river and the Perdido; 
and by giving to Louisiana in consequence of that reunion 
and of the east and v^^est part, the same extent eastwardly 



West Florida 131 

in the hands of Spain as it had when France possessed 
it. Louisiana then as it ought to be according to treaties 
of Spain su'bsequently to the possession by France, is lim- 
ited by the hne of demarkation settled with the United 
States and forming a northern boundary and is extended 
to the River Perdido as its east boundary. 

"This is not only the plain and necessary construc- 
tion of the words but is the only construction that can 
give a meaning to them. For they are without meaning on 
the supposition that Louisiana as in the hands of Spain 
is limited by the Mississippi and the Iberville. Include 
this part therefore, as we (Contend, within the extent of 
Louisiana, and a meaning is given to both as pertinent as 
it is important. Exclude this part, as Spain contends, 
from Louisiana and no treaties exist to which the refer- 
ence is applicable. This deduction cannot be evaded by 
pretending that the reference to subsequent treaties of 
Spain was meant to save the right of deposit and other 
rights stipulated to the commerce of the United States by 
the treaty of 1795 — first because, although that may be 
an incidental object of the reference to that treaty, as was 
signified by his Catholic Majesty to the government of the 
United States, yet the principal object of the reference is 
evidently the territorial extent of Louisiana; secondly be- 
cause the reference is to more than one treaty, to the treaty 
of 1783 as well as to that of 1795 and the treaty of 1783 
can have no modifying effect whatever, rendering it ap- 
plicable, but on the supposition that Louisiana was con- 
sidered as extending east of the Mississippi and the Iber- 
ville, into the territory ceded by that treaty to Spain. 

"In fine the construction which we maintain gives to 
every part of the description of the territory ceded to the 
United States, a meaning clear in itself and in harmony 
with every other part, and is no less conformable to facts, 
than it is founded on the ordinary use and analogy of the 



132 The Purchase of Florida 

expressions. The construction urged by Spain gives on 
the contrary a meaning to the first description which is 
inconsistent with the very terms of it; it prefers in the 
second a meaning that is impossible or absurd, and it takes 
from the last all meaning whatever. 

"In confirmation of the meaning which extends Louis- 
iana to the River Perdido, it may be regarded as most 
consistent with the object of the first consul in the cession 
obtained by him from Spain. Every appearance, every 
circumstance pronoun<ces this to have been to give lustre 
to his administration and to gratify a natural pride in his 
nation by reannexing to its domain possessions which had 
without any sufficient considerations been severed from it, 
and which, being in the hands of Spain, it was in the 
power of Spain to restore. Spain, on the other side, might 
be the less reluctant against the cession in this extent as 
she would be only replaced by it, within the original limits 
of her possessions, the territory east of the Perdido hav- 
ing been regained by her from Great Britain in the peace 
of 1783 and not included in the late cession. 

"It only remains to take notice of the argument de- 
rived from a criticism on the term 'retrocede' by which the 
cession from Spain to France is expressed. The literal 
meaning of this term is said to be that Spain gives back to 
Frantce what she received from France : and that, as she 
received from France no more than the territory west of 
the Mississippi and Iberville, that and no more could be 
given back by Spain. 

"Without denying that such a meaning, if uncontrolled 
by other terms would have. been properly expressed by the 
term 'retrocede,' it is sufficient, and more than sufficient, 
to observe first that with respect to FrarKce the literal 
meaning is satisfied : France receiving back what she had 
before alienated. Secondly, that with respect to Spain not 
only the greater part of Louisiana had been confessedly 



JVest Florida 133 

received by her from France and consequently was literally 
ceded back by Spain as well as ceded back to France. 
But with respect to the part in question Spain might not 
unfairly be considered as ceding- back to France what 
France had ceded to her ; inasmuch as the cession of it 
to Great Britain was made for the benefit of Spain to 
whom on that account Cuba was restored. The effect was 
precisely the same as if France had in form made the ces- 
sion to Spain and Spain had assigned it over to Great 
Britain; and the cession may the more aptly be considered 
as passing through Spain, as Spain herself was a party 
to the treaty by which it was conveyed to Great Britain. 
In this point of view, not only France received back what 
■she had ceded, but Spain ceded back what she had received 
and the etymology even of the term 'retrocede' is satis- 
fied. This view of the case is more substantially just, as 
the territory in question passed from France to Great Brit- 
ain for the account of Spain but passed from Great Britain 
into the hands of Spain in 1783, in consequence of a war 
to which Spain had contributed but little compared with 
France and in terminating which so favorably in this article 
for Spain, France had doubtless a preponderating influence. 
Thirdly, that if a course of proceeding might have existed 
to which the term 'retrocede' would be more literally appli- 
cable it may be equally said that there is no other par- 
ticular term which would be more applicable to the whole 
proceeding as it did exist. Fourth, lastly that if this were 
not the case a nice criticism on t^e etymology of a single 
term can be allowed no weight against a conclusion drawn 
from the iclear meaning of every other term and from the 
whole context." ^ 

The United States appealed to France for her con- 
struction of the treaty. For her unfavorable answer she 



1. Vol. VI, Instructions, p. 226, Madison to Livingston, Marcii 31, 
1804. 



134 The Purchase of Florida 

was promptly maligned by this country and her views dis- 
counted. "It may be observed," writes Madison to Gen- 
eral Armstrong, "that nothing can be more preposterous 
than the joint attempt now made by the French and Span- 
ish governments in discussing the boundaries of Louisiana 
to appeal from the text of the convention which describes 
them, to a secret understanding or explanations on that sub- 
ject between those governments. France sold us Louisi- 
ana as described in the deed of conveyance which copies 
the description from the deed of Spain to France. If France 
sold more than she had a right to sell she would at least 
be bound to supply the deficiency by a further purchase from 
■Spain or to remit pro tanto the price stipulated by us. 
But the case rests on a still better footing. France as- 
signed to us Louisiana as described in the conveyance to 
her from Spain. Our title to the written description is 
therefore good against both, notwithstanding any separate 
explanation or covenant between them, unless it be shown 
that notice thereof w2lS sent to the United States before 
their bona fide purchase was made. This is a principle of 
universal justice no less than of municipal law. With re- 
spect to France, it will scarcely be pretended that any such 
notice was given. On the contrary, she corroborated our 
title according to the text of the bargain by the language 
of M. Talleyrand to Mr. Livingston ; she corroborated our 
particular construction of the text in relation to the eastern 
boundary of Louisiana by the language of M. Marbois ; 
and she corroborated lour construction in relation to both 
the eastern and western boundaries by her silence under the 
known extent to which that construction carried them. And 
with respect to Spain who is equally bound by the assign- 
ment of the ostensible title of France, unless she can prove 
a notice to the United States that the real title was dif- 
ferent from the ostensible one, it is to be observed first 
that no such proof has ever been attempted, and next that 



West Florida 135 

Spain cannot even pretend an ignorance of the necessity 
of such notice. This is evinced by her conduct in another 
instance where a secret stipulation with France contrary 
to the tenor of her treaty with France was alleged in opposi- 
tion to the treaty of the United States with France. France 
it appears had promised to Spain through her minister at 
Madrid that she would in no event alienate the territory 
ceded to her by Spain. The Spanish government sensible 
as it 'was that this promise could not invalidate the meaning 
of the instrument which exhibited the title of France as 
absolute, and therefore alienable, no sooner heard of the 
purchase concluded at Paris by the minister of the United 
States, than she instructed her minister at Washington to 
communicate without delay to the government of the United 
States the alleged engagement of France not to alienate. 
This communication was made on the ninth of September, 
1803 ; and so convinced was Spain of the necessity of the 
most formal notice on such occasions that the Spanish 
minister here repeated the same notice on the twenty-seventh 
of the same month with the addition of some other pretended 
defects in the title of France and urged on the govern- 
ment here an obligation to forbear under such circum- 
stances to ratify the convention with France. Now, if 
it was necessary for Spain, in order to protect herself by a 
secret engagement of France not to alienate, against the 
overt transaction giving France a right to alienate, that she 
should give notice of that engagement to third parties, and 
Spain knew this to be necessary, the same course was equally 
necessary and equally obvious when the effect of the overt 
speculation as to -the limits of the territory sold was to be 
arrested or restricted by any separate agreement between 
the original parties. Yet this course was not pursued. So 
far from it, Spain, in finally notifying through her min- 
ister here a relinquishment of her opposition to the as- 
signment of Louisiana to the United States and conse- 



136 The Purchase of Florida 

quently to the title of France as derived from the treaty 
itself, never gave the least intimation of any other secret 
articles or eng^ements whatever which were to qualify 
the descriptions of boundaries contained in the text of the 
treaty, fully acquiescing thereby in the meaning of the 
text according to the ordinary rules of expounding it." ^' 

Spain insisted that she possessed West Florida not as 
Louisiana but as Florida; the notoriety of which derived 
confirmation from the titles of governors of Louisiana who 
were recognized as "governors of Louisiana and West 
Florida," thus distinguishing that part of the territory 
in question, "which from the circumstance of its situation 
was also placed under their command." This was evidenced 
by the title of the governors of the Havanna who in their 
character of captain generals have always governed under 
the title of "Captain generals of the two Floridas." 

"Under a treaty of retrocession," argued D'Yrujo, 
"France could not hope that what we had never received 
from her should be returned to her : and the American 
government ought not to forget the epoch at which the 
king of Spain made the acquisition of this province at the 
expense of his treasures, of the blood of his subjects, and 
for the benefit of the American people. 

"The expression which follows is less explicit but its 
meaning is evident from that of the passage which precedes 
it and from that improbability and even impossibility which 
would result from a vague and general sense. I allude 
to the following: 'Et qu'elle avait lorsque la France la 
possedait.' It is manifest that this indefinite expression 
can only refer to the period at which Spain delivered 
Louisiana to France because if a greater extent were sought 
to be given to it the other part of the third article could 



1. Vol. VI, Instructions, p. 302, Madison to John Armstrong, June 
6, 1805. 



West Florida 137 

not take place which says that it be delivered 'avec la meme 
etendue qu'elle a actuellement entre les mains de TEs- 
pagne.' It is clear that if it were to be given with more 
'etendue' it could not (be 'la meme qu'elle a actuellement 
entre les mains de rEspagne.' Moreover any person who 
has any knowledge of the history of this country knows 
that France possessed formerly under the name of Louis- 
iana a great part of the territories which now form the 
Western states. If, therefore, the sense of the said ex- 
pression were to be admitted in its greatest latitude it 
would follow that Spain had obliged herself by the above 
mentioned third article to deliver to France a part of the 
states of Kentucky, Tennessee, the whole new, state of 
Ohio, the Indiana Territory, etc., an absurd but necessary 
consequence if the interpretation were taken which some 
persons seem inclined to give to the expression 'lorsque la 
France la possedait.' " ^ 

M. Laussat, the French envoy at New Orleans, who 
had delivered the province of Louisiana to Governor Clai- 
borne and General Wilkinson, took no step while the 
province was in his hands, or at the time he transferred it 
to this country, calculated to dispossess Spain of any part 
of the territory east of the Mississippi. On the contrary 
in a private conference he stated positively that no part 
of the Floridas was included in the eastern boundary: 
France, having strenuously sought to have it extended to 
the Mobile, was peremptorily refused by Spain. ^ 

In support of the claim of his government, D'Yrujo 
quoted to Madison from a journal published in the winter 
of 1803-04 by Ellicott, whom we recall as the perniciously 
patriotic representative of the United States on the boun- 
dary commission of the treaty of 1795, appointed by rea- 



1. Vol. I, D'Yrujo to Secretary of State, March 7, 1804. 

2. Vol. VI, Instrxictions, p. 188, Madison to Livingston, Jan. 31, 
1804. 



13^ The Purchase of Florida 

son of his reputation for knowledge of astronomy and geog- 
raphy. Speaking of the treaty of purchase of L^ouisiana 
in his journal, he said: "By the cession of Louisiana to 
the United States we gain but little on the Gulf of Mex- 
ico and are but little benefited as a maritime people. The 
important and safe harbors in both the Floridas still re- 
main in the possession of his Catholic Majesty."^ 

In a letter to General Armstrong, Talleyrand states the 
French position: "Now it was stipulated in her treaty 
of the year 1801 that the acquisition of Louisiana by France 
was a retrocession, that is to say that Spain restored to 
France what she had received from her in 1762. At that 
period she had received the territory bounded on the east 
by the Mississippi, the river Iberville, the lakes Maurepas 
and Pontchartrain the same day France ceded to England 
by the preliminaries of peace all the territory to the east- 
ward. Of this Spain had received no part and could 
therefore give back none to France. All the territory lying 
to the east of the Mississippi and Iberville and south of 32° 
north latitude bears the name of Florida. It has been 
constantly designated in that way during the time that 
Spain held it: it bears the same name in the treaty of 
limits between Spain and the United States: and in dif- 
ferent notes of Mr. Livingston, of later dates than the 
iretrocession, in which the name of Louisiana is given to 
the territory on the west side of the Mississippi, of Florida 
to that on the east side of it. 

"According to this designation, thus consecrated by 
time, and even prior to the period when vSpain began to 
possess the whole territory' between the 31°, the Missis- 
sippi, and the sea, this country ought in good faith and 
justice to be distinguished from Louisiana. 

"Your Excellency knows that before the preliminaries 
of 1762, confirmed by the treaty of 1763, the French pos- 

1. D'Yrujo to Secretary of State, March 7, 1804. 



West Florida 139 

sessions situated near the Mississippi extended as far from 
the east of this river, towards the Ohio and Illinois, as in 
the quarters of Mobile, and you must think it as unnatural 
after all the changes of sovereignty which that part of 
America has undergone, to give the name of Louisiana to 
the district of Mobile as the territory more to the north 
on the same bank of the river which formerly belonged 
to France. 

"These lobservations, sir, will be sufficient to dispel 
every kind of doubt with regard to the extent of the retro- 
cession made by Spain to France. It was under this im- 
pression that the French and Spanish plenipotentiaries nego- 
tiated and it was under this impression that I have since 
had occasion to give the necessary explanation, when a 
project was formed to take possession of it. I have laid 
before his Imperial Majesty the negotiations of Madrid 
which preceded the treaty of 1801 and his Majesty is con- 
vinced that during the whole course of these negotiations 
the Spanish government has constantly refused to cede any 
part of the Floridas even from the Mississippi to the Mo- 
bile. 

"His Imperial Majesty has moreover authorized me to 
declare to you that at the beginning of the year XI General 
Bournonville was charged to open a new negotiation with 
Spain for the acquisition of the Floridas. This project 
which has not been followed by any treaty is an evident 
proof that France had not acquired by the treaty retro- 
ceding Louisiana the country east of the Mississippi. . . . 

"He (Napoleon) saw with pain the United States 
commence their differences with Spain in an unusual man- 
ner, and conduct themselves towards the Floridas by acts 
of violence which, not being founded in right, could have 
no other effect but to injure its lawful owners. Such an 
aggression gave the more surprise to his Majesty because 
the United States seemed in this measure to avail them- 



140 The Purchase of Florida 

selves of their treaty with France as an authority for their 
proceeding, and because he could scarcely reconcile with the 
just opinion which he entertains of the wisdom and fidelity 
of the federal government a course of proceeding which 
nothing can authorize towards a power which has long 
Occupied and still occupies one of the first ranks in Eur- 
ope." 1 

In a letter to M. le Chevalier de Santivanes, 5 Ger- 
minal, XIII, Talleyrand said: "His Majesty having no pre- 
tensions but to the territory situated to the west of the 
Mississippi and of the River Iberville, (he) has not author- 
ized his commissary at New Orleans to take possession of 
any other province and he did not cede any other to the 
United States." General Armstrong in a letter to Pinck- 
ney speaks of approaching Talleyrand, whose laconic and 
decisive answer was that "the more they considered the 
subject the more France was convinced Spain was right on 
every question of the controversy with us." This state- 
ment on the part of France called forth a vigorous and 
indignant letter from Monroe to Bournonville. "Ivike you, 
I have been a soldier," he writes, "have fought for my 
country, and am accustomed to speak with freedom. Per- 
mit me to ask on what principle can France say anything 
respecting the limits of Louisiana after refusing to do it 
in her treaty with us, and inserted the third article of the 
treaty of San Ildefonso as the only rule by which we were 
to ascertain them? She did not insert the limits then be- 
cause she did not know them. If she knew them then 
why did she not tell us of them? Is it proper to come 
forward now and give definition of any part to our preju- 
dice, which was then withheld, after we have executed the 
treaty with so much good faith ?" ^ 

1. Vol. VII, United States Ministers at Spain to the Secretary of 
State, p. 49, Talleyrand to Armstrong, Dec. 21, 1S04. 

2. Vol. VII, Ministers at Spain to Secretary of State, p. 263, Mon- 
roe to Gen. Bournonville, May 23, 1S05. 



West Florida 141 

The cession of Louisiana was limited by three condi- 
tions : 

(i) The territor}- was ceded "with the same extent 
that it now has in the hands of Spain and (2) that it had 
when France possessed it; and (3) such as it should be after 
the treaties subsequently entered into between Spain and 
other states." In all instruments the first law of construction 
is consistency. These conditions then are to be interpreted 
consistently with each other. 

"M^ith the same extent that it now has in the hands of 
Spain." The two Floridas belonged to Spain but hers! 
was a title secured in 1783 from England. This title ex- 1 
tinguished all French claims, for by the treaty of 1763 
France had ceded all east of the Mississippi to England. - 
Following the language of the English proclamation of 
1763 Spain maintained, after 1783, the divisions of East 
and West Florida. In the old maps, as of D'Anville, Flor- 
ida is mentioned in the singular and Louisiana was com- 
monly made at the same time to cover a large space of 
country to the east of the Mississippi. But in the later 1 
maps when the "Floridas" have been spoken of in the \ 
plural number, Louisiana is bounded on the east by the / 
Mississippi. There is no need here to repeat the arguments ) 
already set forth to show that under Spain the Floridas 
extended to the Mississippi, and that the province west 
of that river was known as Louisiana. ^ 

By the Family Compact of the Bourbons, the treaty of 
August 15, 1 761, it was agreed between France and Spain 
that whoever attacked one crown attacked the other. Spain 
thus joined France in her war against Great Britain, but, 
losing Havana and Cuba, the Bourbon allies were soon 
convinced that it was best for both to bring the war to a 
termination. Now by the Family Compact it had been 
agreed that when the war was concluded they should bal- 
ance the advantages which one might have received against 



\/ 



142 The Purchase of Florida 

the losses of the other. But so disastrous had been the 
fortunes of war that, when the peace of 1762-63 was nego- 
tiated, France possessed no balance of advantages to offer 
to England for the restoration of Havana and Cuba to 
Spain. France therefore determined to give up one of 
her own unconquered provinces in order to secure a fair 
: peace for her ally: this province was Louisiana which then 
crossed the Mississippi to the east. This was to be trans- 
ferred to Spain on condition of her joining with France in 
making over to England everything to the east of the Mis- 
sissippi, England having consented to receive the territory 
thus bounded as the equivalent of her Spanish conquests. 
It seems to have been arranged with the Spanish envoy 
at Paris that the formal offer of Louisiana to his court 
should take place on the very day (November 3, 1762) 
when this territory was offered to England. France ap- 
pears merely to have offered and not at that time to have 
ceded Louisiana to Spain : further, the cession of Florida 
to England was open to recall, the preliminaries not having 
been ratified. But Louisiana with its new limits was ac- 
cepted by Spain on the thirteenth of November, 1763, though 
Spain did not receive possession until 1769, and also by 
ratification of the preliminaries with England on the twenty- 
second of November, 1763. 

These then were not only contemporary but also con- 
1 nected transactions, all to be established together or all to 
' be rejected together. But all being established together, 
the acceptance of Louisiana is to be considered as operat- 
ing back to the date of the offer, while the ratification 
!of the preliminaries equally extends back to the date of 
signing them. 

It is true that the treaty reads "in the same extent that 
it had when France possessed it." These words are fol- 
lowed by others creating a limitation upon them "such as 
it should be after the treaties subsequently entered into 



West Florida 143 

between Spain and other states." Let us observe the effect 
of this clause upon the former. "Subsequently" must re- 
late to any foreign state except France. 'Since France as 
a monarchy held Louisiana, Spain had made at least two 
treaties, the one of cession to England in 1762-63, and the; 
other of arrangement with the United States in 1795./ 
By the first treaty the boundaries of Louisiana and the two 
Floridas were formed and by the second they were ac- 
knowledged — the Mississippi being the eastern limit of 
the one and the western limit of the other. The province 
of Louisiana to the west of the Mississippi had not been the 
subject of any treaty by Spain. There seems to exist an 
opposite design of each of the clauses. The first evi-l 
dently micant that Napoleon was to receive Louisiana (that \ 
is to the west of the Mississippi) as France held it during f 
the monarchy without regard to any alterations of its shape / 
produced by any colonial or governmental regulations on 
the part of Spain. 

The second clause was designed to secure to Spain the 
boundaries which it had both given to and received back 
from England as the western boundary of the Floridas. 
It was further designed to establish those concessions which 
had been made to the United States by the treaty of 1795. 
This interpretation of the two clauses seems to be the only 
one possible to secure even a measure of consistency. ^ 

At the end of the French war or contest for colonial 
possession, French power was gone. By the treaty of 
peace France gave to England Nova Scotia, Acadia, Cape 
Breton, Canada, all the islands and all the coasts of the 
Gulf and River St. Lawrence, and divided her possessions 
in what is now the United States into two grand divisions : 
the line of partition was the Mississippi River to the Iber- 
ville, thence through the Iberville to Lake Maurepas and 



1. Remarks on a Dangerous Mistake made as to the Eastern 
Boundary of L^juisiana, by Benjamin Vaughan, published 1814. 



144 The Purchase of Florida 

along the north shore of Lakes Maurepas and Pontchar- 
train to the Gulf of Mexico. All to the east she ceded to 
England, all to the west to Spain. England divided this 
cession which she had received: from the junction of the 
Yazoo and Mississippi rivers she drew a line due east along 
a parallel to the Appalachicola and down that river to the 
Gulf of Mexico and named that country West Florida, To 
what we know as the state of Florida, east of the Appalachi- 
cola, she gave the name of East Florida. For twenty years 
these boundaries remained untouched: in 1783 Great Brit- 
ain made the northern boundary of West Florida the paral- 
lel of 31° from the Mississippi to the Appalachicola and 
gave the Floridas to Spain. 

In all truth Spain received East and West Florida 
from England, not from France. By the treaty of San Ilde- 
fonso Spain agreed to return to France what she had re- 
ceived from that country in 1762 and not what England 
had given her in 1783. 

But Jefferson and Madison read otherwise: they said 
that in 1800 West Florida belonged to Spain: West Flor- 
ida was at one time a part of Louisiana: in 1800 Spain 
receded Louisiana to France : therefore she receded West 
Florida. That France had once owned West Florida, that 
Frenchmen had built Mobile and Biloxi, that French author- 
ity had once been recognized on the Perdido, sufficed for 
Jefferson and Madison — West Florida they were deter- 
mined to have. If we apply to this treat}'' the rules which 
we apply to a real estate transaction of lesser magnitvide in 
private life, the inconsistent, untenable claims of our gov- 
ernment become apparent. 

It is safe to say that had England or France or some 
equally virile power, capable of resisting and avenging all 
encroachments, been in possession of Florida, our course 
in this dispute would have been far less aggressive. But 
Spain, poverty stricken and oppressed at home, incapable 



West Florida 145 

of resisting pressure abroad — of her we had no fear, and 
having no fear we proceeded as our interests rather than 
our conscience dictated. And should Spain resist, should 
war follow, would it not be even more welcome than peace- 
able submission or ineffectual protest, for thereby we would 
acquire East Florida as well, and perchance more? 



10 



CHAPTER V. 

Wi;ST :^LORIDA AND LATERE NEIGOTIATIONS. 

ON EVERY side the officials of the United States were 
urged to present a bold front and insist upon our al- 
leged rights to West Florida. "I think there can be no 
doubt of your right to go to the Mobile," writes Livingston, 
though admitting that the country between that and the 
Perdido had always been unsettled between France and 
Spain. 1 At any rate he advised Madison to take advantage 
of the ambiguity in the treaty by seizing West Florida as 
far as the Perdido. "The time is particularly favorable to 
enable you to do it without the slightest risk at home," said 
he. "With this in your hand East Florida will be of Little 
moment and will be yours whenever you please. At all 
events proclaim your right and take possession." 

In fact the dispute as to the eastern boundary of Louis- 
iana was but a small portion of the difficulty. All of the 
boundaries of that province were uncertain. The southern 
boundary was the gulf, but whether it went to the Sabine 
or the Rio Bravo was not known. The mountains, where- 
ever they were, constituted the western limit and the Eng- 
lish possessions equally uncertain were understood to bound 
it on the north. 

Monroe's advice was as belligerent as that of Living- 
ston. "Take possession of both of the Floridas and the 
whole country west of the Mississippi to the Rio Bravo 



1. R. R. Livingston to Secretary of State (Madison), May 3, 1804. 



West Florida 147 

unless it be thought better to rest at the Colorado: though 
we think the broader the ground the better. In this view 
all Spanish posts should be broken up within those limits. 
On that ground we might negotiate. The refusal to pay 
for the suppression of the deposit and for Spanish spolia- 
tions would justify taking possession of East Florida. The 
refusal to compromise the affair of the western limits, of 
French spoliations, and of West Florida gives a fair right 
at least to take what belongs to us." ^ This sounds bel- 
licose, especially from the mild and diplomatic Monroe. 
But he was firmly convinced that France was supporting 
Spain in some ulterior scheme and that our course must 
be a bold one: decisive action alone would preserve any 
hope of securing Spanish spoliations due to the French 
cruisers, the suppression of the deposit, and our claim to 
West Florida. 

In 1804 Monroe proceeded to Madrid to press negotia- 
tions with the Spanish ministr}^ for the sale of Florida, the 
settlement of spoliation claims, and determination of boun- 
daries. He was instructed not to consent to the perpetual 
relinquishment of any territory whatever eastward of the 
Rio Bravo. The zone idea was suggested as a favorable 
method of preventing encroachments by either Spanish or 
American settlers. As the United States secured further in- 
formation concerning Louisiana she became more averse to 
the occlusion for any long period of a "very wide space of 
territory" westward of the Mississippi. If the Rio Bravo 
could be made the limit of the Spanish settlements and the 
river Colorado the limit to which those of the United States 
might be extended : and a line northwest or west from the 
source of whatever river might be taken for the limit of 
our settlements to the junction of the Osage with the Mis- 
souri, and thence northward parallel with the Mississippi, 
with an interval to be unsettled for a term of years — such 

1. Vol. VII, Monroe to Madison, May 25, 1805. 



148 The Purchase of Florida 

was our aim. ^ The question of a European war it was 
understood would determine the advisability of pressing 
these matters. The perpetual relinquishment of the terri- 
tory between the Rio Bravo and Colorado was not to be 
made : no money was to be paid in consideration of the 
acknowledgment by Spain of our title to the territory be- 
tween the Iberville and the Perdido. If neither the whole 
nor part of East Florida could be obtained it was deemed 
important that the United States should own the territory 
so far as the Appalachicola and have common if not ex- 
clusive right to navigate that stream. Great care was to 
be exercised that the relinquishment by Spain of the terri- 
tory westward of the Perdido be so expressed as to give 
to the American title the date of the treaty of San Ilde- 
fonso. 

In the summer of 1804 the report of a clash between 
Spain and the United States in the territory in dispute had 
reached Europe and, being published in the English ga- 
zettes, was given general credence. "Be assured the only 
way to deal with this government is to be firm and show 
them you are determined to support your rights and they 
will give way immediately," writes Pinckney from Madrid, 
who a short time later was given leave to return home 
after Monroe had been designated to take his place. ^ 

In the meantime France had arrayed herself on the 
side of Spain in such manner that that nation was neither 
permitted nor disposed to grant our claims either with 
respect to West Florida or the French spoliations. The 
alternative to a successful issue of the negotiations was de- 
clared by Madison to be war, or a state of things guarding 
against war for the present and leaving our claims to be 
hereafter effectuated. 



1. Vol. VI, Instructions, p. 2 44, to Jaanes Monroe and Charles 
Pinckney, July 8, 1804. 

2. Vol. VI, Pinckney to Madison, Oct. 8, 1804. 



West Florida 149 

"It may be fairly presumed," wrote Madison, "consid- 
ering the daily increase of our faculties for a successful 
assertion of our rights by force that neither the nation 
nor its representatives would prefer an instant resort to 
arms, to a state of things which would avoid it without 
hazarding our rights or our reputation. The two articles 
essential in such a state of things are, first a forebearance 
on the part of Spain as well as of the United States to aug- 
ment their settlements or strengthen in any manner their 
military establishments within the controverted limits, sec- 
ondly not to obstruct the free communication from our 
territories through the Mobile and other rivers mouthing 
in the Gulf of Mexico, or through the Mobile at least 

"I forbear to repeat the grounds on which the right 
of the United States to the use of those rivers is to be 
placed. They are already in the archives at Madrid; more 
effect, however, is to be expected from the necessity which 
a refusal of the navigation will impose on the United States 
to enforce their claim than from any appeal to the princi- 
ples which support it; and this necessity must be permitted 
to impress itself fully on the Spanish councils." ^ 

In the meantime Pinckney and Monroe had made their 
final propositions for a treaty to M. Cevallos. If his Cath- 
olic Majesty would cede the territory eastward of the Mis- 
sissippi and arbitrate the claims of the citizens and sub- 
jects of each power according to the convention of 1802, as 
yet unratified by Spain, the United States agreed to make 
the Colorado River the boundary between Louisiana and 
Spain, ceding all right to any territory westward of that 
line. Further they offered to establish a district of terri- 
tories, of thirty leagues on each side of that line, or on the 
American side only, from the Gulf of Mexico to the north- 
ern boundary of Louisiana, to remain forever neutral and 
unsettled, and to relinquish the claim to spoliations which 
were committed by the French within the jurisdiction of 
Spain in the course of the last war — the United States to 
compensate the parties in a sum to be specified, and to re- 

1. Vol. VI, Instructions, p. 295, Madison to Monroe, May 23, 1805. 



150 The Purchase of Florida 

linquish all claim for injuries growing out of the suppres- 
sion of the deposit at New Orleans. ^ 

The special mission ended the latter part of May, 1805, 
by the total rejection in the highest tone by Spain of every 
proposition made. She refused to pay a shilling or even 
to arbitrate the French spoliations : she refused to yield a 
single foot of West Florida: she insisted on a line between 
the Adaes and Natchitoches to cut the Red River as the 
western limit of Louisiana: and she refused to ratify the 
convention of 1802. ^ 

We are inclined to wonder at and at the same time 
to applaud the firm stand taken by Spain at this time. 
Attacked by ravishing famine and devastating pestilence, 
drained of every farthing by her French ally and master, 
and buffeted about by France and England, an object of 
pitiable contempt to all Europe, her position was doubly 
grievous. Yet it was France rather than Spain that re- 
fused us, for French councils were predominant at the 
court of Madrid. Spain, naturally haughty and slow in her 
movements, was extremely jealous and fearful of the United 
States. She accused this country of all manner of ulter- 
ior designs to which, since the days of the Miranda plot, 
we had given little thought. She suspected that we looked 
with wistful eye to her rich but feeble dominions in our 
neighborhood, and this suspicion it had been the policy of 
other nations to excite and encourage. Pinckney was con- 
vinced that with the commencement of war our affairs at 
Madrid would take a more favorable turn : once persuaded 
that war was inevitable she- would sell Florida to us rather 
than see it falling — as it must — without opposition into 
the hands of England. "Spain is saving Florida as a means 



1. Vol. VII, .Letters of Ministers to Secretary of State, p. 2-31. 
Pinckney and Monroe to Cevallos, May 12, 1805. 

2. Vol. VI, Pinckney to Madison, May 28, 1805. 



West Florida 151 

of settling our claims and riveting our affection and friend- 
ship."! 

Jefferson and Madison, in their instructions to Liv- 
ingston, seem to have lost sight entirely of the true char- 
acter of the French government at that time. To talk 
of France being bound to us "no less by sound policy than 
by a regard to right" is but childish prattle and inane 
stupidity when we stop to consider for a moment the man 
then at the head of the French government. Does any one 
suppose that Napoleon stands out in history as the expon- 
ent of "sound policy" or "regard for right?" Well might 
Madison write these dawdling sentiments, but of what 
weight were they? He might dilate upon the necessity 
of France preserving our friendship, but what of it? For 
France it was Spain or the United States, and there could 
be no American friendship as long as there were grounds 
for dispute between Spain and this country. 

It amounted to nothing if Madison did insist that a 
transfer from Spain to the United States of the territory 
claimed by us, or rather of the whole of both Floridas, 
was nothing more than a completion of the policy which 
led France to cede Louisiana. Two conditions alone 
could have induced Napoleon to favor such a transfer; the 
first to prevent the province from falling into the hands of 
her inveterate enemy England, the second that of financial 
considerations — the same causes which had induced the 
sale of Louisiana. We are forced to believe that Napoleon 
sought to convert the negotiations with Spain at this time 
into a pecuniary job for France and her agents. Cash 
was desired as a consideration for a transfer — not such 
intangible arrangements as a release of spoliation claims 
or of trading one country for another. 

In a letter to Breckenridge, under date of August 12, 
1803, Jefferson wrote : "Objections are raising to the east- 

]. Pinckney to Madison, Jan. 24, 1804. 



1^2 The Purchase of Florida 

ward against the vast extent of our boundaries and proposi- 
tions are made to exchange Louisiana or a part of it for 
the Floridas. But as I have said we shall get the Floridas 
without and I would not give one inch of waters of the 
Mississippi to any nation, because I see in a light very im- 
portant to our peace the exclusive right to its navigation 
and the admission of no nation into it." ^ 

Jefferson's decision was strongly upheld by his advisors 
and counsellors. "The United States," writes James Bow- 
doin from Paris, "should pursue that line of conduct which 
best comports with their present interest, regardless of the 
views or feelings of this or the Spanish government. I take 
it they are neither in a situation to bring their force to 
bear nor in a condition to go to war with the United States, 
and that our commerce is absolutely necessary to both, 
from which I infer that if they should be pressed to the 
alternative of an open rupture or to yield the points in 

controversy they will be obliged to give way The 

United States can have nothing to fear from these gov- 
ernments, especially the Spanish, by a decisive line of con- 
duct." 2 

General Armstrong and Monroe, after conferring on 
the situation, likewise advised a measure of decision and 
tone as necessary, as well to our safety as to our honor, 
adding however, a word of caution lest we compromise our- 
selves with France, for by her treaties that country was 
bound to assist Spain in any and all wars. They wrote : 

"It has occurred to us that the following might prob- 
ably have effect: to take possession of the whole country 
westward of the Mississippi to the Rio Bravo, removing 
the Spanish posts that are on this side of it. To say noth- 
ing at present about the eastern side, the law remaining of 
course in force : to have a force at command in Tennessee 
and Georgia ready to take the Floridas at pleasure, being 

1. Jefferson's Works, Vol. IV, p. 499. 

2. Vol. IX, James Bowdoin to Madison. Dec. 2, 1805. 



West Florida 153 

.resolved not to permit the force of Spain or France to be 
increased there : that a power should be given to the pres- 
ident to suspend all intercourse with the Spanish colonies to 
be exercised at his discretion and indeed an adequate power 
over the whole subject. .... The above is the mildest 
course which it would in my judgment be proper to take, 
and in taking it, it ought to be understood that if the terms 
we demanded were not peremptorily accepted it was only 
a commencement of a system of others more decisive and 

important If we are firm I have great confidence 

in our success and almost on our own terms, much better 
than those limited above. Be firm also in sustaining our 
claims to the Rio Bravo. A contrary doctrine should not be 
listened to." 

Monroe also earnestly recommended the immediate sus- 
pension of D'Yrujo for its moral effect on Spain, that 
luckless minister having been guilty of some further indis- 
cretions which had aroused the executive animosity. ^ 
Pinckney advocated stirring up public feeling in the United 
States in favor of annexing Florida so as to make the more 
impression on Spain and induce her to arrange a transfer. ^ 

Let us take up the negotiations more in particular and 
watch their progress. 

Demand was made on Spain for indemnity after the 
close of the first Napoleonic war. Numbers of American 
vessels had been condemned by French consuls resident in 
Spain. French privateers had been fitted out in Spanish 
ports to capture American vessels. Under pretense of a 
blockade of Gibraltar, Spanish subjects had seized every 
American vessel that had come for a convoy through the 
Mediterranean. Spain was ready to make redress for the 
depredations of her own subjects but she absolutely de- 
clined to consider the question of paying for the French 
misdemeanors. Finally the American minister, unable to 
secure better terms, gave way and the convention was 



1. Vol. VII, p. 269, Monroe to Madison, June 30, 1805. 

2. Pinckney to Madison, Aug. 24, 1805. 



154 ^^^ Purchase of Florida 

framed. This provided for the spoliations by the Spanish 
subjects but left the question of French spoliations for 
future settlement. The senate refused to ratify the con- 
vention thus drawn up and the American minister was 
directed to press negotiations at Madrid for a broader 
treaty. Again Spain refused to consider the American 
demand. Meanwhile D'Yrujo, noting the attitude of the 
senate upon the subject, submitted the questions in dispute 
to five eminent lawyers of this country for their decision. 
Jared Ingersoll and William Rawle, leaders of the Phila- 
delphia bar, Stephen du Ponceau, Edward Livingston, and 
Joseph B. McKean, governor of Pennsylvania and brother- 
in-law of D'Yrujo, constituted the notable tribunal to which 
was referred the justice of the demand of the United 
States. 

Concealing the names of the powers, D'Yrujo stated 
the case : 

"The power A (Spain) lives in perfect harmony and 
friendship with power B (United States). The power C 
(France) either with reason or without reason commits 
hostilities against the subjects of the power B, takes some 
of their vessels, carries them into the ports of A, friend to 
both, where they are condemned and sold by the official 
agents of power C without power A's being able to prevent 
it. At last a treaty is entered into by which the powers 
B and C adjust their differences and in this treaty the 
power B renounces and abandons to power C the rig-'ht to 
any claim for the injuries and losses occasioned to its 
subjects by the hostilities from power C." 

Having thus 'Stated the case, D'Yrujo asked : 

"Has the power B any right to call upon the power 
A for indemnities for the losses occasioned in its ports and 
coasts to its subjects by those of the power C after the 
power B has abandoned or relinquished by its treaty with 
C its right for the damages which could be claimed for the 
injuries sustained from the hostile conduct of the power 
C?" 



West Florida 155 

Each of these five lawyers replied in an unqualified 
negative. To the Spanish arguments the United States 
replied : 

"The only supposition on which Spain could turn us 
over to France would be that of her being in a state of 
absolute duress, of her being merely the staff by which 
the blow was given by France. But even on this supposi- 
tion the injuries done by France through Spain could not 
'by any interpretation be confounded with the injuries re- 
leased to France by which could be meant such injuries only 
as proceeded from her own immediate responsibility and as 
were in the ordinary course of things chargeable on her. 

"The last plea under which refuge has been sought by 
Spain against the justice of our claims is the opinion of 
four or five American lawyers given on a case stated, with- 
out doubt, by some one of her own agents : an argument of 
this sort does not call for refutation: but for regret that 
the Spanish government did not see how little such an ap- 
peal from the ordinary and dignified discussions of the two 
governments by their regular functionaries, to the author- 
ity of private opinions and of private opinions so obtained, 
was consistent with the respect it owed to itself or with 
that which it owed to the government of the United States : 
that it did not even reflect on the reply so obvious that 
four or five private opinions, however respectable as such, 
could have no weight against the probability that others 
had been consulted whose opinions were not the same and 
that if the government here could descend to the experi- 
ment, little difficulty could be found in selecting more num- 
erous authorities of the same kind not only in the United 
States but among the jurists of Spain." ^ 

When the convention and the letters showing the 
course of D'Yrujo were laid before the senate in Decem- 
ber, 1803, that body was indignant and less than ever 
disposed to ratify the instrument. The question of the 
Floridas was now urgent and to render possible new nego- 
tiations with Spain the treaty was at length approved, 



1. Vol. VI, Instructions, p. 199, Madison to Pinckney, Feb. 6, 1S04. 



156 The Purchase of Florida 

though not without many eloquent expressions of disap- 
proval and indignation. ^ 

Duly signed and ratified it was shortly dispatched to 
Charles Pinckney at Madrid. He at once carried it to Don 
Pedro Cevallos, the Spanish minister of foreign affairs, 
expecting its prompt approval as a matter of course-. 
True to his Spanish training, Cevallos hesitated and 
delayed. Meanwhile a copy of the Mobile act had come 
to hand. Cevallos at once declared it a violation of Span- 
ish sovereignty, demanded an explanation from Pinckney 
and consumed a month in a profitless interchange of notes. ^ 
At length he agreed to name definitely the conditions on 
which Spain would consent to ratify the convention. Time 
must be given to the subjects of Spain having claims against 
the United States, to prepare and submit them: the sixth 
article in reference to damages inflicted by French cruisers 
upon American shipping must be eliminated, the act set- 
ting up the custom district in West Florida must be re- 
pealed. " 

Pinckney, losing all sense of diplomacy and policy, in 
a delirium of rage wrote a threatening and insolent letter 
to Cevallos seeking enlightenment on "just one question." 
If the sixth article were not suppressed would Spain refuse 
to ratify the convention? An early reply was demanded 
as he proposed immediately to send messengers to all the 
American consuls in Spain and to the commander of the 
American squadron in the Mediterranean, to inform them 
of the critical posture, to bid them warn all ships and be 
prepared to quit Spain at a minute's warning. ^ Cevallos, 
though doubtless impressed by our minister's attitude, coolly 
replied that he did not believe Pinckney 's instructions war- 



1. January 9, 1804. Journal of Executive Proceedings of the Sen- 
ate, Vol. I, pp. 461, 462. 

2. Cevallos to Pinckney, May '31, 1804. 

3. iCevallos to Pinckney, July 2, 1804. 

4. Pinckney to Cevallos, July 5, 1804. 



West Florida I57 

ranted such action and transferred all negotiations from 
Madrid to Washington. ^ Not in the least perturbed by 
Cevallos's answer, Pinckney dispatched the couriers and 
gave notice that as soon as his affairs could be arranged 
he should demand his passports and quit the Spanish court. 

In October news of the developments at Madrid 
reached Washington followed by a request for Pinckney's 
recall ; this request was granted and Monroe ordered to 
Madrid. ^ But Monroe was already on his way. After 
the Louisiana treaty of 1803 had been concluded Mon- 
roe prepared to join Pinckney at Madrid. But the recep- 
tion of that treaty at the Spanish court led the French 
officials to insist that he alter his course. ^ Following their 
advice he remained at Paris and while there, was commis- 
sioned minister plenipotentiary at London in place of Rufus 
King. In July he reached London and immediately took 
up the impressment question with the English government. 
Orders now came to proceed to Madrid. 

Four things he was directed to accomplish ; induce . 
Spain to recognize the Perdido as the eastern boundary of | 
Louisiana ; persuade her to sell her possessions east of the 
Perdido for $2,000,000; secure the payment of our claims 
for condemnations by the French courts on Spanish soil ; 
insist on the right of the United States to Texas. If Spain 
refused to yield the last point he was authorized to waive , 
the question of the western boundary of Louisiana andl 
consent to establish a neutral zone into which people of 
neither power should be permitted to emigrate. The east- 
ern limit of this belt should be the Sabine River from its 
mouth to its source ; a straight line to the junction of the 
Osage and Missouri, and a line parallel to the Mississippi 
River to the northern boundarv. On the west side the 



1. ^Cevallos to Pinckney, July S, 1504. 

2. Madison to Monroe, Oct. SB, 1804. 

3. iMonroe to Madison, July 20, 1S05. Monroe to Talleyrand, Nov. 
1804. Foreign Relations, Vol. II, p. 634. 



1^8 The Purchase of Florida 

limit was fixed at the Rio Colorado to its source; thence 
a line to the most southwesterly branch of the Red River ; 
the hig-hlands parting the beds of the Missouri and Missis- 
sippi from those of the Rio Bravo as far as the source 
of the Rio Bravo and a meridian to the northern 
boundary. No inducement should prevail upon him 
to give up our claim to the Rio Bravo nor to consent 
that the neutral belt should exist for more than twenty years ; 
later he was instructed to secure the Rio Bravo as the limit 
of Spanish, and the Rio Colorado of American settlement 
but not to give up the intervening territory forever. ^ 

Proceeding to Madrid by way of Paris, Monroe there 
sought to enlist French assistance for his undertaking. He 
was not long in learning the attitude of the French govern- 
ment on the question. He saw that it was a financial mat- 
ter. "Spain," he was told, "must cede territory ; the United 
States must pay money." Marbois informed him that for 
a suitable compensation Spain might be induced to comply. 
No official encouragement was given him; in fact he saw 
that France was unmistakably hostile to his mission. Has- 
tening to I^adrid he lost no time in presenting to Cevallos 
a project for a treaty in line with his instructions. Politely 
refusing the project which had been submitted to him, 
Cevallos replied that a plan of treaty should result from a 
negotiation on the points in issue under three heads — gen- 
eral spoliation claims, the subject of the damages caused by 
the suspension of the deposit at New Orleans, and the Louis- 
iana boundaries. 

After a fruitless discussion of the subject of indemnity 
that matter was passed and the eastern boundary of Louis- 
iana taken up. After several weeks of profitless confer- 
ences they passed to a discussion of the western boundary. 
Cevallos proposed to fix a point on the gulf of Mexico 
between the Calcasieu and Marmenton rivers and draw a 



1. Madison to Monroe and Pinckney, July 8, 1804. 



West Florida 159 

line northward between the Spanish post of Nuestra Senora 
de 'los Adaes and the French post of Natchitoches on the 
Red River, where the line should then run to be determined 
by a commission. ^ The reply was, while the United States 
were persuaded that they owned to the Rio Bravo, they 
would nevertheless accept the Rio Colorado on two condi- 
tions; if Spain would ratify the convention of 1802 and 
cede the two Floridas, the United States would waive all 
other claims for damages and as a western boundary estab- 
lish a neutral zone thirty miles wide on one or both sides 
of a line to be the Colorado to its source, to the most south- 
westerly source of the Red River, thence along the high 
lands parting the Missouri and Mississippi rivers from the 
Rio Bravo, and a meridian to the northern boundary of 
Louisiana. ^ Cevallos declaring these terms to be utterly 
unreasonable, the correspondence terminated. Monroe de- 
manded his passports, and was within a few days well on 
his way to London. 

The most favorable terms which he could secure were 
manifestly of French dictation; a loan of seventy million 
livres to be given to Spain and when Spain had transferred 
it to France the United States should receive from Spain 
the disputed territory; the money was to be repaid by in- 
stalments in seven years. ^ Pinckney having received his 
recall prepared to leave but was delayed some months, for 
every mule had been seized for the use of the king and 
other means of transportation could not be secured. In the 
meantime James Bowdoin of Massachusetts was appointed 
to take his place as minister to the court of Spain. 

Jefferson, having been informed that all negotiations at 
Madrid .were broken off, turned first to Madison and 



1. Cevallos to Pinckney and Monroe, April 13, 1805. 

2. Pinckney and Monroe to Cevallos, May 12, 1805. Foreign Re- 
lations, Vol. II, p. 665. 

3. Monroe's Diary at Aranjuez, April 22, 1S05. MSS. State De- 
partment. 



i6o The Purchase of Florida 

then to the other members of his cabinet for advice. Madi- 
son favored dropping the questions which had caused the 
dispute, taking up others as yet untouched by the mission . 
and reopening negotiations anew at Madrid. Gallatin coun- 
seled peace — a war would cost more than Florida was 
worth. He thought the boundaries should have been settled 
when the Louisiana treaty was made ; since this had not 
been done the Sabine and Perdido should be accepted, the 
militia improved and one million dollars appropriated for 
building ships of the line, and, with this as a threat, nego- 
tiations renewed. ^ Smith advised more gun-boats, twelve 
new seventy-fours, and, if necessary, an English alliance 
with war against France and Spain. ^ Jefferson himself 
inclined strongly to an alliance with England, stipulating 
that peace should not be made with France and Spain until 
West Florida and the spoliation claims had been secured. '^ 
Various other counsels were offered. Armstrong, from 
Paris, urged Jefferson to seize Texas and break off all inter- 
course with Spain. This plan seemed most feasible to the 
president. Congress was to be asked for power to drive the 
Spanish out of Texas, to sever diplomatic relations at will, 
and provide a commission to determine the amount of our 
spoliation claims. Monroe, Livingston, and Pinckney offered 
similar advice — their single theme was a bold and deter- 
mined line of conduct. Jefferson's decision was strengthen- 
ed by news from the southwest. From Claiborne, governor 
of the Mississippi Territory, and Wilkinson, commander of 
the army, came reports that the garrisons of Mobile and 
Baton Rouge had been strengthened ; that a fort had been 
erected in Trinity River ; a new governor general had reach- 
ed San Antonio ; a large number of families from old Spain 



1. Gallatin to Jefferson, Sept. 12, 1805. Gallatin's Works, Vol. I, 
p. 241. 

2. Robert Smith to Jefferson, Sept. 10, 1805. 

3. Jefferson to Madison, Aug. 4 and 17, 1805. Madison MSS. 
Department, Aug. 27, 1805. Jefferson's Works, Vol. IV, p. 585. 



West Florida i6i 

were on the way to settle in Texas ; troops were being 
massed at Nacogdoches and Matagorda; that Spanish sol- 
diers had led foraging expeditions into Louisiana and Mis- 
sissippi, stealing horses and abusing Americans; that every 
American vessel attempting to pass through the Mobile was 
forced to pay duty of twelve per cent, on the value of the 
cargo even when it belonged to the United States. 

But before Jefferson's plan could be definitely form- 
ulated and communicated a sudden combination of circum- 
stances changed everything. Each day brought word of 
some new outrage committed by England upon our citizens. 
Our seamen were impressed, our ports blockaded, and our 
ships overhauled and examined; Monroe was neglected at 
London, and Armstrong insulted at Paris, and, to determine 
finally the question, a London packet brought the news that 
an added restriction had been placed upon neutral trade, 
that eighteen American merchantmen had been already con- 
demmed, and that the condemnation of thirty more was 
immediately expected. No English alliance could now be 
considered. The policy of overawing Napoleon must be 
given up. After a conference with the members of his 
cabinet he decided to appeal to France for assistance in the 
Spanish negotiations. Armstrong was to inform Napoleon 
that one imore attempt would be made to secure a peaceable 
settlement and to ask him to lay before Spain three prop- 
ositions : 

To sell the two Floridas for five million dollars ; the 
United States to cede to Spain Louisiana from the Rio 
Grande to the Guadeloupe ; Spain to pay to the United 
States all spoliations committed under her flag. A letter 
was dispatched to Governor Claiborne directing that the 
Marquis de Casa Culvo and all other persons holding com- 
missions or retained in the service of his Catholic Majesty 



162 The Purchase of Florida 

be ordered to quit New Orleans as soon as possible, and in 
such terms as to leave no room for further discussion. ^ 

Word from Armstrong at this time encouraged Jeffer- 
son in his determination to reopen negotiations. During 
the summer an anonymous agent of the French government 
came to him with an unsigned letter from Talleyrand sug- 
gesting another note to Sipain of no uncertain tone and 
calculated to rouse that country from her lethargic indiffer- 
ence/ She should be warned that to persist in her refusal 
to treat could only mean war, and arbitration should be 
suggested. Should Spain agree to this, Armstrong, accord- 
ing to the program, should address Talleyrand asking the 
Emperor Napoleon to serve as arbitrator. Napoleon would 
decree, it was intimated in unmistakable terms, that 
the Floridas should go to the United States in return for 
ten million dollars ; the Rio Colorado to its source and the 
northwest line heading all the waters flowing into the 
Mississippi should be the western boundary of Louisiana; 
a strip thirty leagues each side of this line should be a 
neutral zone forever ; the spoliation claims were to be settled 
by Spain and she should have the same commercial rights in 
Florida that she then enjoyed in Louisiana and New Or- 
leans. Armstrong after decidedly rejecting these terms — 
refusing even to communicate them to his government — 
was a few days later given an audience with the emperor 
and informed that the sum should be seven imillions instead 
of ten. This offer appearing more reasonable, Armstrong 
agreed to forward it to America. The matter was laid 
before the cabinet and debated most carefully ; the Spanish 
troubles were reviewed and discussed from alpha to omega. 
All of Napoleon's propositions except one were finally ap- 
proved; after mature consideration it was determined that 
five million dollars should be the limit of the consideration 



1. Vol. XV, Domestic Letters, p. 52, Madison to Governor Clai- 
borne, Nov. 18, 1805. 



West Florida 163 

to emanate from this government. T'urther a portion of 
this should be canceled by the spoliation claims which ap- 
proximated, it was believed, three million dollars. 

The other two millions must be secured from congress. 
Secrecy above all things was essential. To name publicly 
the inducements would be to invite a refusal. Gathering 
the Spanish papers Jefferson transmitted them to congress 
without any hint of his purpose. Summoning various mem- 
bers of the committee in charge of the message, the presi- 
dent initiated them into the secret and even drew up resolu- 
tions which he desired them to report. Congress assembled 
the second of December and on the following day received 
the message treating at length on the subject of outrages 
inflicted, upon the Spanish indisposition to a friendly ar- 
rangement of boundary disputes, upon their violation of our 
sovereignty by invading Louisiana and Mississippi and mur- 
dering our people in that quarter. More complete details 
he prom.ised would shortly follow and three days later 
another collection of Spanish papers was submitted to a 
breathless and expectant house. 

In obedience to the injunction of secrecy, the galleries 
were promptly cleared and behind closed doors the members 
eagerly listened to the further disclosures. But their ex- 
pectation and curiosity were disappointed. To the surprise 
and astonishment of all, the president suggested no line 
of action. Neither did he make any requests. Unable to 
fathom the mystery, the curious house referred the papers 
to a select committee of which the brilliant but eccentric 
John Randolph of Roanoke was the chairman. Hastening 
to interview the president he was informed that two million 
dollars was wanted immediately to purchase the Floridas. 
A proceeding which seemed to him so irregular, Randolph 
declared he could not and would not support. Money he 
said had not been requested ; and indeed if it had been, he 
would still have opposed such a course, for, after negotia- 



164 The Purchase of Florida 

tions had been suspended, to offer money would be an 
everlasting disgrace to the country. ^ Some of the com- 
mittee however enjoyed Jefferson's confidence to a greater 
degree. Nicholson already had in his possession the resolu- 
tions which the president had drawn up. Barnabas Bid- 
well, intimating that to his mind the proper course was an 
appropriation, moved a suitable grant. His motion was 
lost and an adjournment of two weeks followed. 

During this interval the members of the cabinet strove 
manfully to turn Randolph from his obdurate course, but all 
to no avail. The gentleman from Roanoke denounced the 
whole plan in no measured terms. Jefferson, he declared, 
should not be permitted to have two sets of principles — the 
one ostensible, the other real. He should not be tolerated 
publicly to urge vigorous measures while secretly advising 
tame ones. He should not be allowed to appear as an 
energetic executive thwarted by an unpatriotic and hesitat- 
ing congress. Between losing all hope of securing the 
Floridas and openly breaking with Randolph, Jefferson 
chose the latter alternative, and the discerning public was 
shortly aware of a schism in the dominant party. A secret 
report of the committee was soon made denouncing the 
Hostile attitude of Spain. To a government of rulers such 
a course would be considered ample cause for war. But 
to a government such as ours where the rulers and people 
were so closely identified, and especially to a government 
with a debt which absorbed so large a portion of its revenue, 
an honorable peace must ever be preferred to war. Culti- 
vate the interests of the Union by peace until such time as 
the national debt should be extinguished, that as many 
troops be voted as the president should deem necessary to 
defend the southern frontier and render our territory im- 
mune to all incursions. 



1. Letters of Decius No. 1, Richmond Inquirer, Aug., 18G6. 



West Florida 165 

Jefferson realizing the failure of his original course 
took a new tack and communicated his desires to other 
trusted members of the house who, when the report had 
been presented to the committee of the whole, mustered the 
friends of the administration and immediately submitted 
three resolutions. The first of these provided for a sum 
of money to meet such extraordinary expenditures as might 
be incurred in connection with our intercourse with foreign 
countries. This money was to be borrowed if the amount 
was not in the treasury. The second provided fof the 
perpetuation of the two and one-half per cent, ad valorem 
duty constituting what was termed the Mediterranean fund. 
The third stated that congress would look with favor upon 
any settlement of the boundary which, while it gave Spain 
ample territory on the Mexican side, at the same time 
secured to this country the territory east of the Mississippi 
and the regions watered by that river. Randolph's commit- 
tee report having been defeated, a bill was passed appro- 
priating two million dollars for our negotiations with foreign 
powers; this was accompanied by a resolution explaining 
that the appropriation was made with a view to purchasing 
the Floridas. The senate promptly concurring, Jefferson 
signed the bill on the thirteenth of February. ^ 

On the last day of March the injunction of secrecy was 
removed and the doors of congress were thrown wide open 
that the long confined news might sweep across the land. 
There had been rumors wild and incredible, but yet finding 
credence. In some quarters it was believed that the Louis- 
iana stock would be confiscated, for what had seemed to be 
the conduct of Spain was generally credited to French 
domination. Others were confident that, v/ith the removal 
of the mask of secrecy, would come the declaration of war. 
When therefore the announcement was made that two mil- 
lion dollars had been appropriated for the purchase of 

1. Annuals of Congress, 1805-06, pp. 1226-27. 



1 66 The Purchase of Florida 

Florida it is said that disappointment and disgust were 
vividly pictured on the faces of the crowd thronging about 
the capitol. And as the expectant and dissatisfied multitude 
slowly separated, many and loud were the mutterings that 
Jefiferson was truckling to France and bringing dishonor 
upon the nation. 

In 1804 the hapless D'Yrujo became involved in certain 
transactions in this country which increased his unpopu- 
larity and resulted in instructions to our minister at Madrid 
to insist upon his recall. He was accused of "an attempt 
to debauch a citizen of the United States into a direct 
violation of an act of congress, and into a combination with 
a foreign functionary, in favor of a foreign government 
against the supposed measures of his own." D'Yrujo, it 
seems, approached Mr. Jackson, editor of the Political 
Register of Philadelphia, with a .proposition for printing in 
his paper certain pro-Spanish articles. Having been so 
often made a target for the attacks of the newspapers and 
having sufficiently perused our constitution to know that 
there existed therein some sort of a provision for the 
liberty of the press, D'Yrujo conceived that its use must be 
a "shield of defense as it had been an instrument of attack." 
Having on a previous occasion been taught the futility of 
bringing the authors of these attacks into the courts of 
justice, D'Yrujo concluded to take up the same weapons. 
"Were the foreign ministers to be deprived of this right, 
enjoyed by every individual who breathes the air of the 
United States, they would be reduced to the sad condition 
pf distinguished slaves in the very center of the Land of 
Liberty," wrote D'Yrujo to Madison. Summoning Mr. 
Jackson, D'Yrujo, according to his official explanation, 
sought to impress upon him the fact that the interests of 
both Spain and the United States dictated peace but that 
the spirit being engendered in this country forboded war. 
D'Yrujo requested him to publish certain "explanations and 



West Florida 167 

■elucidations which could not fail to be favorable to the cause 
of peace and that for his trouble he would have the ack- 
nowledgment that would be proper." Jackson in sworn 
affidavits promptly declared that he had detected the "in- 
famous purpose" of the Spanish minister, crediting the 
indiscreet D'Yrujo with all manner of Machiavellian devil- 
try. D'Yrujo blandly insisted that the acknowledgment was 
intended merely as a just compensation, "which is due an 
editor of a newspaper full of advertisements — for the room 
that my intended essays would have occupied in his gazette, 
or a reward for his labor if he was to take upon himself to 
couch my ideas in a more correct language than I could do 
myself." "Surely," continues D'Yrujo, "the honor of a 
man who is in the habit of retailing the space of his paper 
by lines should not be hurt at a just compensation which 
was offered when it was a question of occupying some 
columns." 

To D'Yrujo it seemed comprehensible that a foreign 
minister might risk an intrigue with a high officer of a 
crown, depositary of the secrets of state and director of its 
measures, but bribing the editor of a newspaper whose 
sheets were scarcely to be seen beyond the borders of his 
own city, a man without a place in the government, and 
without personal influence, seemed such perfect folly as in 
itself to establish his innocence. The offer of a reward 
he placed in the same category as the payment of a fee to a 
lawyer or a physician. ^ 

Whatever may have been his purpose in this matter and 
however guiltless his intentions his course was at any 
rate indiscreet and his explanation was not such as to 
increase his standing with the government or proclaim his 
innocence to the people. D'Yrujo was further charged with 
publishing certain correspondence in the papers of the day 



1. Vol. I, iSpanish Minister to 'Secretary of State, D'Yrujo to 
Madison, Oct. 3, 1804. 



1 68 The Purchase of Florida 

and using expressions "grossly disrespectful" to the. exe- 
cutive of the United States. The request for his immedi- 
ate recall was submitted by Monroe and Pinckney to Ceval- 
los, the Spanish foreign minister, in April, 1805. ^ Al- 
though succeeded in his official capacity by Valentine de 
Foronda, D'Yrujo Hngered in the United States until 1807, 
to the indignation of Jefferson who all the while contem- 
plated vigorous steps to relieve the country of the presence 
of "this troublesome foreigner." 

In the spring of 1806 instructions were sent to Arm- 
strong and Bowdoin, at Paris, to guide them in their task 
of securing a Spanish treaty under French auspices. 

/ "The object of the United States," wrote Madison "is 
to secure West Florida which is essential to their interest 
and to obtain East Florida which is important to them; 
procuring at the same time equitable indemnities from Spain 
for the injuries for which she is answerable, to all of which 
the proposed exchange of territory and arrangement of the 
western boundary, may be made subservient." ^ The min- 
isters were directed to seek, if possible, an arrangement 
which would involve no pecuniar}^ consideration on the part 
of the United States; the project of a convention which 
was forwarded to them indeed made no provision for a 
money payment. By that instrument Spain was to confirm 
West Florida and cede East Florida to this country. On 
the west side the Colorado River should be the boundary ; 
provision was made for a neutral zone in the southwest. 

It could hardly be supposed that Napoleon would man- 
ifest any particular enthusiasm in persuading Spain to 
accept such a treaty. It must be conceded that his sole 
motive for desiring an arrangement was the idea that the 
United States would pay a large sum of money which 
would naturally gravitate into his coffers. 

1. Vol. VII, p. 199, Pinckney and Monroe to Cevallos, April 13, 1805. 

2. Vol. VI, Instructions, p. 315, Madison to Armstrong and Bow- 
doin, March 13, 1806. 



West Florida 169 

A few months later Madison, suspecting the rejection 
of the terms which he had suggested, sent instructions that 
in such an event an arrangement be sought providing that 
the status quo, taking the date of the transfer of Louisiana 
to the United States, should be established with respect to 
the disputed territories on both sides of the Mississippi ; 
neither country to strengthen or advance its military force 
or positions or make any other innovations unsatisfactory to 
the other party. The navigation of the Mobile and other 
rivers running from our territories through those of Spain, 
should be freely enjoyed by our citizens in like manner as 
that of the Mississippi was enjoyed by the subjects of Spain 
inhabiting the territory adjoining. Further that the con- 
vention of August, 1802, be allowed by Spain to go into 
effect. Such an arrangement, intimated Madison, could 
alone insure peace between the two countries and would, 
without any dishonorable concessions on the part of either 
nation, afford a time for further consideration "and for 
that increase of the relative power of the United States for 
which time alone is wanted," the last an expression pregnant 
with meaning. ^ 

In the meantime alarming reports of the movements of 
Spanish forces to our southwest had reached Washington. 
Castilian troops had taken post at Lanans between 
Nacogdoches, their former most advanced post, and Nat- 
chitoches, our frontier post. Large reinforcements 
were said to be moving toward our forts in that quarter. 
Parties of dragoons were reconnoitering the disputed coun- 
try and troops had been ordered from the Havana for 
Pensacola and Mobile. Whatever might be the motives, 
such activity, it was felt, could not be favorable to the 
tranquillity of the two nations. Even though Spain insisted 
that they were merely precautionary steps against the pos- 



1. Vol. VI, Instructions, p. 357, Madison to Armstrong and Baw- 
doin, May 26, 1806. 



170 The Purchase of Florida 

sibility of an attack by England, Madison declared that the 
cordial relations existing between this country and Great 
Britain were a sufficient guarantee that no hostile intrusions 
would be attempted, seeking to show some ulterior and 
hostile purpose on the part of the Spanish authorities. ^ 
Moreover the conduct of the Spanish in obstructing the 
Mobile was kindling a flame which must soon acquire pro- 
portions not to be easily resisted. The United States may 
soon "have no other choice than between a foreign and an 
internal conflict." 

The conspiracy of Aaron Burr was at this time fore- 
most in the public mind and served to call attention to our 
Spanish connections. What his famous plot really was 
cannot be definitely known. In the later years oi his life 
he declared that he had planned to do what Houston and 
others later did in Texas. Andrew Jackson, notoriously 
hostile to Spain, being approached, gave the plan his ap- 
proval, persuaded that 'some design against Spanish prov- 
inces was being contemplated. Otherwise we know, from 
his intense patriotism, that he would never have gone so 
far with Burr as to call out his Tennessee militia, for the in- 
vasion of Texas and Mexico. With three hundred Tennessee 
militiamen Jackson declared he would "cut his way through 
those d — d greasers to the heart of Mexico." The confer- 
ences at Blennerhasett's Island, the purchase by Burr of 
the large Spanish grant, point in the same direction. D'Yru- 
jo, it was confidently believed, plotted with Burr with the 
idea that a dismemberment of the Union was the object. 
The silence and manner of Turreau convinced Madison be- 
yond doubt that he did not regard Mexico as the object. 
Merry, the English minister, was in the secret of the plot 
against the Spanish possessions and relished it, though 
without committing his government. These overtures to 



1. Vol. XIV, Domestic Letters, p. 479, Madison to Governor Clai- 
borne, Feb. 25, 1805. 



West Florida 171 

Spain and France disclose a plan to sever the Union. It 
may be safely concluded that Burr would have stopped at 
nothing in an effort to retrieve his shattered fortunes and 
that he would adopt such a plot as augured most for suc- 



cess. 



There was much secret meeting and planning, much 
approaching of various western officials, much sending of 
cipher dispatches, purchasing of supplies and boats, and 
much sailing and counter-sailing on the Mississippi and 
Ohio rivers. And indeed for Burr's success there was too 
much talk and too little action, too much time spent in vain 
social frivolities when the cry should have t)een, "up and 
doing." Had Burr concentrated his time and his talents 
upon the Spanish plot and shown the ability to act quickly 
and decisively, history would tell a different story of the 
southwest. Burr's scheme was popular in that section, and 
familiar withal, ever since the early days of our national 
existence. Genet had proposed that George Rogers Clarke 
should call for volunteers and march upon New Orleans 
and the volunteers had not been slow to offer their services, 
nay to demand that they be accepted. And there had been 
other plots of a similar nature concocted in dark by-ways 
and conjured up in secret meetings but which had never 
seen the light of day. To crystallize that sentiment, organize 
an expedition quietly yet rapidly, and strike suddenly, before 
the enemy could be informed, was to spell success. 

Unfortunately for himself. Burr became connected with 
General James Wilkinson, the commanding officer in that 
region, a man of whom historians even in the charity of 
patriotism are able to say little good. The revealed secrets 
of Spanish archives leave no doubt that in 1787-89, Wilkin- 
son had contracted to devote his influence and his life to 

1. Burr insisted that his plan against Mexico w&.s feasible only 
in case of war between Spain and the United States. After Trafalgar, 
In 1805, Spain was helpless and war with the United States impossible. 
Pitt was a necessary factor in Burr's anti-Spanish plots, and with his 
death in 1806 they were harmless. 



172 The Purchase of Florida 

the end that Kentucky should be deHvered to Spain. In 
the critical days of the Union a Castilian agent, receiving 
pay for his iniquity, later working against Spain, setting up 
brazen claims, and stooping to all manner of contemptible 
treachery, this is the man who later wore the epaulettes of 
commanding general of the American army, when justice, 
with the bandage torn from her eyes, should have seen 
him standing before the execution squad, a condemned 
traitor, the companion of Benedict Arnold in the popular 
execration of later generations. A general of the army, an 
agent in Spanish pay, yet listening eagerly withal to the 
plots of Burr — and prepared to renounce both Spain and 
the United States, if Burr's schemes promised him more of 
personal glory or pecuniary gain. Guilty of treason, cow- 
ardly, treacherous, and corrupt, this was the man who might 
reveal the conspiracy and who did reveal it. 

Andrew Jackson, from certain well defined rumors, was 
convinced of Wilkinson's traitorous conduct towards this 
government and wrote Governor Claiborne a letter of warn- 



"Put your town in a state of defense. Organize your 
militia and defend your city as well against internal enemies 
as external. My knowledge does not extend so far as to 
authorize me to go into detail but I fear you will meet with 
an attack from quarters you do not at present expect. Be 
upon the alert; keep a watchful eye upon our General 
(Wilkinson) and beware of an attack as well from our own 

country as Spain You have enemies within your 

own city that may try to subvert your government and 
try to separate it from the Union. You know I never haz- 
ard ideas without good grounds and you will keep these 
hints to yourself. But I say again be on the alert; your 
government I fear is in danger. I fear there are plans 
on foot inimical to the Union. Whether they will be at- 
tempted to be carried into effect or not I cannot say; but 
rest assured they are in operation, or I calculate boldly. 
Beware of the month of December. I love my country 



West Florida 173 

and government. I hate the Dons ; I would delight to see 
Mexico reduced, but I will die in the last ditch before I 
would yield a foot to the Dons or see the Union disunited. 
This I write for your own eyes and for your own safety; 
profit by it and the Ides of March remember." ^ 

Wilkinson having betrayed his chief, the lesser asso- 
ciates adopted the discreet if cowardly course of seeking 
shelter. And Burr, if it ever was his intention to attack the 
United States, was now helpless, and, a disguised fugitive, 
hoping only to reach the gulf. Detected and captured in 
Alabama he was returned to Richmond to become the prin- 
cipal in one of the most bitter and partisan trials the coun- 
try has ever known. With one accord the Federalists, the 
chief fomenters of the proposed Miranda expedition, yet, 
such the anomialy of events, forgetful of their great Hamil- 
ton, rushed to his defense, and sought, through this means, 
to convict Jefferson of all manner of crimes and misde- 
meanors. 

The affair took on the appearance of a worthy wel- 
come to a returning hero rather than the trial of a man 
who had been, a few short weeks before, a hunted fugitive 
in the wilds of the South. A suite of rooms was especially 
prepared for his confinement and his jailers became rather 
his servants. Magnificent levees were held where the lead- 
ing citizens paid court to dominant high treason. Judge 
and prisoner sat down together at a brilliant banquet. 
Choice fruits, beautiful flowers, daintily scented notes, the 
fair ladies showered upon this notorious seducer of their 
sex. And can even Marshall's most ardent admirer claim 
that the decisions of that eminent jurist Avere wholly un- 
tainted by party prejudice and political passion? It must 
ever remain a problem to future generations, the ananner 
in which leading Federalists rallied to the rescue of the 
murderer whose hands were yet wet with the blood of their 

1. Parton's Jackson, Vol. 1, p. 319. Jackson to Governor Clai- 
borne, Nov. 12, 1806. 



174 ^'^^ Purchase of Florida 

distinguished and adored Hamilton. Yet a great tribute 
they paid to the power of hatred, for their abhorrence of Jef- 
ferson rather than their love of Burr was the salvation of 
the brilliant but dissolute arch-conspirator. 

But a short time before Burr's conspiracy came to a 
head, apparently wholly disconnected with it, Nathaniel 
Kemper with a body of volunteers invaded the Spanish ter- 
ritory to the south, arrested several alcaldes, published a 
proclamation calculated to excite the Spanish against their 
king, and endeavored to obtain possession of Baton Rouge 
by a coup de main; being driven back this knight errant 
had taken refuge in the territories of the United States. ^ 
In answer to our protest against the erection of a military 
road from Pensacola to Baton Rouge, on the ground that 
the United States claimed West Florida, the Spanish min- 
ister justified this course in part on the ground of the 
Kemper affair and similar incursions which had repeatedly 
been made into that province. The United States also 
found grounds for protesting to the Spanish officials, that 
the records and documents of Spain relating to grants of 
land in Louisiana had not been delivered but had been 
sent to Pensacola. Governor Claiborne was directed to take 
such legal measures as might be necessary to secure pos- 
session of them. Further reason for complaint was found 
in the Spanish settlements which were being established in 
the disputed territory to the southwest. Rumors reached 
Washington in the spring of 1807 of strenuous efforts on 
the part of the Marquis of Carondolet to alienate the peo- 
ple of Kentucky from their connection with the United 
States. These accusations, however, failed of substantia- 
tion. 

In 1806 General Miranda, of uncertain fame, whom 
the reader will recall in connection with the plots of 1798, 



1. Vol. XIV, Domestic Letters, p. 405. Madison to Governor Clai- 
borne, Nov. 10, 1804. 



West Florida 175 

appears again on the Spanish-American stage. Reaching 
this country in the winter of 1805-06 he sought some en- 
couragement and assistance in instituting a revolution in 
South America. He evidently had in mind the probability 
of a rupture between the United States and Spain. But 
receiving scant notice from the officials of this government, 
he organized and recruited a company of militia, purchased 
cannon and other stores, loaded them on a chartered ship, 
and, eluding the now watchful officers, set boldly to sea. 
Having fitted out as on a commercial trip to San Domingo, 
the true character of this venture was not known. Touch- 
ing first at a French port, Miranda headed for the Spanish 
possessions and military fame. This, together with the 
Burr expedition, served naturally to irritate Spain who com- 
municated to this country her determination to demand 
damages. Jefferson proposed to offset the complaints of 
Spain with their intrigues for the detachment of the Mis- 
sissippi region from the United States and suggested the 
balancing of this account and the unsettled claims of the 
convention of 1802 by taking Florida. "I had rather have 
war against Spain than not if we go to war with England," 
said the president. In 1808 he favored taking "our own 
limits of Louisiana and the residue of the Floridas as re- 
prisals for spoliations." European complications however 
exerted a chastening influence upon him and decided him 
to still keep peace and hold the favor of the United States 
wavering between France and England. 

In the spring of 1806, France was imdoubtedly anxious 
to secure a settlement of the Spanish-American difficulties 
and arrange a sale of the Floridas. Spain was in most 
desperate financial straits. Bowdoin was approached un- 
officially by French officers desiring to arrange a cession 
of those territories to the United States for six million dol- 
lars. Their intimations induced him to believe they might 
even be secured for four million. Spain owed subsidies to 



176 The Purchase of Florida 

Napoleon and this amount must soon find its way to Paris, 
But she stubbornly refused to contribute more to the French 
war chest. Further, the United States wished to secure 
the Floridas either by way of satisfaction for spoliation 
claims or by exchange rather than by purchase. Thus the 
effort of Napoleon to continue negotiations at Paris came 
to naught. 

The Spanish government was loath to enter into any 
sort of a treaty or convention. To postpone a treaty and 
yet avoid a war, making a treaty only as a last recourse 
was the aim of Spanish diplomacy. As Erving, our charge 
at Madrid, wrote Bowdoin, they felt "that they must sac- 
rifice something by an arrangement, and they trust without 
it they will sacrifice nothing." ^ It is evident that in the 
fall of 1806 Napoleon had lost all interest in any settle- 
ment. In fact, he did not really care to arrange the dis- 
pute, for, after Jena, Spain lay prostrate at his feet, in 
short, was his own. Further, from D'Yrujo's reports, 
Spain was confident that she need have no fear of war wuth 
the United States owing to the diversity of interests in this 
country. The northern states would never consent to a 
war for anything which concerned southern territory, it 
was believed. That this impression had great weight in 
Spain cannot be doubted. And this, with the mercurial var- 
iations of her position in Europe, changed her manner to- 
ward this country. She became more conciliatory to the 
United States as her fortunes in Europe were less favor- 
able, more firm as they brightened. Bowdoin, appreciating 
the failure of our representations at Paris, advocated more 
decisive measures and suggested seizing the Floridas. Like 
Monroe, Livingston, and Pinckney, he felt that we must 
present a decided front, else give up forever our claims 
to West Florida and Spanish spoliations. The publication 
of a Spanish paper at New Orleans which might have a 



Erving to Bowdoin, Sept. lE, 150^6. 



West Florida 177 

circulation in the Floridas had suggested itself as a scheme 
likely to arouse in those territories a desire to become a 
part of this nation. 

In the year 1807, the depredations committed by the 
English fleet off the Virginia capes and the prospect of 
immediate war with that country determined the president 
not in any way to apply "the public funds to objects not 
immediately connected with the public safety." Accord- 
ingly Armstrong and Bowdoin were instructed to suspend 
the negotiations for the purchase of the Floridas "unless 
it shall be agreed by Spain that payment for them shall, 
in case of a rupture between Great Britain and the United 
States, be postponed till the end of one year after they 
shall have settled their differences ; and that in the meantime 
no interest shall be paid on the debt." These terms it was felt 
would be agreeable to her by reason of the advantages which 
Spain and her allies would derive from such a contest. In- 
deed such considerations it was felt ought to lessen the price 
we should pay for the Floridas. For, in the event of war, 
our pecuniary faculties would be materially benumbed while 
those of Spain would be essentially aided by giving that 
country once again the command of her South American 
treasury through the United States. Further, such a war 
might remove the objections hitherto felt by Great Brit- 
ain to enterprises against the Floridas and even lead to a 
military occupation of them with views decidedly adverse 
to the policy of Spain. ^ 

In 1807 information was received in Washington that 
the people of West Florida meditated an attempt to liber- 
ate themselves from the Spanish government. With this 
in view they intended, if the manner of this government 
did not promise taking them by the hand, to address them- 
selves to England. Confident of their ability to overpower 



1. Vol. VI, Instructions, p. 430, Madison to Armstrong and Bow- 
doin, July 15, 1807. 



178 The Purchase of Florida 

the Spanish garrisons, the external aid they sought related 
solely to subsequent support against whatever force Spain 
might employ to regain possession. This development was 
one which must interest both Spain and the United States. 
Great Britain had not hitherto deemed it politic to direct 
any of her forces to the easy conquest of the Floridas, fear- 
ing thereby to add the United States to the number of her 
enemies. The present crisis with Great Britain might alter 
the course on the part of England and thus compel this 
country, either promptly to occupy the territory in ques- 
tion, or see it pass into the hands of a conqueror from 
whom it might not be easily secured in the future. Gen- 
eral Armstrong was directed to make suitable representa- 
tions on this subject with a view either to stimulating Spain 
to an immediate concurrence in the plan of adjustment 
proposed by the United States, or to prepare her and her 
ally for any sudden measures which the approach of war 
with Great Britain might prescribe to this government. ^ 
Napoleon at this juncture made overtures for an ac- 
cession of the United States to the war against England, as 
an inducement to which his interposition would be employed 
with Spain to obtain for us the Floridas. Many his- 
torians consider this the time when we should have fought 
our war which came four years later. Here we would 
have secured a virile and powerful ally, who was nearly 
able to humble the haughty Briton and thus we might have 
derived much benefit from the startling victories of Napo- 
leon, Unfortunately we were doomed to wait until France 
lay exhausted and defeated on the field of battle, when 
England might turn her whole force and divert her battle- 
scarred veterans to our shores and there bring confusion 
and panic upon our untrained militia. Let it suffice to 
say that no man knows the future, and to Jefferson the 



1. Vol. "VI, Instructions, p. 436, Madison to Armstrong and Bow- 
doin, Aug. 2, 1807. 



West Florida ij() 

muse of history had not confided the virgin pages yet un- 
written. To Napoleon's advances Madison repHed that 
"the United States 'having chosen as the basis of their 
policy a fair and sincere neutrality among the contending 
powers, they are disposed to adhere to it as long as their 
essential interests will permit, and are more especially dis- 
inclined to become a party to the complicated and general 
warfare which agitates another quarter of the globe, for 
the purpose of obtaining a separate and particular object 
however interesting to them." ^ 

It was now out of the question to think of negotia- 
tions between the United States and Spain. Harassed by 
Napoleon, drained of men and money, Godoy, the dissolute 
Prince of Peace, fallen, her king had abdicated and his son 
had been crowned amidst the joyful demonstrations of his 
insanely patriotic subjects. The French armies were in 
Madrid and shortly the imprisoned Charles and Ferdinand 
had both surrendered their rights at the dictation of Na- 
poleon. In May, 1808, at first dazed with this kaleidoscopic 
change of sovereigns, the people in every part of the Span- 
ish kingdom were in arms, and anarchy seemed complete 
in that wretched country. Governed by Joseph Bonaparte 
as king and a miserable though native junta, who 
claimed in their peripatetic movements to be the true rulers, 
all questions of diplomacy were forced to give way to the 
sterner considerations of war and pillage. 

In the United States the accredited charge continued 
to conduct the ordinary diplomatic intercourse. Foronda 
found cause for complaint in various irregularities in the 
south and southwest. Negroes and Indians were attack- 
ing Florida and shutting off provisions from the province. 
The commandant of American gunboats captured Spanish 
vessels within the jurisdiction of East Florida. This gov- 
ernment under its Embargo Act, forbidding exportation by 

1. Vol. VI, Instructions, p. 458, Madison to Armstrong, May 2, 1808. 



i8o The Purchase of Florida 

land as well as sea, had shut off supplies from Florida and 
was causing untold hardship and suffering. The Georg- 
ians were raiding Florida, stealing slaves and personal prop- 
erty. The Spanish territory was being violated by men in 
the naval and military service of the United States. They 
were encouraging an uprising at Mobile ; Spanish vessels 
were being shut out of the Mississippi in violation of treaty 
rights. Certain citizens of New Orleans were plotting 
revolutionary movements in Mexico and Vera Cruz and 
setting on foot filibustering expeditions. Such was the bur- 
den of Foronda's letters to the secretary of state in the 
years of 1808 and 1809. That many of his complaints were 
ill-founded is probably true, but that there were constant 
incursions into Spanish territory, and constant violations of 
Spanish sovereignty and that our southern ports, particu- 
larly New Orleans, were being made the headquarters of 
revolutionary plotters and filibusters seems equally cer- 
tain. 

In the fall of 1808 the report gained credence in Spain 
that Napoleon intended to sell the Floridas to the United 
States. This caused the utmost concern and consterna- 
tion in Madrid and the Spanish junta protested vigorously 
to Mr. Erving against such an act. It was rumored that 
negotiations with this in view had already been opened by 
the French minister at Washington. There seems to have 
been no foundation for this canard and Erving promptly 
disclaimed all knowledge of it. 

During the struggle then being waged for the posses- 
sion of the Spanish throne, the United States insisted on 
observing absolute neutrality^ refusing to recognize either 
claimant until the question should be definitely settled. In 
1810 Ferdinand VII having gained at least a temporary 
success, was nominally at the head of the Spanish govern- 
ment and as such appointed De Onis minister at Wash- 
ington to succeed D'Yrujo. The United States, true to its 



West Florida i8i 

declaration, refused to recognize Ferdinand or receive De 
Onis. 

As one reads the history of bleeding Spain during these 
years of national misfortune he must needs nominate it 
a "hapless, miserable country." And yet he cannot fail 
to admire those peasants, priest-ridden and ignorant though 
they were, who rose as one man to fight for their legitimate 
sovereign and drive out the hated despot — the people who 
taught other nations that even Napoleon was vulnerable, 
and inspired them to rise against the curse of Europe. 
For in Spain it was that Napoleon received the first reverses 
which culminated six years later in an overwhelming Water- 
loo. The Spaniards were a people — hitherto Napoleon 
had attacked governments and defeated them. At Jena he 
had fought a government and Europe lay prostrate at his 
feet — at Waterloo he fought a people and St. Helena was 
his grave. Let the future applaud the Spanish patriotism, 
unworthy thoug^h the beneficiaries were, which released 
Europe from the bonds of cruel slavery forged to satisfy 
the insatiable ambition of a heartless warrior. 



CHAPTER VI. 

I^LORIDA DURING THE) WAR OF l8l2. 

THE anarchy which existed in the mother country, the 
downfall of the Spanish monarchy, and the elevation 
of Joseph Bonaparte to the throne had given a show 
of legitimacy to a series of revolutions which gradually in- 
fected most of the Spanish provinces of South America. Nor 
had the organization of the Spanish junta succeeded in 
restoring any degree of order in these countries. The 
downfall of legitimacy at Madrid was rather the excuse than 
the justification of the rebellions which now sprang up in 
the South American colonies, like toad-stools in a night. 
Encouraged and assisted by English emissaries the people 
of Buenos Ayres rose and expelled the viceroy commis- 
sioned by the Spanish junta. The worthy people of Ca*-- 
accas were not slow in imitating their neighbors and soon 
Venezuela, New Granada, and Mexico were in arms and 
the discerning eye could readily detect the signs of immi- 
nent trouble in Cuba and West Florida. In the latter 
territory the germs of rebellion first bore fruit in the dis- 
trict of New Feliciana which lay along the Mississippi 
just across the boundary line of 31°. The immediate cause 
may have been a widely circulated rumor that Napoleon 
intended to seize and hold West Florida. A curious pop- 
ulation, that of this province, since the purchase of Louis- 
iana — a notable congregation of evil-doers; Englishmen, 
Spaniards, renegade Americans, traders, land speculators, 
army deserters, fleeing debtors, fugitives from justice, fill- 



Florida During the War of l8l2 183 

busters, pirates, and others of like ilk. Taking advantage 
of the confusion in Spain and the difficulties in the other 
provinces these people determined to seize the opportunity 
to set up a free government — which meant simply substi- 
tuting their own misrule for that of Spain. In the spring 
of 1810 they issued a call for a convention which with the 
consent of the governor, Don Carlos Debault Delassus, met 
at St. John's Plains in July. Delegates from San Feliciana, 
Baton Rouge, St. Helena, and Tauchipaho responded to 
the call. 

The settlers were, generally speaking, divided into 
three classes. One, mostly the people of New Feliciana, 
wanted an independent government ; another faction insisted 
that the province should support Ferdinand VII ; but the 
largest number sought annexation to the United States, 
in which they were stoutly supported by the press of 
Tennessee and Kentucky. It was argued by these papers 
that if the United States did not take West Florida, Eng- 
land would. In that event the people of Kentucky and 
Tennessee and the territories of Indiana, Mississippi, and 
Louisiana would never tolerate being cut off from access 
to the Gulf of Mexico and trade on the Atlantic. Those 
desiring a separate government issued a manifesto, — a 
combination of queer political philosophy and grandilo- 
quent literature, — a blending of our Declaration of In- 
dependence and constitution with certain other features 
making it radically different. 

This innovation proved too bold and when the con- 
vention reassembled after a short adjournment, the dele- 
gates merely suggested a few reforms which Delassus 
promised to put into execution. They recommended a pro- 
visional government in the name of Spain; courts of jus- 
tice modeled after those of the United States, a miHtia, 
the naturalization of aliens and a printing press under 
the control of the judiciary. Such a scheme was manifestly 



184 The Purchase of Florida 

unsatisfactory to both those who favored annexation to 
the United States and those who, with greater temerity, 
wished to take their place in the world as an independent 
nation — in short these two factions vowed they would 
never submit to such a government as the one proposed, 
and soon they had a declaration of independence, a state, 
a constitution, a lone-star flag, a standing army of one 
hundred and four men and a president of their own. 
Philemon Thomas, an American, was ordered by the con- 
vention to take the Spanish fort at Baton Rouge. Rapidly 
getting together a motley crowd of boatmen, Thomas 
moved upon the fort which was garrisoned by about twenty 
half-sick, incapacitated men under the command of Louis 
Grandpre. Storming the works, the insurgents captured 
the town taking prisoner, among others, Governor Delas- 
sus. 

The convention thereupon declared West Florida a 
free and independent state and instructed John Rhea, its 
president, to offer terms of annexation to the United States ; 
West Florida should be admitted into the Union as a state 
or territory with the power to govern itself, or at least as 
part of Orleans ; it should be recognized as having full 
title to its public lands and that one hundred thousand 
dollars should be loaned to it by the United States. ^ 

The requests of the revolutionary party were refused 
and Madison replied to their offer of annexation by a pro- 
clamation taking possession of territory in the name of 
the United States, by virtue of the treaty of 1803, and an- 
nexing it to Orleans. An order was drawn up addressed 
to the governor of Orleans to carry out the terms of the 
proclamation. Spain and Great Britain, at that time allies, 
protested strongly against Madison's course. Claiborne was 
directed to hold a consultation with the governor of Mis- 
sissippi and the commander of the troops, and proceed im- 

1. American Papers, Foreign Affairs, Vol. Ill, p. 39 5. 



Florida During the War of l8l2 185 

mediately to West Florida and take possession as far as the 
Perdido River. This done, he was to organize the govern- 
ment, mark out parish limits, set up parish courts, organize 
militia, and take other necessary steps to secure to the 
people the "peaceful enjoyment of their lives, property, 
and religion." By the first of December, Claiborne was 
scattering copies of the president's proclamation broadcast 
through the towns and hamlets of West Florida much to 
the indignation of the newly chosen governor, Fulwar 
Skipwith, who pompously declared that his dignity had 
been insulted, that a copy of the proclamation should have 
been brought to him before being thus indiscriminately scat- 
tered among the people. Then he took the mirth pro- 
voking course of recalling Philemon Thomas from a pro- 
jected assault upon Mobile, shutting himself up in the 
fort at Baton Rouge and defying Governor Claiborne to do 
his worst. 

Colonel Pike was ordered at the head of a force 
to proceed by land to Mobile, and the commander of sev- 
eral of Jefferson's famous gunboats was directed to pro- 
ceed from New Orleans to the same point. Claiborne 
hastened to Francisville. There, raising the American 
flag, he addressed the people. He was followed on the 
program by General Thomas who delivered a passionate 
harangue. The United States he declared had refused as- 
sistance and protection when it was needed, and now, when 
it was unnecessary, sought to force it on them; the claim 
of the United States to West Florida was bad in law and 
morals ; Madison's proclamation he characterized as a 
declaration of war ; his oration, if we may thus term an 
harangue delivered amidst such settings, he concluded by 
theatrically announcing his determination of hastening to 
Baton Rouge and on the ruins of that fort giving up his 
life, if need be, for the sake of his country. The challenge 
was accepted ; the troops were recalled from Mobile ; gun- 



1 86 The Purchase of Florida 

iboats were ordered from New Orleans and in forty-eight 
hours Claiborne was in Baton Rouge and the United States 
flag was flying over the city. Trouble ensued. The mal- 
contents tore down the stars and stripes and in its stead 
ran up the lone-star flag. Providentially the troops and 
gunboats appeared and those disposed to create trouble 
quickly subsided. Even the fort quietly surrendered and 
there were no ruins and no generals immolated on the altar 
of patriotism. In the other sections even less opposition 
was offered to the American occupation and by the close of 
the year we were in possession of the districts of Baton 
Rouge, New Feliciana, St. Helena, St. Ferdinand and 
Tauchipaho. 

But beyond the Pearl, conditions w^ere even worse. 
Here, for years, there had been no pretense of enforcing 
law or preserving order. The character of the people of 
that section was even more hopeless than those of West 
Florida. Now had come their opportunity. They sought 
a government of their own with themselves as officials. 
Under the command of Reuben Kemper they proceeded 
against Mobile. At first repelled by the Spanish, the in- 
surgents returned to the attack. So exhausted and dis- 
gusted was Governor Folch at the neglect of his own 
government that in a letter to Robert Smith, our secre- 
tary of state, he offered to give up both Floridas to the 
United States if assistance did not arrive from Havana 
or Vera Cruz before January i, 1811. This letter did 
not reach Washington until the first of January but imme- 
diately upon its arrival Madison sent it to Congress with 
a secret message. He asked a declaration from that body 
that the United States could not, without concern, see 
the Floridas pass from the ownership of Spain to that of 
any other foreign power ; and he requested authority to take 
possession of the province with the consent of the Spanish 
officials. 



Florida During the War of l8l2 187 

The senate was already in secret session considering 
a bill on West Florida. A committee to which had been 
referred that portion of the president's message relating to 
that province had reported a resolution declaring all the 
region south of the Mississippi Territory, east of the Mis- 
sissippi River and west of the Perdido, to be part of the 
territory of Orleans ; other sections of the bill related to 
claims and titles to land. The discussion was bitter and 
prolonged and the arguments presented varied and novel. 
The proclamation was unconstitutional and illegal as an 
act of legislation and a declaration of war ; an act of legis- 
lation in that it joined the province to a territory of the 
United States and gave Claiborne governmental authority 
over it ; a declaration of war in that it directed the occupa- 
tion of the country by a military force. The remnants of 
the Federalist party were particularly bitter in their char- 
acterization of the course of the administration.- With the 
battle taunt of French influence they eloquently dilated 
upon the respectful treatment of Spain when an ally of 
France and enemy of England, and compared it with the 
high-handed treatment of her now that she was the ally 
of England and the enemy of France. That it was a piece 
of robbery was their final judgment. The Republicans tak- 
ing the negative declared that the proclamation was not an 
act of legislation and that the president had not assumed 
a war power ; Florida was rightfully ours and its occupa- 
tion was an act of prudence and necessity ; the Federalists, 
they delared, were Anglophiles who had never been able 
to free themselves of the English influence. 

In the midst of the debate, congress received the 
secret message accompanied by the letters of Governor 
Folch. A fortnight later Madison attached his signature 
to a bill and a joint resolution. The resolution declared 
that in view of the situation of Spain and her American 
colonies and the influence which Florida must ever exert 



1 88 The Purchase of Florida 

on the peace, tranquillity, and commerce of the United 
States this country must view with grave alarm any act by 
which any part of that province might pass into the hands 
of a foreign power ; that a due regard for our own national 
safety made it necessary to occupy the territory; the occu- 
pation, however, should be temporary and subject to future 
negotiation. The bill which they passed was based on the 
letter of Governor Folch and authorized the president to 
receive and hold Florida east of the Perdido River, if the 
local authorities were willing to deliver it up or if any for- 
eign power attempted to occupy it. The president was 
authorized, if necessary, to use the army and navy and 
expend one hundred thousand dollars. He was further 
empowered to set up a temporary government and vest the 
civil, military, and judicial powers in such persons as he 
might see fit. ^ Madison, in conformity with this resolu- 
tion, appointed General George Matthews and Colonel John 
McKee commissioners to carry out the law and ordered their 
instructions immediately prepared. 

While the United States claimed all the territory from 
the Mississippi to the Perdido her authority did not extend 
\ to the Mobile and it is doubtful if she was recognized be- 

yond the Pearl. To the Pearl even, congress was not 
ready to enforce its authority and by the act granting 
the people of Orleans the power to frame a constitution 
and seek admission as a state, the Mississippi, the Iber- 
ville, Lake Maurepas, Lake Pontchartrain, and the Gulf of 
Mexico were made the eastern boundary of the state of 
Louisiana. 

There has been much discussion among historians on 
the right of the United States thus to seize West Florida. 
Jefiferson who consistently followed, and urged upon Mad- 
ison, the policy of using the intrigues and combinations 

1. Before adjournment an act was passed forbidding the promul- 
gation of this resolution and law before t".e end of the next session 
of congress. 



Florida During the War of l8l2 189 

of Napoleon to obtain Florida and even Cuba for the Unit- 
ed States, was anxious to ''maintain in Europe a correct 
opinion of our political morality." He believed that the 
documentar}'- history would prove the conscientiousness of 
the United States. The question of title to West Florida 
arose in the case of Foster and Elam against the United 
States, but the supreme court, without deciding on the 
merits as to what had passed by that convention, held that 
it was bound by the legislative construction that the ter- 
ritory passed to the United States by the treaty of Paris 
of 1803.1 

The course of the United States called forth a bitter 
protest from the Spanish representative at Washington, 
Juan B. Bernabue. He complained that French emissaries 
were permitted to stop in the United States contrary to 
the neutrality laws at the very time that France was con- 
fiscating American vessels ; that these French emissaries 
moreover were charged to stir up revolution in the Span- 
ish territories. On the other hand Spain allowed Amer- 
ican vessels to trade freely in her ports ; had assisted the 
United States in her revolutionary war, and was the first 
to send an accredited agent to this government. "Spain, 
notwithstanding this conduct," wrote Bernabue, "is treated 
by the United States as an enemy, her frontiers in this 
quarter of the world are invaded without any other reason 
or motive being assigned saving the convenience of the 
acquisition of those territories to the views and interests 
of the invaders, or perhaps because it has been presumed 
that Spain, who has dared to face and arrest the progress 
of the most formidable power in the world, is in such a 
state of weakness as not to be able to defend her rights 
whenever they may be violated and infringed in the most 



1. Vol. II, Peters, p. 253. 



r 



190 The Purchase of Florida 

open manner." ^ Complaint was also made that the in- 
surrections in West Florida, Buenos Ayres, and Caraccas 
were publicly favored, that a consul had been appointed 
who resided at and exercised his consular functions 
among the rebels at Caraccas permitting a considerable re- 
mittance of arms and ammunition from the United States 
to the provinces in rebellion ; further, that agents and 
emissaries of these revolting colonies were admitted to this 
country; and that French cruisers were tolerated in our 
ports and those of Joseph Bonaparte were permitted to 
cruise against the commerce of Spain. In short, concluded 
Bernabue, the Spanish troubles in this hemisphere were 
largely due to the fact that the United States did not re- 
strain her "factious citizens." 

To General Matthews and Colonel McKee were sent 
instructions for carrying into effect the provisions of the 
act of congress relative to that portion of the Floridas 
east of the River Perdido. The purpose of the United 
States was to take possession of East Florida for fear 
that, in the present chaotic condition of Spanish affairs, 
some foreign power might seize it. The country was to 
be held subject to future diplomatic negotiations. The 
commissioners were directed to proceed immediately to that 
province "concealing from general observation the trust 
.... with that discretion which the delicacy and importance 
of the undertaking required." 

Did Governor Folch or the local authority seem in- 
clined to surrender in an amicable manner, General 
Matthews was to accept his abdication in behalf of the 
United States and if the Spanish officials should insist on 
a stipulation for the future re-delivery of the country, such 
a demand should be complied with. Thus much for an 
"amicable surrender." "Should there be room," writes 



1. Juan B. Bernabue to Secretary of State, Vol. II. Spanish Min- 
isters to Secretary of State. 



Florida During the War of l8l2 191 

Robert Smith, "to entertain a suspicion of an existing de- 
sign of any foreign power to occupy the country in ques- 
tion you are to keep yourselves on the alert and, on the 
first undoubted manifestation of the approach of a force 
for that purpose, you will exercise with promptness and 
vigor the powers with which you are invested by the pres- 
ident to pre-occupy by force the territory to the entire 
exclusion of any armament that may be advancing to take 
possession of it." ^ These instructions at the present day 
seem extraordinary. 

Hastening to St. Mary's, a small place on the Amer- 
ican side of the line, Matthews encountered a condition 
of affairs which, as he construed his instructions, demanded 
that immediate possession be taken on the plea of self- 
preservation. The river was alive with British shipping 
engaged in smuggling goods into the United States in 
manifest violation of the non-importation law. Amelia 
Island which was situated at the mouth of the St. Mary's 
River just off the coast of Florida, was a notorious re- 
sort of smugglers. Fernandina, the Spanish town on the 
island, was merely an entrepot for their illicit trade. Span- 
ish authority existed there more in fiction than in fact. 
No law of any kind was in force. 

After making diligent inquiries, Matthews concluded 
that to obtain quiet possession was impossible. The profits 
of the illegal traffic were far too alluring to be thus tamely 
surrendered. Inferring that the country was to be taken 
at all events, he recommended the employment of force. 
The course of West Florida furnished to his mind a suit- 
able criterion. The people of East Florida should be en- 
couraged to revolt, declare the province independent, and 
then apply for annexation to the United States. Two 
hundred stand of arms and fifty horsemen's swords would 



1. Vol. XVI, Domestic Letters, p. 1. Robert Smith to Gen. 
George Matthews and Col. John MoKee, Jan. 26, 1811. 



192 The Purchase of Florida 

be necessary and he would guarantee that they reached 
the people without in any manner compromising the Unit- 
ed States. These suggestions were more fully enlarged 
upon to Senator William H. Crawford of Georgia and by 
him communicated to President Madison. Mistaking 
silence for consent Matthews began to organize the revolu- 
tion. In the order of General Eustis, a hint had been 
given to create a new local authority friendly to the Unit- 
ed States. For this the conditions were ripe. Adventur- 
ous spirits — the stuff of which filibusters are made — • 
abounded along the St. Mary's. It was familiarly termed 
the "jumping place" of criminals and desperate characters 
from Georgia and Florida. The "moccazin boys" were 
even then making their slave and cattle stealing raids into 
the Indian country. Outlawry was everywhere the dom- 
inent influence. The weak Spanish government could of- 
fer no effective protection to the planters in the northeast. 
Many of the nominal subjects of Spain were disaffected, 
first among whom was General John Mcintosh, an ideal 
leader for such a revolution as the one contemplated. After 
his release from Moro Castle he had returned to Florida, 
gathered together his former adherents and quit the pro- 
vince after wreaking vengeance by destroying a small Span- 
ish post at the Cow Ford, and some Spanish boats near the 
site of Jacksonville. By 181 1 he had become a man of im- 
portance on the lower St. John's. He owned large num- 
bers of negroes, horses, and boats and was extensively en- 
gaged in cutting pine timber under a lucrative contract. 
The insurrection was acomplished through his influence 
under the protection of General Matthews. He devoted all 
his property to the "sacred" cause under the guarantee by 
Matthews that the United States would make good any 
loss he might suffer. The two other leading agents there 
were the postmaster at St. Mary's and the United States 
deputy marshal. 



Florida During the War of l8l2 193 

By the spring of 1812 some two hundred of these ad- 
venture-seeking "patriots" were assembled near St. Mary's. 
Organizing themselves they announced as their purpose 
the establishment of republican institutions in Florida. A 
provisional government was formed and officers duly elec- 
ted. General John H. Mcintosh was chosen governor or 
director of the republic of Florida, and Col. Ashley was 
named as military chief. One day in March, 1812, found ' 
them across the St. Mary's River on Florida soil, and there 
on a bluff six miles above Amelia Island they camped and 
ran up a white flag decorated with a soldier with bayonet ^ 
charged and the motto "Salus populi — suprema lex." 

Fernandina had been occupied as a Spanish port for 
three or four years and had rapidly grown to be a place of 
importance. During the existence of the embargo, par- 
ticularly, the town had flourished and as many as a hun- 
dred and fifty vessels might be seen at one time in her 
harbor. In 1812 a Spanish garrison of ten men under 
the command of Don Jose Lopez held the place. It was 
deemed of vital necessity to secure possession of the town. 

On the fifteenth of March, Colonel Ashley sent an 
ultimatum to Lopez. The determination of the LTnited 
States to seize East Florida had led the inhabitants to do 
it themselves. Therefore under the patronage and pro- 
tection of the United States they had taken possession of 
the country from the St. Mary's River to the St. John's ; V 
and now they summoned Fernandina to surrender. It is 
certain, beyond all peradventure, that General Matthews 
having determined upon the occupation of Amelia Island, 
used the patriot organization as a cover to effect his purpose. 
Nine American gunboats under the command of Hugh 
Campbell had come into the harbor with the avowed pur- 
pose of preventing smuggling and enforcing the non-im- 
portation law. To Commander Campbell, Lopez dispatched 
messengers informing him of the demands of the insur- 



194 ^'^^ Purchase of Florida 

gents and inquiring whether he had orders to aid them. 
Messengers were similarly dispatched to Major Laval who 
was in command of the American troops at Point Peter. 
Laval replied that he had no such orders, while Campbell 
referred the whole affair to General Matthews. General 
Matthews was at the time, so the commandant informed 
the messengers, in the camp endeavoring to persuade the 
troops to join the patriots. 

In an interview which followed, the messengers in- 
formed him plainly that the patriots were Americans brought 
into Florida under the promise of five hundred acres of 
land to each of them in the event of the success of the 
revolution. In the eyes of Spain, they declared, it was an 
American invasion. After having thus delivered themselves 
of these expressions, for which there could be no denial, 
the messengers proceeded to the patriot camp and informed 
the commanding officer that urtder no circumstances would 
they surrender to him, but that they would treat with the 
United States. According to agreement all three parties, 
Spanish, Americans, and patriots met the next day at the 
patriot camp on Belle River. 

The conference, however, proved barren of results and 
the messengers set out for Amelia Island, there to find 
the American gunboats drawn up in line in front of 
Fernandina with their guns trained upon the fort. The 
patriots dropped down the river in boats and Lopez, seeing 
the line of war ships with strings on their cables, their 
guns bearing upon the town, matches lighted and flying 
the flag of a neutral power, but prepared to enforce the 
demands of the soi-disant patriots, had no alternative but to 
surrender. The Spanish garrison, ten strong, marched out 
and grounded arms, Lopez gave up his sword, Mcintosh 
hauled down the Spanish flag and hoisted the patriot ban- 
ner. The articles of capitulation, entered into March 17, 
181 2, stipulated that within twenty-four hours after the 



Florida During the War of l8l2 195 

capitulation the island should be surrendered to the United 
States and should be exempt from the operation of the 
non-importation law. By noon of the following day the 
stars and stripes were flying- over the fort and a company 
of United States soldiers were doing garrison duty. The 
manner and the pretences under which this was done reflect 
but little credit on the United States government and the 
transparent sham of taking possession of the country by 
"patriots" supported by the United States troops was both 
a reproach upon our dignity and a stain upon our honor. 

The patriots themselves sought other fields to conquer, 
other worlds to win, and, still encouraged and led by citi- 
zens and officers of the United States, began the march to 
St. Augustine. With them, it appears, went a detach- 
ment of United States regulars. Taking possession of 
old fort Moosa, about two miles distant, they invested the 
place. Dislodged from this site by a Spanish gunboat, 
they still hovered about the city and cut off all supplies. 
The courage and bravery of a company of negroes, led by a 
free black, alone saved the town from starvation. The 
Indians of Florida were aroused to attack the xA.mericans 
and patriots, and for a year the unhappy province was 
scourged by these contending parties. 

The occupation of Fernandina and the subsequent 
movement upon St. Augustine brought forth a vigorous re- 
monstrance from the Spanish minister at Washington. He 
learned that Matthews had seduced the inhabitants by 
offering to every free white male inhabitant fifty acres of 
land, the free exercise of his religion, the undisturbed pos- 
session of his estates, assuring them that the American gov- 
ernment would pay to individuals whatever debts might be 
due to them from the Spanish authorities on account of 
salary or otherwise. ^ The British minister also presented 



1. De Onis to Secretary of State, Vol. HI, Sept. 5, 1811. 



196 The Purchase of Florida 

a protest against this "flagrant violation of neutral terri- 
tory." 

President Madison was placed in an embarrassing posi- 
tion. General Matthews was his accredited commissioner 
and had been instructed in writing to occupy the country, 
if there should be room to entertain a suspicion that any 
other power contemplated taking possession. The alter- 
native was presented of sacrificing his agent and disov/ning 
his acts or of boldly justifying his course, assuming the 
responsibility, and accepting the consequences. Pursuing 
the usual course of those in authority, he sacrificed another. 
Declaring that General Matthews had transcended his 
authority, he regretted the occurrence and promised to re- 
store conditions to their status quo ante. Matthews was 
relieved of his position and Governor Mitchell of Georgia 
appointed in his stead. The letter of disavowal which 
Matthews received must have read painfully after his zeal- 
ous efforts "to promote the welfare of the country." ^ 

The conduct of our officials in Florida furnishes a sad 
contrast to what Monroe at that time declared to be the 
policy of this country towards Spain. In a letter to Gov- 
ernor Howard he had written, "The United States are at 
peace with Spain. The convulsions of the Spanish mon- 
archy have produced no effect on this policy towards her. 
The disorganized condition of that power and its embar- 
rassments have afforded motives rather to forbear to press 
claims of right founded on positive wrongs than to seek 
redress by force which under other circumstances might 
have been done." ^ 

Had our conduct been dictated by the principles thus 
proclaimed, the task of the historian would be far more 
pleasant, for it is more agreeable to praise than to apolo- 



1. Vol. XVI, Domestic Letters, James Monroe to Gen. George 
Matthews, April 4, 1812. 

2. Vol. XVI, Domestic Letters, p. 199, Sept. 3, 1812. 



Florida During the War of l8l2 197 

gize for the deeds of one's own country. Governor Mitchell 
was directed to withdraw the American troops if, on reach- 
ing St. Mary's, he saw no prospect of foreign occupation. 
He was further instructed to restore Amelia Island and, 
above all, take care to secure from molestation or harm 
those men, who had been induced by General Matthews 
to embark in the revolution. Accepting the mission, 
Mitchell hastened to St. Mary's, there to -find affairs in a 
serious condition. The patriots firmly declined to retire ; 
and at a meeting at their headquarters before St. Augustine, 
they issued a call for additional recruits and pledged their 
honor not to lay down their arms until absolute indepen- 
dence had been won. Without money, they promised to 
pay all volunteers in land or such property as might be 
captured from their enemies. ^ 

Having been attacked by the Spanish gunboats they v/ere 
forced gradually to retire to St. John's. The governor of 
Florida declined to make any agreement with Mitchell for 
the immunity of these self-seeking "patriots." Alarm.ed by 
the attacks upon the revolutionists, indignant at the refusal 
of Governor Estrada to accept the proffered arrangement, 
and desirous of ousting Spain from this province, Governor 
Mitchell determined upon bold measures and sent to Sa- 
vannah for aid. The Republican Blues and Savannah Vol- 
unteer Guard were soon on their way to St. Mary's. Sim- 
ultaneously with their arrival came an express bearing news 
of the declaration of war against England. Seventeen Brit- 
ish ships lying at anchor were immediately seized, a large 
quantity of floating timber cut for the use of the British 
navy was confiscated, and a call issued to Georgia for more 
troops. One hundred men from the vicinity quickly re- 
sponded. 

Aroused by Indian attacks, the Georgia legislature, in 
the fall, passed an act providing that a state force be 

1. May 2, 1812. 



1/ 



198 The Purchase of Florida 

raised to reduce St. Augustine and chastise the hostile 
redskin?. They further resolved that the occupation of 
East Florida was essential to the safety of their state 
whether congress should approve or not. Thus the state 
of Georgia apparently came into conflict with the Fed- 
eral government, but, as it happened, its measures were 
consistent with the policy of the administration which was 
compelled to resort to military operations both against the 
hostile Indians and the British forces now in Spanish ter- 
ritory. With this complication, Governor Mitchell was re- 
lieved of further duty after having received the thanks of 
Madison for the "ability and judgment" which he had dis- 
played "in the important and delicate transaction." ^ The 
trust was again transferred, this time to General Thomas 
Pinckney. Like his predecessors he was to take posses- 
sion of the province only upon the peaceable surrender 
by the Spanish authorities or in view of its possible seizure 
by some other foreign power. ^ 

To the Spanish representations upon our course in East 
Florida a characteristic answer had been returned. Spain 
owed the United States more than the province was worth 
for spoliations and for the suppression of the deposit at 
New Orleans. The United States looked to East Florida 
for their indemnity. They would permit no power to take 
it and would take it themselves at the invitation of the 
inhabitants or to prevent its falling into the hands of an- 
other nation. As for West Florida, that belonged to the 
United States by a title which could not be improved, and, 
it might have been added, whicH could not be proved. ^ 

In the meantime the question of the revolted South 



1. Vol. XVI, Dom&stic Letters, p. 72, Madison to Governor 
Mitchell of Georgia, Oct. 13, 1812. 

2. Vol. XVI, Domestic Letters, p. 204, Madison to Gen. Thomas 
Pinckney, Dec. 8, 1812. 

3. Vol. VII, Instructions, p. 173, Monroe to Joel Barlow, Nov. 
21, 1811. 



Florida During the War of l8l2 199 

American colonies had become a burning one between this 
country and Spain. The provinces of Venezuela had de- 
clared their independence and a similar step was imminent 
at Buenos Ayres and in other quarters. The Departments 
of Venezuela had proposed to the United States the rec- 
ognition of their independence and the reception of a min- 
ister from them. Though such a recognition in form was 
not made, a friendly and conciliatory answer was 
given to them. They were also informed that the min- 
isters of the United States in Europe would be instructed 
to avail themselves of suitable opportunities to promote their 
recognition by other powers, an object "thought to 
be equally due to the just claims of our southern brethren, 
to which the United States cannot be indifferent, and to 
the best interests of this country." ^ 

The fate of West Florida was soon determined by 
congress. That portion south of 31° and between the Mis- 
sissippi and Pearl rivers was added to the new state of 
Louisiana. ^ The portion between the Pearl and the Per- 
dido was annexed to the Mississippi Territory. This act 
differed little from a declaration of war. For when, by 
Madison's signature, it became a law, the Spanish banner 
floated over Mobile and Spanish troops held the city in 
the name of Ferdinand. 

In the war of 181 2 it was hardly to be expected that 
Spain would or could maintain order in her Florida pos- 
sessions or that she would perform the duties of a neutral 
power. Her throne was the plaything of Napoleon, her 
king was his prisoner. Without any force capable of com- 
manding obedience to law it was natural that the Floridas 
should become, more than ever, the breeding ground of 
pirates, smugglers, and privateers. Further, in the Euro- 



1. Vol. VII, Instructions, p. 183, Monroe to Joel Barlow, Nov. 27, 
1811. 

2. Act of Congress, April 14, 1812. Act of Congress, April 8, In 
effect April 30, 1812. 



200 The Purchase of Florida 

pean alliance against Napoleon, Spain and her armies were 
completely under English domination. It was probable that 
now, in view of the war, England would seize the Floridas 
and use them as a base of supplies, a plan which had often 
seemed so seductive to that power but which had never 
been pursued because of the attitude of the United States. 
That the United States should forestall her enemy by first 
occupying the country was a course which to President 
Madison admitted of no argument. Nor did he doubt that 
it would appeal to congress in the same light and that that 
body would promptly authorize it. He intended to be pre- 
pared for immediate compliance with the expected order. 

The governor of Tennessee was requested to prepare 
a militia force of fifteen hundred men for "the defense of the 
lower country." General Pinckney, who had been named as 
Governor Mitchell's successor, was informed that when 
congress should consent to the proposed seizure of the 
Floridas, troops would be dispatched to him for the cap- 
ture of St. Augustine. ^ Wilkinson, the weakling, the 
traitor to both friend and country, was commanded to hold 
himself in readiness to lead an army into West Florida. ^ 

It seemed to the people of the Mississippi Valley that 
the authorities at Washington had at last begun to see 
the light, and there was much rejoicing among those 
Westerners at the projected turn of affairs. At length their 
dreams were to be realized — were to become fact rather 
than fancy. They were not afflicted with any mental 
troubles about the "defense of country" and "extra-terri- 
torial service" such as had reflected so little credit upon 
their brothers of the Canadian border. Conquest was their 
purpose and to them no peace was desirable, nay, no peace 
was tolerable, that did not recognize American sovereignty 



1. Monroe to Pinokney, Jan. 13, 1813. War Department Archives. 

2. Monroe to Wilkinson, Jan. 30, 1813. Ibid. 



Florida During the War of l8l2 201 

from the Sabine to the St. Mary's, from Canada to the Gulf 
of Mexico. 

Governor Blount's order to General Jackson to call 
out two thousand men found every fighting man in Tennes- 
see eager for the fray. The troops, having been mustered 
in on the seventh day of January, 1813, set out from Nash- 
ville. They were the men for the purpose. Their leader, 
Jackson, whose heart was ulcerated with hatred for the 

Dons, wrote : "They are the choicest of our citizens 

They go at our country's call to do the will of the govern- 
ment. No constitutional scruples trouble them. Nay, they 
will rejoice at the opportunity of placing the American eagle 
on the ramparts of Mobile, Rensacola, and Fort St. Augus- 
tine." 1 Their principal heritage had been a hardy con- 
stitution and a bitter hatred for the Spanish. Now at last 
had come the hour when they might wipe out with blood 
and fire the insults of former days which they had suf- 
fered at the hands of those whom they despised. The 
cavalry, if such it may be called, rode through the Indian 
country, while the remainder of the force embarking on 
boats slowly made their way down the Ohio, the Cumber- 
land, and the Mississippi. On the fifteenth of February, in 
obedience to instructions from Wilkinson, they put in at 
Natchez and camped on the neighboring cliffs impatiently 
awaiting orders to move on the enemy. 

In the meantime the senate had declined to countenance 
the occupation of East Florida and orders were hastily 
dispatched to the intrepid Jackson ; "the cause for march- 
ing the corps under your command to New Orleans no 
longer exists. You will therefore consider it as dismissed 
from public service." ^ Jackson's indignation knew no 
bounds and in contempt of his instructions he marched his 
men back to Nashville, making himself personally respon- 



1. Parton's Jackson, Vol. II, p. 372. Jaxikson to Secretary Bustis. 

2. Armstrong to Jackson, Feb. 6, 1813. 



202 The Purchase of Florida 

sible for their rations and pay, and defying all attempts to 
enlist his volunteers into the regular regiments. 

Though demurring to the seizure of East Florida, con- 
gress consented to the invasion of West Florida and, on 
February 20, Madison signed an act to accomplish that 
purpose. Orders were immediately hastened to Wilkinson 
and by the middle of May that officer had organized an 
expedition at Pass Christian, had led it against Mobile, had 
taken Fort Charlotte and the city (April 15), had begun the 
erection of Fort Bowyer at the entrance to the bay, and had 
returned to New Orleans (May 19). There he fou«d 
awaiting him orders to proceed to the Canadian border to 
retrieve the failures of our generals in that region. May 
16 General Pinckney withdrew from Amelia Island and 
quiet reigned along the coast. 

In the early months of 1813 came the profifered media- 
tion of the Russian czar, an offer which Madison gladly 
embraced. Quickly appointing a joint commission composed 
of Albert Gallatin, John Ouincy Adams, and James A. Bay- 
ard, Madison provided them with instructions and dis- 
patched them to St. Petersburg where they arrived in July 
to the consternation, if not embarrassment, of Alexander 
who had been at least politely discouraged in his pacific 
efforts by Lord Castlereagh. ^ Aware of the friendly rela- 
tions existing between Russia and Spain, and the interest 
which Alexander took in behalf of Ferdinand, our com- 
missioners were instructed to broach cautiously the question 
of the Floridas at St. Petersburg. ^ Fearful lest our war- 
like course in East Florida might injure the American cause 
in the eyes of Europe, particularly with Russia, besides its 
exasperating effect on the protesting northern peace men, 
it was decided not to endanger the outcome of the Russian 



1. Adams was already at St. Petersburg as minister to Russia. 

2. Vol. VII, Instructions, pp. 27C, 279. Monroe to J. Q. Adams, etc., 
April 27, 1813. 



Florida During the War of l8l2 203 

mediation because of East Florida. Orders were issued for 
the evacuation of that province, but possession was retained y 
of West Florida together with Mobile. 

A rude awakening was in store. British emissaries 
were in the meanwhile at work stimulating the southern 
Indians to make war upon the United States. Tecumseh 
with his passionate eloquence had visited the southern tribes 
in the fall of 181 1. After his departure there appeared 
certain miraculous emblems of his mighty power and wrath. 
With counsels divided, surrounded by white settlements and 
friendly Choctaws and Chickasaws, the infatuated Creeks 
took the war path. Arms and supplies were furnished them 
from a British fleet in the gulf and some assistance seems 
to have been given by the Spanish governor at Pensacola. 

Approaching Fort Mimms, an American stockade east 
of the Alabama River and ten miles above its junction with 
the Tombigbee, they terrified the white settlers who in 
wild alarm had taken refuge there from all parts of 
the surrounding country. On the thirtieth of August the 
setting sun cast its rays upon the most revolting scenes of 
savage cruelty as the hostile Creeks completed one of the 
bloodiest massacres history has to record. The buildings 
of the fort were in ashes and out of five hundred and fifty 
persons, four hundred were scalped or roasted to death. 
Neither age nor sex was spared. 

Mingled with the wail of grief and despair there arose 
from the southern border a cry for vengeance. Tennessee 
instantly responded with her ready volunteers, now pledging 
the faith of the state without awaiting arrangements with 
the federal authorities. General Jackson was again in 
command. The East and West Tennessee troops uniting 
in the upper Alabama country, after many sanguinary en- 
counters drove back the foe, who, in utter disregard of the 
most elementary tactics of warfare, instead of turning to 
threaten Mobile had advanced northward from Fort Mimms. 



204 The Purchase of Florida 

Finally at the battle of the Horseshoe (March 27-29, 1814) 
the Creek nation was annihilated and the few surviving 
warriors abjectly sued for life and peace. After signing- a 
treaty with the Indians at Fort Jackson, August 9, 1814, 
the trip was resumed. Floating down the Alabama River, 
Mobile was reached a few days later and preparations were 
at once under way for the invasion of, Florida. 

The possession of that province was to Jackson's mind 
absolutely necessary to the national peace and welfare. He 
welcomed the chain of circumstances which seemed likely 
to make him the instrument for wresting it from those 
despised Dons for whom he had long entertained an ill 
concealed contempt and hatred. When appointed major 
general he had written to Armstrong begging for orders 
to attack and reduce Pensacola. These orders did not 
materialize and when he reached Fort Jackson he deter- 
mined to go about the matter in another though equally 
effective way. With an ungovernable temper Jackson had 
a faculty, amounting really to a talent, for provoking quar- 
rels. Seizing upon every opportunity to drag the Spanish 
into an attitude of open hostility toward the United States, 
he demanded from the governor of Pensacola the delivery 
of those Red Stick Indians who had escaped into Florida. 
In August when he reached Mobile he was more than ever 
hot for an attack upon Pensacola, for the English were 
already there. 

Spain was absolutely at the mercy of England and with 
the disorganized state of affairs existing in the Iberian 
Peninsula, England exercised complete mastery and domin- 
ion over her. There is nothing to show that Spain did not 
act in good faith. She was unable, from her impotency to 
preserve her neutrality and give force to her desires. To- 
gether with her colonies she was a mere puppet in the 
hands of our enemies, and surely not to be held accountable 
as a nation acting of her own volition. It is claimed that 



Florida During the War of l8l2 205 

the obligations of gratitude and the prospect that England 
might soon have possession of Louisiana, and be able to 
dispose of it, led Spain to violate her neutrality in Florida, 
but these suspicions fail of documentary proof. Certainly 
it cannot be disproved that Spain protested both to London 
and to other courts of Europe against England's summary 
course in the province of Florida. 

The English fleet sent to capture Savannah lay many 
weeks under Amelia Island whence it must soon have 
departed but for the provisions and supplies claimed to 
have been furnished by the citizens and authorities of East 
Florida. The Spanish governor is said to have congratu- 
lated the victorious Weathersford upon his successes against 
the Americans and to have received the surviving warriors 
of the now broken chief into the friendly shelter of Pensa- 
cola. The harbor of Pensacola was the finest in all Florida. 
Fort Barrancas, six miles from the town, poorly garrisoned, 
guarded, together with Fort St. Michael, the entrance to the 
bay. This place the English selected as the point d'appui 
for their operations in the Gulf of Mexico, as a rendezvous 
for their fleet and a convenient point whence they might 
operate against Mobile and New Orleans. 

Maintaining at least the outward forms of neutrality, 
which was reciprocated by the United States, unwilling then 
to add another to its enemies, the governor general of Cuba 
refused to permit the British to land at Pensacola. The 
town, then but the grave of its former splendor, was peopled 
with Indians, half breeds. West Indian traders, smugglers, 
buccaneers, fugitive slaves, and white men "with a past" who 
had fled from the States for cause. Despite the refusal of 
the Spaniards, late in July there was sighted from the 
lookouts an approaching British fleet, the forerunner and 
vanguard of the great expedition — Major Edward 
Nicholls with four officers, eleven non-commissioned officers, 
ninety-seven marines, two howitzers, a thousand stand of 



2o6 The Purchase of Florida 

arms and three thousand suits of clothing-, and Captain 
Percy commanding the sloops "Hermes" and "Carron." 
Landing without ceremony, Nicholls seized Forts Barran- 
cas and St. Michael, hoisted the English flag beside that of 
Spain, built barracks for his soldiers, took up his quarters 
in the governor's house and began a rapid issue of sonor- 
ous proclamations to the people of Louisiana and Kentucky. 
"Natives of Louisiana," began one of these bombastic 
productions of his pen, "on you the first call is made to 
assist in liberating your paternal soil from a faithless, im- 
becile government. The American usurpation of this coun- 
try must be abolished. I am at the head of a large body of 
Indians well armed, well disciplined and commanded by 
British officers. Be not alarmed at our approach. The 
same good faith which distinguished the Britons in Europe 
accompanies them here. A flag over any door, whether 
Spanish, French, or English, will be a sure protection ; nor 
dare any Indian put his foot on the threshold thereof under 
penalty of death. Inhabitants of Kentucky, you have too 
long borne with grievous impositions. The whole brunt of 
the war has fallen on your brave sons. Be imposed on no 
longer. Range yourselves under the standard of your fore- 
fathers or observe a strict neutrality. After the experience 
of twenty-one years can any of you longer support those 
brawlers for liberty who call it freedom when they them- 
selves are free ?" ^ As an additional stimulus to the zeal 
of the Indians the bounty on American scalps was raised 
from five to ten dollars. We may imagine the spirit with 
which these proclamations were received on the Kentucky 
borders. True it might be, that they felt their treatment 
at the hands of the eastern states had been contemptuous, but 
in their hearts they harbored an undying hatred for both 
Briton and Spaniard — the former for having instigated the 
hostile savages to bloody attacks upon defenseless settle- 

1. Nlles W^eekly Register, Vol. VII, pp. 134-135. 



Florida During the War of l8l2 207 

ments, the latter from the days of the Mississippi blockade. 

Meanwhile iCaptain Woodbine, one of the English 
officers was busy with his new recruits. Some seven hundred 
warriors in full paint and feather were soon enrolled, with 
the expectation of drilling them into serviceable soldiers as 
the Indians of the East Indies are drilled. A truly comical 
yet pathetic scene they must have presented in their red 
army uniforms, divided into companies and battalions, those 
denizens of the forest used to the single file and the ambush. 
"Such scenes of preposterous costuming, of tripping over 
swords, of hopeless drilling and mad marching and counter- 
marching as the common of Pensacola then witnessed can 
be imagined only by those who know precisely what sort of 
creatures Indians are. Captain Woodbine might as well 
have attempted to train the alligators of the Florida lagoons 
for the British artillery service." ^ 

Captain Percy, to take his part in this farcical exhibi- 
tion, dispatched a ship, the "Sophie," to Jean Lafitte, the 
"pirate of the gulf," leader of the Barratarian privateers — 
to use a euphemism for their real character. An alliance 
was sought with these robbers who carried on their nefar- 
ious trade under the semblance of authority, for they had 
secured letters of marque and reprisal from the various 
revolted colonies of Spani-sh-America, particularly that of 
Cartagena. Failing to secure the assistance of the wily 
Lafitte, whose stronghold was within a few days destroyed 
by the Americans under Commander Daniel Patterson, 
Nicholls determined immediately to attack Jackson at Mo- 
bile. Fort Bowyer, a diminutive earthen affair built by 
Wilkinson on a low sand pit at the entrance to Mobile 
Bay, was defended by twenty guns, only eight of which 
were serviceable, with a garrison of one hundred and sixty 
men under Major William Lawrence. Captain Percy pro- 
ceeded against this fort with the "Hermes" of twenty-two 

1. Parton's Jackson, Vol. I, p. 579. 



2o8 The Purchase of Florida 

guns, the "Sophie" of twenty guns, the "Carron" and 
"Childers" of eighteen guns each, and a large force of 
marines and Indians under Colonel Woodbine. The mar- 
ines and Indians with two light guns were landed in the 
rear of the fort behind the sand hills, on September 12. 

Three days later the fleet, headed by the "Hermes," 
sailed for the bay in line of battle. Adopting the battle cry of 
"Don't give up the fort," the offlcers solemnly swore never 
to surrender until the ramparts were in ruins, and only 
then under the assurance of protection from an Indian 
massacre. At about four in the afternoon the "Hermes" 
followed by the rest of the fleet ran into the narrow channel 
leading into the bay, dropped anchor off the fort, and .the 
attack was on. The superior American marksmanship soon 
left the final issue in no doubt. The "Hermes" with her 
cable cut, and her bow swinging toward the fort, was slowly 
swept down the stream exposed to a raking fire until she 
finally grounded. She was immediately deserted and fired 
by her officers and crew. The other ships, suffering badly, 
drew off and at daybreak of the sixteenth were making sail 
for Pensacola while the Indians and marines beat a hasty 
land retreat towards the same town. 

Jackson, in command of only parts of three regiments 
of regulars, with a thousand miles of coast to defend, with- 
out a fort garrisoned or well armed, would gladly have 
pursued the enemy and carried the attack to Pensacola ; but 
he was forced to await the arrival of the twenty-five hun- 
dred men he had summoned from Tennessee. Here was a 
wild borderer, "of fiery word and ready blow," with a genius 
for quarreling, who had never met a civilized foe, in su- 
preme command, and practically without instructions, left to 
solve intricate questions of diplomacy and superintend the 
puzzling affairs of internal government, with a powerful 
expedition of a great nation to meet and conquer. While 
awaiting reinforcements and chafing under the enforced 



Florida During the War of l8l2 209 

delay the unlettered Jackson took to the proclamation busi- 
ness himself. He addressed to the Louisiana settlers a 
reply to that of Nicholls and much in the style employed by 
the Briton, and another to the free negroes exhorting them 
to enlist against the common enemies. 

At this time a messenger arrived with letters from 
Washington warning him of the intended attack upon New 
Orleans. Word was received shortly before that the enemy 
was preparing an expedition against Louisiana and that five 
thousand troops had been ordered from Tennessee and 
twenty-five hundred from Georgia to reinforce those now 
under his command and that one hundred thousand dollars 
in treasury notes had been given to Governor Blount to pay 
the cost of the armament. ^ Scarcely heeding these orders, 
Jackson, following a course long in his mind, set out with 
a force of from three to four thousand men for Pensacola as 
soon as the Tennessee troops had arrived. Leaving Mobile 
November 3, he conducted the expedition with all that 
impetuous zeal for which he later became famous. 
Demanding the surrender of Pensacola on the night of the 
sixth, he carried it by storm the following day, witnessed 
the destruction of Fort Barrancas by the British on the 
eighth and was again in Mobile on the eleventh, there to find 
fresh instructions awaiting him. ^ 

Applauding his conduct of the expedition against Mo- 
bile the authorities cautioned him against any attack upon 
Pensacola. "Do not, at present," wrote Monroe, "involve 
the United States in a contest with Spain. The conduct of 
the Pensacola governor is for complaint rather through the 
diplomatic channels than an attack on the place. Great 
trust is reposed in you." ^ Jackson's conduct likewise be 



1. ivronroe to Jackson, Sept. 25, 1814. MSS War Department 
Archives. 

2. Lossing's War of 1812, p. 1023. 

3. Monroe to Jackson, Monroe Correspondence, Oct., 1814. 

14 



2IO The Purchase of Florida 

came a subject for complaint through the diplomatic chan- 
nels. Pensacola fallen, Jackson in sad contrast with his 
former zeal, appeared to ignore the threatened attack upon 
New Orleans. Leaving twelve hundred men at Mobile, dis- 
patching one thousand more to attack the Indians and Brit- 
ish on the Yellow River and the Escambia, he ordered Gen- 
eral Coffee to march with two thousand by easy stages to 
Baton Rouge. Sending one regiment direct to New Orleans, 
he himself, suffering in body and mind, slowly made his 
way to that city arriving on the second of Decem- 
ber. But of the subsequent events culminating in the battle 
of New Orleans and the utter discomfiture of the British 
expedition the historian of Florida has little concern. 

During the war many complaints were received of ex- 
peditions fitted out in America against the Spanish forces 
in the colonies now in revolt. In the spring and fall of 
1812 numerous complaints were made that the Mexican 
insurgents were procuring arms from the United States and 
that a filibustering expedition against that province was 
being planned and organized. Further, American priva- 
teers were indiscriminately plundering Spanish vessels. The 
principal offenders named were the "Revenge" under Cap- 
tain Butler, and the "Saratoga." 

In the fall of 1813 a proclamation pubhshed in bom- 
bastic and passionate language by a certain Dr. John H. 
Robinson appeared at Pittsburgh. Dr. Robinson had al- 
ready figured in the letters which De Onis, the unrecognized 
Spanish envoy, filed at the state department complaining of 
the insurgent junta representing the revolutionists of Mex- 
ico at New Orleans. The object of the Pittsburgh procla- 
mations was to secure men for service in Mexico against 
the Spanish army. Dr. Robinson, it seems, had lately been 
in the employ of the United States in making a report of 
the conditions in the internal provinces of Spain. His rela- 
tions with the government made his present activity a cause 



Florida During the War of l8l2 211 

for stronger suspicions upon the part of De Onis. With 
him were operating General Toledo, the late commander of 
the revolutionists of Texas, and General Humbert, a French 
adventurer, all engaged in organizing and equipping a force 
in Louisiana, and elsewhere within the United States, for 
Mexican service. ^ In July De Onis again protested against 
the activity of these insurgent representatives in this coun- 
try. With the aid of the pirates of Barataria, whose sup- 
pression and extinction he requested, a force of some six 
hundred men had been publicly and notoriously recruited 
and armed in the territory of New Orleans, and under 
General Humbert and General Gutierres had departed 
against Matagorda and Tampico. ^ Furthermore banditti 
from Georgia, under the orders of General Harris of the 
Georgia militia and Colonels Alexander and MacDonald, 
had been making hostile incursions into Florida, burning 
the houses and establishments of the Spanish citizens and 
robbing them of their slaves and stock. 

During the progress of the war ejfforts had constantly 
been made at the different courts of Europe to impress upon 
their governments — particularly those of the maritime na- 
tions, including Spain — that we were ifighting for their 
cause as well as our own, against the right of search and 
impressment. It was hoped that they might realize that 
it was to their interest that we should not be forced to yield 
up our rights on the sea. After the fall of Napoleon it was 
believed from persistent rumors that England and the allies 
would dispatch large forces to the United States and that 
Spain in particular was hostile to this country. The council 
of state it seems recommended to the king of Spain a 
declaration of war against the United States upon the 
general grounds of our proceedings relative to Louisiana 



1. Monroe to Governors of Louisiana and Mississippi Territories, 
Feb. 14, 1814. Vol. XVI, Domestic Letters, pp. 230, 231. 

2. De Onis to Secretary of State, July, 1814, Volume IL 



212 The Purchase of Florida 

and Florida. Expeditions were even then preparing at 
Cadiz, their destination supposed to be Mexico and Buenos 
Ayres though many, expecting an Anglo-Spanish alliance 
against this country, looked to see them sail for the United 
States. A fortunate peace rescued America from these 
perils. 

During the negotiations the envoys of the United States, 
in the early stages, insisted upon the cession of the lower 
part of the Canadas arguing that by such a cession only 
could a lasting peace be secured with Great Britain. ^ This 
representation, quite in keeping with similar pleas at the 
court of Spain — for this had been one of the reasons ad- 
vanced for the sale of the Floridas — indicated that only by 
the absence of foreign neighbors could peace be maintained 
with this country, a rather unfortunate commentary, it would 
seem, upon the character and disposition of this government 
and our border settlers. Carried to its logical conclusion 
we must have a continental nation embracing both Americas 
or a reductio ad absurdum. 



1. Vol. VII, Instructions, p. 373. 



CHAPTER VII. 
re;sumption of dipIvOmatic relations. 

N July, 1810, De Onis had been appointed minister 
from Spain, but that country, being then torn by fac- 
tional and civil war, and her throne variously claimed by 
Joseph Bonaparte, Ferdinand VII, and the junta, the 
United States determined to become in no manner con- 
nected with any pf the aspirants to the royal power, and 
declined either to recognize Ferdinand or receive De Onis. 
Until some ruler should be recognized as legitimate and 
©beyed by all factions, the United States declined to receive 
any representative in an official capacity from that country. 
De Onis however proceeded to the United States where he 
was acknowledged merely as a private or unaccredited per- 
sonage ; once in this country he directed at Monroe a rapid 
fire of protests at this refusal to receive him. Ferdinand and 
the junta were in control of all Spain and her armies and 
navies, while Joseph Bonaparte could only be considered in 
the light of a foreigner invading the country. Other 
nations had recognized the junta and for the United States 
to follow their lead could scarcely be considered a violation 
of neutrality. 

Exception was taken by this government to the man- 
ner in which the Chevalier de Onis had conducted himself 
since his advent in this country. Gardoqui had endeavored 
to promote a dismemberment of the western from 'the 
Atlantic states and had pursued, with the co-operation of 
the Spanish authorities at New Orleans, certain measures 



214 The Purchase of Florida 

of a highly odious and reprehensible nature. D'Yrujo's 
conduct had been similar to that of Gardoqui with the 
difference that it was less masked and 'more indecent and 
insulting to the United States. He had been a party to the 
Burr conspiracy against the Union, and he had sought to 
debauch and seduce the Western people. De Onis it was 
insisted had followed in the footsteps of his unfortunate 
predecessors, had attempted repeatedly to excite discontent, 
had publicly manifested decidedly hostile views towards the 
United States and had even suggested the means by which 
their dismemberment might be accomplished. Such was 
the nature of the replies made to the protestations of Barn- 
abue and De Onis. In short De Onis was held to be 
persona non grata. 

Barnabue filed with Monroe a complete disclaimer and 
denial of these charges. The character of De Onis was the 
highest and his feelings to the United States most friendly. 
Further it was probable, maintained Barnabue, that those 
papers, which it was said proved De Onis's complicity in 
plots against the United States, were forgeries. Of late, 
Spanish passports had been repeatedly forged and even the 
seal of office and exequaturs of the Spanish consuls in Phil- 
adelphia, Baltimore, and New York had been counterfeited. 
And there had come into his possession a copy of a letter 
from De Onis forged by the French revolutionary party in 
the United States. ^ 

George W. Erving, who was our charge at Madrid, 
owing to the war and chaotic condition of affairs in 
Spain, quit that country in May, 1810, and went to 
England. The United States had no direct intercourse 
with the Spanish nation during the terms of the cortes 
and regency, but throughout these year? this country 
was unofficially represented by Anthony Morris, and 
Thomas L. Brent who had been secretary of legation. 



1. Barnabue to secretary of state, Vol. II, p. 3, July, 1811. 



Resumption of Diplomatic Relations 215 

Affairs had not progressed smoothly even before Erving's 
departure in 1810, for we find him complaining that the 
papers and letters of the legation were being searched and 
scrutinized by Spanish officials. On some charge, it is not 
clear just what, the Reverend Thomas Gough, agent and 
chancellor of the legation, had been arrested. And Erving 
found cause to felicitate himself upon foiling an attempt 
made in 1808, by one Ravarra, to assassinate him. 

After Erving left Madrid there seems to have been 
much friction, much scheming, much working at cross 
purposes in the American legation. Thomas Brent and 
Anthony Morris and Thomas Gough, among the three, 
generated an over-supply of friction. Brent in his letters 
to the United States spoke always in most disparaging and 
contemptuous tenms of Morris whom he accused of seeking 
the appointment of minister to Spain. Mr. Morris advanced 
his knowledge of the Spanish language as an inducement for 
his nomination to the coveted post. But Gough, failing to 
be properly impressed, wrote : "Mr. Morris may talk of his 
proficiency in the Spanish language and his diplomatic 
career, but of both I think as highly as of the progress of 
Cato in the Greek who began to learn this tongue at the 
age of sixty." ^ At any rate Morris was party to a discred- 
itable intrigue, in which figured certain Spanish officials, 
to make himself minister — one feature of which was to 
discredit Erving with the ministry of Spain who would 
protest against his appointment. In 1814 the government 
of Spain was re-established and Ferdinand seated on the 
throne with the consent of the nation. In August of that 
year Erving was named as our minister to that country. 

Cevallos, the Spanish minister of foreign affairs, how- 
ever, announced that certain wrongs committed by the 
United States must be redressed before a minister from 
this country could be received. De Onis, who, as we have 



1. Thomas Gough to Thomas Brent, Feb. 29, 1816. 



2i6 The Purchase of Florida 

seen, was personally disagreeable to our president, was 
to ibe received, the posts in both Floridas were to be re- 
turned to the Spanish officials, and due satisfaction made for 
their seizure. ^ De Onis moreover was to be recognized 
under and by virtue of his appointment and letters of 1809, 
when, from the position taken by the United States, the gov- 
ernment of Spain was practically in abeyance. The United 
States declined to enter into any discussion of the events 
in the Floridas during the recent war, until ministers had 
been reciprocally received, when these affairs might be 
made the subject of diplomatic interchanges. As for the 
refusal to receive De Onis under the appointment of 1809, 
that, it was insisted, was imputable to the state of Spain at 
that time, her territory being in the possession of contending 
armies nearly equal, victory sometimes favoring both and 
the result altogether precarious. It was the interest of the 
United States to take no part in that controversy and they 
were under no obligation to do so. Had they acknowledged 
either party, as would have been done by the acceptance of a 
minister, just cause of offense would have been given to the 
other. As soon as Ferdinand was recognized and received 
as the sovereign of Spain the president had appointed a 
minister to him, instructed tO' explain why that measure 
had not been sooner adopted. 

There were serious objections to De Onis personally 
but "in a spirit of amity," it was declared that, "if his 
Catholic Majesty after knowing them should request your 
recognition as an act of accommodation to himself it would 
be complied with." Much was made of the fact that the 
Chevalier de Onis had produced no letter of credence from 
Ferdinand, and that his appointment by the central junta 
was in itself not a sufficient authority. Monroe was indig- 
nant at the repeated requests for the acceptance of De Onis 



1. George W. Erving to Monroe, Paris, Dec. 4, 1814, "Vol. XIII. 



Resumption of Diplomatic Relations 217 

"not as an act of accommodation to your sovereign but of 
concession on the part of tlie United States," and further 
took occasion to communicate to De Onis certain of his 
views upon the course of one power pressing another, 
equally independent, to recognize against its will a minister 
to whom objections of a personal nature were entertained. ^ 

A vast amount of undignified quibbling, alike discredi- 
table to both nations, was indulged in over this question 
of the recognition of ministers and renewal of diplomatic 
intercourse. Each nation insisted upon the acceptance of 
its minister as the condition precedent to its reception of the 
representative of the other. And when, in June of 1815, 
De Onis received new letters of credence from Ferdinand 
the United States still refused to receive him until Ferdinand 
should expressly state that he desired his acceptance as a 
personal favor to himself. Ferdinand having at length 
complied with this condition, that gentleman was received 
by the president, December 19, 181 5, as a "distinguished 
proof of his high consideration" for the Spanish monarch. 
Diplomatic intercourse was thus at length renewed after 
irritating higgling and splitting of hairs, partaking too 
much of the child's method of quarreling. 

Diplomatic relations having been resumed, the ques- 
tions of years' standing were again taken up. Anthony 
Morris, during that gentleman's sojourn at Madrid, having 
authority to receive "informal communications" from the 
Spanish government, as early as 1814, expressed the opinion 
that East and West Florida could be purchased. He inti- 
mated that $10,000 for douceurs would be indispensable as 
the different departments of the Spanish government were 
not sufficiently "regenerated" to allow great hopes of suc- 
cess without the use of such means. Spain was at that 
time practically bankrupt and corruption was rampant in 
public office. The suggestion of Morris seems to have 



1. Vol. II, Foreign Letters, p. 86, Monroe to De Onis, May 5, 1815. 



21 8 The Purchase of Florida 

elicited neither consideration nor reply from this govern- 
ment. In the fall of 1815 it was persistently rumored in 
Europe that the Floridas had been ceded to England but, 
in response to a pointed inquiry from Morris, Cevallos as- 
serted in the most positive terms that no such cession had 
been made. ^ 

After his reception in December, 181 5, De Onis entered 
feelingly into a series of protests against our course in the 
Floridas during the war of 1812, and our relations with the 
revolted Spanish provinces, in permitting filibustering ex- 
peditions to be fitted out in this country. He first impera- 
tively demanded that West Florida be returned before any 
discussion as to its ownership could be considered. He 
bitterly and repeatedly protested against that "gang of sedi- 
tious, incendiary profligates who were carrying on with 
impunity, in the state of Lvouisiana and New Orleans espec- 
ially, an uninterrupted system of raising and arming troops 
for the purpose of lighting the torch of revolution in the 
kingdom of New Spain (Mexico)." All the state of 
Louisiana had witnessed, he declared, those armaments, 
the public recruitings, the transportation of arms, the 
meetings of the seditious and their hostile and warlike march 
from the territory of this republic against the dominions of 
their friendly and neighboring power, 

Joseph Alvarez de Toledo and Joseph Manuel de Her- 
rera, the latter calling himself "minister near the United 
States" of the self styled Mexican congress, were the ring- 
leaders in these recruiting expeditions. De Onis requested 
that orders be issued to the collectors of the custom houses 
prohibiting the admission into our ports of vessels sailing 
under the insurgent flag of Cartagena, the Mexican con- 
gress, Buenos Ayres or any other place in insurrection 
against Spanish authority. Vessels, . flying the flags of 
these revolted colonies, were constantly armed in our harbors 



1. Vol. II, Foreign Letters, p. 86, Monroe to De Onis, May 5, 1815. 



Resumption of Diplomatic Relations 219 

with the object of destroying and plundering Spanish ves- 
sels, and then returning to our ports to find a mart for the 
spoils of their piracies. ^ 

Without doubt a serious breach of international law 
was committed by the United States during these years, 
although this nation exercised what it declared to be great 
diligence against these abuses. To the impartial critic 
there seems to have been a highly damaging and incriminat- 
ing amount of connivance and (blindness on the part of many 
of the government officials. These so-called revolutionary 
governments could have no communication with any power 
in amity with Spain for neither that government nor any 
other had acknowledged their independence. That a 
stronger, more virile nation than Spain would have taken 
more decisive measures than recourse to mere diplomatic 
protests, we cannot doubt. As it was, the United States 
might well have been liable for damages and spoliations on 
the very principle by which we enforced the Alabama claims 
against England half a century later. The Spanish com- 
plaints against the filibustering expeditions and armaments 
fitted out in our ports covered a period of ten years from 
1812. 

In a vigorous protest, which followed closely upon the 
heels of his first, De Onis announced to Monroe that he 
had received positive information that two bodies of troops 
of one thousand men from Kentucky and three hundred 
from Tennessee, commanded by American citizens holding 
Mexican cormmissions, were about to set out for Mexico to 
enlist in the revolutionary service. Toledo, Humbert, 
Amaya, Bernado, Gutierres, Urtui, Dr. Robinson, and Ma- 
jors Peive and Priere were the leaders against whom the 
Spanish minister sought executive action. Unless the in- 
surgent activity in this country be immediately suppressed, 
"the king, my master," declared De Onis, "will have reason 



1. Vol. in, De Onis to Monroe, Dec. 80, 1815. 



220 The Purchase of Florida 

to suspect that if those meetings are not authorized by the 
government, they are at least tolerated; all the assurances 
I may give to my sovereign of the friendly disposition of the 
president will not stand any competence when compared 
with the evident proofs I had the honor to communicate in 
this and my former note; particularly when his Majesty 
is well convinced of the resources and authority of the 
federal government and the promptitude with which their 
orders are strictly observed in the whole Union." ^ 

This he followed with an explanation of the violation 

1. Vol. Ill, De Onis to secretary of state, p. 2, Jan., 1S16. 

In this letter De Onis seeks to show the short-sightedness of the 
people of our southern and western states in helping to secure the 
freedom of New Spain, or Mexico, and helping to there build up a 
new and independent nation. The statements and conclusions of the 
3xjani.sh minister are most interesting in view of our later history, and 
the present condition of Mexico. "Grant that the new government and 
constitution would be all that could be desired: the climate of Mex- 
ico is more temperate than that of the United States, the soil richer 
and more productive; the productions and fruits more abundant, 
wealthy and of a superior quality, and that provisions, hand work, 
wood, houses, clothing, etc., are in consequence of the mildness and 
regularity of the climate exceeding cheaper than in this country. If 
this event should take place do you not think, sir, as I do, that so 
many alluring prospects and so many evident advantages would deprive 
this republic of the successive emigrations from Europe and, what ia 
more, of a very considerable part of the most useful and industrious 
inhabitants of this confederation who would carry with them to Mex- 
ixo their flour and saw mills, machines, manufactures, their enter- 
prising genius, in a word their general instruction and all the means 
that actually promote and vivify the commerce of these states. I flat- 
ter myself that this event will not happen ; but I am fully convinced 
that all the consequences of this hypothesis can be demonstrated 
almost with a mathematical certainty ; and that if the citizens of 
Kentucky, Louisiana and Georgia should reflect deeply on this sub- 
ject, far from giving any aid to these incendiaries, thirsty of gold and 
regardless of the happiness of their country, would unite themselves 
with the authorities of the king, my master, to punish that gang of 
perfidious traitors that hide themselves in their territory with the 
criminal design of devastating their country." 

That -Mexico today has an excellent constitution no one questions. 
So indeed has Venezuela and manj-^ of the other periodically revolu- 
tionizing southern nations. It seems to be not the form of govern- 
ment so much as the genius of the people that constitutes a nation 
great or insignificant. The climatic conditions must be considered 
largely as a factor entering into the character and disposition of the 
people. 



Resumption of Diplomatic Relations 221 

of the neutrality of Florida in the war of 1812. De Onis de- 
clared that Spain had protested to Great Britain and to 
Europe against the forcible occupation of Florida and vio- 
lation of her neutrality, and that it was due to personal 
misconduct of the governor of West Florida. As a proof 
of this he called attention to the fact that the strictest neu- 
trality was observed in Cuba, East Florida and other 
Spanish possessions, thus absolving from all blame the 
Spanish ministr}^ and government. Then began a long and 
tedious interchange of views and presentation of arguments 
on the western and eastern boundaries of Louisiana. 

De Onis insisted that the territory extending to the 
Rio Bravo or del Norte had been under the dominion of 
Spain both before and 'since the treaty by which France 
had ceded Louisiana to his Catholic Majesty, that it had 
been under Spanish dominion from the time of the dis- 
covery and conquest of Mexico, without ever having passed 
by treaty to any other nation. He declared, in 1816, that 
the two Floridas had passed into the hands of England by 
cession from France and Spain in 1763, and were in the 
legitimate possession of England from 1763 to 1783, and 
therefore France could not cede them — together with 
Louisiana — to Spain, by the treaty of 1764, nor could Spain 
retrocede them to France, France not having received them 
from her, unless there should have been an article on this 
point, in which express and direct mention was made of that 
cession. Further the claim of the United States to any of 
the Floridas seemed to De Onis wholly intangible, for the 
two contracting parties, Spain and France, had declared in 
the most solemn manner, the first that she did not cede to 
France any part of the Floridas, the second that she had 
not acquired them by the treaty of San Ildefonso nor had the 
least intention to set up a claim to them. De Onis main- 
tained that according to all the principles of justice no one 
could be ousted from what he holds until the right of the 



222 The Purchase of Florida 

claimant should be proved and recognized — that Spain 
having been in possession of West Florida when the United 
States claimed it, she should keep it until in a friendly nego- 
tiation this republic had shown a better right to it. 

Taking an analogous case in private law, if A .should 
say that 'he never sold B a certain plot of land, and B says 
that he never claimed Ownership of it, would C, a purchaser 
from B, simply enter and take possession of the premises 
which A says he never 'bought ? De Onis forwarded to Mon- 
roe copies of several letters confirming his representations 
on the filibustering expeditions which were continually being 
organized in the southwest. These implicated the former 
leader, John Mclntos'h, in a plot to recruit in Georgia a 
number of vagabonds to invade again East Florida.^ De- 
spite presidential proclamations these violations of our 
neutrality became constantly more flagrant. 

In reply to the representations of De Onis, Monroe en- 
tered into a careful review of the grounds of complaint of 
the United States against Spain. He rehashed the Spanish 
spoliation claims — the losses sustained by the seizure and 
condemnation of vessels in Spanish ports — ■ the failure to 
ratify the convention of 1802, the suppression of the deposit 
at New Orleans, the negotiations preliminary to the pur- 
chase of Louisiana and the consequent dispute over boun- 
daries, our unsuccessful effort to secure Florida by pur- 
chase or trade and thus remove the dangerous element of 
jealousy and the resultant injuries to the two countries — 
how every proposition of the American envoys had been 
rejected and none made in return. Such conduct on the 
part of Spain, insisted Monroe, would have justified, if it 
did not even invite, decisive measures on the part of the 
United States. It left this nation free to pursue such a 
course as, in their judgment, a just regard to the honor, 

1. Vol. Ill, De Onis to Monroe, Feb. ,22, 1816. A translation 
of these letters bears out the charges made by De Onis. The question 
then arises whether the letters are authentic. 



Resumption of Diplomatic Relations 223 

the rights, and the interests of the nation might dictate. 
For the condition of affairs in the Spanish Peninsula and 
the Spanish provinces in America excited no apprehension 
of any serious consequences that might follow even a de- 
cisive action on our part. Besides the injuries already cata- 
logued there were the breaches of neutrality, whic'h the 
Spanish government permitted, if indeed it did not author- 
ize, by British troops and British agents in Florida and 
through the Creeks and other Indian tribes in the late war. 

"In reply to your demand for the exclusion of the flag 
of the revolting provinces," wrote Monroe, "I have to ob- 
serve that in consequence of the unsettled state of many 
countries and repeated changes of the ruling authority in 
each, there being at the same time several competitors, and 
each party bearing its appropriate flag, the President 
thought it proper some time past to give orders to the col- 
lectors not to make the flag of any vessel a criterion or con- 
dition of its admission into the ports of the United States. 
Having taken no part in the differences and convulsions 
which have disturbed those countries, it is consistent with 
the just principles, as it is with the interests of the United 
States, to receive the vessels of all countries into their ports, 
to whatever party belonging and under whatever flag sail- 
ing, pirates excepted, requiring of them only the payment 
of the duties and obedience to the laws while under their 
jurisdiction: without adverting to the question whether 
they had committed any violation of the allegiance or laws 
obligatory on them in the countries to which they belonged 
either in assuming such flag or in any other respect." 

In answer to the complaints of De Onis that the United 
States was oft'ering assistance to the revolted provinces and 
that, but for the support which the revolutionists received 
from the people of this nation, they must have long since 
miserably failed, Monroe wrote: "All that your govern- 
ment had a rio-'ht .to claim of the United States was that 



224 ^^^ Purchase of Florida 

they should not interfere in the contest or promote by any 
active service the success of the revolution, admitting that 
they continued to overlook the injuries received from Spain 
and remained at peace. This right was common to the 
colonists. With equal justice might they claim that we 
would not interfere to their disadvantage ; that our ports 
should remain open to both parties as they were before the 
commencement of the struggle ; that our laws regulating 
commerce with foreign nations should not be changed to 
their injury. On these principles the United States have 
acted." 1 

De Onis intimated that in a general treaty, which would 
settle all differences between the two countries, Spain might 
be willing to cede her claim to territory east of the Missis- 
sippi, in satisfaction of -claims and in exchange for terri- 
tory west of that river. ^ However the king of Spain was 
unwilling to deprive himself of East Florida and the 
important port of Pensacola, the key to the Gulf of Mexico. 
In support of the contention that West Florida did not pass 
into the hands of France with the cession of Louisiana, De 
Onis quoted the sixth article of the treaty of 1778 between 
France and the United States, by which the former power 
engaged never to acquire West Florida or any of the ter- 
ritories ceded to England in 1763. In answer to our claims 
against Spain for spoliations by French cruisers and French 
prize courts, De Onis argued that these claims had been 
settled by France in her treaty with the United States in 
1803, wherein the United States had released France from 
all liabihty 'by the provision for indemnification. At any 
rate Spain could in no way be held liable and, if the treaty 
of 1803 did not settle those claims, the responsibility rested 
with France alone. 

Months were consumed in an exchange of arguments 



1. Vol. TI, Foreign 'Leg-ations, p. 121, Monroe to CheA'alier Se Onis, 
Jan. 19, 1816. 

2. Vol. VIII, Instructions, p. 3i2, Monroe to iErving, March 11, 181?. 



Resumption of Diplomatic Relations 225 

concerning- the Louisiana boundaries, without arriving at 
any conclusion. Each party to the controversy presented 
some few new deductions in its ov\^n favor, but it was mostly 
a tiresome reiteration of the correspondence of a decade 
before, able neither to convince nor persuade. Monroe 
argued, with much show of reason, that had it been intended 
to exempt any portion of the fonmer province of Louisiana 
from the operation of the treaty of San Ildefonso, it would 
have been easy to do so and in a manner to preclude all 
douibt of the intention of the parties. It mig'ht have been 
stated that Spain ceded back to France such part of the 
province as France had ceded to Spain. Or they mig'ht have 
defined the extent of the cession by a natural boundary 
which would have been equally distinct, concise, and satis- 
factory, and thus there could have arisen no controversy 
between France and Spain, nor between the United States 
and Spain respecting the eastern limits. ^ It is not neces- 
sary to review the arguments, already given at length, ad- 
vanced by the two nations. 

We find the communications of De Onis to the secre- 
tary of state at this time, teeming with complaints against 
the unjust rulings of the American prize courts and the 
armament of vessels in our ports — filibustering expeditions. 
The "Fairy," the "Romp," the "Chasseur" and the "Comet" 
— the same vessel often sailing under different names — • 
were frequently mentioned as offenders. One vessel in par- 
ticular, the "Caledonia," was being fitted out by a Xavier 
Mina, at Baltimore, to assist the Mexican insurgents. Her 
cargo consisted of twenty-five hundred muskets, fifty pair 
of pistols, two cases of swords and cutlasses, one hundred 
saddles, bridles and complete equipment for one hundred 
cavalry, a quantity of cavalry uniforms, barrels of powder, 
nine eight-pounders, a printing press for striking off procla- 



1. Vol. II, Foreign DLegations, p. 14i2, Monroe to Chevalier de Onis, 
June 10, 1816. 
15 



226 The Purchase of Florida 

mations, etc., and all manner of provisions. In the same 
connection De Onis filed charges against the officer com- 
manding the naval forces of the United States on the New 
Orleans station, for encouraging and conniving at this fili- 
bustering. That many of the complaints of De Onis were 
misrepresentations and exaggerations we can well believe, 
but at the same time we are forced to admit that there was 
good cause for his protests. 

It can scarcely be denied that except for the assistance 
rendered, directly or indirectly through the United States, 
most of the Spanish American revolutions must have mis- 
erably failed. It is also true that many Spanish vessels 
fell a prey to these South American privateers within fir- 
ing distance of our shores ^ — a violation of the territory of 
the United States. And in many instances, particularly at 
Baltimore, Norfolk, and New Orleans, the fitting out of 
these armaments was only too clearly connived at by the 
American customs officials. Many of the charges of De 
Onis were substantiated by affidavits of American citizens 
who had been asked to enlist for service on these vessels, 
being assured "that they were being fitted out for the pur- 
pose of fighting the Spaniards." Nor did these privateers 
hesitate in the most wanton manner to prostitute the flag 
of the United States. As an instance, we may cite the 
case of the "Patricia Mexicana," commanded by Jose Esta- 
fanos, manned with citizens of the United States, and cov- 
ered by the American flag, under which they chased and 
brought to the Spanish polacre, the "Santa Maria," until, 
having effected her capture, the insurgent flag was 
hoisted. An unparalleled audacity these buccaneers dis- 
played by such predatory acts, in trampling under foot na- 
tional rights and removing themselves from the protection 
of international law. 

The so-called "Napoleon Propaganda" in the late sum- 
mer of 1817 aroused alike the French and Spanish ambas- 



Resumption of Diplomatic Relations 227 

sadors. This was a plot, it seems, on the part of certain peo- 
ple who had emigrated to this country from Europe — • 
ostensibly to settle western lands — to seduce the western 
inhabitants and organize, under color of forming a colony, 
an expedition to invade Mexico and there proclaim Joseph 
Bonaparte. The plot was supported by the very riches 
of which Joseph had plundered Spain. This matter was 
laid before the secretary of state !by the French minister 
but, like many of the wild schemes so prevalent in that day 
and region, it seems to have rapidly vanished into thin air 
or to have died in the imaginations of those adventurous 
empire builders in whose minds alone it may have had its 
only existence. 

We now come to treat of one of the most audacious 
and surprising incidents of American history. 

The treaty of Fort Jackson, which terminated the Creek 
war of 1814, ceded to the United States several million acres 
of Indian land purposely selected so as to separate the In- 
dian settlements of Georgia and Alabama • — an arrange- 
ment which it was expected would insure peace and order 
in that section. But, unfortunately for these hopes, many of 
the Creeks, still unsubdued and refusing to recognize the 
treaty, had fled to Florida and joined the Seminole Indians 
under their chief Boleck, or more popularly "Billy Bowlegs." 
Here as the allies of Great Britain, and relying upon the 
promises of that nation, they fully expected the restoration 
of their lands upon the conclusion of peace between England 
and the United States. 

In this contention they were supported by a former 
British officer and adventurer. Colonel Edward Nicholls, 
who, claiming to be "on his Majesty's service," concluded an 
offensive and defensive alliance between England and the 
Seminoles, rebuilt an old fort on the Appalachicola some fif- 
teen miles from its mouth, supplied it with arms, made a de- 
mand on Colonel Hawkins for the evacuation of the Creek 



228 The Purchase of Florida 

lands under the ninth article of our treaty with England, and 
requested the arrest of certain men charged with murder- 
Early in the summer of 1815 Nicholls with his troops, the 
Indian prophet Francis, and many of the leading Creeks, 
departed for London, leaving in the fort some 750 barrels 
of cannon powder, 2,500 muskets, casks of gunpowder, and 
many hundred carfbdnes, pistols, swords and various accou- 
trements. These English officers, not under direct respon- 
sibility, and operating on foreign territory, acted witli much 
arbitrary self will, seizing the opportunity to gratify their 
personal malice without being held to strict account. It is 
impossible to understand many of their actions consistently 
with any theory and it is certain that England would not 
have sanctioned much that was done in her name. 

Besides the refugee Creeks there were in Florida at 
that time, many runaway slaves — ■ probably a thousand or 
more — who had escaped from their Georgia owners. They 
had adopted the manner of life of the redskins. They were 
commanded by chiefs and had farms and grazing lands 
stretching fifty miles either way along the Appalachicola 
from the British post. After the departure of Nicholls and 
has followers these negroes seized the British post and it 
was henceforth known as the "Negro Fort." The blacks 
rapidly degenerated into an army of outlaws and plunderers. 
The Georgia frontier was especially the scene of their ef- 
forts. They harried the country, drove ofif cattle, freed 
slaves, rescued criminals, murdered those who resisted, fired 
upon iboats passing up and down the river. and became the 
terror of the region. General Jackson was directed by the 
secretary of war to demand' of the Spanish governor of 
Pensacola the suppression of this nuisance. ^ Jackson 
promptly complied with the orders and intimated at the 



1. Crawford to Jackson, March 15, 1S16, (State Papers, 2nd Ses- 
sion, 15th Congress, No. ;i,22, p. 6. 



Resumption of Diplomatic Relations 229 

same time that if Spain did not destroy the fort and break 
tip the outlaws, the United States would. ^ 

General Edmund Gaines had fceen instructed to take 
po'ssession of the lands secured under the Fort Jackson 
treaty, build forts and block-houses and furnish suitable 
and sufficient protection for the surveyors engaged in run- 
ning the township and section lines. Colonel Clinch was 
deputed to undertake these duties. As Clinch moved down 
the Chattahoochee, General Gaines, fearing danger from the 
Negro Fort, asked and secured authority from General 
Jackson to build a fort on the Appalachicola, near the 
boundary, so as to effectively overawe the hostile negroes. ^ 
Jackson gave this permissiion to Gaines in no uncertain 
terms : "The growing hostility of the Indians," he said, 
"must be checked by prompt and energetic measures. Half 
peace and half war is a state of things which must not ex- 
ist. I have no doubt that this fort has been established by 
•some villains for the purpose of murder, rapine, and plun- 
der, and that it oug-'ht to be blown up regardless of the 
ground it stands on. If you have come to the same con- 
clusion destroy it and restore the stolen negroes to their 
rightful owners." ^ 

Gaines immediately set albout building the fort, after- 
wards called Fort Scott, near the junction of the Flint, 
Chattahoochee and Appalachicola rivers. Owing to the 
cost and hazards of land transportation he decided to bring 
his supplies from New Orleans by water. This of course 
necessitated passing the Negro Fort. Fearful of an attack 
at this ipoint, Gaines requested Daniel Patterson, commander 
of the New Orleans station, to provide a convoy. ^ Jairus 



1. Jackson to the Governor of Pensacola, State Papers, 2nd Ses- 
sion, 15th iComgress, TSTo. Ii2'2, p. 8. 

2. Gaines to Jackson, March 20, 1816, ibid., pp. 14, 15. 

3. Jackson to Gaines, April 8, 1816. 

4. Gaines to Patterson, OMay 2i2, 18l!6, State Papers, 2nd Session, 
15th Congress, No. 1'2'2, pp. 118, 119. 



230 The Purchase of Florida 

Loomis was accordingly ordered to rendezvous with two 
guniboats at Pass Christian prepared to escort up the river 
two transports laden with ordnance and provisions. On 
July 10, 1816, the fleet arrived at the mouth of the Ap- 
palachicola. 

In the meantime, hearing that the Indians were drink- 
ing the war medicine, and celebrating their martial dances, 
and confident that the passage of the fleet would be disputed 
at the Negro Fort, General Gaines ordered Colonel Clinch, 
with sufficient troops to move down the river, take a position 
near the Negro Fort and raze it at the first sign of an attack. 
Clinch and Loomis prepared to move at the same time. 
During the delay a boat crew, while seeking fresh water, 
was attacked by the negroes and three men were killed and 
one made prisoner. 

Floating down the river from Fort Scott, Clinch met a 
party of negro-hunting Seminoles who joined him, hoping 
to secure possession again of their fort. A negro with a 
wihite scalp at his belt was captured. From ihim was learned 
the attack on the boat crew. Clinch now determined on 
his course, pushed forward and invested the fort. A de- 
mand for its surrender was answered by the hoisting of a 
red flag and the English Union Jack with a defiant dis- 
charge of cannon. L/Oomis, in response to the request of 
Clinch, came up with his boats and on the morning of July 
27 opened fire. The ramparts were strong enough to with- 
stand unscathed the liglit guns of the^ vessels. It was then 
determined to burn the fort. After securing the range, a 
ball, red hot from the cook's galley, was sent sputtering over 
the wall into the magazine. The scene that followed defies 
description and the mind must take the place of the pen. 
There is no imagination so torpid as not to be able to con- 
ceive at once all the friglitful colorings of the picture. 
Seven hundred barrels of gunpowder tore a vast hole in 
the ground, and hurled the wretched, screaming, mangled 



Resumption of Diplomatic Relations 231 

victims througli the air. 1 The scene was of hell in all its 
fury. The tortures were of the damned. Some two hun- 
dred and seventy men, women, and children were instantly 
killed, while of the sixty or more taken alive the greater 
number soon found death a welcome relief from their suf- 
ferings. Gargon, the leader, and a Choctaw chief, taken 
alive, were consigned to the cruel tortures of the infuriated 
Seminoles. 

As the curtain fell on this awful scene, peace and quiet 
along the frontier were secured, temporarily at least. The 
Seminoles were duly impressed with the strength of the 
federal power and the awful visitation upon the enemies 
of the United States which they had witnessed. With 
peace seemingly assured, and the prospect of an early acqui- 
sition of the province of Florida toy the United States, many 
of the more prominent men of Tennessee started a wild 
speculation in Pensacola property. But the Seminole In- 
dians could not forget the wrongs they had suffered at the 
hands of the whites and awaited but a new provocation and 
an able leader to induce them to take the war-path and 
show that quiet is not pacification, nor is desolation peace. 

The story now shifts to the east and for the next act 
the curtain rises upon Amelia Island. We need no effort 
of the mental faculties to realize the condition into 
which that island had fallen since the withdrawal of 
the American troops, who had earlier taken the place in 
conjunction with the so-called East Florida "patriots." We 
have further seen that this was essentially an era and com- 
munity of filibustering and privateering. The expedition of 
General Miranda who had sailed from New York to Carta- 
gena in 1806 was probably the first. His example was per- 
sistently followed. Amelia Island, from its location and its 
utter freedom from all law or recognized authority, was aa 



1. Jairus Loomis to Daniel Patterson, Aug. 1'3, 181'6, State Papers, 
2nd Sesision, 15th Congress, No. 119, pp. 16, 16. 



232 The Purchase of Florida 

admirable depot for such undertakings. The people there 
had become quite accustomed to adventurers of all sorts, 
pirates, admirals, generals, and dignitaries of every kind 
and description suddenly appearing to assume authority, 
presently to vanish silently away. The island long feasted 
its eyes on the prodigious galloping and curvetting of red- 
sashed majors, gold laced colonels and epauletted gener- 
als. 

Since the termination of the war of 181 2, a motley and 
miscellaneous crew it was that had congregated there — ■ 
British adventurers who had followed in the wake of the 
^English army, Irish and French refugees ; Scotch enthusi- 
asts, Mexican and Spanish insurgents ; graduates of the 
Baratarian school ; relics and remnants of a negro squad 
that had served in Mexico under Aury ; privateersmen, 
slavers, traders and all manner of scoundrels — in short the 
ncbility of deviltry were all tliere. And that they included 
many Americans we cannot for a moment doubt when we 
learn that among the first acts of the filibusters was the 
establishment of a newspaper. One of this brand of ad' 
venturers who had gravitated to the South American scenes 
of rebellion and revolution was a Gregor MacGregor, who 
claimed to be a brother-in-law of General Simon Bolivar. 
After an unsuccessful attempt against tlie Spanish posses- 
sions in Mexico, having recruited at Baltimore an expedi- 
tion to "wrest the Floridas from Spain," MacGregor arrived 
in Fernandina harbor late in June of 181 7, and within a 
few days captured the fort. ^ 

Colonel Morales, the Spanish officer in command, sailed 
for St. Augustine while MacGregor took possession of the 
lower St. Johns and established a blockade of the city. 
MacGregor was, like most of those leaders, a man of intel- 
ligence and fine appearance. In demanding the surrender 
of Fernandina he had addressed a communication to Mor- 



1. July 14 and 21, 1817. 



Resumption of Diplomatic Relations 233 

ales to which he had signed himself : "Gregor MacGregor, 
Brigadier General of the armies of the United Provinces of 
New Granada and Venezuela, and General-in-chief of that 
destined to emancipate the provinces of both Floridas, under 
the commission of the Supreme Government of Mexico, 
and South America, etc., etc." 

The series of proclamations which followed the advent 
of this Scotchman was truly formidable. Official docu- 
ments gay and impressive with chromatic seals and jaunty 
ribbons were daily promulgated. In one of them his 
followers were directed to wear, each on his left arm a 
s'hield of red cloth with the words "Venredores de Aurala" 
and a wreath of oak and laurel leaves embroidered in yel- 
low silk. In another he promised soon to plant the "green 
cross of Florida on the proud walls of St. Augustine." A 
third declared all Florida in a state of blockade beginning 
at the south side of the island of Amelia and extending to 
the Perdido. ^ But nature in endowing MacGregor with 
the talent of producing proclamations exhausted her gifts 
and denied him the ability to carry them out. Wearied 
in tjhe effort of composition, he achieved nothing more. 

There may have been some honest intention in their 
announced plans for freeing Florida but it seems more 
reasonable to conclude that it was bis purpose to supplant 
Spanish misrule in those regions by his own. Those who 
fight for freedom, to avenge their wrongs or even to retali- 
ate for the grievances of their country, enlist us in their 
cause at once. But we find little in the affair at Amelia 
to awaken our sympathy or merit our support. The people 
of Florida did not appear to have any love for the self- 
styled patriots, nor did the insurgents display any marked 
zeal in joining the Scotchman's standard. 

Abundantly supplied with money, MacGregor enter- 
tained at lavish dinners and entertainments the worthy fam- 



1. Niles Register, Vol. XIII, p. 28, Sept. 6, 1817. 



234 ^^^ Purchase of Florida 

ilies of Fernandina. But affairs went badly. Disease and 
desertions played havoc with his already depleted forces. 
Supplies were scarce. His paper money did not inspire 
confidence and rapidly depreciated. The proposed expedi- 
tion to St. Augustine was abandoned. In September Mac- 
Gregor sailed for New Providence to secure recruits and 
supplies, leaving in command one Hubbard, lately sheriff of 
New York. 

One day, about the first of October, a small fleet ap- 
peared in the harbor under the command of Louis Aury, a 
man of the MacGregor stripe. A short account of Aury's 
career will help the reader to a clearer understanding and 
appreciation of these filibusters, then in the zenith of their 
power and glory. According to his own narration, being 
filled with a burning desire to immolate himself on the altar 
of freedom, Aury had gone to Cartagena to devote his life 
to the cause of liberty. The Spanish fleet and troops arriv- 
ing at that point most inopportunely for his ambitions, he 
had managed, with a few 'ships, to run the blockade and 
reach San Domingo. After laying in stores and recruiting 
his forces he and his followers eagerly scanned the horizon 
for an available spot where they might "spill their blood in 
the cause of American independence and freedom." 

Texas seemed the most profitable field for these seekers 
of gory fame and they were not long in reaching Galveston 
Bay where Aury was hailed with delight by Don Manuel de 
Herrera whom we recognize as the "Minister Plenipoten- 
tiary from the Republic of Mexico to the United States." 
Galveston was declared the Puerto Habillitado, of the Re- 
public of Mexico, Aury was made military governor, let- 
ters of marque were issued, courts of admiralty established. 
A horde of vagabonds promptly assembled like vultures 
gathering for the feast. Negroes, smugglers, Baratarian 
refugees, freebooters, escaped criminals and others of the 
same type — on they came — a motley horde they were. 



Resumption of Diplomatic Relations 235 

This patch of sand however was not to Aury's taste and 
in April, 181 7, the place was abandoned by that fickle leader, 
with no one left to assume the authority so lavishly bestowed 
upon him. But within a few days these noble buccaneers 
had formed a new government — a travesty to be sure ; 
the governor, admiralty judges, prize courts, collector, 
notary public, secretary and all the other functionaries 
necessary for carrying on a good intentioned state. They 
too sought to execute another weird bit of drollery, trag- 
ically saluting liberty and prospective spoils. What mat- 
tered Mexico to them, should they be blamed because 
they had never heard of such a nation? Were they not 
assembled in the sacred cause of plunder and loot? 

Their only object was to capture Spanish ships and 
Spanish property, and could they be censured if in their 
zeal they occasionally made mistakes in distinguishing na- 
tional flags and thus fell into a way of plundering every 
sort of property, and capturing all manner of ships so pre- 
sumptuous as to appear on the high sea? 

But what good all their plunder if they possessed no 
market or no clearing house? To obviate this difficulty 
Ihey raised the Mexican flag and declared that they were 
acting under authority of that republic — for this sophistry 
might indeed save many a well curved neck from the venge- 
ful and profane gallows. In their courts of admiralty the 
captured ships were adjudged good prizes and the plunder 
was hurried to New Orleans through this mock obedience 
to the troublesome forms of international law. There the 
market was kept stocked with "jewelry, laces, silks and 
linens, muslins, britannias, seersuckers, china, crockery, 
glass and slaves," and every other conceivalble commodity. 

But to return to Aury. Entering Fernandina he was 
appealed to for assistance, which, with proper magnanimity, 
he refused, unless tlie green cross should give way to the 
Mexican flag and he be made governor and commander- 



236 The Purchase of Florida 

in-chief. Compliance was rendered easy by necessity, and 
Octoiber 4th Amelia Island, formally declared a part of the 
Republic of Mexico, passed into the hands of "General" 
Aiiry. But his rule was brief in this volatile community. 

Acting under the joint congressional resolution of Jan- 
uary, 181 1, the president of the United States ordered 
troops and ships to suppress the "liberation" movement. 
Resistance being futile, Aury, protesting against sudh inter- 
ference, quietly surrendered Fernandina and the Ainerican 
navy took possession while he sailed away out of the his- 
tory of Florida. A second time was Fernandina thus under 
the stars and stripes, garrisoned by United States troops, 
in trust for the king of Spain. But the place was soon 
abandoned by the American marines who evacuated in the 
face of a superior enemy — the yellow fever, that rapidly 
depopulated the town. 

In the meantime the Seminole Indian question had 
become critical. The failure to recover the lands ceded by 
the treaty of Fort Jackson had made them ugly and venge- 
ful, and when tlhey saw white settlements and forts on their 
ancestral domains and hunting grounds they sullenly de- 
termined to take an early opportunity of regaining by force 
what they felt to be rightfully their own. During 181 7 col- 
lisions between the Indians and white settlers were fre- 
quent. The Indian agents, Hawkins and Mitchell — tlie 
latter a former governor of Georgia — undoubtedly the 
fairest and best informed witnesses who appeared before the 
congressional committee in 1818-19, testified that the 
blame for these collisions was equal, that tihe white settlers 
were as much the aggressors as the Indians, and that the 
lawless persons in Georgia and Florida were particularly 
to be censured for acts which provoked retaliation. The 
Indians with the Bible theory of "an eye for an eye and a 
too'tih for a tooth" navely claimed that four Indians had 
been killed to one white and that tlhey must insist upon a 



Resumption of Diplomatic Relations 237 

proper balancing of accounts. With the usual inaccuracy 
and perversion in the reports which were sent north, the 
blame was laid upon the redskins. Harrowing stories were 
rife of men, women, and children murdered, cabins burned, 
cattle run off, and of unwonted warlike preparations on the 
part of the savages. ^ That most of these reports were 
true there can be little doubt, but that the whites had 
brought much of it upon themselves by their treatment of 
the unfortunate redskins there is as little question. 

A settlement of about twoscore Indians, known as 
Fowltown, some fifteen miles from Fort Scott, near the 
national boundary became particularly inflamed. War 
paint was used in crude and inartistic abundance, the war 
dance was celebrated, the red war pole erected and notice 
sent to Major Twiggs in command of Fort Scott "not to 
cross or cut a stick of timber on the east side of the Flint." 
The warning was met with silent contempt but when Gen- 
eral Gaines arrived with reinforcements it was determined 
to summon the Fowltown chief to a conference. The invi- 
tation having met with a defiant refusal, Major Twiggs 
was dispatched with two hundred and fifty men to bring the 
chief and leading warriors, or, in case he met with resist- 
ance, to treat theiji as enemies. As the Americans ap- 
proached the town they were fired on ; most of the Indians 
having found refuge in the swamps, the town was taken 
and burned. "This fact," said Mitchell, "was, I conceive, 
the cause of the Seminole war." The whole country arose 
and war was on. 

In accordance with a decision reached at a meeting of 
some twenty-seven hundred warriors, shortly before, the 
Indians considered war as an accepted fact now that the 
American troops had crossed the Flint River. While the 
soldiers were burning Fowltown a large open boat under 
Lieutenant Scott, containing seven women, four children 

1. American State Papers, Military Affairs, Vol. I, pp. 6S1-685. 



238 The Purchase of Florida 

and forty soldiers, was slowly wending its way up the Ap- 
palachicola toward Fort Scott. Fearing trouble, Scott had 
sent to the fort for help. There were, however, no signs 
of hostility until, in picking its course, the boat came close 
to the shore of a densely wooded swamp when suddenly a 
volley of musketry was poured upon the party at point- 
blank range. Lieutenant Scott and almost every soldier 
fell. Boarding the helpless craft the Indians retaliated 
for the Fowltown ruins by an indiscriminate slaughter. 
The historian would gladly draw the curtain on the scene. 
A grewsome play of savage deviltry was enacted there. 
Women cut down and scalped, children taken by the heels 
and their brains dasbed out, the dead mutilated by savages 
drunk with the sight of blood. Of the whole boatload 
only five survived the horrible orgy. One woman was car- 
ried into captivity and four men, leaping overboard, suc- 
ceeded in reaching the other shore able to convey the awful 
news to an indignant audience. 

In response to Lieutenant Scott's appeal for help, two 
covered boats with forty men were hastily dispatched. Too 
late to be of any assis.tance, the reinforcements pushed on 
and rescued Major Muhlenburg who was coming up from 
Mobile with three boats laden with military stores. For 
four days these boats were obliged to remain at anchor 
in mid-stream for no man could raise his head above the 
bulwarks without offering himself as a target for the fire of 
the Indians. ^ 

By the time that reports of these outrages reached 
Washington General Gaines, in obedience to orders from 
Calhoun, had gone to Amelia Island. Instructions were 
immediately disipatched to Andrew Jackson, directing him 
to proceed to Fort Scott, assume command of the forces 
stationed there, call on the governors of adjacent states for 
the necessary militia, and push the war to an end. This 

1. American State Papers, iMilitary Affairs, Vol. I, pp. 690, 691. 



Resumption of Diplomatic Relations 239 

order, dated December 26, 181 7, was passed on its way south 
by a letter from Jackson to Monroe. 

Hatred of the Spanish was Jackson's cloud and his 
pillar of fire whidh guided his days and nights. In Nash- 
ville it was generally understood and expected that Jackson 
was moving against Florida when he set out for the Sem- 
inole war, and it was for this expedition that most of the 
volunteers enlisted. "To storm the walls of St. Augustine" 
was the battle cry in Tennessee. 



CHAPTER VIII. 

Jackson's war with the se^minoles. 

JACKSON, after reading the orders to Gaines to prose- 
cute the war against the Indians, wrote a confidential 
letter to President Monroe on the subject. "The executive 
government has ordered," said he, "and, as I conceive, very 
properly, Amelia Island to be taken possession of. This or- 
der ought to be carried into execution at all hazards and sim- 
ultaneously the whole of East Florida seized, and held as 
indemnity for the outrages of Spain upon the property of 
our citizens. This done, it puts all opposition down, se- 
cures our citizens a complete indemnity and saves us from 
a war with Great Bcitain or some of the continental powers 
combined with Spain. This can be done without implicat- 
ing the government. Let it be signified to me through any 
channel (say Mr. J. Rhea) that the possession of the Flor- 
idas would be desirable to the United States and in sixty 
days it will be accomplished." ^ 

Of the history of this famous letter there are two 
utterly irreconcilable stories. According to that of Mon- 
roe he was sick in bed when it arrived. Glancing at it he 
observed from a perusal of the first one or two lines that 
it related to the Seminole War. Handing it to Calhoun 
who came in shortly, that gentleman replaced it with the 
remark that it would require Monroe's personal attention, 
but without explaining the contents. Crawford, who hap- 



1. Andrew Jackson to Monroe, Jan. 6, 1818. Benton's Thirty 
Tears' View, Vol. I, p. 170. 



Jackson^s War with the Seminoles 241 

pened in soon afterwards, likewise read it but made no 
comments. The letter was then laid away and forgotten, 
according to Monroe, and he did not read it until after the 
conclusion of the war. Why the letter should have been thus 
submitted to Crawford, with whose duties it had no rela- 
tion, unless it had been to secure his views on its expres- 
sions and sentiments is not quite clear. Nor is it to be 
credited that Calhoun should have read such startling state- 
ments from the officer in command, likely to involve the 
nation in serious difficulties without even a comment or ex- 
pression of opinion. 

In his exposition, prepared during his lifetime but 
published after his death, Jackson said : "Availing himself of 
the suggestion contained in the letter, Mr. Monroe sent for 
Mr. John Rhea (then a member of congress), showed him 
the confidential letter and requested him to answer it. In 
conformity with this request Mr. Rhea did answer the let- 
ter and informed General Jackson that the president had 
shown him the confidential letter and requested him to state 
that he approved of its suggestions. This answer was re- 
ceived by the general on the second night he remained at 
Big Creek, which is four miles in advance o'f Hartford, 
Georgia, and before his arrival at Fort Scott to take com- 
mand of the troops." ^ 

The production of the Rhea letter would have solved 
the whole question. Its absence was thus explained by 
General Jackson: "About the time (February 24, 1819) 
Mr. Lacock made his report (to the senate), General Jack- 
son and Mr. Rhea were both in the city of Washington. 
Mr. Rhea called on General Jackson, as he said, at the re- 
quest of Air. Monroe and begged him on his return home 
to burn his reply. He said the president feared that by 
the death of General Jackson or some other accident, it 
might fall into the hands of those who would make an 

1. Exposition, Benton's Thirty Tears' View, Vol. I, p. 179. 
IC 



242 The Purchase of Florida 

improper use of it. He therefore conjured him by the 
friendship which had always existed between them (and 
by his obHgations as a brother Mason) to destroy it on his 
return to Nashville. Believing Mr. Monroe and Mr. Cal- 
houn to be his devoted friends, and not deeming it possible 
that any incident could occur w'hich would require or jus- 
tify its use, he gave Mr. Rhea the promise he solicited, and 
accordingly, after his return to Nashville, he burnt Mr. 
Rhea's letter and on his letter book, opposite the copy of 
his confidential letter to Mr. Monroe made this entry : 'Mr. 
Rhea's letter in answer is burnt this 12th April, 1819.' " ^ 

Mr. Rhea was an aged member of congress from Ten- 
nessee, an intimate friend of Jackson, and counsellor of 
Monroe. But three persons ever saw the Rtiea letter, name- 
ly, General Jackson, Rhea himself, and Judge Overton. 
The two latter both wrote statements supporting the conten- 
tion of General Jackson though neither of the gentlemen at- 
tempted to give the substance of the destroyed letter. 

Mr. Monroe claimed, on the other hand, never to have 
read the letter until after the war and denied having author- 
ized Mr. Rbea to answer it. There are no allusions to the 
matter in any of Mr. Monroe's correspondence. This 
silence may of course be credited to forgetfulness or discre- 
tion. At any rate, granted that the letter was not answered, 
the course of the administration upon that hypothesis was 
highly reprehensible. General Jackson had meanwhile re- 
ceived orders vesting him with discretionary powers. Mr. 
Calhoun wrote to Governor Bibb, that General Jackson was 
"authorized to conduct the war as he thought best." Jack- 
son's letter of January 6th clearly indicated the course that 
he "thought best." 

Any sane man must have seen that, in the absence of 
express orders to the contrary, General Jackson would 
seize East Florida. Silence then meant tacit consent. If 



1. Benton's Thirty Tears' View, Vol. I, p. 179. 



Jackson's War with the Seminoles 243 

Mr. Rhea really did write, under Monroe's direction, Jack- 
son 'had the express approval of the administration. If 
Jackson's letter received no reply but he was to "conduct 
the war as he thought best" then Jackson had the implied 
approval of the administration. Jackson's character and 
disposition were even at that time matters of common 
knowledge. Were his sentiments and intimations to be so 
lightly considered? On the twenty-fifth of March Jackson 
informed Calhoun that he intended to occupy St. Marks and 
on April 8th informed him that it was done, yet he received 
no word of disapprobation. On the fifth of May he 
wrote to Mr. Calhoun saying that he was about to move 
on Pensacola to occupy that town. Still no word of criti- 
cism. On the second of June he wrote to the secretary of 
war that on May 24th he had entered Pensacola and on the 
28th received the surrender of the Barrancas, yet no breath 
of censure. 

Not until the receipt of Monroe's private letter 
of July 19th did Jackson receive any intimation that his 
Florida operations were other than what Monroe and Cal- 
houn expected. ^ The confidential understanding and ex- 
press agreement, or if it be preferred the tacit consent, made 
Jackson's instructions as effectually orders "to take and 
occupy the province of Florida as if that object had been 
declared on their face." Under any hypothesis it is im- 
possible to do otherwise than hold the administration re- 
sponsible for Jackson's wild career in Florida. That for 
reasons of policy Monroe and Calhoun sought to absolve 
themselves from all blame can scarcely concern the histor- 
ian. That certain of Jackson's acts in connection with the 
invasion would have been thoroughly disapproved by Mon- 
roe and Calhoun no one will deny, but for them, however, 
the impartial critic must reserve the censure for the gen- 
eral event. 



1. Benton's Thirty Tears' View, Vol. I, p. 172. 



244 The Purchase of Florida 

Calhoun's order to proceed to Fort Scott was received 
at Nashville, January nth. It gave Jackson power to call 
on the governors of the adjacent states for militia. The 
Georgia militia had been called out by Gaines before start- 
ing for Amelia Island. Jackson therefore concluded to se- 
cure a thousand mounted volunteers from West Tennessee 
and Kentucky, the men with whom he had fought in 1813 
and 1814. But the governor of Tennessee was absent from 
the state — none knew where he was or when he would 
return. Taking the responsibility upon himself Jackson pri- 
vately summoned to Nashville a number of his old volun- 
teer officers and laid the scheme before them. The officers 
separated to carry out the measures. The general issued 
one of his characteristic addresses and within twelve days 
of the meeting, such was the popularity of the cause and the 
leader, two regiments of mounted men numbering more 
than a thousand were assemWed at the old rendezvous at 
Fayetteville, Tennessee. The governor of Tennessee ap- 
proved General Jackson's measures, irregular though they 
were. So did Mr. Calhoun in his letter of January 24th. 
We may pass lightly over the ensuing incidents. 

On the tenth of March General Jackson assumed com- 
mand at Fort Scott. He ordered part of his provisions sent 
to the fort (Scott) by the Appalachicola on which the Span- 
ish had no fortifications. On the site of Negro Fort he 
erected Fort Gadsden and sent word to the Spanish com- 
mander at Pensacola that if the fort at Barrancas hindered 
his supply boats from ascending the Escambia he would 
consider it an act of hostility to the United States. An arbi- 
trary and aggressive course' this, to the representative of 
an independent nation with whom we were at peace. But 
Jackson knew nothing of red tape and cared less for diplo- 
matic niceties. All through the military correspondence 
there was talk of marching into East Florida and attacking 
the Indians through that province as though no possible 



Jackson's War with the Seminoles 245 

question could be raised as to orders or the restrictions of 
international law. 

He immediately advanced towards St. Marks. Captain 
McKeever in command of the squadron agreed to cooper- 
ate with him in the movement on St. Marks. The follow- 
ing is a portion of a remarkable and characteristic order 
delivered by the general to McKeever : "It is reported to 
me that Francis, or Hillis Hago, and Peter McQueen, 
prophets, who excited the Red Sticks in their late war 
against the United States and are now exciting the Sem- 
inoles to similar acts of hostility, are at or in the neighbor- 
hood of St. Marks. United with them it is stated that 
Woodbine, Arbuthnot, and other foreigners have assembled 
a motley crew of brigands — slaves enticed away from their 
masters, citizens of the United States, or stolen during the 
late conflict with Great Britain. It is all important that 
these men should be captured and made examples of, and 
it is my belief that on the approach of my army they will 
attempt to escape to some of the sea islands. . . . You will 
therefore, cruise along the coast, eastwardly, and as I ad- 
vance, capture and make prisoners all, or every person, or 
description of persons, white, red, or black, with all their 
goods, chattels, and effects, together with all crafts, vessels 
or means of transportation by water. . . . Any of the sub- 
jects of his Catholic Majesty, sailing to St. Marks, may be 
permitted freely to enter the said river. But none to pass 
out, unless after an examination it may be made to appear 
that they have not been attached to or in any wise aided 
and abetted our common enemy. I shall march this day 
and in eight days will reach St. Marks, where I shall ex- 
pect to communicate with you in the bay." There 
is no precedent in all modern history for such a high handed 
course. Let the rnind for one moment contemplate the fleet 
of a nation with whom> we were at peace maintaining a 
blockade of one of our ports and compelling our citizens to 



246 The Purchase of Florida 

submit to search. For what principle was fought the war 
of 1812 ? In defense of what right did Jackson himself beat 
back the English at New Orleans? International law and 
American consistency were violated at the same stroke. 

In his forward march Jackson came upon a number 
of Indians engaged in the innocuous pursuit of "herding 
cattle." Upon these redskins an attack was ordered. Many 
were killed but some succeeded in escaping and fled to St. 
Marks. As Jackson understood his orders he was to pur- 
sue the Indians until he caught them wherever they might 
go. That Spanish rights were to be respected so far as 
was consistent with that purpose. That the Spanish ina- 
bility to police her own territory and maintain order therein 
was to be the justification of his course. His proceedings 
were based on two positive and arbitrary assurruptions. 
First that the Indians received aid and encouragement 
from St. Marks and Pensacola. That the Spanish denied 
this was of no matter to Jackson for his presumption had 
always been that every Spanish official was a consummate 
prevaricator. His second assumption was that Great Brit- 
ain kept paid emissaries in Florida hostile to the United 
States. This latter presumption, prevalent in the United 
States at that time, seems upon a careful consideration of the 
facts to have been wholly groundless. England had without 
doubt made some connection with the Indians during the 
late war and had encouraged them to believe that with the 
treaty of peace they would be reimbursed for their losses, 
but there is no evidence that after the termination of. the 
war she did not act in good faith. She promptly disavowed 
the acts of Colonel Nicholls and firmily refused to either 
aid or encourage the deputation of Indian chiefs that were 
shipped to London. But the inaccuracy of Jackson's as- 
sumption did not save the lives of two English subjects so 
unfortunate as to fall in the hands of that fire eating officer. 

Alexander Arbuthnot, a Scotchman seventy years of 



Jackson's War with the Seminoles 247 

age, a man of considerable ability and education, had come 
to Florida in 181 7 attracted by the prospect of a flourishing 
Indian trade. He established as friendly relations as pos- 
sible with the Indians for his own security and advantage. 
By fairer treatment and more equitable prices he secured a 
large part of the Indian trade to the indignation and loss 
of an older firm who had habitually cheated and swindled 
the savages. He soon received from the Creek chief power 
of attorney to act for him in all affairs which concerned the 
tribe. At the request of the Indian chief, he wrote letters 
to the governor of the Bahamas, the British minister at 
Washington, to Colonel Nichol'ls at London, the governor of 
Florida, the officers comimanding the neighboring United 
States forts. General Mitchell and others. The treaty of 
Ghent had been violated, for the lands taken froim the 
Creeks by the treaty of Fort Jackson had not been restored. 
The Georgians were murdering and plundering the In- 
dians. The English government ought to send an agent to 
report upon the American course in Florida. Thus trad- 
ing with the redskins, by a mere chance he reached St. 
Marks in April of 1818. There, hearing for the first time 
of the approach of Jackson and the arrival of McKeever's 
fleet, he dispatched a letter to his son, in charge of his 
schooner lying at anchor in the Suwanee River below the 
towns of Boleck — and bade him hurry his goods to a 
place of safety, get them on the ship if possible and sail 
for Cedar Keys Bay. 

On April 6th, after having burned Fowltown where 
he found the redpole decorated with the scalps of a year's 
accumulation, Jackson halted near St. Marks and sent his 
aide-de-camp to demand admittance to the town. To pre- 
vent in the future such gross breaches of neutrality, as had 
characterized the past, Jackson informed the governor that 
it was necessary that St. Marks should be occupied and gar- 
risoned by United States troops and held until the termina- 



248 The Purchase of Florida 

tion of the war. The Spanish officer in command, Don 
Francisco Casa y Luengo, replied that he would have to 
write for authority to admit the troops, to do so personally 
was beyond his power. This answer was delivered to Gen- 
eral Jackson on the morning of April 7th. He instantly re- 
plied by taking possession of the fort, replacing the Spanish 
flag with that of the United States, and quartering the 
American troops within the fortress. The governor could 
and did offer no resistance. He was forced to content him- 
self with a formal protest against such unusual and unwar- 
ranted proceedings. Arbuthnot was found within the fort, 
preparing to leave the town, and was promptly seized by 
order of General Jackson.' 

In the meantime Captain McKeever had captured two 
more prisoners of note. Violating all rules of national law 
and by a ruse as disgraceful as it was exceptional, Mc- 
Keever entered the bay with the English flag at his mast- 
head and thus lured on board his ship the Indian prophet 
Francis and his companion Himollemico — the latter the 
savage who had attacked Lieutenant Scott's expedition. 
These Indians, supposing the ship to be the one long looked 
for from England with supplies and munitions of war, had 
boarded her and upon being enticed into the cabin were 
■seized and bound. The next day they were sent up to the fort 
and hung by Jackson's order. For the capture of St. Marks, 
history and investigation are unable to present an adequate 
justification. But we must stand aghast at Jackson's im- 
perial assumption of the dread prerogative of arbitrarily 
dooming men to death without a trial. The prophet Francis 
was an educated man of pleasing manners, humane dispo- 
sition, well versed in English and Spanish — indeed a model 
chief. Himollemico was the type of the cruel, morose, 
bloodthirsty savage, who probably richly deserved his fate, 
but no one has ever explained by what law or custom, 
ohserved in the service of the United States, they were put 



Jackson's War with the Seminoles 249 

to death, when thus captured by an ignoble stratagem, not 
even on the field of battle, and without the bare formality 
of a trial of any sort. 

Jackson pushed on as rapidly as possible for Suwanee, 
the headquarters of Boleck ("Billy Bowlegs"), the Seminole 
chief, and the refuge of the troublesome negroes, half 
breeds, and fugitive slaves. Arbuthnot had a trading post 
here, and it was to this place that he had written the let- 
ter to his son directing him to remove the stock of goods. 
In the afternoon of April 17th Jackson, forming his army 
into three divisions, rushed on to overwhelm the village, 
but found it abandoned. 

Arbuthnot's warning to his son had been read to Bow- 
legs who was thus aible, with his women and children, to 
escape into the swamps, so inaccessible and so plentiful in 
that region. Jackson was baffled and, we need not be told, 
enraged. The town was burned. Nearby were taken 
prisoners an Englishman by the name of Robert Ambrister 
and three companions, two of them negroes, who, unaware 
of the course of events, had accidentally stumbled upon the 
American camp. 

On one of the negroes was found Arbuthnot's letter to 
his son. Froim Cook, the white man, it was learned that the 
letter had been read to Bowlegs and was responsible for the 
escape of the Indians and the, evacuation of the town. Am- 
brister was found to be an agent of Arbuthnot, with head- 
quarters on Arbuthnot's schooner then at the mouth of the 
Suwanee River. Lieutenant Gadsden was hastily dispatch- 
ed to capture the schooner. Jackson had considered 
Arbuthnot an English emissary. The escape of the In- 
dians enraged him and, we may say, bemuddled his mind. 
He now considered Ar^buthnot's letter an overt act of inter- 
ference in the war. 

The Seminole war was now ended. It had been con- 
temptible and meager in military results, but it was prolific 



250 The Purchase of Florida 

in its surprising complications. On April 20th, the 
Georgia troops marched homeward to be disbanded. On 
the 24th General Mclntosih and his brigade of Indians were 
dismissed. On the 25th General Jackson with his Tennes- 
see militia and his regulars was again at Fort St. Marks. 

Having accepted the cession of West Florida to the 
United States, General Jackson further assumed the author- 
ity of constituting a provisional government for the con- 
quered province. He appointed one of his officers, Colonel 
King, civil and military governor. He extended the rev- 
enue laws of the United States over the country and ap- 
pointed another of his officers. Captain Gadsden, collector 
of the port of Pensacola, with authority to execute those 
laws. He declared what civil laws should be enforced and 
provided for the preservation of the archives as well as 
for the care and protection of what had been the property 
of the Spanish crown but which now, in the general's con- 
ception, had become the property of the United States. 

The war was over, but one more act of imperial au- 
thority remained to complete the cycle of Jackson's astound- 
ing conduct. At St. Marks was convened a "special court" 
of fourteen officers to try Ambrister and Arbuthnot and 
determine what punishment, if any, should be meted out to 
them. That they were not unceremoniously hanged or shot, 
as were the Indians, we must admit was a concession on 
the part of Jackson hardly to have been expected. Of all 
the tribunals convened to sit on cases, the court-martial is 
without doubt the least likely to dispense any measure of 
equity. To mete out vengeance rather than justice seems 
to be their purpose. The constituent memlbers are not 
selected by reason of any special fatness for their task or be- 
cause they possess in any measure the judicial qualities. 
And of all the iniquities which may be credited to this 
form of tribunal, it is doubtful whether any were ever more 
reprehensible than those perpetrated by the one which was 



Jackson's War with the Seminoles 251 

convened that twenty-eighth of April, over which General 
Gaines presided and before which Arbuthnot was arraigned. 
Three charges were filed against the unfortunate 
Scotchman : 

1. Inciting the Creeks to war against the United 
States. 

2. Acting as a spy and supplying them with munitions 
of war. 

3. Inciting the Indians to murder William Hambly 
and Edmund Doyle. 

The third charge was so absurd that it was twithdrawn 
after the court had determined that it possessed no jurisdic- 
tion in the matter. Such a violation of all known or 
accepted methods of procedure and rules of evidence has 
seldom been seen, in even the most arbitrary tribunals. 
There was no real evidence against Arbuthnot on any 
charge, that would stand in an ordinary court of law. His 
business and presence in Florida were open and obvious. 
He had, while using his influence and ability in behalf of 
the Indians, always advised them to peace and submission 
rather than to a course which he well knew would lead to 
their certain defeat and extinction. For his construction of 
the treaty of Ghent there is much to be said. Indeed diplo- 
matic measures were necessary to set it aside. As for his 
letter to his own son, written entirely in the line of his bus- 
iness, it could hardly be ground for censure though it did 
render Jackson's march of two hundred miles all but fruit- 
less. To the question, can traders be executed if their in- 
formation, not transmitted through the lines, frustrate mili- 
tary purposes, we imagine there can be but one answer. At 
any rate Arbuthnot was found guilty by a two-thirds vote 
of the court and sentenced to be hanged. 

Ambrister was tried on the charge of aiding and com- 
forting the enemy and waging war on the United States. 
He had no ostensible business in Florida — an adventurer 



252 The Purchase of Florida 

in short. It was proved that he had come to Florida on 
"Woodbine's business," that he had captured Arbuthnot's 
schooner and plundered his store, that he had sent into New 
Providence for arms and that he had sent a party "to 
oppose" the American invasion. Ambrister made no formal 
defense but put himself on the mercy of the court. He was 
promptly pronounced guilty and sentenced to be shot. A 
member of the court, however, securing a reconsideration 
of the sentence, he was awarded fifty lashes on the bare 
back and confinement with ball and chain at hard labor for 
one year. 

In his orders of April 29th, Jackson, disapproving the 
revised sentence of Ambrister, ordered the first finding car- 
ried out. Accordingly Arbuthnot was hanged from the 
yard arm of his schooner, and Ambrister took his place as a 
target before an execution squad. 

Jackson had committed a murder all the more atrocious 
because done under the guise of legal form. Anbuthnot was 
executed upon the testimony of men who had the strongest 
interest in his conviction, and upon evidence of a nature 
which would not today be tolerated in any proceeding, crim- 
inal or civil, in any court of this country. The presiding 
officer of that court was the officer whose arrogant, unrea- 
soning treatment of the Fowltown Indians precipitated the 
war. And yet the war was concluded and the enemy 
crushed and obliterated before these two lives were sacri- 
ficed. Did the rules of war demand instant death ? Would 
it not have been the part of charity, nay of reason, to for- 
ward the case to Washington? 

With his dying breath Arbuthnot declared that his 
country would avenge his execution. Political reasons 
alone, we may /believe, prevented the fulfillment of the un- 
fortunate victim's prophecy. The executions produced the 
most intense indignation in England, and all Europe stood 
aghast. At an entertainmicnt given by the French ambas- 



Jackson s War with the Seminoles 253 

•sador on July 30, 1818, the foreign ambassadors and min- 
isters crowded about our Mr. Rush in eager curiosity to 
know of this matter of Pensacola and of the probable war 
with Spain. That the whole affair smacked of hostilities, 
with either Spain or England or both, was the general im- 
pression. And to Europe long drunk with the mad Na- 
poleonic carnival of fire and slaughter another war would 
prove an object of unalloyed pleasure at least to those 
nations which might stand at the ringside, as it were, and 
be the spectators. After the kaleidoscopic metamorphoses 
which had marked the days of the great conqueror a few 
years of peace had greatly bored .the ennuye continent. 

The executions became the subject of parliamentary 
inquiry. The excitement was at fever heat. Stocks fell. 
The newspapers were particularly bitter in their denunciation 
of the United States and the offending general was addressed 
in their columns by the opprobrious names of "tyrant," "ruf- 
fian," and "murderer," and was placarded about the streets 
of London. "We can hardly believe that anything so 
offensive to public decorum could be admitted even in 
America" was the comment of one journal. After a full 
deliberation the cabinet however declared that the conduct 
of Arbuthnot and Ambrister had been unjustifiable, and did 
not therefore call for the special interference of Great 
Britain. And in the ensuing days of seething popular 
passion when war iwould have been certain "if the ministry 
had but held up a finger," the cabinet stood firm for peace. 
We may well believe with the traditional jealousy with 
which Great Britain has ever guarded the interests and the 
lives of her subjects that there was some ulterior motive 
which had determined Lord Castlereagh and his compeers in 
their decision. 

Since the termination of the Napoleonic wars and the 
second treaty of Paris England had become isolated and now 



254 The Purchase of Florida 

stood alone against the continental powers. ^ To the United 
States only could she look for support against the reaction- 
ary doctrines promulgated in the holy alliance. For Eng- 
land to go to war with the United States would have left 
the European powers free to pursue their purposes without 
a single restraining force and would leave Great Britain 
without one ally to whom she might turn for either 
moral or material support in those principles for whose 
recognition she was then working. To declare war then 
.would be merely to accentuate her isolation and invite worse 
calamities. At any rate the inquiry was not pressed by 
England as all patriotic citizens must hope the United States 
would push a similar one. 

The two Indians who had been hanged had no friends 
to demand an explanation or reparation, but their execution 
was a most awkward thing to justify before the world. 
The Creeks were not a nation in contemplation of inter- 
national law — not the possessors of the soil on which they 
had lived and fought, because enjoying only what, by a 
suitable stretch of national ethics or morals, may be termed 
tihe right of temporary use or occupation, subject to the 
higher and ultimate title which vested in the nation. There 
had been no declaration of war, yet the Indians were not 
rebels against the United States and in the eyes of any but 
Jackson they possessed so^me belligerent rights. Though 
there never was any proof that anybody incited the Indians 
yet, whatever rights the redskins possessed, the Englishmen, 
even had they been complete allies, must have been entitled 
to. If the Indians were not to be slain like wild beasts or 
executed by court-martial for levying war on the United 
States, the Englishmen were done to death without legal or 
moral right. 

Learning that some five hundred hostile Indians were 
receiving friendly asylum at Pensacola, Jackson hurried 



1. November 20, 1815. 



Jackson's War with the Seminoles 255 

off to that place with a small detachment of regulars and 
militia. On his march he was met by a messenger from 
the governor of that town, protesting against his summary 
course and ordering him either to quit the province of 
West Florida or be prepared to meet force with force. 
If this notice was intended to overawe Jackson and induce 
him to withdraw it failed of its purpose most signally. It 
only aroused and excited him, and on May 24th he 
entered Pensacola without the slightest opposition beyond 
that of the quill. Capturing Fort Carios de Barrancas, 
whither the Spanish had retreated, and leaving a garrison of 
American troops, some five days later Jackson was marching 
homeward. On his way he learned of an attack by the 
Georgia militia on the villages of friendly and allied Indians. 
A fiery correspondence between Governor Rabun of Georgia 
and General Jackson ensued in which, though the general 
was undoubtedly right, he provoked anger and discord by 
his violent, impetuous manner where a temperate remon- 
strance, judiciously administered, would have better gained 
the object in view. ^ 

In the whole Florida campaign we have seen that prej- 
udice and assumption took the place of evidence and in- 
formation. Jackson's theory "of making the United States 
as uncomfortable a neighbor to Spain as he could," had 
borne fruit. His only regret was that when he took Pensa- 
cola he ''had not stormed the works, captured the governor, 



1. The following is an atjstract rrom a sarcastic letter written 
by Governor Rabun to General Jackson, Sept. 1, lSil8 : "I hope 
you will now permit me in turn to recommend to you that before you 
undertake to prosecute another campaign you examine the orders of 

your superiors with more attention than usual Indeed, sir, we 

had expected that your presence at the head of an overwhelming force 
would have afforded complete protection to our bleeding and distressed 
frontier, but our prospect was only delusive, for it would seem that the 
laurels expected in Florida was the object that accelerated your march 
far more than the protection of the 'ignorant Georgians.' " Andrew 
Jackson IVIiSS., Congressional Library. 



256 The Purchase of Florida 

put him on his trial for the murder of Stokes and his fam- 
ily, and hung him for the deed." ^ 

Thus terminated the Seminole war, insignificant and 
trivial in the forces Involved and the actual military 
operations. On the American side there were engaged about 
eighteen hundred whites and fifteen hundred friendly In- 
dians. Tihe hostile Indians numbered not more than about 
one thousand, of whom not over one half were at 
any one time before Jackson. What fighting there was, 
•was largely done by the allied Indians. They lost twenty 
men, the whites lost one man and the hostile Indians sixty. 
Yet this petty Indian campaign was one of the most preg- 
nant and important events in our national history. 

The Seminole war was soon made the subject of a 
congressional investigation. In both the house and the 
senate the question was sulbmitted to committees. That of 
the house presented two reports. The majority report con- 
demned the proceedings of the trial and execution of Ar- 
buthnot and Ambrister. The minority report declared that 
where there was much in the conduct of the campaign to 
praise, there was little to censure and when the incalculable 
benefits resulting to the nation were considered it was their 
sense that Jackson and his officers deserved the thanks of 
the nation. 

In due time the report of the majority was taken up in 
the committee of the whole and the resolution "That the 
house of representatives of the United States disapproves the 
proceedings in the trial and execution of Alexander Arbuth- 
not and Robert Ambrister" was debated. William C. Cobb 
of Georgia opened the discussion. He could conceive of no 
law, martial, municipal, or national, that had been violated 
by the luckless Englishmen. Martial law subjected spies 
to the death penalty. But although these men, or one of 



1. For this remarkable statement see Jackson's letter to George 
W. Campbell, then minister to Russia, Parton's Jackson, Vol. II, p. 500. 



Jackson's War with the Seminoles 257 

them, was accused of this, he was acquitted of the charge. 
Admitting the truth of the charges for which they were exe- 
cuted, yet they were not declared penal in any of the rules 
of war, neither were they declared to 'be the subject matters 
for trial before a court-martial. The evidence of papers 
not produced or accounted for, the belief of persons whose 
testimony of undoubted facts ought to have been suspected, 
hearsay, and that of Indians, negroes, and criminals who, had 
they been present, could not have been sworn, were all in- 
discriminately admitted and acted upon. 

Did not the reconsideration of the sentence in Am- 
brister's case render null and void the first decree of the 
court? Can it be said that there was any other sentence 
than the one last passed in the case? The whole proceeding 
on its very face manifested a cruelty that must excite the 
greatest disapprobation of all impartial men. In his 
official orders Jackson had justified the execution of Am- 
brister in these words — "It is an established principle of 
the law of nations that any individual of a nation making 
war against the citizens of another nation, they being at 
peace, forfeits his allegiance, and becomes an outlaw and a 
pirate." No one had ever heard or dreamed of such a rule 
of international law. Reason, propriety, justice, and 
humanity all cry aloud against such a principle. If Jack- 
son's statement stood unchallenged, LaFayette, De Kalb, 
Pulaski, Steuben, and the large host of foreigners who 
joined the standard of our fathers in the revolution, and 
with their life's blood baptized the infant nation, were "out- 
laws and pirates," and had they been captured were subject 
to trial by court-martial and sentence to an ignominious 
death. 

Jackson had usurped the power of congress to de- 
clare war. International law permits us to cross the lines in 
fresh pursuit of the enemy, but does not sanction razing forts, 
conducting sieges, receiving capitulations, mounting bat- 



258 The Purchase of Florida 

teries, and granting terms of surrender to such places. The 
reasons for invading Florida were many of them ridiculous 
and such as, to say the most, are but causes of war. They 
may contain wrongs which demand redress but that through 
diplomatic channels, and not by any such methods as those 
employed by Jackson. A certain mystery appeared on the 
face of the documents which, Cobb declared, quite staggered 
him. The perfect confidence shown by Jackson in the cor- 
rectness of his proceedings, in which he had clearly violated 
what appeared to be his orders, seemed quite unaccountable 
and suggested something ulterior. Jackson did not attempt 
to excuse himself, did not seem to think he had overleaped 
his orders, and had neither apprehension nor fear as to the 
opinion that the executive might form of his proceedings. 
Did it not seem a suspicious circumstance that General 
Jackson had not been called to account for thus transcending 
his orders? Let it be admitted that Spain was too weak 
and had forfeited her right of sovereignty, yet to whom had 
it been forfeited and why to the. United States rather than 
to some other nation? Oobb took the occasion to declare 
that he was personally hostile to Spain and felt that that na- 
tion had done us many wrongs, but that his feelings upon 
that subject could not render him callous to the stain which 
Jackson had inflicted on our national honor. 

Let it be granted that a nation had broken a treaty, as 
we insisted Spain had done, is it usual for the commanding 
general to go in and inaugurate a war? Moreover Vattel, 
in his "Law of Nations," declares that a nation's breach of 
a treaty may be excused by the other nation especially, as in 
this case, when it proceeds from weakness. There existed 
no proofs of a warlike association between the Spanish and 
the Indians which would identify them as equally our ene- 
mies according to the definition given of this compact by 
international law. Had we been dealing with Great Britain 
instead of Spain, a virile instead of a weak nation, would 



Jackson's War with the Seminoles 259 

we have proceeded in this manner ? Was Jackson's declara- 
tion that "St. Marks was necessary as a depot for the suc- 
cess of his future operations," in any sense a justification? 
Gibraltar mig-ht be the same if we contemplated an attack 
on the Barbary States. His feelings and dignity having 
been injured by the "insulting letter of the governor of 
Pensacola," Jackson "hesitated no longer and exposed the 
nation to war." "But sir," concluded Cobb, "I have dome 
with this disagreeable subject — I turn with disgust from 
this nauseous scene." 

In the course of his speech Cobb introduced three 
amendments ; one instructed the committee on military 
aflfairs to report a hill forbidding the execution of any 
captive of the army of the United States in time of peace, 
or in time of war with any Indian tribe unless the president 
approved. Another declared that the house of representa- 
tives disapproved of the seizure of St. Marks, Pensacola, 
and the Barrancas, as contrary to orders and the con- 
stitution. The third instructed the proper committee to 
frame a bill prohibiting United States troops marching into 
foreign territory unless ordered to do so by congress, or 
when in hot pursuit of an enemy beaten and flying- for 
refuge across the border. 

Holmes of Massachusetts then took up the cudgels in 
behalf of Jackson and was in turn followed by Henry Clay. 
Beginning with a disclaimer of all hostility to either Jack- 
son or the administration, this eloquent speaker launched 
forth in a wonderful oration. Strengthened by his perfect 
diction, vivified by his stirring appeals, and marked by his 
acute reasoning, apt illustrations, and glowing peroration, 
this effort strongly affected the house and won for its 
author the bitter and undying hatred of Jackson. For to 
the douglhty fighter those who approved his acts were his 
friends, those who criticised, his enemies, and that, too, 
whether or no any personal feeling was brought into the 



260 Thi Purchase of Florida 

discussion of either law or fact. At any rate Clay was in 
opposition to the administration because he had not been 
aippointed secretary of state. His hostility is generally 
declared to have been factious, despite his disclaimer. There 
are some facts which lend color to the theory that Clay and 
Crawford had already begun to regard Jackson as a possible 
competitor for the presidency. 

Clay began his speech with a bitter denunciation of the 
treaty of Fort Jackson. He blushed with shame at the 
ignoble and unworthy ruse by which Francis and Himollem- 
ico were captured and the unceremonious manner in which 
they were executed, under the guise of retaliation for the 
crimes which had been committed by their followers. Even 
admitting the guilt of Arbuthnot and Ambrister he ridiculed 
and riddled Jackson's argument by which their execution 
had been justified. He likened their treatment to that ac- 
eorded by Napoleon to the Due d'Enghien, and found a 
duplicate for the seizure of Pensacola and St. Marks in 
the bombardment of Copenhagen and capture of the Danish 
fleet by England. To Jackson's statement that Arbuthnot 
and Ambrister had been legally condemned and justly pun- 
ished. Clay remarked, "The Lord preserve us from any such 
legal convictions and such legal condemnations." 

While acquitting Jackson of any intention of violating 
the laws, as he said. Clay accused him of seizing forts, 
usurping the exclusively congressional power of making 
war, and took occasion to warn the people against the 
military hero covered with glory. The eloquent Kentuckian 
closed with incomparable albility. "They m.ay bear dovv^n all 
opposition," he declared, "they may even vote the general 
public thanks. They may carry him triumphantly through 
this house. But if they do, in ray humble judgment, it will 
be the triumph of insubordination, a triumph of the military 
over the civil authority, a triumph over the powers of this 
house, a triumph over the constitution of the land. And I 



Jackson's War with the Seminoles 261 

pray devotedly to heaven that it may not prove, in its ulti- 
mate effects and consequences, a triumph over the liberties 
of the people." 

Other speakers followed in much the same general 
strain. Jackson had committed an act of war. He him- 
self had said that the articles of capitulation of Pensacola, 
"with the exception of one article, amounted to a complete 
cession of the country to the United States." If this did not 
constitute war the speakers earnestly demanded a suit- 
able definition of that term. Granted, as Jackson's adher- 
ents claimed, that the law of nations authorizes retaliation, 
yet the same law says, "where severity is not absolutely 
necessary, clemency becomes a duty." The war against the 
Indians being at an end, where was the necessity ? Arbuth- 
not was punished upon the testimony of his admitted per- 
sonal enemies as the papers show. "The judgment of a 
court-martial is always under its own control," declares 
Macomb, "until it is communicated to the officer by whom it 
was convened." The final judgment of Ambrister was the 
only judgment of the court. And, by appointing the court- 
martial, Jackson was morally bound to accept its verdict. A 
notable example, they declared, of the maxim that when a 
man acquires power he forgets rights. It was even directly 
intimated that the court-martial was irregularly formed, and 
its verdict prepared beforehand. 

The treaty of Fort Jackson of 1814, came in for a bitter 
arraignment. In its terms it was most harsh and severe; 
it was made with a minority of the Creek chiefs who had 
remained either friendly or passive. There were at the 
time manifest signs of its disapproval by the majority of 
Indians. They were robbed of a large portion of their 
territory, and unromantic roads, trading houses, etc., were 
inflicted upon the portion left to them. Not a single hostile 
chief had either signed or acquiesced in the pact, which was 
declared to be quite like the most of our Indian treaties. 



262 The Purchase of Florida 

According to the principles of international law, it is 
not permitted to cross a neutral line after an enemy, scat- 
tered and 'broken up, fleeing from death and destruction, as 
were the Seminoles, but only after one retreating with the 
idea of again renewing the attack. Vattel laid it down that 
"extreme necessity may even authorize the temporary 
seizure of a place (in a neutral country) and the putting a 
garrison therein, for defending itself against an enemy or 
preventing him in his designs of seizing this place when the 
sovereign is not able to defend it. But when the danger is 
over it must be immediately surrendered." Where was the 
necessity which had justified Jackson's course, the opposition 
demanded. After the Indians had been conquered, with 
whom was the general waging war? Not with Spain and 
not with the Indian tribes — because they had (been already 
subdued. 

Jackson's letter of the second of June to the secretary 
of war was bitterly denounced. It read in part : "The 
Seminole war may now be considered at a close, tranquillity 
again restored to the southern frontier of the United States, 
and as long as a cordon of military posts is maintained along 
the Gulf of Mexico, America has nothing to apprehend from 
either foreign or Indian hostilities. Captain Gadsden is in- 
structed to prepare a report on the necessary defenses of 
the country as far as the military reconnoissance will permit, 
accompanied with plans of the existing works ; what addi- 
tions or improvements are necessary, and what new works 
should in his opinion be erected to give permanent security 
to this important territorial addition to our republic." Un- 
sparing were the terms in which this report was character- 
ized. 

But Jackson was not without his defenders. Johnson, 
Tallmadge, Poindexter, Alexander Sm}i:h of Virginia, 
and Barbour ably met the onslaught of his detractors. They 
tore to pieces the speech of Clay, they quoted Vattel and 



Jackson s War with the Seminoles 263 

Martens in support of their hero. They enumerated pre- 
cedents in our own national history which vindicated the de- 
fendant. 

Yet after nearly a century Jackson's conduct stands 
out in bold relief, while their alleged precedents have paled 
into O'blivion. The case of Major Andre and the conduct 
of Washington were cited repeatedly as though there could 
have been any real analogy between the conduct of the un- 
fortunate Englishman of our revolutionary days and that of 
his equally unfortunate countrymen of later date. 

For twenty-seven days, without interruption, and to the 
exclusion of all business, flowed this stream of oratory. No 
attack upon any public man up to that time had so inter- 
ested and aroused the country. The sensations at the trial 
of Samuel Chase and of Aaron Burr were as nothing com- 
pared with this. Popular feeling was with Jackson. His 
hold upon the country had already begun to exert a wonder- 
ful dispensating influence for him and his misdoings. He 
possessed an extraordinary comibination of those qualities 
calculated to arouse the imagination and sentiment of the 
people. The strange magic of military success had carried 
him to a height from which to attempt to drag him down 
would have (been to invite ruin. Official Washington knew 
this only too well, and so did Jackson. 

The battle of New Orleans, the one brilliant land feat 
of our armies in the war of 1812, had given him a firm hold 
upon the hearts of the people. Niles, representing the pop- 
ular sentiment and believing in the emissary theory, exactly 
summarized the general attitude in this paragraph : "The 
fact is that ninety-nine in a hundred of the people believe 
that General Jackson acted on every occasion for the good 
of his country, and success universally crowned his efforts. 
He has suffered more hardships and encountered higher 
responsibilities than any man living in the United States to 



264 The Purchase of Florida 

serve us and has his reward in the sanction of his govern- 
ment and the approbation of the people." ^ 

On both sides of the question were the finest orators, the 
most skillful debaters, the shrewdest and most consummate 
politicians of the generation. This and the feeling that on 
the outcome might depend a Spanish war, brought all 
Washington to the daily feast of words and reason. Even 
the minority of the house committee, friendlier to Jackson, 
declared that after considering the documents submitted it 
would have been "more correct" to acquiesce in the final ver- 
dict of the court-martial in Ambrister's case. At length on 
the eighth of February a vote was taken on the amendments 
and on the resolution. In each case Jackson was sustained 
both by the committee of the whole and by the house. 

In the senate the question had been referred to a com- 
mittee early in December, but no report was made until 
February 24th. The document then submitted declared that 
the general's ideas of international law were entirely un- 
founded on any recognized authority, that his actions were 
"calculated to inflict a wound on the national character," and 
condemned his conduct at every point. After an order to 
print, the report was laid on the table where it remained 
when the second session of the fifteenth congress ended on 
March 4th. 

While the senate committee was in session preparing 
their report, wild stories were current in Washington of 
Jackson's wrathful denunciations of different members of 
the committee. It was commonly stated that he proposed 
to lie in wait and inflict summary vengeance upon his critics. 
Mr. Lacock of the senate committee wrote : "General Jack- 
son is still here and by times raves like a madman. He has 
sworn most bitterly he would cut ofl^ the ears of every mem- 
ber of the committee who reported against his conduct. 
This bullying is done in public, and yet I have passed 

1. Vol. XVI, Niles Register, p. 25. 



Jackson's War with the Seminoles 265 

his lodgings every day and still retain my ears. Thus 
far I consider myself fortunate. How long I shall 
be spared without mutilation I know not, but one thing I 
can promise you, that I shall never avoid him a single inch. 
And as the civil authority here seems to be put down by the 
military, I shall be ready and willing to defend myself and 
not die soft." After Jackson's return from his northern 
trip and after the report of the committee, his threats and 
menaces were repeated with increased violence, and there 
was more talk of ears as the reward of vengeance. There is 
good foundation for the story that Commodore Decatur 
with difficulty succeeded in preventing Jackson from enter- 
ing the senate chamber to attack Mr. Eppes. Members of 
the committee went armed prepared to resist bodily assault 
with powder and bullets. 

General Jackson, after his return from Florida and 
during the congressional investigation, received many let- 
ters of fulsome praise and sickening flattery from unworthy 
sycophants — men who swore by the gods that they 
"adored" him, and lived for the opportunity to "feast their 
eyes on their favorite soldier and peacemaker." The Jack- 
son correspondence teems with these letters from that 
class of men who ascribe to themselves something of glory 
or fame in communicating with those prominent in the 
public eye. In April, 1819, Ex-Governor Blount wrote 
Jackson a highly disgraceful letter in which he traduced the 
opposition and referred to Cobb and Clay in disgustingly 
indecent terms. 

Jackson's friends characterized Lacock's report as a 
"most imalicious and iniquitous production where facts were 
suppressed and circumstances exhibited in a light to mis- 
lead and pervert the judgment," while General Jackson 
himself spoke of Crawford's "depravity of heart" and de- 
parture from that "strictly honorable deportment" in oppos- 
ing him through congress. An "infamous report of un- 



266 The Purchase of Florida 

godly scoundrels" — such the Jackson coterie of flatterers 
nominated the senate committee resolution. 

Captain Gadsden, a devoted personal friend of General 
Jackson, spoke of the "whole conduct of the executive as 
mysterious, and characterized with a degree of indecision 
and imbecility disgraceful to the nation" — a remark worthy 
of a court-martial and dismissal from the army. ^ Governor 
McMinns of Tennessee was "prodigiously pleased" to learn 
that Florida was in the hands of "the Americans out of 
which I trust in God they never will be taken." ^ One John 
B. White wrote a drama, "The Triumph pf Liberty" in 
honor of the failure of Jackson's enemies in congress, and 
sent a copy to the general accompanied by a nauseating 
letter of adulation. ^ 

It is generally conceded that had there been less decla- 
mation and more convincing argument in support of the 
majority report in the house, Jackson would not have been 

1. Capt. Gadsden to Gen. Jackson, Sept. 28, 1818. 

2. Governor McMinns to 'Gen. Jackson, June 20, 1818. 

'3. The following is a fair sample of the letters received by Gen- 
eral Jackson from fawning individuals throughout the country : 

Boone County, State of Ken tuck, Felbruary 20, 1819. 
To Major General A. Jackson, Sir : — 

Indulge one of the American revolution, while you are surrounded 
by an approving multitude, to offer his mite of gratitude to the pro- 
tector of female innocence and helpless infancy, and his country's 
wrongs, against the wily hand of the savage instigated by, and sup- 
plied with the means to perpetrate their cruel acts by the imbecile 
Spaniard and the vile Briton. 

I hope ere this "the long agonies are o'er," of your quondam friends ! 
and when time shall have obliterated their sickliness and the forked 
tongue of envy and malice shall be at rest, the children, yet unborn, 
shall sound the praises of the man who had the fortitude, courage, 
virtue, and obedience to the call of necessity to step forward, with a 
gallant band to encounter every privation, hardship, and danger to 
rectify that country's wrongs. I am a simple, plain man in my habits 
and manners, no courtier. But here claim the privilege to give my 
sentiments in favor of patriotism, fortitude, courage, virtue, and morals 
when mingled with glorious deeds ; of every man who nobly steps 
forward in the cause of Humanity, Justice, and his country's freedom ; 
in opposition to the enemies of the Human race ! ! ! Accept the respect 
of my rational homage and very high consideration. 

John Brown. 



Jackson's War with the Seminoles 267 

sustained. Parton says : "If there had been but one hard- 
headed, painstaking, resolute man in the house who had 
spent ten days in reading and comparing the evidence relat- 
ing to the invasion of Florida and the execution of the pris- 
oners, and two days more in presenting to the house a com- 
plete exposition of the same, hammering home the vital 
points with tireless reiteration, the final votes would not 
have been what they were. The cause, despite the month's 
debate, was, after all, decided without a hearing." ^ 

When the news of Jackson's Florida exploits reached 
Washington all was excitement among the officials and the 
public. The administration was in a quandary. It was 
ignorant of the fact that Jackson had been authorized to 
violate neutral territory. Moreover, this administration, 
like those which had preceded it was timid, and, without 
precedents, knew scarcely anything of its powers. The 
cabinet was certainly anxious to secure Florida, but by 
purchase not by conquest. Monroe was weak, to say the 
least, and possessed little of the "defiant patriotism" of the 
younger Adams. The whole matter came up in the cabinet 
on the question of what disposition to make of Jackson and 
his conquests. On the fifteenth of July Adams records in his 
diary that there was a cabinet meeting lasting from noon 
until near five. The president and all the members of the 
cabinet except himself were of the opinion that Jackson 
should be disavowed and suitable reparation made. 

'Calhoun, "generally of sound, judicious, comprehensive 
mind," was offended with Jackson's insubordination to the 
war department and insisted that he be roundly censured. 
The secretary of war, was convinced that we would certainly 
have a Spanish war, and that such was Jackson's object 
that he might be able to command an expedition against 
Mexico. Crawford feared that if Pensacola were not at 
once restored and Jackson's acts disavowed, war would 

1. Parton's Andrew Jackson, Vol. II, p. 550. 



268 The Purchase of Florida 

follow and that our ships and commerce would ibecome^the 
prey of privateers from all parts of the world sailing under 
the Spanish flag, and that the administration would not be 
sustained by the people. ^ Jackson had to face the Indians 
but the cabinet was compelled to face Spain and England, 
congress, the hostile press, the people and not least, Jackson 
himself. The question was indeed embarrassing and com- 
plicated. 

During July and August, cabinet meetings were held 
almost daily and the question was hotly debated. In all of 
these conferences Jackson's sole friend and only defender 
was Adams, the secretary of state, the man upon whom 
would fall the 'labor of vindicating the general diplomatic- 
ally, should the administration decide to assume the respon- 
sibility. Adams declared that there was no real though an 
apparent violation of instructions and that his proceedings 
were justified by the necessity of the case and by the mis- 
conduct of the Spanish commanding officers in Florida. 
He insisted that if Jackson were disavowed he (Jackson) 
would immediately resign his commission and turn the 
attack upon the administration and would carry a large part 
of the public with him. With the overwhelming majority 
against Jackson, the question arose as to the degree to 
which his acts should be disavowed. 

The entry in Adams's diary under date of July 19, is of 
interest as indicating something of the struggle in the cab- 
inet. Having presented a new point in justification of 
Jackson, Adams commented upon the ensuing arguments : 

"It appeared to make some impression upon Mr. Wirt, 
but the president and Mr. Calhoun were inflexible. My 
reasoning was that Jackson took Pensacola only because 
the governor threatened to drive him out of the province 
by force if he did not withdraw ; that Jackson was only 
executing his orders when he received this threat; that he 

1. Memoirs of J. Q. Adams, Vol. IV, pp. 107-109. 



Jackson's War with the Seminoles 269 

could not withdraw his troops from the province consistent- 
ly with his orders and that his only alternative was to 
prevent the execution of the threat. I insisted that the 
character of Jackson's measures was decided by the inten- 
tion with which they were taken, which was not hostility 
to Spain but self defense against the hostility of Spanish 
officers. I admitted that it was necessary to carry the 
reasoning upon ^my principles to the utmost extent it would 
bear, to come to this conclusion. But if the question was 
dubious, it was better to err on the side of vigor than of 
weakness — on the side of our own officer who had ren- 
dered the most eminent services to the nation, than on the 
side of our bitterest enemies and against him. I glanced 
at the construction which would be given by Jackson's 
friends and by a large portion of the public to the disavowal 
of his acts. It would be said that he was an obnoxious man, 
that after having the benefit of his services he was aban- 
doned and sacrificed to the enemies of his country ; that his 
case would be compared with that of Sir Walter Raleigh. 
Mr, Calhoun principally bore the argument against me 
insisting that the capture of Pensacola was not necessary 
upon the principles of self defense and therefore was both 
an act of war against Spain and a violation of the consti- 
tution, that the administration by approving it, would take 
all the blame of it upon themselves ; that by leaving it upon 
his responsibility, they would take away from Spain all 
pretext for war and for resorting to the aid of other Euro- 
pean powers — they would also be free from all reproach 
of having violated the constitution; that it was not the 
menace of the governor of Pensacola that had determined 
Jackson to take that place; that he had really resolved to 
take it before ; that he had violated his orders and, upon his 
own arbitrary will, set all authority at defiance." 

After many days of argument, when Adams continued 
to oppose the unanimous opinions of the president, the secre- 



270 The Purchase of Florida 

tary of the treasury, Crawford, the secretary of war, Cal' 
houn, and the attorney general, Wirt, a draft of a note to 
De Onis was prepared and a newspaper paragraph was sub- 
mitted to the press for publication. With a sigh at this 
"weakness and confession of weakness" Adams set himself 
to the task of meeting the protests and threats of De Onis 
and the inquiries of Bagot. 



CHAPTER IX. 
ADAMS vi:rsus de; onis. 

WE have seen that on the renewal of diplomatic rela- 
tions with Spain in December, 1815, De Onis de- 
manded the isurrender of so much of West Florida as 
Madison had organized under the congressional act of 
181 1, and that this demand had been followed by an inter- 
change of views upon the title to that province which Spain 
claimed never to have ceded to France, since she haa 
received it from England and not from his Christian 
Majesty. 

In 1816 Monroe expressed his surprise and regret that 
De Onis should bring up these troubles when he was with- 
out authority to settle them and declared that full power to 
conclude a treaty had been sent to George W. Erving, the 
minister of the United States at Madrid. Cevallos, the 
Spanish foreign minister, repeatedly complained of the 
number of Americans to be found officering the insurgent 
privateers and fighting in the ranks of the revolutionists 
against Spain ; and of the export of arms from the United 
States to the insurgent forces. In answer to our complaints 
against the British occupation of East Florida during the 
late war, Cevallos denied that it had been done "with the 
acquiescence of the Spanish government. On the contrary 
it had remonstrated repeatedly and in the most energetic 
terms to the cabinet of St. James on this violation of its 
territory." ^ But Cevallos had no intention of troubling 

1. Letters from Ministers Abroad, Vol. XIII, p. 30, Erving to Sec- 
retary Monroe, Aug-., ISie. 



272 The Purchase of Florida 

himself with such a negotiation and gave De Onis full 
power to treat, referring the whole matter back to Wash- 
ington. 

In January, 1817, an ofifer was made by Monroe of so 
much of Texas as lies between the Rio Grande and Colorado 
in exchange for the two Floridas, to which De Onis replied 
that the territory offered was already the property of Spain 
and could not therefore be made the basis of an exchange. 
And further that he had no instructions covering the entire 
cession of the two Floridas. De Onis declared that he 
could consent to no arrangement by which Spain should 
cede her claims to territory east of the Mississippi unless 
the United States ceded their claims to all the territory west 
of that river. And that even such an agreement would be 
restricted to a recommendation to his government to adopt 
such an arrangement. Monroe, declaring such terms utter- 
ly inadmissible, commented with considerable indignation 
upon the Spanish minister's lack of powers, and announced 
that this government had no motive to continue the nego- 
tiation on the subject of boundaries. De Onis was then 
requested to state whether he would enter into a convention 
similar to that of 1802, which had never been ratified, pro- 
viding compensation for spo'liations and for the suppression 
of the deposit at New Orleans. ^ The negotiation on the 
matter of boundaries being thus abruptly terminated, De 
Onis despatched his secretary of legation to Madrid for 
more definite powers. 

Erving at this time wrote a letter ito our secretary of 
state giving his impression of the status of our affairs with 
Spain. "I would not intimate," said he, "that Spain is 
disposed to war — on ithe contrary I believe its dispositions, 
though not friendly, to be pacific — this of necessity, for it 
has not the means of making war on us with any effect and 



1. Vol. II, Foreign ^Legations, p. 197, Monroe to De Onis, Jan. 14, 
18il7; iUd., p. 19S, same to same, Jan. 25, 1817. 



Adams Versus De Onis 273 

it cannot in the present state of England count upon her 
assisitance. But there are innate vices which no experience 
can correct and there is an obstinacy in error which defies 
all policy or persuasion . . . they have had a long- experi- 
ence of our forbearance which they attribute to our weak- 
ness — they suppose that expedients, evasions, and palli- 
atives will answer now as well as ever — they do not regard 
affairs in the concrete but are satisfied if they do not find 
immediate danger in every separate one — for the rest they 
trust to time and accident, and think it will never be too 
late to ward off the blow." ^ 

In his next letter home, Erving treated at length of 
the apparent Russian-Spanish understanding. Heretofore 
Spain had hoped for an alliance with England as the most 
likely to sustain and increase her power. A strict alliance 
between Great Britain and Portugal, and the views of the 
former power on the subject of the revolted Spanish col- 
onies, furnished the proper instruments for Mr. Tatischoflf, 
the Russian minister at Madrid, a man bitterly hostile to 
England and everything English, by which he gained the 
entire confidence of the Spanish king and succeeded in 
withdrawing Spain from her connection with England. 
Rumors were abroad of a Russian plot which were given 
some credence because of comporting with the well known 
inordinate ambition of the czar, and yet so extravagant and 
absurd as, on their face, to be incredible. Russia wished 
to secure a footing in the Mediterranean and would endeav- 
or to wheedle Spain out of Majorca or Minorca. Russia 
might secure Texas in America. A cession of Louisiana 
by Spain was proposed. And for these magnificent acqui- 
sitions what should be the consideration? Her mediation 
with Austria respecting Parma, etc., which as yet had 
produced no results. Her mediation with Brazil who, with 



1. Letters from Ministers Abroad, Vol. XrV, G. W. Erving to 
secretary of state, March 2, 1817. 
18 



274 The Purchase of Florida 

the revolted colonies, would only ridicule the idea : "But," 
concluded Erving, "Mr. Tatischoff is adroit, and the king 
in his weakness imagines that if he has the great Emperor 
Alexander for his friend he has nothing to fear." ^ 

Another letter of Erving's tends to show the relations 
of Spain with the European powers and their bearing upon 
a Spanish- American treaty. In part it follows : "Upon 
the whole, sir, I conclude that the course which this gov- 
.ernment will take — the more or less zeal with which it will 
act — the more or less moderation and good faith which it 
will display — will very principally depend on its always 
fluctuating hopes and fears on the side of England; should 
its disputes with the king of Brazil ripen into a serious 
rupture, it will certainly make an attempt on Portugal ; then 
a breach with England of course ; but this I consider to be 
a remote possibility — the question as to the slave trade has 
created consideraible discussion between the two govern- 
ments. England as I understand has offered to his Cath- 
olic Majesty a certain sum for the relinquishment of the 
traffic and he has demanded a larger sum — the question 
turning upon this point cannot be considered as one of great 
difficulty ; with respect to the colonies I believe it to be 
very certain that England has offered her mediation but 
here these governments cannot agree ; Spain in the true 
spirit of her system insists on their returning to their ancient 
unqualified allegiance — England, besides the reasonable ob- 
jections which she has to oppose to such absurd and hopeless 
overtures, cannot find that she has any interest in making 
them ; she does not wish to separate the colonies from Spain 
— on the contrary ; but she desires that the trade to them 
may be open." ^ 

Although the Russian influence continued to prepon- 



1. 'Letters from 'Ministers Albroad, Vol. XIV, Erving to secretary 
of state, April 6, 1817. 

2. Ibid., Erving to secretary of state, No. 30, April 6, 1817. 



Adams Versus De Onis 275 

derate at Madrid, England soon succeeded in settling the 
trade question with Spain upon a fair and satisfactory basis. 

"Whether Russia, England, or France have given any 
encouragement to Spain in her disputes w^ith the United 
States or not," writes Erving, "it is quite certain that in case 
of a rupture Spain will appeal to one or all of them. . . . 
Of their ministers here I am inclined to think that the 
Russian Tatischoff, at least (certainly not the English), 
who meddles with everything, has interfered with his advice 
and that I see the influence of it. . . . Upon the whole 
however I do not think that the hopes of Spain founded 
upon the interference of others are so strong as to induce 
her to decline reasonable overtures." ^ At this time Spain 
resolved to use heroic measures to force her American col- 
onies to return to their allegiance. With this in view and to 
organize a suitable armament she purchased a fleet of ships 
from Russia which, to Russia's lasting disgrace, proved 
a lot of rotten hulks unable even to sail out of the harbor 
of Cadiz. One of the fruits, this was, of Tatischoff's influ- 
ence over the Spanish monarch. 

The arrival at Madrid of De Onis's secretary of lega- 
tion was made the occasion for a proposition by Don Jose 
Pizarro, the new foreign minister, that the negotiations be 
again transferred to Madrid. ^ Erving having consented 
to this plan, after an exchange of views, Pizarro submitted 
to our minister the outline of a treaty by the terms of which 
Spain agreed to cede the Floridas in return for every inch of 
territory the United States owned or claimed to own west 
of the Mississippi from its source to the Gulf of Mexico. ^ 
This was promptly and unequivocally rejected and the sec- 
retary of De Onis was immediately dispatched with new 
instructions and nearotiations a^ain transferred to Wash- 



1. Letters from Ministers Abroad, Vol. XIV, Erving to J. Q. 
Adams, Aug. i27, IS 17. 

.2. Pizarro to Erving, July 16, 1817. 

3. Pizarro to Erving, Aug. 17, 1817. 



276 The Purchase of Florida 

ington. ^ The Spanish council of state and principal offi- 
cials were moistly grandees and priests, bigoted and narrow 
minded, who lived and talked only of the glories of the days 
of Charles V., unaWe to realize the present decrepit condi- 
tion of the kingdom. "The ancient policy of never con- 
ceding," wrote Erving, "still prevails in the council of state 
before which all such matters are discussed - — the members 
of this council, for the most part inveterate in the prejudices 
of former times, are wholly unfit for the direction of state 
affairs in this day." ^ 

After an exchange of notes reciting in detail the various 
claims of the two parties in dispute, Adams, in January, 
1818, proposed an adjustment of all dififerences iby an 
arrangement on the following terms : 

1. Spain to cede all her claims to territory east of the 
Mississippi. 

2. The Colorado from its mouth to its source and from 
thence to the northern limits of Louisiana to be the western 
boundary. 

3. The claims of indemnities for spoliations, whether 
Spanish, or French within Spanish jurisdiction, and for the 
suppression of the deposit at New Orleans, to be arbitrated 
and settled by commissioners in the manner agreed upon in 
the unratified convention of 1802. 

4. The lands in East Florida to the Perdido to be 
made answerable for the amount of the indemnities which 
may be awarded by the commissioners under this arbiLra- 
tion. With an option to the United States to take the lands 
and pay the debts, distributing the amount received equally, 
according to the amount of their respective liquidated claims" 
among the claimants. No grants of land subsequent to 
August II, 1802, to be valid. 

1. Pizarro to Erving, Aug. 30, 1817. 

2. Letters from iMinisters Afbroad, Vol. XV, Erving to J. Q. 
Adams. Adams entered ujwn his duties as secretary of state Sep- 
tember i22, 1817. 



Adams Versus De Onis 277 

5. Spain to be exonerated from the debts or any part 
of them. 1 

These proposals did not differ materially from those 
made to Cevallos in May, 1805. 

De Onis had protested against the seizure and occupa- 
tion of Amelia Island 'by General Gaines ; and the deter- 
mination thus manifested 'by the American government 
"that the adjoining territories of Spain should not be mis- 
used by others for purposes of annoyance to them," it was 
felt would convince Spain of the necessity for coming to an 
immediate arrangement. There followed another elaborate 
and tedious discussion of the grounds on which each nation 
rested its claims, concluding with a statement from De Onis 
that the demands of the United States were so extraordin- 
ary that he must again dispatch a messenger to Madrid 
for additional instructions. That Adams was irritated at 
the course of the negotiations soon became apparent. De 
Onis was truly a finished scholar in the Spanish procrasti- 
nating school of diplomacy. Of him Adams said, "He has 
more of diplomatic trickery in his character than any other 
of the foreign ministers here." In his letter of March 12, 
1818, in reply to the statement of De Onis that his argu- 
ments were the same as they had been for the past fifteen 
years "because truth is eternal," Adams said: "The ob- 
servation that truth is of all time and that reason and justice 
are founded upon immutable principles has never been 
contested by the United States, but neither truth, reason, 
nor justice consist in stubbornness of assertion nor in the 
multiplied repetition of error." ^ 

Adams in the same note remarked that the discussion 
had been "sullied by unworthy and groundless imputations" 
on the part of De Onis, who had declared that the United 
States did not herself believe in the validity of the state- 

1. Vol. II, Foreign Legations, p. 27i3, Adams to De Onis, Jan. 16, 
1818. 

2. Ihid., p. 282, same to same. 



278 The Purchase of Florida 

merits and arguments used by her ministers in support of 
her claims, and further that these arguments were "vague 
and groundless." 

In March Erving noticed that the Spanish attitude 
toward the United States had become decidedly more favor- 
able: "I must attribute (this) in part to the failure of 
the hopes which he (Pizarro) once entertained of receiving 
support from other quarters in the disputes between the 
United States and Spain, in part to the little prospect of- 
fered by the Russian memorial of a prompt and vigorous 
interference of the allies in the disputes between Spain and 
her colonies — but most principally to the prompt and 
vigorous course taken by our government in regard to 
Amelia Island and Galveston, in fine to the menacing atti- 
tude of the United States." ^ 

The negotiations with Spain were also being helped 
along by the friendly services of the new French government. 
Erving seemed no less out of patience with De Onis than 
Adams had been, and characterized his plea of requiring 
new powers, as indeed the most extraordinary device for 
delay that could have been hit on: "It is to be hoped that 
it is the expiring struggle of procrastination as it is the 
very apex of shuffling diplomacy or the dregs of a worn 
out capacity." ^ 

After much haggling, Erving's efforts finally succeeded 
in securing from Pizarro by the end of June an offer to 
ratify the old convention of 1802 without qualification. 

In January of 1818 Air. Bagot, the British minister in 
Washington, showed to Mr. Adams a copy of a dispatch 
from Lord Castlereagh to Sir Henry Wellesley dated Au- 
gust 27, 181 7, and being an answer to one from him which 
had enclosed a detailed statement by the Spanish minister 
of the 'State of the controversies between the United States 

1. Vol. XV, Letters from Ministers Albroad, Erving to J. Q. Adams, 
March 16, 1818. 

2. Ihid., same to same, June 12, 1818. 



Adams Versus De Onis 279 

and Spain, for the mediation of Great Britain. Lord Castle- 
reagh declined to intervene unless it should be requested by 
both parties. In making the communication, Bagot ex- 
pressed the willingness of Great Britain to mediate if the 
United States should concur with Spain in requesting it. 
In a letter to Erving upon the su'bject Adams made the 
following comments : "But in reflecting upon these trans- 
actions it could not escape observation, 

"i. That this overture from Mr. Pizarro to Sir Henry 
Wellesley must have been made early in August last, 
between the first and the fifteenth and precisely while Mr. 
Pizarro was professing an intention to conclude immediately 
a treaty with you. 

"2. That no notice was given to you either by Mr, 
Pizarro or by Sir Henry Wellesley, of this very important 
incident in a negotiation to which the United States were a 
party, and in which the step ought not to have been taken 
without first consulting you. Mr. De Onis, however, pri- 
vately insinuates that the offer of mediation did really first 
come from Great ' Britain. That it was not requested by 
Spain but resulted from an intimation by Spain that she 
had resolved to cede the Floridas to the United States, to 
which she requested the assent of England ; having been, as 
he further hinted, under previous engagements to England 
that she would not cede any of her territories to them. 
Instead of acquiescing in the pretended cession Great Britain 
now, according to Mr. De Onis, offered her mediation. 
However the fact may be, it is evident that Spain and Great 
Britain have some serious misunderstandings with each 
other, and it can scarcely be expected that the policy which 
England is adopting in relation td South America will tend 
to reconcile them." 1 



1. Vol. VIII, Instructions, p. 178, J. Q. Adams to Erving, April 
20, 1818. 



280 The Purchase of Florida 

In the meantime Adams, convinced of the desirability 
of recognizing the South American colonies, had sent offi- 
cials to report upon the conditions prevailing in those prov- 
inces. After their return he was more than ever anxious 
not only to recognize some of them, particularly Buenos 
Ayres, which had held out against Spain since 1816; but 
of persuading certain of the European powers to take a 
similar course. England had sought to dissuade the United 
States from this step, as likely to frustrate her plan oi 
mediation between Spain and the revolutionists, by which 
Spanish sovereignty should still be recognized, but the 
colonies were to be opened to the trade of the world and 
granted certain rights of self-government. This failing, 
Adams addressed a note to Richard Rush, our minister at 
the court of St. James, inquiring what part he thought the 
"British government would take in regard to the dispute 
■between Spain and her colonies, and in what light they will 
view an acknowledgment of independence of her colonies 
by the United States. Whether they will view it as an act 
of hostility to Spain and, in case Spain should declare war 
against us in consequence, whether Great Britain will take 
part with her in it?"^ 

War with Spain then seemed imminent, even more 
probable, than it had upon many occasions since 1789. The 
South American colonies had been taught by the United 
States something of the manner in which a hated yoke might 
be thrown off, and were now looking to this country for 
sympathy and assistance. Their efforts to obtain official 
recognition and an exchange of ministers were eager and 
persistent. The constant violations of our neutrality by the 
organization of filibustering expeditions inspired the first 
neutrality act, which has since served to establish the princi- 



1. Vol. VIII, Instructions, p. 2*6, J. Q. Adams to Richard Rush, 
Aug. 15, 1818. 



Adams Versus De Onis 281 

pie of international obligation in such cases, and has been the 
basis of all subsequent legislation on the subject in this 
country and Great Britain. Continental Europe, still op- 
pressed by the reaction of the era of revolution and the 
imperial Napoleon, had banded together to crush out repub- 
licanism as some noxious serpent. Thus, naturally hostile 
to rebellions and convinced that Spain would ultimately 
prevail, they formed the holy alliance to help the Spanish 
Bourbons, to the extent even of subduing her rebellious col- 
onies. It was far different on this side of the ocean. 
Apart from a natural sympathy in such conflicts, it was 
generally believed that the revolted provinces were destined 
to drive the hated Spaniards back to their ships. After 
many a long and anxious cabinet discussion, the part of 
caution and reason prevailed and it had been determined to 
postpone a recognition, until circumstances should clearly 
warrant such a course. But Clay ever alert, now that he 
had failed to secure the office of secretary of state-- in 
direct line for succession to the presidential chair — found 
in this an excellent opportunity to harass the administration. 
Moreover the question was one which appealed to him and 
offered an excellent opportunity wherein he might at the 
same time abuse the heads of the government, and laud 
liberty and freedom with his matchless eloquence and su- 
Vjerh oratory. 

The United States, thus, if not duly cautious in her 
Florida negotiations, might find herself face to face not 
alone with Spain but with all continental Europe. Nor 
indeed could she afford to offend England and thus risk the 
failure of negotiations, then under way with that country, 
for a treaty of friendship, boundaries, and commercial con- 
cessions — at this time, under circumstances demanding ex- 
treme caution and circumspection on the part of the United 
States, had Jackson violated Spanish sovereignty and mur- 
dered English su'bjects. 



282 The Purchase of Florida 

De Onis was strenuously protesting against the intol- 
erable use of our ports by the privateers of Buenos Ayres 
and the filibustering parties which were being fitted out to 
fight against Spain, when reports reached Washington of 
Jackson's campaign. Upon receipt of the report of the 
governor of West Florida, he entered a vigorous and indig- 
nant protest, demanding that St. Marks be delivered to the 
Spanish commander with all the arms and stores, that the 
American troops be withdrawn and full indemnity be made 
for damages done by the American army in Florida. ^ Re- 
ports of the capture of Pensacola were not long in reaching 
the capital, and De Onis, now thoroughly aroused, de- 
manded of Adams to be informed "in a positive, distinct, 
and explicit manner, just what had occurred." Fuller ac- 
counts soon arrived and he once more addressed Adams. 
He protested vigorously against Jackson's invasion. The 
Spanish officials had neither incited nor aided the Indians, 
and, even had they done so, the proper course was for the 
United States to make a demand on these officers for such 
Indians and criminals as had escaped to Florida. "These 
facts (the capture of the Spanish posts) need no comment; 
they are notorious and speak for themselves. Their enor- 
mity has filled even the people of this Union with wonder 
and surprise and cannot fail to excite the astonishment of 
all nations and governments. The American general can 
have neither pretext nor subterfuge of which he can avail 
himself to give the least color for this invasion and exces- 
sive aggression — unexampled in the history of nations. 
Whatever pretexts may be resorted to, to mislead and im- 
pose on the vulgar, will be frivolous, contradictory, and 
falsified by the very course of events, public and notorious." 
He demanded the prompt restitution of St. Marks, Pensa- 
cola, Barrancas and all other places wrested by Jackson 



1. iDe Onis to J. Q. Adams, June 17, ISIS. American State Papers, 
Foreign Relations, Vol. IV, p. 495. 



Adams Versus De Onis 283 

from the crown of Spain, together with all artillery, stores, 
and property and indemnity for losses, "together with the 
lawful punishment of the general and the officers of this 
republic by whom they were committed." ^ 

Adams's reply to De Onis was dated July 23. It re- 
minded him that by the treaty of 1795 both Spain and the 
United States were bound to keep peace along the frontier. 
That neither power was to permit the Indians dwelling on 
its soil, to cross the boundaries and molest subjects or citi- 
zens of the other. "Notwithstanding this precise, express, 
and solemn compact of Spain, numbers, painful to recol- 
lect, of the citizens of the United States inhabiting the fron- 
tier, numbers not merely of persons in active manhood, 
but of the tender sex, of defenseless age and helpless in- 
fancy, had at various times been butchered with all the 
aggravations and horrors of savage cruelty, by Seminole 
Indians, and by a banditti of negroes sallying from within 
the Spanish border and retreating to it again with the hor- 
rid fruits of their crimes." 

Jackson had, in 1816, in accordance with the treaty 
provision, called upon the governor of Pensacola ^ to break 
up a stronghold of which this horde of savages and fugi- 
tive slaves had possessed themselves in Florida, and the 
answer acknowledged the obligation but pleaded a lack of 
force for its fulfilment; and that the United States had 
finally been compelled with its own force to accomplish its 
destruction. With this in mind, when Indian hostilities 
broke out in 181 7, among others, the following orders were 
issued to the American general in command: "On the 
receipt of this letter should the Seminole Indians still refuse 
to make reparation for their outrages and depredations on 
the citizens of the United States, it is the wish of the presi- 
dent that you consider yourself at liberty to march across 

1. American iState Papers, Foreign Relations, Vol. V, De Onis 
to J. Q. Adams, July 8, 1818. 

2, Maurico de Zuniga. 



284 The Purchase of Florida 

the Florida line and to attack them within its limits, should 
it be found necessary, unless they should shelter themselves 
under a Spanish fort — in the last event you will immedi- 
ately notify this department." The right of pursuing an 
enemy who seeks refuge from actual conflict within a neu- 
tral territory could not be denied. But in this case the 
territory of Florida was not even neutral, for it was the 
abode of the Indians, and Spain was bound to restrain 
them. The capture of St. Marks and Pensacola were Jack- 
son's own acts rendered necessary by the "immutable prin- 
ciples of self defense" and the hostility of the governor of 
Pensacola. Further, that the governor of Pensacola had 
caused it to be directly reported to the American general 
that Fort St. Marks was in imminent danger from the 
Indians and negroes. Then, with surprising audacity, 
which must have taken De Onis off his feet, Adams in the 
name of the United States called upon his Catholic Majesty 
for the punishment of all the Spanish officers concerned. 
The letter closed with the intimation that "Pensacola will 
be restored to the possession of any person duly authorized 
on the part of Spain to receive it ; and that Fort St. Marks 
being in the heart of the Indian country and remote from 
any Spanish settlement, can be surrendered only to a force 
sufficiently strong to hold it against the attack of the hos- 
tile Indians, upon the appearance of which it will also be 
restored." ^ 

In reply De Onis asserted that tlie Indians had repeat- 
edly complained to the Spanish officers in East Florida of 
the "incessant injuries and vexations committed on them by 
the citizens of this republic inhabiting the frontiers." 
"Strange indeed, it must appear to the whole world," con- 
tinued De Onis, "that General Jackson should arrogate to 
himself the authority of issuing orders and imposing re- 



1. Vol. II, Foreign Legations, p. 328, Adams, to De Onis, July 
23, 1818. 



Adams Versus De Onis 285 

strictions on the governor of Pensacola." The matters of 
complaint should have been referred to the two govern- 
ments for settlement. The reasons assigned by Jackson 
only increased the enormity of his offense. The governor 
of Pensaoola had not in any manner intimated that he was 
fearful lest St. Marks might fall into the hands of the 
Indians and negroes. Again demand was made for the 
punishment of Jackson. 1 

In the meantime, De Onis having received notice of the 
action of the Spanish council of state upon the conven- 
tion of 1802, announced that he was prepared to exchange 
the ratifications of that convention. It was, however, deter- 
mined to postpone the exchange of ratifications with the 
view of securing a more general and satisfactory adjust- 
ment of all the other subjects in controversy between the 
two nations. ^ 

An account of the occurrences in Florida had been sent 
to Spain by De Onis, and with the first news Pizarro began 
to address Mr. Erving on the subject. As fuller details 
reached him Pizarro became more and more insistent upon 
an explanation, until in August, by the order of the king, 
all negotiations with the United States were suspended, 
"until satisfaction should be made by the American gov- 
ernment" for the proceedings of Jackson which were con- 
sidered "acts of unequivocal hostility against him, and as 
outrages upon his honor and dignity, the only acceptable 
atonement for which would consist of a disavowal of the. 
American general, the infliction upon him of a suitable 
punishment for his conduct," and the restitution of the 
posts and territories taken by him from the Spanish author- 
ities, with indemnity for all the propenty taken and all 
damages and injuries, public or private, sustained in conse- 



1. Vol. V, Foreign Relations, De Onis to Adams, Aug-. 5, 1818. 

2. Vol. II, Foreign Legations, p. 341, Adams to De Onis, Oct. 2'3, 
1818. 



286 The Purchase of Florida 

quence of it. ^ Negotiations however were soon renewed, ^ 
and Adams sent to Erving, for presentation to the Spanish 
foreign minister, one of the most wonderful state papers 
ever conceived — a full statement of the American case. 

This document, destined to become so famous, was 
narrative in form. Beginning with the violation of Span- 
ish neutrality by the English forces in the late war, Adams 
went on to speak of Colonel Nicholls and his crew, consist- 
ing of "all the runaway negroes, all the savage Indians, all 
the pirates, and all the traitors to their country," collected 
for the purpose of waging an ''exterminating war against 
that portion of the United States." He treated with rid- 
icule and scorn the pretensions of Colonel Nicholls that the 
United States had failed to observe that article of the 
treaty of Ghent which related to the Indian lands, since oui 
Creek war had terminated by the treaty of Fort Jackson, 
concluded some four months before the close of the war of 
1812, and that we were at peace with those Indians at the 
time of the treaty of Ghent. He then derided the "treaty 
of alliance, offensive and defensive, and a treaty of naviga- 
tion and commerce with Great Britain" which Colonel Nich- 
olls had concluded with the ignorant and credulous Indians. 
He referred to the occupation of the Negro Fort. 

Then he fell upon poor Arbuthnot whom, he character^ 
ized as the successor of Nicholls, as a foreign incendiary in 
the employment of instigating the Seminole and outlawed 
Red Stick Indians to hostilities against the United States. 
Even his "intrusion" as a trader he declared was without 
excuse or justification and contrary to the policy of all 
European powers in this hemisphere. His "infernal insti- 
gations" were but too successful and his arrival was fol- 
lowed by the visitation upon the peaceful inhabitants of 
the border, of "all the horrors of savage war." He then pro- 



Pizarro to Brving, Aug. 29, 1818. 
De Onis to Adams, Oct. 18, 1818. 



Adams Versus De Onis 287 

ceeded to justify Jackson in crossing the boundary and in 
seizing St. Marks. It needed "no citations from printed 
treatises on international law" to prove his contentions for 
"it is engraved in adamant on the common sense of man- 
kind." He applauded the arrest of Arbuthnot, "the Bnitish 
Indian trader from beyond the sea, the firebrand by whose 
torch this Negro-Indian war against our borders had been 
kindled." 

Adams disclosed the fact that councils of war had 
been held within the very walls of St. Marks by the savage 
chiefs and warriors. That the Spanish storehouse had 
been appropriated to their use. That it was an open mar- 
ket for cattle known to have been stolen by them from 
citizens of the United States, and which had been con- 
tracted for and purchased by the officers of the garrison. 
That information had been sent from this fort by Arbuth- 
not to the enemy, of the strength and movements of the 
American army. That ammunition, munitions of war, and 
all necessary supplies had been furnished to the Indians. 
He then enlarged upon the hostility of the governor of 
Pensacola, and justified Jackson in the capture of that 
town. 

"The president," declared Adams, "will neither inflict 
punishment nor pass censure upon General Jackson for that 
conduct — the vindication of which is written in every page 
of the law of nations, as well as in the first law of nature, 
self-defense." On the contrary, "suitable punishment," it 
was demanded, should be inflicted upon Don Jose Mazot, 
governor of Pensacola, and Don Francisco Luenzo, com- 
mandant of St. Marks, for their "defiance and violation of 
the engagements of Spain with the United States." If 
these officers were powerless, Adams declared, the "United 
States can as little compound with impotence as with 'per- 
fidy, and Spain must immediately make her election, either 
to place a force in Florida, adequate at once to the protec- 



288 The Purchase of Florida 

tion of her territory and to the fulfihnent of her engage- 
ments or cede to the United States a province of which she 
retains nothing but the nominal possession, but which is 
in fact a derelict, open to the occupancy of every enemy, 
civilized or savage, of the United States, and serving no 
other earthly purpose than as a post of annoyance to 
them." 

To Pizarro's complaint of the "shameful invasion of 
his Majesty's territory," Adams inquired "What was the 
character of Nicholls's invasion of his Majesty's territory, 
and where was his Majesty's profound indignation at that? 
. . . Has his Majesty suspended formally all negotiation 
with the sovereign of Colonel Nicholls for this shameful in- 
vasion of his territory without Color of provocation, without 
pretence of necessity, without shadow or even avowal of 
pretext? Has his Majesty given solemn warning to the 
British government that these were incidents 'of transcen- 
dent moment, capable of producing an essential and thor- 
lough change in the political relations of the two coun- 
tries?' . . . Against the shameful invasion of the territory, 
against the violent seizure of the forts and places, against 
the 'blowing up of the Barrancas, and the erection and main- 
tenance under British banners of the Negro Fort on Span- 
ish soil ; against the negotiation by a British officer in the 
midst of peace, of pretended treaties, offensive and defen- 
sive, and of navigation and commerce upon Spanish terri- 
tory, between Great Britain and Indians, Indians which 
Spain was bound to control and restrain? If a whisper of 
expostulation Was ever wafted from Madrid to London it 
was not loud enough to be heard across the Atlantic, nor 
energetic enough to transpire beyond the walls of the pal- 
aces from which it issued and to which it was borne." 

Next the affair of Amelia Island and MacGregor and 
his crew of patriots was discussed in no uncertain terms 
of indignation and wrath. Ambrister and his career were 



Adams Versus De Onis 289 

glowingly depicted. "Is this narrative," he questioned, "of 
dark and complicated depravity ; this creeping and insid- 
ious war; this mockery of patriotism, these political phil- 
ters to fugitive slaves and Indian outlaws ; these perfidies 
and treacheries of villains, incapable of keeping their faith 
even to each other ; all in the name of South American 
liberty, of the rights of runaway negroes, and the wrongs 
of savage murderers ; all combined and projected to plunder 
Spain of her provinces and to spread massacre and devas- 
tation along the border of the United States ; is all this 
sufficient to cool the sympathies of his Catholic Majesty's 
government excited by the execution of these 'two sub- 
jects of ,a power in amity with the king?' The Spanish 
government is not at this day to be informed, that cruel as 
war in its mildest forms must be, it is, and necessarily must 
be doubly cruel when waged with savages. That savages 
make no prisoners but to torture them ; that they give no 
quarter ; that they put to death without discrimination of 
age or sex. That these ordinary characteristics of Indian 
warfare have been applicable in their most heart-sickening 
horrors to that war, left us by Nicholls as his legacy, re- 
instigated by Woodbine, Arbuthnot, and Ambrister, and 
stimulated by the approbation and encouragement and aid 
of the Spanish commandant at St. Marks, is proof re- 
quired?" 

By way of illustrating the horrors which he had so 
eloquently described Adams cited three occurrences, two of 
which took place before Arbuthnot reached Florida and the 
third, one with which there exists no reason for connecting 
the unfortunate trader. The first was the case of the sailor 
Daniels, who had been captured by the occupants of the 
Negro Fort and tarred and burned alive in July, 1816. The 
second was the murder of Mrs. Garret and her children, in 
February, 181 7, which General Mitchell expressly testified 
was an act of retaliation for the murder of Indians by the 

19 



290 The Purchase of Florida 

whites. The third was the massacre of Lieutenant Scott and 
his party, which we know to have been the Seminole re- 
venge for the attack of General Gaines upon Fowltown, 
and which occurred while Arbuthnot was at New Provi- 
dence . 

"Contending with such enemies, although humanity 
revolted at entire retaliation and spares the lives of their 
feeble and defenseless women and children, yet mercy her- 
self, surrenders to retributive justice the lives of their 
leading warriors taken in arms, and still more the lives of 
the foreign white incendiaries who, disowned by their own 
governments, and disowning their own natures, degrade 
themselves beneath the savage character by voluntarily 
descending to its level. ... It is thus only that the barbari- 
ties of Indians can be successfully encountered. It is thus 
only that the worse than Indian barbarities of European 
impostors, pretending authority from their governments, 
but always disavowed, can be punished and arrested. Great 
Britain yet engages the alliance and co-operation of savages 
in war. But her government has invariably disclaimed all 
countenance or authorization to her subjects to instigate 
them against us in time of peace. Yet so it has happened to 
this day, all the Indian wars with which we have been 
afflicted have been distinctly traceable to the instigation of 
English traders or agents. Always disavowed yet always 
felt; more than once detected but never before punished. 
Two of them, offenders of the deepest dye, after solemn 
warning to their government, and individually to one of 
them, have fallen, flagrante delicto, into the hands of an 
American general. And the punishment inflicted upon 
them has fixed them on high as an example, awful in its 
exhibition but we trust auspicious in its results, of that 
which awaits unauthorized pretenders of European agency 
to stimulate and interpose in wars between the United 
States and the Indians within their control." 



Adams Versus De Onis 291 

xA^dams also embodied in the note a demand for the 
punishment of the Spanish officers for their misconduct, 
and a further demand "of Spain for a just and reasonable 
indemnity to the United States for the heavy and necessary 
expenses which they have been compelled to incur by the 
failure of Spain to perform her engagement to restrain 
the Indians, aggravated by this demonstrated complicity of 
her commanding officers in their hostilities against the 
United States." 

Then followed further justification of the execution of 
Arbuthnot and Ambrister, declaring that Jackson would 
have been warranted in summarily hanging" them without 
the formality even of a trial. That the latter had confessed 
his guilt and that the defense of tbe former consisted "solely 
and exclusively of technical cavils at the nature of part 
of the evidence against him." 

Adams wound up the document with an open threat.. 
■'If the necessities of self defense should again compel the 
United States to take possession of the Spanish forts and 
places in Florida," it was fitting that the United States 
should "declare, with the frankness and candor that be- 
comes us, that another unconditional restoration of them 
must not be expected. That even the president's confi- 
dence in the good faith and ultimate justice of the Spanish 
government will yield to the painful experience of con- 
tinual disappointment. And that after unwearied and 
alonost unnumbered appeals to them for the performance of 
their stipulated duties, in vain, the United States will be 
reluctantly compelled to rely for the protection of their 
borders upon themselves alone." ^ 

Such was the answer to Pizarro, and with it was 
dispatched a forbidding mass of documents. Adams's de- 
fense was plausible and was fortified with references to doc- 



1. Vol. VIII, Instructions; p. 257, J. Q. Adams to George Erving, 
Nov. 28, 1818. Also see Appendix C. 



292 The Purchase of Florida 

uments which, when examined with care, however, fail to 
bear out his statements. For example he quotes a letter as 
proving that Ar*buthnot was not a trader but had certain ul- 
terior plans. The letter, on the contrary, bears no testimony 
whatever to the assertion. Some essential facts were 
omitted. Many were misstated an/d others perverted. 
Nothing was said of the tragedy of the Negro Fort — the 
awful career of that hot shell. Scarcely an allusion to the 
Fowltown attack which precipitated the war. The "fire- 
brand" Arbuthnot, mild mannered man of seventy summers, 
peace loving and submission-counselling, it was he who 
had taught the Indians to slaughter and pillage, to rnurder 
defenseless women, and take little children by the heels 
and dash their brains out on the side of the boat. No 
reference was made to Jackson and his notoriously anti- 
Spanish sentiments ; or to the surprise and opposition to the 
course of the general so widely prevalent in the United 
States. 

There was no intimation of what every fair and im- 
partial student must admit, that the Seminole war was 
inspired by the attacks and ravages committed upon the 
redskins by the white border settlers. There was no hint 
that the attacks of the Indians were retaliatory ; and that 
they were induced by that same treatment which, we blush 
to admit, has ever been accorded the doomed race that 
stands in the path of the white man's advance to something 
that he desires. The letter made no allusion to the pitiaible 
and defenseless condition of the Seminole Indians, and the 
size of the army and the amount of armament collected by 
Jackson for the contest with, so weak and contemptible a 
foe; or of the conclusions to be drawn from such suspicious 
circumstances. There was no comment upon the articles 
of capitulation of Pensacola which showed most clearly 
that the reasons assigned by Jackson for his expedition 
were Ibut a pretext, and that the real motive was a pro- 



Adams Versus De Onis 293 

visional cession of the province as the first step to a 
permanent acquisition. 

It was indeed a highly ingenious instrument and did 
credit to the author's legal acumen. To quote Parton, it 
stands as "the most flagrant piece of special pleading to be 
found in the diplomatic records of the United States." To 
one who is not acquainted with the facts its perusal is a 
pleasure and, admitting its premises, there can be no answer 
to its conclusions. Never has a diplomatic paper met with 
more signal success. It averted war. It silenced the 
English government and warranted that country in ignor- 
ing the execution of its subjects, though it was anxious for 
such an excuse. It gave the continental powers ground 
for refusing to assist Spain in making war against the 
United States. It convinced the people of the United 
States, and even well nigh persuaded Pizarro and the 
Spanish council of state. In this country it won for its 
author universal applause. ^ "Adams has done honor to his 
country and himself," was the verdict of all, irrespective of 
party or principle. The document as if by magic cleared 
the air so heavily surcharged with rumors and threats of 
war, and on the convening of congress the president was 
able to announce that our relations with Spain did not dififer 
materially from what they had been a year before. 

It was also necessary to appease General Jackson for 
the disavowal of certain of his acts. A long letter, a happy 
blending of mild rebuke and pleasing compliment, wa^; writ- 
ten by President Monroe exiplaining the necessity of sur- 
rendering the Spanish posts. One paragraph in particular 
was noteworthy as showing the prevalent feeling upon 
the subject of a Spanish war. "Should we hold the posts 
it is impossible to calculate all the consequences likely to 
result from it. It is not improbalble that war would im- 

1. Jefferson thought that a translation of the note should be 
sent to all of the courts of Europe. 



294 The Purchase of Florida 

mediately follow. Spain would be stimulated to declare it ; 
aind once declared the adventurers of Britain and other 
countries would, under the Spanish flag, privateer on our 
commerce. The immense revenue which we now receive 
would be much diminished, as would be the profits of our 
valuable productions. The war would prdbably soon be- 
come general ; and we do not foresee that we should have a 
single power in Europe on our side. Why risk these con- 
sequences? The events which have occurred in both the 
Floridas show the incompetency of Spain to maintain her 
authority; and the progress of the revolutions in South 
America will require all her forces there. There is much 
reason to presume that this act will furnish a strong in- 
ducement to Spain to cede the territory, provided we do 
not wound too deply her pride by holding it. If we hold 
the posts, her government cannot treat with honor, which, 
by withdrawing the troops, we afford her an opportunity to 
do. The manner in which we propose to act will exculpate 
you from censure, and promises to obtain all the advantages 
which you contemplated from the measure, and possibly 
very soon. From a different course no advantage would be 
likely to result, and there would be great danger of ex- 
tensive and serious injuries."^ 

In a similar vein Calhoun wrote to Jackson : "A war 
with Spain, were it to continue with her alone, and were 
there no great neutral powers to avail themselves of the 
opportunity of embarrassing us, would be nothing. But such 
a war would not continue long without involving other 
parties, and it certainly would in a few years be an English 



war 



" 2 



Gallatin, then our minister at Paris, had written that 
the capture of Pensacola and the execution of the two 
Englishmen, as well as that of the Indian chiefs, had excited 



1. Monroe to Jackson, July 19, 1818. 

2. Calhoun to Jackson, Sept., 1818. 



Adams Versus De Onis 295 

in France and even in other parts of Europe "sensations 
peculiarly unfavorable" to the United States. To Rush, 
at London, Adams wrote : "The impression produced upon 
the public mind in England, throughout Europe, and even 
partially in this country has been, that this was, on our part, 
a wanton and unprovoked war upon the Indians and that 
the execution of Arbuthnot and Ambrister were acts of 
sanguinary cruelty in violation of the ordinary usages of 
war." 1 

Pizarro, commenting upon the Florida affair, referred 
to the executions as an "act of barbarity glossed over with 
the forms of justice and therdby rendered, on considering 
the nature of the plan and other circumstances, a refine- 
ment of cruelty." On the whole he had concluded "that 
it appears that a forcible occupation was preferred to a 
peaceful acquisition — no claim to the territory invaded 
by General Jackson, whether founded or unfounded, has 
been advanced by the American government — no revolu- 
tion of the inhabitants real or supposed offered a pretext — 
no previous aggressions by banditti, as was urged on the 
otecasion of the unjust occupation of Amelia Island." ^ 
There could be no doubt in their eyes that the invasion of 
Florida "was a premeditated act of hostility" and that "Gen- 
eral Jackson, trampling under foot all laws, has committed 
in the territory of his Majesty outrages and excesses, of 
which there are few examples in the civilized world." "It 
will," Pizarro continued, "one day or other be stated with 
surprise that the theatre o.V such devastation and unpro- 
voked offense, in the midst of peAce, was the very same, on 
which Spain, not many years since, shed her blood and 
poured out her treasures for the United States in the 



il. Vol. VIII, Instructions, pp. 204-)20'5, J. Q. Adams to Richard 
Rush, Dec. 1, 1818. 

i2. Letters from Ministers Abroad, Vol. XVI, Pizzaro to Erving. 
Aug. 29, 1818. 



296 The Purchase of Florida 

days of their calamity."^ Spain had protested to France, 
England, and other continental courts against the conduct 
of Jackson and the action-of the United States. Adams in 
his valuaible diary refers to an interview with Bagot upon 
the execution of Aributhnot and Ambrister in which some 
quotations were made from Jackson's letters. "He (Bagot) 
said," writes Adams, "he should think little of anything said 
or written by General Jackson because he thought there 
were evident marks in his conduct of personal bitterness 
and inveteracy." 

In September, Pizarro and the other ministers, as a 
result of a court intrigue, were dismissed and banished and 
Casa D'Yrujo named as foreign minister in his -stead. 
On Pizarro, Erving commented, "his intelligence and good 
sense, his moderate and conciliatory temper and his honor 
and good faith recommended him to every one — no Spanish 
minister of late years has done so much to repair the dis- 
ordered state of affairs as he has done, and none has re- 
ceived more marks of the satisfaction of the foreign cabinets 
with whom he has treated." Of the new minister, Erving 
wrote, "I expect no good from D'Yrujo in our affairs and 
shall be very happy if I can only keep him from undoing 
whatever Pizarro has done favorable to an amicable ad- 
justment of them." 2 

For reasons of public policy, France had been anxious 
to secure a friendly settlement between Spain and the 
United States and thus prevent hostilities. Again then did 
European complications and dynastic aliances come to the 
rescue of the United States and prevent awkward compli- 
cations. "France," wrote Erving to Adams, "is very 
reasonably alarmed at the least symptom of discord any- 
where. It knows that the smallest spark may produce con- 



1. Letters from Ministers Abroad, Vol. XVT, Pizzaro to Erving 
Aug. 11, 1S18. 

2. IMd., Erving- to J. Q. Adams, iSept. 20, 1818. 



Adams Versus De Onis 297 

flagration and that France is most combustible. The evacu- 
ation of the allies cannot but increase that tremor ; not like 
besotted Spain who has flattered herself so long that she 
was under the protection of a special providence, who has 
expected support from all quarters and has relied with entire 
confidence on that of England, the enlightened government 
of France sees that in the event of a rupture between the 
United States and Spain, the natural progress of things 
will necesarily lead to an alliance or at least to a very 
dangerous concert of measures 'between the United States 
and Great Britain. The separation of the congress of Aix- 
la-Chapelle without the least demonstration of a disposition 
to listen to the 'jeremlades' of Spain naturally confirms 
this apprehension. This then is probably the most favor- 
able moment for treating with Spain which has yet 
occurred, and I do not doulbt but that even Mr. Casa 
D'Yrujo is no'w fully convinced of the necessity of making 
what he would consider considerable sacrifices to procure 
an arrangement." ^ 



1. Letters from Ministers Ajbroad, Vol. XVI, Brving to J. Q. 
Adams (private), Oct. 2,2, 1818. 



CHAPTER X. 
the; tre;aty of 1819. 

IN accordance with our agreement, the Spanish posts, 
which had been captured by Jackson, were deHvered 
over to the proper officials. 

It might seem at first, that the reoccupation of Florida 
by the Spanish was a mere matter of form in which a proud 
and sensitive nation consulted its dignity and satisfied its 
honor by being placed in a position to make a voluntary sur- 
render of the province instead of submitting to a conquest. 
The course of Jackson had wounded her pride and exposed 
her weakness to the world. But the delay of Spain in 
ratifying the treaty, after the pressure of conquest had 
been removed, forces us to the conclusion that the mailed 
fist of Jackson was as much responsible for its final cession 
as the diplomatic pen of the secretary of state. 

Enraged and humbled Spain, and rapacious and de- 
termined United States — these Adams must bring together 
and that too when there was so much of wrong on both sides 
and such realm for honest differences. Nor was De Onis 
unworthy of Adams's mettle. Of him we read Adams's 
opinion : "Cold, calculating, wily, always commanding his 
temper, proud because he is a Spaniard but supple and cun- 
ning, accommodating the tone of his pretensions precisely 
to the degree of endurance of his opponents, bold and over- 
bearing to the utmost extent to which it is tolerated, care- 
less of what he asserts or how grossly it is proved to be un- 



The Treaty of l8ig 299 

founded, his morality appears to be that of the Jesuits as 
exposed by Pascal. He is laborious, vigilant, and ever 
attentive to his duties ; a man of business and of the world." 
We are inclined to wonder whether this was not written by 
an irritated author after a long hard day of unsuccessful 
attempt to persuade the skillful Spaniard. 

But De Oni'S was scarcely less solicitous than his adver- 
sary for a treaty and certainly the difficulties which he en- 
countered were no less grave. He was anxious to 
return home and to crown his mission to this country by 
a treaty which would be acceptable to his king and becoming 
to his fame. The Spanish noibles, three thousand miles away, 
were unable to appreciate the true situation. Arrogance 
and Spanish strength had not declined pari passu. The 
concessions demanded by the United States were to them 
humiliating and intolerable. De Onis must have been often 
exasperated and discouraged, for, after a long attempt to 
persuade Adams to meet him on a boundary line, he de- 
clared that he had taken infinite pains "to prevail upon his 
government to come to terms of accommodation, and 
insisted that the king's council was composed of such ignor- 
ant and stupid niggards, grandees of Spain, and priests," 
that Adams "could have no conception of their obstinacy 
and imbecility." 

In October of 1818 De Onis informed Adams of the 
arrival of new instructions, and offered as the western 
boundary a line from the Gulf of Mexico between the Mer- 
menteau and Calcasieu rivers to the Red River at latitude 
32°, thence due nortli to the Missouri and along that river 
to its source. ^ 



1. De Onis to Adams, Oct. 24, ISIS : "A line beginning on the 
Gulf of Mexico between the rivers Mermenteau and Calcasieu follow- 
ing the Arroyo Hondo between the Adaes and Natchitoches, crossing 
the Rio or Red River at 32° of latitude and 93° of longitude from Lon- 
don — and thence running directly north, crossing the Arkansas, White 
and Osage rivers and then following the middle of that river to its 
source." 



300 The Purchase of Florida 

This, the first sign of concession on the part of Spain, 
was met by an offer on the part of the United States, which, 
abandoning the Rio Grande, proposed the Sabine from its 
mouth to 32° ; a line due north to the Red River ; the 
channel of that river to its source in the mountains, then 
to the summit and along the crest to latitude 41" 
and by it to the Pacific Ocean. De Onis, accepting the 
Sabine line, declared that he had no authority to go to the 
Pacific whereupon Adams withdrew his offer and declared 
that the United States stood by the Rio Grande. 

A further difficulty presented itself in the question of 
the grants of land which had been made in Florida. Adams 
wrote to De Onis that the United States could not "recog- 
nize as valid all the grants of land until this time, and at 
the same time renounce all their claims and those of their 
citizens for damages and injuries sustained by thean and 
for the reparation of which Spain is answerable to them. 
It is well known to you, sir, that notice has been given by 
the minister of the United States in Spain to your govern- 
ment that all the grants of land alleged to have been made 
by your government within those territories must be can- 
celled, unless your government should provide some other 
adequate fund from which the claims ... of the United 
States and their citizens may be satisfied." ^ The United 
States in return for the cession of Florida, would exonerate 
Spain from all claims and agree to make satisfaction for 
them to an amount not exceeding five million dollars — the 
amount and validity of the claims to be determined by a 
commission which should meet at Washington within three 
years. 

De Onis replied that the demand that the Spanish land 
grants in Florida after 1802 be declared null and void, was 
"offensive to the dignity and imprescriptible rights of the 

1. Adams to De Onis, Oct. 31, 1818, Vol. II, Foreign Legations, p. 
360. 



The Treaty of l8ig 301 

crown of Spain" which, as the legitimate owner of both 
Floridas, had a right to dispose of those lands as it pleased 
— and further as the said modification would be productive 
of incalculable injury to the bona fide possessors who have 
.acquired, settled, and improved these tracts. However he 
agreed that the grants made since January 24, 181 8, "the 
date of my first note announcing his Majesty's willingness 
to cede them to the United States . . . shall be declared null 
and void in consideration of the grantees not having com- 
plied with the essential conditions of the cession, as has 
been the fact." ^ 

The question of the South American colonies was like- 
wise an embarrassing feature in the negotiations. Monroe 
was anxious not only to recognize the revolted provinces of 
Spain, but also to persuade England and other European 
countries to take the same step. Under date of July 25, 
1818, we find the following entry in the diary of John 
Ouincy Adams: "Two days ago he (Monroe) had very 
abruptly asked me to see Mr, Bagot and propose through 
him to the British government an immediate co-operation 
between the United States and Great Britain to promote the 
independence of South America. 'All South America and 
Mexico and the islands included.' I told him I thought 
Great Britain was not yet prepared for such a direct propo- 
sition." 

The first of the following year representations were 
made to the English government upon this subject. These 
consisted of a statement of the attitude of this country 
toward the belligerents and an efifort to secure some con- 
certed action in the matter. Adams declared that it was 
the purpose and the policy of this government to "remain 
neutral;" to award to both of the contestants "equal 
and the same treatment, recognizing neither the supremacy 



1. Vol. V, Foreign Relations, De Onis to S. Q. Adams, Nov. 16, 
1818. 



302 X\he Purchase of Florida 

contended for by Spain nor the independence contended for 
by the South Americans." An entire equality of treatment 
was not possible. As Spain, being an acknowledged sover- 
eign power, has "ministers and other accredited and privi- 
leged agents to maintain her interests and support her 
ri'ghts," the American government considered it among the 
obligations of neutrality to obviate this inequality and "we 
listen therefore to the representations of their deputies or 
agents and do them justice as much as if they were formally 
accredited." Adams had the grace to admit that "by 
acknowledging the existence of a civil war the right of 
Spain as understood by herself is no doubt affected. She 
is no longer recognized as the sovereign of the provinces in 
revolution against her." 

This state of things was declared to be merely tem- 
porary. Any guarantee of the restoration of Spanish sov- 
ereignty in South America on the part of the allied powers 
would have been a departure from neutrality by them. No 
mediation ought to be undertaken without the consent of 
both parties in the contest. "Whether we consider the 
question of the conflict between Spanish colonial dominion 
and South American independence upon principles, moral 
or political, or upon those of the interest of either party 
to the war, or of all other nations as connected with them, 
whether upon grounds of right or of fact, they all bring 
us to the same conclusion that the contest cannot and ought 
not to terminate otherwise than by the total independence 
of South America. . . . Convinced as we are that the Span- 
ish authority can never be restored at Buenos Ayres, in 
Child, or in Venezuela, we wish the British government and 
all the European allies to consider how important it is to 
them, as well as to us, that these newly formed states 
should be regularly recognized," both because of their just 
right to such recognition, and that they may be held to an 
observation of the rules of the laws of nations. For that 



The Treaty of 18IQ 303 

course seemed to present the only effectual means of "re- 
pressing the excessive irregularities and piratical depreda- 
tions of armed vessels under their flags and bearing their 
commissions. ... It is hardly to be expected," declared 
Adams, "that they will feel themselves bound by the ordi- 
nary duties of sovereign states while they are denied the 
enjoyment of all their rights." The letter then stated the 
determination of President Monroe to recognize the govern- 
ment of Buenos Ayres "at no remote period" and concluded 
that, "if it should suit the views of Great Britain to adopt 
similar measures at the same time and in concert with us, 
it w411 Ibe highly satisfactory to the president." ^ 

After the refusal of De Onis to accept the Sabine bound- 
ary proposition in full, there was a lull in the negotiations. 
Early in January the president and his cabinet conferred 
upon the advisability of securing from congress an act 
authorizing the seizure of Florida upon certain contin- 
gencies. The secretary of state favored such a bill and 
desired that it should extend to the power of taking and 
holding the entire province, "in the event of any further 
failure on the part of Spain to fulfill her engagement of re- 
straining by force the Indians within her territory from 
hostilities against the United States, formal notice having 
been given her that such would be the result." Crawford 
declared that it would give the nation the appearance of 
acting in bad faith and lose the credit we had obtained in 
Europe by restoring the places captured by General Jackson. 
Calhoun did not consider the necessity sufficiently urgent. 
That to suppose Spain unable or unwilling to fulfill her 
treaty engagements would be, in the least, insulting. That 
congress ought to "pass laws only upon existing facts and 
not upon speculative anticipations." 



1. Vol. VIII, Instructions, p. 296. J. Q. Adams to Richard Rusti, 
Jan. 1, 1819. 



304 The Purchase of Florida 

Wirt stated that if it were res Integra it might be rn^ 
suiting to Spain to assume that she would not fulfill her 
treaty, and asked if all prospect of obtaining Florida by an 
arrangement seemed hopeless. Adams answered in the 
affirmative unless such a law should pass ; that that might 
bring Spain to it but that nothing else would. The matter 
was then laid aside for future consideration. ^ 

Agreeably to his instructions and the policy of his 
government, Hyde de Neuville, the French minister at 
Washington, took a warm interest in the negotiations. He 
served as a channel of communication and carried proposi- 
tions and counter-propositions, arguments and denials be- 
tween the two negotiators — messages which could pass 
better through a third party than directly fro-m hand to 
hand. He even expostulated and argued in turn with De 
Onis and with Adams imploring the one to yield a point, 
the other to be reasonable in his demands. England's prof- 
fered services were rejected. Adams neither needed nor 
desired any mediation. He was willing to take upon him- 
self the entire responsibility for the success or failure of his 
efforts. 

But Adams was forced to contend with lukewarm sup- 
port, nay even active opposition in his own ranks. Craw- 
ford, apart from seeking to disgrace Jackson and thus make 
him an impossibility for the presidency, sought steadily to 
discourage a Spanish treaty on the ground that, if it were 
a success, it would add too much strength and popularity 
to Monroe's administration. This secretary of the treasury, 
of whom Adams said, "He has a talent for intrigue only," 
did not hesitate to intimate indirectly to De Neuville and De 
Onis that the French should demand special commercial 
privileges in Louisiana, and that Spain should insist upon a 
boundary line west of the Mississippi more favorable to her 
than that offered by Adams. The cabinet of Monroe at 

1. J. Q. Adams's Diary, Jan. 2, 1819. 



The Treaty of iSlQ 305 

that time was innately vicious, the various members fighting 
the administration and one another, all playing for the 
presidential stake, utterly indifferent to the demands of the 
country and the pledges of their oaths. There was every 
reason to expect that Clay would fight any treaty which 
did not satisfy the wildest demands of the United States 
and of his romantic mind. Crawford desired to see Adams 
fail in his negotiations or conclude an unpopular treaty. 

In Spain, D'Yrujo, the foreign minister, was hostile 
to the United States, and was still controlled by the "unex- 
tinguished rancorous feelings ... of ancient date." The 
king was probably more anxious for a treaty and more 
ready to make the necessary sacrifices to obtain it, than any 
member of his council. Erving wrote home that however 
sincere may be the disposition of the Spanish government to 
treat at that time, a dissolution of congress before a treaty 
was concluded, "or without taking some very strong reso- 
lution with regard to the Floridas," would produce a most 
unfavorable change. If the independence of the South 
American colonies should be acknowledged the greatest 
evil which Spain apprehended would thus come to pass, 
and the temptation to any sort of an arrangement would be 
diminished. Should the independence not be acknowledged 
and the Floridas be restored, Spain would "lapse into se- 
curity or indifference, " for twelve months would thus be 
gained for the operation of chances in her favor. "But in 
either of the supposed cases," concluded Erving, "should the 
president be authorized to take and to hold possession of 
the Floridas till the claims of the United States ibe satisfied, 
this pressure may produce a final adjustment." ^ 

In January, 1819, De Onis, announcing the receipt of 
new instructions, offered the old line to the source of the 
Missouri, with a new one thence to the Columbia, and so to 



1. Vol. XVI, Letters from Ministers Albroad, Erving to J. Q. 
Adams, Jan. 4, 1819. 
90 



3o6 TMie Purchase of Florida 

the sea. Monroe anxious for a treaty — though long m 
accord with Adams — as De Onis gradually conceded point 
by point, began to fear lest Adams by insisting on extreme 
measures would not only fail in a treaty but might invite 
war. But Adams seems to have correctly measured the exact 
line to which the pressure of Spanish misfortunes would 
compel De Onis to advance. Gradually yielding, but bit- 
terly protesting, and imploring Adams to concede here or 
there and advance to meet him, the Spanish minister slowly 
approached the demands of our secretary of state. Yet so 
slowly was this done that we find Adams noting in his diary 
that he "could not express the disgust with which he was 
forced to carry on a correspondence with him upon subjects 
which it was ascertained that we could not adjust." And 
even saying to De Onis that he "was so wearied out with 
the discussion that it had become nauseous," and that he 
"really 'could discuss no longer and had given it up in 
despair." ^ And yet during all this time the other members 
of the administration and the members of congress talked 
freely both with De Neuville and De Onis intimating how 
far they may urge their pretensions and how far we might 
"be prevailed upon to concede." ^ 

There were many alarming pauses and Adams was 
ever anxious as to the outcome and fearful lest De Onis 
might make a firm stand and refuse absolutely to yield 
more. But as they approached nearer to an agreement 
Adams records that the president was inclined to give up 
all that remained in contest. On February ii, Monroe 
declared decidedly for agreeing to the 100° of longitude 
and 43° of latitude and taking the middle of the rivers 
(Arkansas, Red, and Multnomah). The other members of 
the administration all inclined the same way, but Adams 
was convinced that more might be obtained by adhering 

1. Adams's Diary, Feb. 11, 1819. 

2. IMd., Feb. 15, 1819. 



The Treaty of 18IQ 307 

steadily to our demands. ^ De Onis objected strongly to 
having the United States name five million dollars in the 
treaty, to he paid for claims, lest it should appear that he 
was selling Florida for that sum, while it was worth ten 
times that amount; that to name that figure would arouse 
indignation in Spain and endanger the ratification of the 
treaty. ^ 

The proposed line of De Onis to the South Sea was the 
beginning of the end. For each receded gradually until 
on the twenty-second of February, 1819, the two negotiators 
signed and sealed the counterparts of the treaty — consum • 
mating the diplomatic efforts of this country for nearly a 
score of years. 

The result justified Adams and was a great personal 
triumph, although Erving is authority for the statement 
that the Spanish cabinet was "highly delighted with the 
treaty." ^ No concession had been made except as to 
accepting the Sabine as the boundary. The United States 
received the Floridas in return for an agreement to settle 
the disputed claims of certain of her citizens against Spain 
to an amount not more than $5,000,000; while the Spanish 
claims against the United States, provided for in the con- 
vention of 1802, were wholly expunged. The western 
boundary secured for this country the coveted outlet to the 
shbres of the "South Sea." The line ran along the south 
banks of the Red and Arkansas rivers leaving all the islands 
to the United States, although granting to Spain a common 
right of navigation. 

Let us quote from the famous diary under date of 
February 22, 1819: "It was near in the morning when I 
closed the day with ejaculations of fervent gratitude to the 
Giver of all good. It was, perhaps, the most important day 

1. Adams's Diary, Feb. 11, 1S19. 
2.. Ibid., Feb. 15, 1819. 

3. Vol. XVI, Letters from Ministeirs Abroad, Brving to J. Q. 
Adams, April 2 8, 1819. 



3o8 The Purchase of Florida 

of my life. What the consequences may be of the compact 
this day signed with Spain is known only to the all-wise and 
all-beneficent Disposer of events, who has brought it about 
in a manner utterly unexpected and by means the most 
extraordinary and unforeseen. Its prospects are propitious 
and flattering in an eminent degree. May they be realized 
by the same superintending bounty that produced them. 
May no disappointment embitter the hope which this event 
warrants us in cherishing, and may its future influence on 
the destinies of my country be as extensive and as favora- 
ble as our warmest anticipations can paint. Let no idle 
and unfounded exultation take possession of my mind, as 
if I could ascribe to my own foresight or exertions any 
portion of the event. It is the work of an intelligent and 
all-embracing cause. May it speed as it has begun, for 
without a continuation of the blessings already showered 
down upon it, all that has been done will be worse than 
useless and vain. 

"The acquisition of the Floridas has long been an 
©"bject of earnest desire to this country. The acknowledg- 
ment of a definite line of boundary to the South Sea forms 
a great epoch in our history. The first proposal of it in 
this negotiation was my own and I trust it is now secured 
beyond the reach of revocation. It was not even among 
our claims by the treaty of independence with Great Britain. 
It was not among our pretensions under the purchase of 
Louisiana — for that gave us only the range of the Missis- 
sippi and its waters. I (first introduced it in the written 
proposal of 31st October last, after having discussed it 
verbally both with De Onis and De Neuville. It is the 
only peculiar and appropriate right acquired by this treaty 
in the event of its ratification." 

A protest against the treaty, particularly against the 
boundary line, appeared the folloAving day in one of the 
Washington papers, and was believed to have been written 



The Treaty of iSlQ 309 

or inspired by Clay. However his opposition was practi- 
cally without effect, and on the twenty-fourth the treaty 
was unanimously ratified. It was proclaimed a day later 
by President Monroe. 

But troubles soon appeared. In February, 1818, while 
the negotiations for the cession of the Floridas were under 
way, Erving wrote to Madison that the king had made three 
vast grants of land in that province — one to the duke of 
Alagon, captain of the bodyguards ; another to the Count 
•de Punon Rostro, one of his Majesty's chamberlains ; the 
third, which it was believed contained all the land in Florida 
and the adjacent islands not already disposed of, was to 
Don Pedro de Varges, the treasurer of the household. There 
can be no doubt that this was a highly disgraceful act of bad 
faith and that the intention of the king was to deprive the 
United States of the ownership of the crown lands. Adams, 
with these grants in mind, we will recall, had insisted in 
October of 1818 that all grants made since 1802 in the 
Floridas should be declared null and void. De Onis in a 
counter-proposition suggested rather the date of January 
24, 1818, that being the date when Spain first expressed her 
willingness to cede the Floridas. Adams finally accepted 
this date, but not knowing the exact date of the grants 
referred to 'hj Erving, distinctly declared to De Onis that 
he did so with the express understanding that these three 
grants should be held void. Adams cannot foe absolved 
from blame, for he was undoubtedly guilty of carelessness 
in not examining the original grants. He accordingly wrote 
to De Onis that he understood it to be the intent of the treaty 
to nullify the grants. De Onis at first evaded and quibbled, 
but a few days later he candidly declared that it was his 
understanding that these three grants were, by the eighth 
article of the treaty, to be null and void whatever their dates 
may have been. 



3IO The Purchase of Florida 

In April, in consequence of a long expressed desire, 
the Chevalier de Onis returned home and was succeeded at 
Washington by General Don Francisco Dionisio Vives. On 
the twenty-ninth of April Erving held his farewell audience 
with the king and princes of Spain and gave way to his 
successor, John Forsyth of Georgia. ^ 

That no doubt might exist upon the point of the land 
grants, Forsyth received special instructions to deliver a 
written declaration upon the subject when he exchanged 
the ratifications of the treaty. On reaching Madrid, in 
May, he applied to Marquis Casa d'Yrujo for a date for 
exchanging ratifications. Receiving no reply, he wrote 
again, two weeks later, reminding him of the presence of 
the sloop of war, "Hornet," in the harbor of Cadiz, that the 
time for her departure was nearly at hand, and that if she 
returned without the ratified treaty a most unfavorable im- 
pression would Ibe created in the United States. ^ This 
brought a reply. "The importance of the treaty made nec- 
essary an extended deliberation on the part of the king." ^ 
Before a decision could be reached there must be cer- 
tain explanations on the part of the United States ; 
that a person enjoying the fullest confidence of his Majesty 
would be sent to Washington for that purpose. August 
twenty-second being the last day on which, by the terms of 
the treaty, ratifications could be exchanged, Forsyth served 
formal notice on the twenty-first, that matters were in 
precisely the same condition as before the consummation of 
the convention, and the United States were free to enforce 
and maintain their claims in such manner as might seem 
best. 

In the meantime the "Hornet" «had reached the United 



1. Forsyth as a member of the senate was ever inveterate in his 
attacks upon General Jackson for his course in Florida. 

2. Forsyth to D'Yrujo, May IS and June 4, 1S19. 

3. Gonzales Salmon to Forsyth, June 19, 1819. 



The Treaty of 18IQ 311 

States. Full instructions were dispatched to Forsyth. The 
United States would hold Spain responsible "for all dam- 
ages and expenses which may arise from the delay or refusal 
of Spain to ratify, and from the measures to which the 
United States may resort to give efficacy to their rights, and 
that for the indemnities to which they will be justly entitled 
for this violation of faith by Spain, the United States will 
look to the territory west of the Sabine River." From the 
powers given to De Onis, after the signature of that min- 
ister and the ratification of the United States the treaty 
was as binding upon the honor and good faith of the Span- 
ish king and nation as it would be after its ratification by 
the king. 

De Onis had declared that he was ashamed that the 
grants had been made and wished them declared void be- 
cause of certain remarks publicly made that he was per- 
sonally interested in them. These grantees were not named 
in the treaty (i) to save the honor of the king, and (2) 
because there were other grants made at the same time and 
to have named these would presumptively have raised an 
inference in favor of others. De Onis had expressly stated 
(i) that the grants in question were all, in his belief, in- 
cluded among those positively annulled by the date of Jan- 
uary 24, 1818; (2) that these grants had been made by 
the king with the view of promoting population, cultiva- 
tion, and industry, and not with that of alienating the terri- 
tory and, (3) that the grants were all null and void because 
the grantees had not complied with the essential conditions 
of the grants. 

Adams continued : "When the government of a nation 
degrades itself by flagrant and notorious perfidy, those who 
are constrained to entertain political relations of neighibor- 
hood are justified by the law of nature, and it is their duty 
to themselves in subsequent transactions with such a state, 
to take pledges of security for the performance of its en- 



312 T\he Purchase of Florida 

gagements more effectual than confidence in its good faith. 
Such pledges are amply within the reach of the United 
States, in their intercourse hereafter with Spain, nor is it 
to be presumed that those who are entrusted with the main- 
tenance of the rights and interests of this nation, will over- 
look or neglect the duty which may be devolved upon them 
of taking them." ^ Forsyth was also to announce that, 
although six months had elapsed, the ratification by Spain 
would still be received on two conditions. It must be 
within one week, and must be accompanied by the avowal 
that the three land grants in question were null and void. 
This demand having been explicitly stated, the note was 
returned to Forsyth with the statement that it could not be 
laid before the king. Forsyth insisted that it be delivered, 
and v/rote to Adams that in the event of its failing he should 
leave Madrid. ^ 

The situation was now considered so critical that Count 
Bulgary, the Russian charge d'affaires, was sent to explain 
matters and request that the returned note be withheld, and 
to say that a minister would be immediately sent to the 
United States to ask for certain explanations. The minister 
selected for this mission was Mariscal de Campo Don Fran- 
cisco Dionisio Vives and with his departure Forsyth was 
notified that all discussion of the difficulty at Madrid must 
cease. 

Vives with the undoubted purpose of consuming as 
much time as possible, traveled by easy stages from Madrid 
to Bayonne, thence to Paris, and from Paris to England, 
reaching the United States in April, 1820. 



1. Vol. Villi, Instructions, p. .343, J. Q. Adams to Forsyth, Aug. 
18, 1819. See also De Onis to Adams, Oct. '2:4, 1'818, and answer 
Oct. 31, 1818. De Onis to Adams, Nov. 16, 1818. De Onis to Adams. 
Feb. 9, 1819. Adams to De Onis, Feb. 13, 1819. 

2. Forsyth to Duke of San Fernandino and Quirago, Oct. 18, 
1819. Answer to Forsyth, Nov. 12, 1819. Forsyth to Duke of San 
Fernandino, etc., Nov. 20, 1819. Forsyth to Adams, Nov. 27, 1819. 



The Treaty of l8ig 313 

In the United States the course of Spain aroused in- 
tense indignation. There was a wide feehng that the Unit- 
ed States should forcibly possess Florida, that Spain had 
paltered long enough with us. Adams, long before desir- 
ous of an act of congress authorizing the seizure of Florida 
and Galveston, now thoroughly indignant, advised that the 
United States prepare at once to take and hold the disputed 
territory and some undisputed territory as well. Monroe 
and the other members of the cabinet advocated a milder 
course. France and England expressed hopes to this coun- 
try that no violent action would be precipitately taken. 

The agitation of the slavery question, already exerting 
a great power in American politics, had its influence on 
the still pending and rather dubious Spanish treaty. The 
south was desirous of seizing not only the Floridas but as 
much as possible towards Mexico to carve into more slave 
states. But the north was no longer eager for an extension 
of the Union on the southern side. Sectional predominated 
national interests. The question was not without its effect 
upon the presidential aspirations of Adams. 

Poor Spain, with her vast American empire in open and 
successful revolt, was in no humor to add to her losses by 
the cession of Florida. The announcement that a special 
envoy would be sent to the United States to treat further 
in the case created, in this country, a sensation of the most 
profound disgust. Jackson, fuming at the Spanish breach 
of faith, wrote to Senator Eaton : "I deprecate the idea of 
v^raiting longer for an explanation from unfaithful Spain. 
Can we. receive a minister from that power, under present 
circumstances, without compromising in some degree our 
national character ? Under the bad faith of Spain, as I 
believe, the only good explanation that can be given is from 
the mouth of American cannon." ^ The general was ex- 



1. Jackson to Eaton, Dec. 28, 1819. 



314 T^he Purchase of Florida 

pecting soon to have the pleasure of leading another ex- 
pedition into Florida. ^ 

In April of 1820, Vives arrived in Washington and 
immediately addressed Adams upon the reasons which had 
induced the delay in ratifying the treaty. The sys- 
tem of hostility so prevalent in many parts of the Union 
against the Spanish dominions was a cause of grave dis- 
satisfaction. The "scandalous system of piracy" carried 
on from the ports of this country induced Spain to de- 
mand: That satisfactory and effectual measures be taken 
to repress "the barbarous excesses and unexampled depre- 
dations committed upon Spain, her possessions and prop- 
erties; that in order to put an entire stop to any future 
armaments and to prevent all aid whatsoever being afforded 
from any port of the Union which may be intended and 
employed in the invasion of the possessions of his Catholic 
Majesty in America, the United States will agree to give 
security that their integrity shall be respected. And finally 
that they will form no relations with the pretended govern- 
ments of the revolted provinces of Spain lying beyond the 
sea, and will conform to the course of proceeding adopted 
in this respect by other powers in amity with Spain." In 
addition Vives took occasion to comment upon the "dis- 
respectful" manner in which Forsyth had conducted him- 
self in Madrid. ^ During the interim between the departure 
of De Onis and the arrival of Vives, the charge of the Span- 
ish legation had constantly complained of the filibustering 
expeditions from the ports of the United States and of the 
vessels which had been brought into our ports and adjudi- 
cated prizes. Strong proofs were also presented of the 
connivance of the American officials and men-of-war. 



:i. In January, 1819, even, Jackson had considei-ed the plans for 
another attack upon Florida, and was making preparations with that 
in view. Gaines to Jackson, Jan. 16, 1819. 

'2. (Eton Vives to J. Q. Adams, Volume VI, Foreign Relations, 
April 14, 1820. 



The Treaty of iSlQ 315 

Adams, in reply to the representations of Vives, as- 
serted that by the universal usage of nations nothing could 
release a sovereign from the obligation to ratify such a 
treaty except the proof that his minister, empowered to 
conduct the negotiations, had been faithless to his trust by 
transcending his instructions — that this the Spanish king 
did not even allege. ^ 

To this contention Vives took exception and declared 
that there might be other reasons sufficiently valid to exon- 
erate a sovereign from the obligation of ratifying a treaty. 
"The scandalous proceedings of a number of American 
citizens ; the decisions of several of the courts of the Union 
and the criminal expeditions set on foot within it, for the 
invasion of his Majesty's possessions in North America, 
when the ratification was still pending, were diametrically 
opposite to the most sacred principles of amity and to the 
nature and essence of the treaty itself. ... So that the 
belief generally prevailed throughout Europe that the rati- 
fication of the treaty by Spain and the acknowledgment of 
the independence of her reibellious trans-Atlantic colonies 
by the United States would be simultaneous acts. ... It 
is therefore," he concluded, "not possible to assign reasons 
more powerful or more completely justificatory of the sov- 
ereign resolution of the king to suspend his ratification of 
that instrument." ^ 

Vives was told in reply that the representations made to 
his government of the hostility of our courts, people, and 
administration were unfounded. That in the war between 
Spain and her South American provinces an impartial neu- 
trality had been constantly avowed and faithfully maintain- 
ed. That whenever the laws enacted for the preservation 
of neutrality were found defective they had been strength- 

1. Vol. II, Foreign Legations, p. 385, J. Q. Adams to Don Vives, 
April 21, 1820. 

2. Vol. VI, Foreign Relations, Don Vives to J. Q. Adams, April 
2i4, 1820. 



3i6 The Purchase of Florida 

ened by new provisions. That Spanish property, illegally 
taken, had been constantly restored by the decisions of our 
tribunals and that even life itself had not been spared when 
individuals had been found guilty of piracy against Spain. 
"But that the United States would not contract any engage- 
ment with regard to the revolted provinces. That it would 
be inconsistent with the obligations of neutrality and had 
not been done even by any of the European nations, and 
further that the United States could not, "consistently with 
what is due themselves, stipulate new engagements as the 
price of obtaining the ratification of the old." That if tliere 
were any further delay in the ratification of the treaty by 
Spain this country could not hereafter accept either the five 
million dollars for indemnities nor the Sabine for the bound- 
ary line. 1 

In answer to certain observations made by Vives upon 
the subject of our proposals to European powers for recog- 
nizing the South American colonies, Adams wrote : "The 
proposal which at a prior time had been made by the gov- 
ernment of the United States to some of the principal powers 
of Europe for a recognition in concert of the independence 
of Buenos Ayres was founded . . . upon an opinion then 
and still entertained that this recognition must and would, at 
no very remote period, be made by Spain herself. That 
the joint acknowledgment by several of the principal powers 
of the world at the same time might probably induce Spain 
the sooner to accede to that necessity in which she must 
ultimately acquiesce, and would thereby hasten an event 
propitious to her own interests toy terminating a struggle in 
which she is wasting her strength and resources without a 
possibility of success; an event ardently to be desired by 
every friend of humanity, afflicted by the continual horrors 
of war, cruel and sanguinary almost beyond example ; an 



1. Vol. II, Foreign Legations, p. 387, J. Q. Adams to Vives, May 3, 
1820. 



The Treaty of l8ig 317 

event, not only desirable to the unhappy people who are 
suffering the complicated distresses and calamities of this 
war, but to all nations having relations of amity and com- 
merce with them. 

"This proposal, founded upon such motives, far from 
giving Spain the right to claim of the United States an 
engagement not to recognize the South American govern- 
ments ought to have been considered by Spain as a proof 
at once of the moderation and discretion of the United 
States; as evidence of their disposition to discard all selfish 
or exclusive views in the adoption of a measure which they 
deemed wise and just in itself, but most likely to prove 
efificacious by a common adoption of it, in a spirit entirely 
pacific, in concert with other nations, rather than by a 
precipitate resort to it, on the part of the United States 
alone." 1 

Vives denied the assertion that the laws of the United 
States were or had been competent to prevent the excesses 
of which he had complained, and asserted that the Euro- 
pean nations so far from being disposed to recognize the 
insurgent governments of South America, had declined the 
invitation thus extended. He further declared that the 
question of the land grants had not been the chief motive 
for suspending the ratification of the treaty, but rather the 
question of the South American provinces. "I shall sub- 
mit it," he concluded, "to the general sense of the reflecting 
part of mankind to decide whether the reasoning you rely 
on to show the motives of the American government for 
proposing to the powers to acknowledge the revolted prov- 
inces of Spanish America and in exhibiting them as favor- 
alble not only to suffering humanity but to the interests of 
Spain herself, is not in the highest degree specious. For if 
such maxims were to be adopted, nations could no longer 



1. Vol. II, Foreign Relations, p. 398, J. Q. Adams to Don Vivea, 
May 8, 1820. 



3i8 Tihe Purchase of Florida 

count upon the integrity of their possessions or on the 
maintenance of that mutual amity and good understanding 
which it is equally their duty and their interest to cultivate 
in their mutual relations." ^ 

In the meantime, by a change in the government of 
Spain, and the adoption of a constitution, the sovereign was 
prohibited from alienating any portion whatever of the 
Spanish territory without the consent of the cortes. Vives 
informed Adams that the king would lay the treaty before 
that body at its next meeting in July. ^ Adams maintained 
that the solemn pledge of the nation had already been 
given before the change and could not be affected by any 
subsequent engagement of the king. Forsyth was in- 
structed to manifest no peculiar earnestness to obtain the 
ratification ; but to announce that, in the event of further 
delay, an additional provision for indemnity would be de- 
manded and that the right of the United States to the 
western boundary of the Rio del Norte "will be re-asserted 
and never again relinquished." ^ 

On the ninth of May the papers on the Florida treaty 
were sent to both houses of congress. Adams had as- 
sumed an air of effective indifference. In view of the 
prevailing public opinion, the secretary of state maintained 
a decisive bluntness and stubbornness scarcely calculated to 
invite further discussion. Spain might make the treaty or 
take the consequences, and congress was about to declare 
upon the consequences. No other course than this obvious 
indifference could have been more effective. 

In congress the question went over to the next session, 
but in the house much had already beerl said on the sub- 
ject. Several attempts had been made to secure vigorous 
action. A member from Virginia, impressed with the idea 



1. Vol. VI, (Foreign Relations, Vives to Adams, May 5 and 9, 18'20. 

2. Ibid., Vives to Adams, May 2,8, 1820. 

3. Vol. IX, Instructions, p. 7, Adams to Forsytii, May 25, 1820. 



The Treaty of l8ig 319 

that De Onis had been authorized to cede more territory 
than provided in the treaty, moved that the president be 
asked to inform the house how much the Spanish minister 
had been empowered to cede. At one time the committee on 
foreign affairs reported a bill authorizing the president to 
take possession of both East and West Florida, and if nec- 
essary to use the army, navy, and militia. The motion and 
bill were both ignored and, as the house shovi^ed a strong 
disposition to do nothing, Clay made a vigorous attack on 
the treaty. 

He introduced two resolutions which were referred to 
the committee of the whole. The first declared that, by the 
constitution, congress alone had the power to dispose of 
territory belonging to the United States and that no treaty 
alienating any part thereof was valid unless approved by 
congress. The second declared that as the equivalent of- 
fered by Spain for the territory of the United States west 
of the Sabine was inadequate, it would be inexpedient to re- 
new the treaty. Clay declared that he did not desire to re- 
new a discussion of the treaty making power. But as con- 
gress alone had power to dispose of the territory of the 
United States, and, as the constitution contained specific 
grants of power to congress, they controlled, and it must 
follow that no treaty disposing of territory could be valid 
without the consent of the house as well as the senate. 
A treaty fixing limits or establishing boundaries might be 
valid without the intervention of the house. The treaty 
of 1794 with England had done so. So had that of 1795 
with Spain. And the provisions of the treaty of Ghent for 
determining the northeast boundary of Maine — they did 
not mark out a new boundary, they merely established or 
proclaimed the location of the old line. The Florida treaty 
differed from these. It had fixed a new and arbitrary line 
wjtjjp^. large cession of territory to Spain. "What do we 
get for Florida?" demanded Clay. "We get Florida loaded 



320 Tlhe Purchase of Florida 

and encumbered with land grants which leave scarcely a 
foot of soil for the United States. What do we give? 
We give Texas free and unencumbered. We pay five mil- 
lion dollars and we surrender all our claims for damages 
not included in that five million dollars." 

Several 'members replied to Clay asserting that Texas 
had always been disputed territory, and that our claim to 
it had always been questionable. That Clay's construction 
of the treaty making power would prevent any question of 
limits ever being settled without the consent of the house, 
as such questions always involved the cession of territory 
by one or both parties. The resolutions failed to pass the 
committee of the whole, and the question was dropped for 
the time. Monroe in his message transmitting the corre- 
spondence with General Vives had requested that no ac- 
tion be taken till Spain had once more been heard from. 
With this congress willingly complied, though many radi- 
cals were for forcing immediate action. 

While negotiations were pending Adams received little 
support in his efforts to push the boundary line westward. 
Monroe and the cabinet cared little for Texas. Jackson 
who was consulted, thought that the Sabine should be ac- 
cepted if thereby we could acquire the Floridas. His inter- 
ests were then centered in the Floridas and he was indiffer- 
ent as to Texas. Jackson afterwards denied this in a vio- 
lent and insulting manner. ^ In a letter to President Mon- 
roe, the general wrote : "I am clearly of your opinion that, 
for the present, we ought to be contented with the Floridas, 
.... With the Floridas in our possession, our fortifica- 



1. In 1836 General Jackson denied having been consulted in re- 
gard to the boundary line. When told that Adams's diary showed that 
he had approved of the line of the Sabine, he vehemently replied : 
"His diary. Don't tell me anything more about his diary. Sir, that 
diary comes up on all occasions — one would think that its pages were 
as immutable as the laws of the Medes and Persians. Sir, that diary 
will be the death of me Sir, I did not see it ; I was not con- 
sulted about it." Vol. II, Parton's Life of Jackson, p. 587. 



The Treaty of iSlQ 321 

tions completed, New Orleans, the great emporium of the 
West, is secure. The Floridas in possession of a foreign 
power, you can be invaded, your fortifications turned, the 
Mississippi reached, and the lower country reduced. Prom 
Texas an invading enemy will never attempt such an en- 
terprise. If he does, notwithstanding all that has been said 
on the floor of congress on this subject, I will vouch that 
the invader will pay for his temerity." ^ 

On the fifth of October Forsyth's efforts were rewarded 
by the Spanish cortes, who, after annulling the three land 
grants, advised the king to ratify the treaty, which he did 
October 24, 1819. At the same time the cortes declared 
that they "had observed with great mortification and pain 
that besides the alienation of valuaible provinces of the 
Spanish monarchy. .... the Spanish negotiator of the 
treaty had left altogether unprovided for and had renounced 
all the just claims of Spanish subjects upon the United 
States for which indemnity had been stipulated by the con- 
vention of 1802." 2 

The treaty was ratified despite the opposition of Clay 
who had declared that Florida must come to us sooner or 
later ; "that ripened fruit will not more surely fall. Flor- 
ida is enclosed between Georgia and Alabama and cannot 
escape. Texas may," Only four votes were cast against 
it: Brown of Louisiana, a brother-in-law of Clay; Richard 
M. Johnson of Kentucky from mere political subserviency to 
Clay ; Williams of Tennessee from a violent hatred of Gen- 
eral Jackson ; and Trimble of Ohio from "some maggot of 
the brain." 

Mr. Benton was bitter in his regrets that the western 
boundary had not been extended much further westward 
into Texas. Besides cutting ofif Texas, the treaty, he de- 
clared, dismembered the Mississippi, mutilated two of its 

1. Gen. Jackson to President Monroe, June 20, 1820. 
.2. Vol. VI, Foreign Relations, Memorandum of Interview between 
Adams and Vives, Feb. 12, 1821. 

n 



322 The Purchase of Florida 

noblest rivers, and brought a non-slave-holding foreign do- 
minion to the neighborhood of New Orleans. He declared 
that "the Spanish government had offered us more than 
we had accepted" and that our policy and not hers had 
deprived us of Texas and the vast territory between the 
Red River and Upper Arkansas. Political considerations 
had entered into the question, for the repugnance in the 
northeast was not merely to territorial aggrandizement in 
the southwest but to the subsequent extension of slavery 
in that quarter. To prevent the slavery extension question 
from becoming a test in the presidential election was, he 
declared, the true reason for thus giving away Texas. 

But the treaty met with popular approval and Mr. Ben- 
ton was forced to admit that he stood "solitary and alone" 
in the matter, not a paper in the United States supporting 
his opposition. ^ Jefferson remained inflexibly opposed to 
its ratification. 



1. Benton's Thirty Tears' View, Vol. I, p. 16. 



CHAPTER XL 

THE FLORIDA TREATY. 

EAST Florida was delivered by Governor Coppinger to 
Lieutenant Robert Butler of the United States army, 
July lo, 1 82 1, and on that day the Spanish flag was 
finally lowered from the walls of St. Augustine, where it 
had so long and so proudly waved. The stars and stripes 
announced the second acquisition to the young nation of the 
New World. 

Before the end of the cession during which the Florida 
treaty was ratified, congress did not have time to legislate 
for the new territory. An act was passed, however, ex- 
tending to it the revenue law and the laws against slave 
trade which had already existed in the United States. In 
April, General Jackson was appointed governor of Florida, 
possessing all the powers of the captain generals of Cuba 
and the Spanish governors of Florida, except those of grant- 
ing lands and laying taxes. An American governor under 
Spanish law, of American territory not under the consti- 
tution — an anomalous position pregnant with possibilities 
for complications of serious import. With what was at- 
tributed to the traditional Spanish policy, the actual ces- 
sion of Florida was not accomplished until July 17. In 
the meantime Jackson fumed, and his fury and his hatred 
for Spain and things and people Spanish increased in geo- 
metric proportion. 



324 T'he Purchase of Florida 

In September through a trifling misunderstanding re- 
specting some papers in the hands of the Spanish officials, 
Jackson sent Callava, the Spanish commissioner, and sev- 
eral of his associates, to the calaboose in that same unrea- 
soning manner and with that same contempt for all law and 
form which had characterized his conduct of affairs in the 
Seminole war. Somebody had crossed his path and in- 
curred his wrath and that somebody must pay the penalty. 
Then Elgin Fromentin, judge of the western district of 
Florida, in due form issued a habeas corpus for Callava. 
Jackson's wrath knew no bounds. He summoned Fromentin, 
to show cause why he had not interfered with the governor 
and thus become liable. A stormy interview followed and 
each side sent a statement to the authorities at Washington. 
Meanwhile some of Fromentin's friends, with less discre- 
tion than loyalty, published a defense of the judge. Again 
Jackson waxed warm and they were ordered out of Flor- 
ida at four days' notice on pain of arrest for contempt and 
disobedience. 

Worthington, the secretary and acting governor 
of East Florida, was meanwhile em!broiled with Cop- 
pinger, the former Spanish governor, over papers which had 
been seized under Jackson's orders. These were a few of 
the problems which the headstrong Tennesseean prepared 
for his friends at Washington within six months' service. 
Small wonder that Adams dreaded the arrival of mails from 
Florida lest some new difficulty of Jackson's brewing be 
presented for solution. In fact his whole conduct, based 
only upon a snap judgment, was in open disregard and 
contempt of all diplomatic obligations, propriety, law, or 
procedure, and his course only failed of being atrocious by 
being ludicrous. ^ In short Jackson played the fool. Yet 
again his personal popularity saved him. But why have 



1. For a detailed account of the whole miserable farce, see VoL 
II, Parton's Jackson, p. 6i3i8. 



The Florida Treaty 325 

trusted so dangerous, so irresponsible a man in so delicate 
a position? Only because of his personal popularity we 
presume, for everybody had been taught what to expect of 
Jackson. When he was sent to Florida as governor there 
was ringing in Monroe's ears Jefferson's remark upon the 
subject of sending Jackson on the Russian mission, "Why, 
good God, he would breed you a quarrel (before he had 
been there a month." Yet he was sent south and the nation 
was made ridiculous in the eyes of the world. 

Now that Florida was actually ours, all reason for de- 
lay in recognizing the South American countries seems 
to have disappeared and in March, 1822, congress passed 
an appropriation for missions to these revolted provinces. 

^ ;{; ^ ^ >ic 

Thus ends the history of the acquisition of Florida and 
our relations with Spain. No sooner were we a nation than 
we cast our eyes about. We coveted Florida, and we 
talked of manifest destiny, and the falling of ripened fruit, 
and eased our conscience by like casuistry. Spain was 
weak, she was entangled in the Herculean grasp of Euro- 
pean complications — all of which materially assisted this 
ever favorable manifest destiny. The nation's leaders, 
Hamilton, Jefferson, Madison, Monroe, Livingston, Pinck- 
ney, and a score of others all insisted that we must pos- 
sess the Floridas. They wanted Louisiana, they even talked 
of Mexico and South America — they were to be ours, 
peaceably if possible, forcibly if necessary. ^ 

True, we suffered much at the hands of Spain in our 
early years. She had sought to confine us to the Atlantic 
seaboard, and when that became impossible, she attempted 
to hold the east bank of the Mississippi and prevent the 
advance of the frontiersmen. She sought to seduce our 
Western territory from its connection with the Union, and 



1. Hamilton in 1799 had considered the acquisition of Louisiana 
and the Floridas as "essential to the permanency of the Union." 



326 T\he Purchase of Florida 

many of our officers, notably the contemptible Wilkinson, 
were guilty of corrupt connections with these plots. This 
not by way of justification — but England was doing the 
same thing and France was not innocent. 

Then we acquired Louisiana. France, admittedly, had 
no right to sell it to us, yet we desired it, it was possible 
to secure it, and so it became ours. Spain vigorously pro- 
tested but was obliged to acquiesce lest even worse mis- 
fortune come upon her. A strong, powerful nation we 
may well believe would have done something more than 
weakly protest. We were in a position to profit by the 
troubles of Europe and we cared naught for the ineffectual 
anger of deceived and injured Spain. And we must blush 
with shame when we note that the great Fisher Ames was 
not alone in thinking the purchase of Louisiana mean and 
despicable when the province might have been seized by 
violence — or to use the synonymous expression, have come 
to us by manifest destiny. To secure by purchase what 
might soon have yielded to force, they deemed cowardly 
and unstatesmanlike. 

Louisiana secured, we deliberately set about to acquire 
the two Floridas. We systematically stirred up trouble for 
Spain. We advanced a claim to West Florida that was 
wholly untenable. Spain, nay, all Europe, considered our 
pretensions founded on a sophistry in words, though there 
was an evident perspicuity in sense. Then we proceeded 
, to seize the territory by arms under the shameful pretence 
■/ that we would give it up when we found the seizure wrong 
— a dangerous and astounding theory, supported neither by 
law nor morals. In 181 1 Congress passed a resolution and 
an act authorizing the seizure of the Floridas under certain 
contingencies, leaving the widest latitude to executive dis- 
cretion. This was a bold defiance of the law of nations and 
individuals. Spain had every right to either hold or sell 
her territory, and to whatever nation she pleased. The 



The Florida Treaty 327 

United States forbade her doing either. We announced 
that we would wage war upon Spain if she attempted to 
sell, and upon whatever nation might become fhe vendee. 

Every American citizen knows in his heart that nothing 
of the kind would have been conceived or attempted if Spain 
had been able to defend by force her unquestionable rights. 
Nor did we stop there. To all intents and purposes we 
served notice upon her that she must dispose of the ter- 
ritory to us or prepare for war. We were determined to 
possess Florida. What did we offer in return? We would 
release her from the claim.s which we held against her. 
We presented huge bills for damages, many of which would 
never have been allowed in any court in this country. We 
held her responsible for the losses inflicted by French ves- 
sels and French prize courts after we had expressly released 
France from all liability. We brought forward claims for 
the 'losses of our citizens along the Florida line, losses which 
by their own misconduct they had expressly invited — for 
the white settlers of Georgia were responsible for most of 
the Indian ravages in that section, apart from the losses 
which they themselves had inflicted in their constant raids 
across the Florida line. 

We thus presented enormous claims to bankrupt Spain 
and we well knew that in only one way could she liquidate 
them — by surrendering her territories. Then we took 
further advantage of the confusion in Spanish affairs by 
fomenting insurrections in her territories and under this 
miserable and humiliating guise sought to extend our 
power. How gross the artifice, how shallow the deception ! 
We seized Amelia Island under the pretext of breaking up 
a nest of pirates and bandits — a proceeding particularly 
disgraceful to us because it was principally American free- 
booters who had congregated there. 



328 The Purchase of Florida 

During all these years, had England, Russia, or France 
supported the wishes of Ferdinand, he would probably 
have defied the United States. " 

Then the Seminole war, our own fault, because largely 
the direct result of instructions from our government to the 
officers in that region. Jackson with his genius for arrang- 
ing diplomatic controversies, this inveterate don-hater with 
his intense and notorious anti-Spanish sentiments, was sent 
to conduct the war. This man, whose desire it had long 
been to seize Pensacola and occupy the Floridas as indem- 
nity for our claims, was dispatched on a mission where 
infinite tact and self control were imperatively demanded. 
Then followed what might have been expected and what 
appears to have been desired, a series of violations of inter- 
national law which astounded the whole world and incurred 
the hostility of Europe. No more here of Arbuthnot and 
Ambrister. The Spanish governor at St. Marks may have 
been an accomplice of the Seminoles ; but there was noth- 
ing calculated to implicate other Spanish commandants, and 
even if all were guilty, self preservation did not require 
a summary seizure of the posts, or Jackson's presumption, 
or Adams's either, that Spain sanctioned the treachery of 
her provincial agents. 

And in the meantime we were tearing at the vitals of 
Spain in another direction. All South America was in 
revolt and we were giving the revolutionists something 
more than our mere sympathy. Monroe admitted in his 
confidential letters that the policy of his administration had 
been to throw the moral weight of the United States in the 
scale of the colonies, without ' so deeply compromising the 
nation as to make it a party to the war. Our ports were 
opened to them; filibustering expeditions were organized 
in this country ; our harbors were filled with their prizes ; 
our good offices had been exercised for them, and to good 
purpose, with every power in Europe; and by the policy 



The Florida Treaty 329 

thus pursued more real service had been done them than 
recognition could possibly have procured. We feared to 
acknowledge their independence lest it ruin our purposes 
with regard to the Floridas, but those once in our hands, 
with singular bad faith, ministers were immediately dis- 
patched to their governments. For nearly a year Spain 
had held up the treaty of 1819 in an effort to secure from 
this country a pledge not to recognize the South American 
countries. True, we had refused, but a strict adherence to 
the rules of international ethics — if in truth there be any 
such thing — ^hardly countenanced our course in the mat- 
ter. 

The question then presents itself for candid, honest 
consideration: How far was the cession of Florida due to 
the fact that we wanted it and were determined to have it 
at all hazards, and how far to the "grievances" of one 
kind and another which we urged against Spain, and then 
how far were these "grievances" due to the acts of our 
own citizens? Had we been unselfish and shown a dispo- 
sition, as a friendly power, to help Spain out of her diffi- 
culties, were there any troubles which could not have been 
removed without our threats of war and without our insist- 
ing upon a transfer of territory? Had our claims to that 
province been even weaker, which is difficult to conceive, 
or those of Spain a hundredfold stronger than they actu- 
ally were, would we not have acquired the territory all the 
same — would not this same manifest destiny have exer- 
cised its all-potent influence ? 

Consider for a moment the position of Spain on 
this continent at the opening of the nineteenth cen- 
tury, and that of the United States at the same time. 
One great fact stands out above all this intervening 
century of diplomacy with its dark intrigues and chi- 
canery on one side and the other — those vast terri- 
tories which were then in the possession of Spain now 



330 The Purchase of Florida 

recognize our sovereignty — and that transfer has been 
effected without any appreciable cost to ourselves. There 
is no American today who is not ashamed of our wholly 
unwarranted method of despoiling Mexico ; can he feel 
any prouder of the Florida acquisition? Or are we the 
especial pet of manifest destiny, and when will she cease 
to honor our nation with her lavish gifts? 

At the time of the acquisition of Florida, Crawford 
suggested that England and France regarded the United 
States as ambitious and encroaching, and he counselled 
moderation. Adams cared naught for foreign opinion and 
replied that "if the world do not hold us for Romans, they 
will take us for Jews, and of the two vices I would rather 
be charged with that which has greatness mingled in its 
composition." He deemed it proper that the world should 
be "familiarized with the idea of considering our proper 
dominion to be the whole continent of North America." 
This was a "law of nature" and could not fail. To suppose 
that Spain and England could, through lapse of time, re- 
tain their possessions on this side of the Atlantic was to his 
way of thinking a "physical, moral, and political absurdity." 
More talk then of manifest destiny and its miracles or, more 
accurately, manifest determination and strength on the one 
side, and manifest weakness on the other. It was the 
right of might — the triumph of force. 

THS END. 



APPENDICES 



APPENDIX A. 

VOL. VI, INSTEUCTIONB, P. 137. 

James Monroe. July 29, 1803. 

On the presumption .... that you will have proceeded to 
Madrid it is thought proper to observe to you that although 
liouieiana may in some respects be more important than the 
Floridas and has more than exhausted the funds allotted for the 
purchase of the latter, the acquisition of the Floridas is still to 
be pursued, especially as the crisis must be favorable to it. 

You will be at no loss for the arguments most likely to 
have weight in prevailing on Spain to yield to our wishes. 
These colonies separated from her other territories on this con- 
tinent by New Orleans, the Mississippi and the whole of "Western 
Liouisiana are now of less value to her than ever, whilst to the 
United States they retain the peculiar importance derived from 
their position and their relation to us through the navigable 
rivers running from the United States into the G-ulf of Mexico. 
In the hands of Spain they must ever be a dead expense in time of 
peace, indefensible in time of war, and at all times a source 
of irritation and ill blood with the United States. The Spanish 
government must understand in fact that the United States can 
never consider the amicable relation between Spain and them 
as definitely and permanently secured without an arrangement 
on this subject which will substitute the manifest indications of 
nature for the artificial and inconvenient state of things now 
existing. 

The advantage to be derived to your negotiations from the 
war which has just commenced will certainly not escape you. 
Powerful and effectual use may be made of the fact that Great 
Britain meant to seize New Orleans, with a view to the anxiety 
of the United States to obtain it — of the inference from that 
fact, that the same policy will be pursued with respect to the 
Floridas. Should Spain 'be in the war it cannot be doubted 



334 T^^^ Purchase of Florida 

that they will be quickly occupied by a British force and held 
out on some condition or other to the United States. Should 
Spain be still at peace and wish not to lose her neutrality she 
should reflect that the facility and policy of seizing the Floridasi 
must strengthen the temptations of Great Britain to force her 
into the war. In any view it will be better for Spain that the 
Floridas should be in the hands of the United States than of 
Great Britain and equally so that they should be ceded on bene- 
ficial terms by herself than that they should find their way to 
us through the hands of Great Britain 

By the enclosed note of the Spanish minister here you will 
see the refusal of Spain to listen to our past overtures, with 
the reasons for the refusal. The answer to that communica- 
tion is also enclosed. The reply to such reasons will be very 
easy. Neither the reputation nor the duty of his Catholic 
Majesty can suffer from any measure founded in wisdom and 
the true interests of Spain. There is as little ground for sup- 
posing that the maritime powers of Europe, will complain of, 
or be dissatisfied with, a cession of the two Floridas to the 
United States more than with the late cession of Louisiana by 
Spain to France or more than with the former cession through 
which the Floridas themselves have passed. What the treaties 
are subsequent to that of Utrecht, which are alleged to preclude 
Spain from the proposed alienation have not been examined. 
Admitting them to exist in the sense put upon them, there is 
probably no maritime power who would not readily acquiesce 
in our acquisition of the Floridas as more advantageous to itself, 
than the retention of them by Spain shut up against all foreign 
commerce and liable at every moment to be thrown into the 
preponderant scale of Great Britain, Great Britain herself 
would unquestionably have no objection to their being trans- 
ferred to us: unless it should be drawn from her intention to 
conquer them for herself, or from the use she might expect to 
make of them in a negotiation with the United States and with 
respect to France. Silence at least is imposed on her by the 
cession to the United States of the province ceded to her by 
Spain: not to mention, that she must wish to see the Floridas 
like Louisiana kept out of the hands of Great Britain and has 
doubtless felt that motive in promising her good offices with 
Spain for obtaining these possessions for the United States. Of 
this promise you will of course make the proper use in your 
negotiations. 



Appendices 335 



For the price to be given for the Floridas you are referred 
generally to the original instructions on this point. Although 
the change of circumstances lessens the anxiety for acquiring 
immediately a territory which now more certainly than ever, 
must drop into our hands and notwithstanding the pressure of 
the bargain with France on our treasury; yet for the sake of 
a peaceable and fair completion of a great object you are per- 
mitted by the president, in case a less sum will not be accepted, 
to give $2,250,000', the sum heretofore apportioned to this pur- 
chase. It will be expected however that the whole of it, if 
necessary, be made applicable to the discharge of debts and 
damages claimed from Spain — as well those not yet admitted 
by the Spanish government as those covered by the convention 
signed with it by Mr. Pinckney on the eleventh day of August, 
1802. 

These claims include those arising from privateers' depreda- 
tions along Florida and Mississippi lines and losses arising from 
violation of our deposit at New Orleans. 

If it be impossible to bring Spain to a cession of the whole 
of the two Floridas a trial is to be made for obtaining either 
or any important part of either. The part of West Florida 
adjoining the territories now ours and including the principal 
rivers falling into the gulf will be particularly important and 
convenient. 

It is not improbable that Spain in treating on a cession of 
the Eloridas may propose an exchange of them for Louisiana 
beyond the Mississippi or may make a serious point of some 
particular boundary to that territory. Such exchange is inad- 
missible. In intrinsic value there is no equality: besides the 
advantage, given us by the west bank of the entire jurisdiction 
of the river. We are the less disposed also to make sacrifices 
to obtain the Floridas because their position and the manifest 
course of events guarantee an early and reasonable acquisition 
of them. With respect to the adjustment of a boundary between 
Louisiana and the Spanish territories, there might be no objec- 
tion to combining it with a cession of the Floridas, if our 
knowledge of the extent and character of Louisiana were less 
imperfect. At present any arrangement, would be a step too 
much in the dark to he hazarded, and this will be a proper answer 
to the Spanish government. . . . 

Should no cession whatever be obtainable, it will remain 
only, for the present, to provide for the free use of the rivers 



33^ The Purchase of Florida 

rumiing from the United States Into the gulf. A convenient de- 
posit is to be pressed as equally reasonable there as on the Mis- 
sissippi. 

The free use of those rivers for our external commerce is 
to be insisted on as an important right. 



APPENDIX B. 

FBOM MAJORITY REPORT OF COMMITTEE ON MILITARY AFFAIRS CON- 
GRESS (H. OF E.), JANUARY, 1819. ANNALS OF CONGRESS, P. 516. 

Your committee can find no law of the United States author- 
izing a trial before a military court for such offenses as are 
alleged against Arbuthnot and Amibrister (except so much of 
the second charge as charges Arbuthnot with "acting as a spy" of 
which part of the charge the court found him "not guilty"), nor in 
the opinion of our committee does any usage authorize or ex- 
igency appear from the documents accompanying the report of 
the trial which can justify the assumption and exercise of power 
by the court-martial and the commanding general on this occa- 
sion. It is admitted as a maxim of the law of nations that where 
the war is with a savage nation which observes no rules and never 
gives quarter we may punish them in the person of any of their 
people whom we may take (belonging to the number of the 
guilty) and endeavor by this vigorous proceeding to force them to 
respect the laws of humanity. Wherever severity is not a 
necessity mercy becomes a duty. In vain has your committee 
sought for a shadow of a necessity for the death of the prisoners 
arraigned before the court. The war was at an end to all in- 
tents and purposes, the enemy's strongholds had been destroyed — 
many of them killed or taken prisoners, and the remainder a 
feeble band dispersed and scattered in every direction. The 
Spamish fort of St. Marks which it was supposed (and no douT)! 
justly) had protected them was also in our possession and so 
entirely was the war considered to be terminated that the Georgia 
militia under General Glascock had returned to their homes. 
Then where was the absolute necessity which alone could war- 
rant a departure from the exercise of that clemency of which 
the United States has heretofore so justly boasted? 

Your committee find in the general order of the twenty-ninth 
of April, in which Greneral Jackson orders the execution of Arbuth- 

22 



338 The Purchase of Florida 

not and Ambrister this remarkable reason, intended as a justifi- 
cation of the executions, principally of Amhrister but applying 
to both Arbuthnot and Ambrister: "It is an established principle 
of the law of nations that any individual of a nation making war 
aga;inst the citizens of another nation, they being at peace, forfeits 
his allegiance and becomes an outlaw and a pirate." It may be 
asked by what system of interpretation the offenses charged 
could be considered as piracies which imply in common accepta- 
tion offenses upon the high seas, of whicli the court could not as- 
sume cognizance; and it is equally difficult to understand the pro- 
priety of the application of the term "outlaw" to the offenders — 
a term which applies only to the relations of individuals with 
their own governments. It will not be pretended that Lafayette 
who volunteered his services in the cause of America in the 
war which established our independence forfeited his allegiance, 
became an outlaw, and subjected himself to an ignominious death 
had he fallen into the hands of the English, or can it be believed 
that one voice could be heard in justification of Spain if she 
were to execute such of our countrymen as she may make 
prisoners, while fighting in the armies of the South American 
patriots? And if these cases should not be considered of such a 
nature as to warrant a resort to so severe a measure while they 
occurred with a people in a state of revolution and considered 
by the parent countries to be in a state of rebellion, much less 
could these (Arbuthnot and Ambrister) be considered liable to 
it who were acting with a power acknowledged and treated as 
sovereign and independent by us. 

Your committee beg leave to call your attention particularly 
to the case of R. C. Ambrister who, after having been subjected! 
to a trial before a court which had no cognizance or jurisdiction 
over the offenses charged against him was shot by the order of 
the commanding general contrary to the forms and usages of 
the army and without regard to the finding of that court which 
had been instituted as a guide for himself. . . . 

Nor can your committee forbear including in their strictures 
the court-martial who sat on .the trial of Arbuthnot and Am- 
brister. A court-martial is a tribunal invested with limited 
jurisdiction having for its guidance the same rules of evidence 
which govern courts of law; and yet Arbuthnot Is refused by the 
court-martial, before whom he was on trial for his life, the 
benefit of the testimony of Ambrister who had not been put upon 
his trial at that time and whose evidence would have been re- 



Appendices 339 

ceived by any court of law as legal, if not credible. Many other 
exceptions might be made to the evidence recorded in these pro- 
ceedings : particularly to the question put to the witness, Hambly, 
namely: "Do you believe the Seminoles would have commenced 
the business of murder and depredation on the white settlements 
had it not been at the instigation of the prisoner (Arbuthnot) 
and a promise on his part of British protection?" Answer: 
"I do not believe they would, without they had been assured of 
British protection." A leading question is expressly forbidden to 
be used by a court-martial by Macomb on martial law, and of 
which the court must have heen apprised as it is a work com- 
mon in the army and usually referred to by every court-martial 
when in session: and the question was calculated to elicit an 
expression of opinion and belief from the witness rather than a 
statement of facts upon which alone could the court act. Hear- 
say evidence, in a case of life and death, your committee will 
venture to assert, was never before received against the accused 
in any court of this country and yet on the face of the record 
of the proceedings of the court-martial, hearsay testimony is ad- 
mitted which had been received from an Indian who, if present, 
would not have been allowed to; give evidence himself. After 
mature deliberation your committee beg leave to submit the fol- 
lowing resolution: Resolved that the honor and right of the 
United States disapproves the proceedings in the trial and exe- 
cution of Alex. Arbuthnot and Robert C. Ambrister. 



APPENDIX C. 

VOL. VIII. INSTBUCTIONS, P. 2i57. 

To 'George W. Erving. November 28, 1818. 

In the fourth and last of these notes of Mr. Pizarro he 
has given formal notice that the king, his master, has issued 
orders for the suspension of the negotiation between the United 
States and S'pain until satisfaction shall have been made by the 
American government to him for those proceedings of General 
Jackson: which he considers as acts of unequivocal hostility 
against him and as outrages upon his honor and dignity, the 
only acceptable atonement for which is stated to consist in a dis- 
avowal of the American government thus complained of: the 
infliction upon him of a suitable punishment for his supposed mis- 
conduct: and the restitution of the posts and territories taken 
by him from the Spanish authorities with indemnity for all the 
property taken and all damages and injuries, public or private, 
sustained in consequence of it. 

Within a very few days after this notification Mr. Pizarro 
must have received with copies of the correspondence between 
Mr. De Onis and this department the determination which had 
been taken by the president to restore the place of Pensacola with 
^he Fort of Barrancas to any person properly authorized on the 
part of Spain to receive them: and the Fort of 'St. Marks to any 
Spanish force adequate to its protection against the Indians by 
whom its forcible occupation had been threatened, for purposes 
of hostility against the United States. The officer commanding 
at the post has been directed to consider two hundred and fifty 
men as such adequate force and in case of their appearance with 
proper authority to deliver it up to their commander accordingly. 

From the last mentioned correspondence the Spanish govern- 
ment must likewise have been satisfied that the occupation of 
these places in (Spanish Florida by the commander of the Amer« 
lean forces was not by virtue of any orders received by him from 



Appendices 341 

this government to that effect with any view of wresting the prov- 
ince from Spain nor in any spirit of hostility to the Spanish gov- 
ernment. That it arose from incidents which occurred in the pros- 
ecution of the war against the Indians, from the imminent danger 
in which the Fort of St. Marks was of being seized by the Indians 
themselves; and from the manifestations of hostility to the United 
States iby the commandant of St. Marks, and the governor of 
Pensacola, the proofs of which were made known to General 
Jackson and impelled him from the necessities of self defense to 
the steps of which the Spanish government complains. 

It might he sufficient to leave the vindication of these 
measures upon, those grounds and to furnish, in the enclosed 
copies of 'General Jackson's letters and the vouchers by which 
they are supported, the evidence of that hostile spirit on the part 
of the Spanish commanders, but for the terms in which Mr. 
Pizarro speaks of the execution of a British subject taken, one 
at the Fort of St. Marks and the other at Suwany and the inti- 
mation that these transactions may lead to a change in the re- 
lations between; the two nations which is doubtless to be under- 
stood as a menace of war. It may be therefore proper to remind 
the government of his Catholic Majesty of the incidents in which 
this Seminole war originated: as well as of the circumstances 
connected with it in the relations between Spain and her ally, 
whom she supposes to have been injured by the proceedings of 
General Jackson: and to give the Spanish cabinet some precise 
information of the nature of the business peculiarly interesting 
to Spain in which these subjects of her allies, in whose favor she 
takes this interest, were engaged, when their projects of every 
kind were terminated in consequence of their falling intO' the 
hands of General Jackson. 

iln the month of August, 1814, while a war existed between 
the United States and Great Britain to which Spain had formally 
declared herself neutral, a British force — not in the fresh 
pursuit of a defeated and flying enemy, not overstepping an 
imaginary and equivocal boundary between their own territories 
and those belonging in some sort as much to their enemy as to- 
Spain, but approaching by sea and by a broadband open invasion 
of the Spanish province, at a thousand miles or an ocean's dis- 
tance from any British territory — landed in Florida; took pos- 
session of Pensacola and the Fort of Barrancas and invited by 
public proclamations all the runaway negroes, all the savage 
Indians, all the pirates and all the traitors to their country whom 



342 The Piirchase of Florida 

they knew or imagined to exist within reach of their summons to 
join their standard and wage an exterminating war against the 
portion of the United States immediately bordering upon this 
neutral' and thus violated territory of Spain. . . . The land com- 
mander of the British forces was a certain Colonel NiidhoUs wlio, 
driven from Pensacola by the approach of General Jaxjkson, 
actually left to he blown up the Spanish Port of Barrancas when 
he found it could not afford him protection, and evacuating that 
part of the province landed at another, established himself on 
the Appaiachicola River, and there erected a fort from which to 
sally forth with his motley tribe of black, white, and red com- 
batants against the defenseless borders of the United States in 
that yicinity. A' part of thisr force consisted of a corps of 
colonial marines, levied in the British colonies, in which George 
Woodbine was a captain and Robert Chrystie Ambrister was a 
lieutenant. As between the United States and Great Britain we 
Bihould be willing to bury this transaction in the same grave of 
oblivion with other transactions of that war, had the hostilities 
of Colonel Nicholls terminated with the war. But he did not 
consider the peace which ensued between the United States 
and Great Britain aS' having put an end either to his military 
occupations or to his negotiations with the Indians against the 
United iStates. Several months after the ratification of the treaty 
of Ghent he retained his post and his party-colored forces in 
military array. By the ninth article of that treaty the United 
States had stipulated to put an end to hotilities immediately 
after its ratification with all the tribes or nations of ilndians with 
whom t'hey might be at war at the time of the ratification and 
to restore to them all the possessions which they had enjoyed in 
the year .1811. This article had no application to the Greek 
nation with whom the United States had already made peace by 
a treaty concluded August 9, 1814, more than four months before 
the treaty of Ghent was signed. Yet Colonel Nicholls not only 
affected to consider it as applying to the Seminoles of Florida 
and the outlawed Red iSticks whom he had induced to join him 
there, but actually persuaded them that they were entitled, by 
virtue of the treaty of Ghent, to all the lands which had belonged 
to the Creek nation within the United States in the year of 1811, 
and that the government of Great Britain would support them in 
that pretension. He asserted also this doctrine in a correspond- 
ence with Colonel Hawkins, then the agent of the United States 
with the Creeks, and gave him notice in their name, with a 



Appendices 343 



mockery of solemnity, that they had concluded a treaty of alli- 
ance offensive and defensive and a treaty of navigation and 
commerce with Great Britain of which more was to be heard 
after it should be ratified in England. 'Colonel NichoUs then 
evacuated his fort which in some of the enclosed papers is 
called the Fort of Prospect Bluff, but which he had denominated 
the British post on the Appalachicola, took with him the white 
portion of his force, and embarked for England with several of 
the wretched savages whom he was thus deluding to their fate: 
among whom was the Prophet Francis or Hillis Hadjo, and left 
the fort, amply supplied with military forces and ammunition, 
to the negro department of his allies. It afterwards was known 
by the name of the Negro Fort. 

Colonel Hiawkins immediately communicated to this govern- 
ment the correspondence between him and Colonel Nicholls . . . 
upon which Mr. Mbnroe, then secretary of state, addressed a 
letter to Mr. Baker, the British charge d'affaires at Washington 
complaining of Nicholls's conduct and showing that his pretence 
that the ninth article of the treaty of Ghent could have any appli- 
cation to his Indians was utterly destitute of foundation. Copies 
of the same correspondence were transmitted to the minister of 
the United States then in England with instructions to remon- 
strate with the British government against these proceedings of 
Nicholls and to Show how incompatible they were with the peace 
which had' been concluded between the two nations. These 
remonstrances were accordingly made. First, in personal in- 
terview with Earl Bathurst and Lord Castiereagh and afterwards 
in written notes addressed successively to them. . . . Lord Bath- 
urst in the most unequivocal manner confirmed the facts and dis- 
avowed the misconduct of Nicholls and declared his disappro- 
bation of the pretended treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, 
which he had made: assured the AJmerican minister that the 
British government had refused to ratify that treaty: and 
would send back the Indians whom Nicholls had brought with 
him, with advice to make their peace on such terms as they 
could obtain. L«ord Castiereagh confirmed the assurance that 
the treaty would not be ratified: and if at the same time that 
these assurances were given certain distinctions of public 
notoriety were shown to the Prophet Hillis Hadjo and he was 
actually honored with a commission as a British officer, it is 
to be presumed that these favors were granted him as rewards 
of past services and not as encouragement to expect any sup- 



/ 



344 ^^^ Purchase of Florida 

port from Great Britain in a continuance of savage hostilities 
against the United States; all intention of giving any such, sup- 
port having heen repeatedly and earnestly disavowed. 

The Negro Fort however, abandoned 'by Colonel Nicholls, 
remained on the Spanish territory, occupied by the banditti to 
whom he had left it and held by them as a post from whence 
to commit depredations, outrages, murders, and as a receptacle 
for fugitive slaves and malefactors to the great annoyance both 
of the United States and of Spanish Florida. In April, 1816, 
General Jackson wrote a letter to the governor of Pensacola 
calling upon him to put down this common, nuisance to the 
peaceable inhabitants of both countries. That letter with the 
answer of the governor of Pensacola have been already com- 
municated to the Spanish minister here and by him doubtless to 
his government. Copies are nevertheless now again enclosed; par- 
ticularly as the letter from the governor explicitly admits that 
this fort constructed by Nicholls in violation both of the terri- 
tory and neutrality of Spain was still no less obnoxious to his 
government than to the United States: but that he had neither 
sufficient force nor authority without orders from the governor 
general of the Havanna to destroy it. It was afterwards, July 
27, 1816, destroyed by a cannon shot from a gun vessel of the 
United States which in its passage up the river was fired upon 
from it. It was blown up with an English flag still flying at its 
standard: and immediately after the barbarous murder of the 
boat's crew, helonging to the navy of the United States by the 
banditti left in it by Nicholls. 

In the year 1817 Alexander Arbuthnot of the island of New 
Providence, a British subject, first appeared as an Indian trader 
in Spanish Florida: and as the successor of Colonel Nicholls in 
the employment of instigating the Seminole and outlawed Red 
Stick Indians to hostilities against the United States by re- 
viving the pretence that they were entitled to all the lands which 
had 'been ceded by the Creek nation to the United States in 
August, 1814. As a mere Indian trader the intrusion of this 
man into a Spanish province was contrary to the policy observed 
by all the European powers in this hemisphere, and by none 
more rigorously than by Spain, of excluding all foreigners 
from intercourse with the Indians within their territories. It 
must be known to the Spanish government whether Arbuthnot 
had a Spanish license for trading with the Indians in Spanish 
Florida or not, but they also knew that Spain was bound by treaty 



Appendices 345 

to restrain by force all hostilities on the part of those Indians 
against the citizens of the United States: and it is for them to 
explain how, consistently with those engagements, Spain could, 
contrary to all the maxims of her ordinary policy, grant such a 
license to a foreign incendiary whose principal if not his only 
object appears to have been to stimulate those hostilities which 
Spain had expressly stipulated by force to restrain. In his in- 
fernal instigations he was but too successful. No sooner did he 
make his appearance among the Indians accompanied by the 
Prophet Hillis Hadjo, returned from his expedition to England, 
than the peaceful inhabitants on the borders of the United States 
were visited with all the horrors of savage war — the robbery of 
their property and the barbarous and indiscriminate murder of 
women, infancy, and age. 

After the repeated expostulations, warnings, and offers of 
peace through the summer and autumn of 1817, on the part of 
the United States, had been answered only by renewed outrages 
and after a detachment of forty men under Lieutenant Scott 
accompanied by seven women had been waylaid and murdered by 
the Indians, orders were given to General Jackson and an ade- 
quate force -was placed at his disposal to terminate the war. 
It was ascertained that the Spanish force in Florida was inade- 
quate for the protection even of the Spanish territory itself 
against this mingled horde of lawless Indians and negroes, and 
although their devastations were committed within the limits of 
the United States they immediately sought refuge within the 
Florida line and there only were overtaken. The necessity of 
crossing the line was indispensable: for it was from beyond the 
line that the Indians made their murderous incursions within 
that of the United States. It was there that they had their 
abode: and the territory belonged in fact to them though within 
the borders of the Spanish jurisdiction. There it was that the 
American commander met the principal resistance from them: 
there it was that they found still bleeding scalps of our citizens, 
freshly butchered by them: there it was, that he released the 
only woman who had been suffered to survive the massacre of 
the party under Lieutenant Scott. But it was not anticipated 
by this government that the commanding officers of Spain in 
Florida, whose especial duty it was, in conformity to the solemn 
engagements contracted by their nation, to restrain by force 
those Indians from hostilities against the United States, would 
be found encouraging, aiding, and abetting them and furnishing 



346 The Piirchase of Florida 

them supplies for carrying on such hostilities. The officer in 
command immediately before General Jackson, was therefore 
specially instructed to respect as far as possihle the Spanish 
authority, Avherever it was maintained, and copies of those orders 
were also furnished to General Jackson upon his- taking command. 

In the course of his pursuit as he approached St. Marks he 
was' informed, direct from the governor of Pensacola, that a 
party of the hostile Indians had threatened to seize that fort and 
that he apprehended the Spanish garrison was not in strength 
sufficient to defend it against them. Ttis information was con- 
firmed from other sources and by the evidence produced upon 
the trial of A'mbrister is proved to have been exactly true. By 
all the laws of neutrality and of war as^ well as of prudence and 
humanity, he was warranted in anticipating his enemy by the 
amicable, and that being refused, by the forcible occupation of 
the fort. It will need no citations from printed treatises on 
International law, to prove the correctness of this principle. It 
is engraved in adamant on the common sense of mankind, no 
writer upon the laws of nations ever pretended to contradict it. 
None of any reputation or authority ever omitted to assert it. 

At Fort St. Marks, Alexander Arfbuthnot, the BTitish Indian 
trader from beyond the sea, the firebrand, by whose touch this 
negro Indian war against our borders had been rekindled, was 
found an inmate of the commandant's family. And it was also 
found that by the commandant, himself, councils of war had 
been permitted to be held within it by the savage chiefs and 
warriors: that it was an open market for cattle known to have 
been robbed by them from citizens of the United States and which 
had been contracted for and purchased by the officers of the gar- 
rison: that information had been afforded from this fort by Ar- 
buthnot to the enemy of the strength and movements of the 
American army: that the date of departure of express had been 
noted by the Spanish commissary and ammunition, munitions of 
war, and all necessary supplies furnished to the Indians. 

The conduct of the governor of Pensacola was not less marked 
by a disposition of enmity to the United States and by an utter 
disregard to the obligatioms of the treaty by which he was bound 
to restrain by force the Indians from hostilities against them. 
When called upon to vindicate the territorial rights and authority 
of Spain by the destruction of the Negro Fort, his predecessor 
had declared it to be not less annoying and pernicious to the 
Spanish subjects in Florida than to the United States, but had 



Appendices 347 

pleaded his inaibility to subdue it. He himself had expressed his ap- 
prehensions that Fort St. Marks would be forcibly taken by the 
savages from the Spanish garrison; yet at the same time he had 
refused the passage up the Escambia River, unless upon the pay- 
ment of excessive duties, to provisions destined as supplies for 
the American army which by the detention of them was subjected 
to the most distressing privations. He had permitted free ingress 
and egress at Pensacola to the avowed savage enemies of the 
United States. Supplies of ammunition, munitions of war, and 
provisions had been received by them from thence. They had 
been received and sheltered there, from the pursuit of the 
American forces, and suffered again tO' sally thence to enter 
upon the American territory and commit new murders. Finally 
on the approach of General Jackson to Pensacola the governor 
sent him a letter denouncing his entry upon the territory of 
Florida as a violent outrage upon the rights of Spain, commanding 
him to depart and withdraw from the same, and threatening, in 
case of his non-compliance, to employ force to expel him. 

lit became therefore, in the opinion of General Jackson, in- 
dispensably necessary to take from the governor of Pensacola 
the means of carrying his threat into execution. Before the 
forces under his command the savage enemies of his country had 
disappeared. But he knew that the moment those forces should 
be disbanded, if siheltered by Spanish fortresses, if furnished with 
ammunition and supplies 'by Spanish officers and if aided and 
supported by the instigation of Spanish encouragement, as he 
had every reason to expect they would be, they would reappear 
and, fired, in addition to their ordinary ferociousness, with re- 
venge for the chastisement they had so recently received, would 
again rush with the war-hatchet and scalping knife into the 
borders of the United .States and mark every footstep with the 
blood of their defenseless citizens. So far as all the native re- 
sources' of the savage extended, the war was at an end and Gen- 
eral Jackson was about to restore to their families and their 
homes the brave volunteers who had followed his standard and 
who had constituted the principal part of his force. This could 
be done with safety leaving the regular portion of his troops 
to garrison his line of forts and two small detachments of volun- 
teer cavalry to scour the country round Pensacola and sweep off 
the lurking remnant of savages who had been scattered and dis- 
persed before him. This was sufficient to keep in check the 
remnant of the banditti against whom he had marched so long 



348 The Purchase of Florida 

as they should be destitute of other aid and' support. It was 
in his judgment not sufficient, if they should be suffered to rally 
their numbers under the protection of Spanish forts and to 
derive new strength from the impotence or the ill will against 
the United States of the Spanish authorities. 

He took possession therefore of Pensacola and of the fort of 
Barrancas as he had done of !St. Marks, not in a spirit of hostility 
to Spain but as a necessary measure of self defense: giving notice 
that they should be restored whenever Spain should place com- 
manders and a force there able and willing to fulfill the engage- 
ments of Spain towards the United States of restraining by force 
the Florida Indians from hostilities against their citizens. The 
president of the United States, to give a signal manifestation of 
his confidence in the disposition of the king of Spain to perform 
with good faith this indispensable engagement and to demonstrate 
to the world that neither the desire of conquest nor hostility 
to Spain had any influence in the councils of the United States, 
has directed the unconditional restoration to any Spanish officer, 
duly authorized to receive them, of Pensacola and the Barrancas, 
and that of St. Marks to any Spanish force adequate for its de>- 
fense against the attack of the savages. But the president will 
neither inflict punishment nor. pass a censure upon General Jack- 
son for that conduct for which he had the most immediate and 
effectual means of forming a judgment: and the vindication of 
which is written in eyery page of the law of nations as well as 
in the first law of nature, self defense. He thinks it, on the con- 
trary, due to the justice which the United States have a right 
claim from Spain, and you are accordingly instructed to demand 
of the Spanish government, that inquiry shall be instituted in 
the conduct of Don Jose Mazot, governor of Pensacola, and of 
Don Francisco C. Luengo, commandant of St. Marks, and a 
suitable punishment inflicted upon them for having, in deflance 
and violation of the engagements of Spain with the United 
States, aided and assisted these hordes of savages in those very 
hostilities against the United States which it was their official 
duty to restrain. This inquiry is due to the character of those 
officers themselves and to the honor of the Spanish government. 
The obligation by Spain to restrain by force the Indians of 
Florida from hostilities against the United States and their 
citizens is explicit, is positive, is unqualified. The fact, that for 
a series of years, they have received shelter, assistance, supplies, 
and protection, in the practice of such hostilities, from the 



Appendices 349 

Spanisli commander in Florida is ctear and unequivocal. If, as 
the commanders both at Pensacola and St. Marks, have alleged, 
this has been the result of their weakness rather than of their 
will, if they have osisisted the Indians against the United Stajtes, 
to avert their hostilities from the province which they had not 
sufficient force to defend against them, it may serve in some 
measure to exculpate, individually those officers; but it must 
carry demonstration irresistible to the Spanish government, that 
the right of the United States can as little compound with im^ 
potence as with perfidy and that Spain must immediately make 
her election either to place a force in Florida adequate at once to 
the protection of her territory and to the fulfilment of her en- 
gagements or cede to the United (States a province of which she 
retains nothing but the nominal possession, but which is in fact 
a derelict, open to the occupancy of every enemy, civilized or 
savage, of the United States and serving no other earthly pur- 
pose, than as a post of annoyance to them. 

That the purposes, as well of the Negro-Indian banditti with 
whom we have been contending, asi of the British invaders of 
Florida v/ho first assembled and employed them, and of the 
British intruding and pretended traders, since the peace, who 
have instigated and betrayed them to destruction, have not been 
less hostile to Spain than to the United States, the proofs con- 
tained in the documents herewith enclosed are conclusive. (Mr, 
Pizarro's note of the 29th of August speaks of his Catholic 
Majesty's profound indignation at the "sanguinary executions 
on the Spanish soil of the subjects of powers in amity with the 
king" — meaning Atbuthnot and Ambrister. Let Mr. Pizarro's 
successor take the trouble of reading the enclosed documents 
and he will discover who Arbuthnot and Ambrister were and 
what were their purposes, that Arbuthnot was only the successor 
of Nicholls, and Ambrister the agent of Woodbine and the sub- 
altern of MacGregor. Mr. Pizarro qualifies General Jackson's 
necessary pursuit of a defeated savage enemy beyond the Span- 
ish Florida line as a shameful invasion of his Majesty's territory. 
Yet that territory was the territory also of the savage enemy and 
Spain was bound to restrain them by force from hostilities against 
the United States; and it was the failure of Spain to fulfill this 
engagement which had made it necessary for General Jackson 
to pursue the savage across the line. What was the character of 
Nicholls's invasion of his Majesty's territory and where was his 
Majesty's profound indignation at that? Mr. Pizarro says, his 



350 The Purchase of Florida 

Majesty's forts and places have been violently seized on by Gen- 
eral Jackson. Had they mot been seized on, nay had not the 
principal of his forts been blown up by Nicholls and a Biritish 
fort on the same Spanish territory been erected during the war 
and left standing aS a negro fort in defiance of Spanish authority 
after the peace? Where was his Majesty's indignation at that? 
Has his Majesty given solemn warning to the British government 
that these were incidents "of transcendent moment capable of 
producing an essential and thorough change in the political 
relations of the two countries?" Nicholls and Woodbine in their 
invitations and promises to the slaves to run away from their 
masters and join t'hem did not confine themselves to the slaves 
of the United iStates, They received with as hearty a welcome 
and employed with equal readiness the fugitives from their 
masters in Florida and Georgia. Against this special injury the 
governor of Pensacolai did earnestly remonstrate with the BTitish 
Admiral Cockburn, but against the sihameful invasion of the 
territory; against the blowing up of the ^Barrancas, and the 
erection and maintenance under British banners of the Negro 
Fort on Spanish soil; against the negotiation by a British officer 
in the midst of peace, of pretended treaties, offensive and defen- 
sive, and of navigation and commerce, upon Spanish territory 
between Great Britain and Spanish 'Indians whom Spain was 
bound to control and restrain; if a whisper of expostulation was 
ever wafted from Madrid to London it was not loud enough to 
be heard across the Atlantic nor energetic enough to transpire 
beyond the palaces from w'hich it issued and to which it was 
borne. 

The connection between Arbuthniot and Nicholls and between 
Ambrister, Woodbine and MacGregor is established beyond all 
question by the evidence produced at the trials before the court- 
martial. T have already remarked to you on the very extraor- 
dinary circumstance that a British trader from beyond the sea 
should be permitted by the Spanish authorities to trade with 
the Indians of Florida. Froni his letter to Hambly flated May 
3', 1817, it appears that his trading was but a pretence and that 
his principal purpose was to act as the agent of the Indians of 
Florida and outlaws from the Creeks, to obtain the aid of the 
British government in their hostilities against the United States. 
He expressly tells Hambly there that the chiefs of those outlaws 
was the principal cause of his (Arbuthnot) being in the country; 
and that he had come with an answer from Earl Bathurst, de- 



Appendices 351 

livered to him by Governor Cameron of New Providence, to 
certain Indian talks in w'hicli this aid of the British government 
had been solicited. Hambly himself had been left by Nicholls 
as the agent between the Indians and tbe British government; 
but having found that Nicholls had failed in his attempt to pre- 
vail upon the British government to pursue this clandestine war 
in the midst of peace, and that they were not prepared to support 
his pretence that half a dozen outlawed fugitives from the Creeks 
were the Creek Nation; when Arbuthnot the incendiary came 
and was instigating them by promises of support from Great 
Britain to commence their murderous incursions into the United 
States, Hambly at the request of the chiefs of the Creeks them- 
selves, wrote to him, warning him to withdraw from among that 
band of outlaws and giving him a solemn foreboding of the doom 
that awaited him from the hand of justice, if he persevered in 
the course that he pursued. Arbuthnot nevertheless persisted; 
and while he was deluding the wretched Indians with the 
promise of support from England he was writing letters from 
them to the British minister in the United States, to Governor 
Cameron of New Providence, to Colonel Nicholls tO' be laid before 
the British government and even to the Spanish governor of St. 
Augustine and the governor general of the Havanna, soliciting in 
all quarters aid and support, arms and ammunition for the 
Indians against the United States, bewailing the destruction of 
the Negro Fort, and charging the British government with having 
drawn the Indians into war with the United States and deserting 
them after the peace. 

You will remark among the papers produced on his trial a 
power of attorney, dated June 17, 1817, given him by twelve 
Indians, partly of Florida and partly of the fugitive outlaws from 
the United States. He states that this power and his instruc- 
tions were to memorialize the British government and the gov- 
ernor general of the Havanna. These papers are not only sub- 
stantially proved as his handwriting on the trial, but in the 
daily newspapers of London of the 24th and 25th of August, his 
letter to Nicholls is published (somewhat curiously garbled) 
with a copy of Hamlbly's above mentioned letter to him and a 
reference to this Indian power of attorney to him aproved by 
the commandant of St. Marks, F. C. Luengo. Another of the 
papers is a letter written im the name of the same chiefs by 
Arbuthnot to the governor general of the Havanna asking of 
him permission for Arbuthnot to establish a warehouse on the 



3^2 The Purchase of Florida 

Appalachicola; Taitterly and falsely complaining that the Ameri- 
cans had made settlements on their lands withim the Spanish, 
lines, and calling upon the governor general to give orders to 
displace them and send them hack to their own country. In tills 
letter they assign as a reason for asking the license for Arbuthnot 
their want of a person to put in writing for them their talks 
of grievances against the Americans; and they add "the com- 
mander of the fort of St. Marks has heard of all our talks and 
complaints. He approves of what we have done and what we 
are doing and it is hy his recommendation we have thus pre- 
sumed to address your excellency." You will find these papers 
in the printed newspapers enclosed and in the proceedings of 
the court-martial and will point them out to the Spanish gov- 
ernment, not only as decisive proof of the unexampled compliance 
of the Spanish officers in Florida to foreign intrusive agents and 
instigators of Indian hostilities against the United States, but 
as placing beyond a doubt that participation of this hostile spirit 
in the commandant of St. Miarks, which General Jackson so 
justly complains of and of which we have so well founded a 
right to demand the punishment. Here is the commandant of 
tlie Spanish fort, bound by the sacred engagement of a treaty 
to restrain by force the Indians within his command from com- 
mitting hostilities against the United States, conspiring with 
those same Indians and deliberately giving his written appro- 
bation to their appointment of a foreigner, a British subject, as 
their agent to solicit assistance and supplies from the governor 
general of the Havanna and from the British government for 
carrying on those same hostilities. 

Let us come to the case of Ambrister. He was taken in 
arms, leading and commanding the Indians in the war against 
the American troops; and to that charge upon his trial pleaded 
guilty. But the primary object of his coming there was still 
more hostile to Spain than to the United iStates. You find that 
he told three of the witnesses who testified at his trial that he 
had come to this country upon Mr. Woodbine's business at Tampa 
Bay, to see the negroes righted, and one of them that he had a 
commission in the patriot army under MacGregor, and that he 
expected a captaincy. And what was the intsnded business of 
MacGregor and Woodbine at Tampa Bay? It was the conquest 
of Florida from Spain by the use of those very Indians and 
negroes whom the commandant of St. Marks was so ready to aid 
and support in war against the United States. The chain of 



Appendices 353 

proof that establishes this fact is contained in the documents 
communicated by the president to congress at their last session 
relating to the occupation of Amelia Island by MacG-regor. From 
these documents: you will find that while MacGregor was there 
Wtoodbine went from New Providence in a schooner of his own 
to join him; that he arrived at Amelia Island just as MacGregor, 
abandoning the companions of his achievement there, was leav- 
ing it; that MacGregor, quitting the vessel in which he had 
embarked at Amelia, went on board that of Woodfbine and re- 
turned with him to New Providence; that Woodbine had per- 
suaded him they could yet accomplish the conquest of Florida 
with soldiers to be recruited at Nassau, from the corps of col- 
onial marines which had served under Nicholls during the late 
war with the United States, which corps had 'been lately disbanded, 
and with negroes to be found at Tampa Bay, and 1,500 Indians 
already then engaged to Woodbine, who pretended that they had 
made a grant of all their lands to him. Among the papers, the 
originals of which are in our possession, are, in MacGregor'si own 
handwriting, instructions for sailing into Tampa Bay, with the 
assertion that he calculated to be there by the last of April or 
first of May of the present year; a letter, dated December 27 last, 
to one of his acquaintances in this country which was to have 
been issued at Tampa Bay, to the inhabitants of Florida, by the 
person charged with making the settlement there, before his 
arrival, announcing his approach for the purpose of liberating 
them from the despotism of Spain and of enabling them to form 
a government for themselves. He had persuaded those who 
would listen to him here, that his ultimate object was to sell 
the Florida® to the United States. There is some reason to sup- 
pose that he had made indirect overtures of a similar nature to 
the British government. This was Ambrister's business in 
Florida. He arrived there in March, the precursor of MacGregor 
and Woodbine, and immediately upon his arrival he is found 
seizing upon Arbuthnot's goods and distributing them among the 
negroes and Indians; seizing upon his vessel and compelling its^ 
master to pilot him with a body of armed negroes toward the 
fort of St. Marks; with the declared purpose of taking it by 
surprise in the night; writing letters to Governor Cameron of 
New Providence urgently calling for supplies of munitions of 
war and of cannon for the war against the Americans, and let- 
ters to Colonel Nicholls renewing the same demands of supplies 
and informing him that he is with 300 negroes, "a few of our 

23 



354 The Purchase of Florida 

Bluff people" who tiad stuck to the cause and were relying upon 
the faith of Nicholls's promises. "Our Bluff people" were the 
people of the Negro Fort, collected by Nicholls's and Woodbine's 
proclamations during the American and English war, and "the 
cause" to which they stuck was the savage, servile, exterminating 
wa;r against the United States. 

Among the agents and actors of such virtuous enterprises as 
are here unveiled, it was hardly to he expected that there would 
be found remarkable evidences of their respect, confidence, and 
good faith towards one another. Accordingly, besides the violent 
seizure and distribution by Ambrister of Arbuthnot's property, 
his letters to Governor Cameron and to Nicholls are filled with 
the distrust and suspicions of the Indians, that they were deceived 
and betrayed by Arbuthnot; while in Arlbuthnot's letters to the 
same Nicholls, he accuses Woodbine of having taken charge of 
poor Francis the prophet, or Hillis Hadjo, upon his return from 
England to New Providence, and under pretence of taking care 
of him and his affairs, of having defrauded him of a large portion 
of the presents which had been delivered out from the king's 
stores to him for Francis's use. This is one of the passages of 
Arbuthnot's letter to Nicholls omitted in the publication of it 
last August in the London newspapers. 

Is this narrative of dark and complicated depravity; this 
creeping and insidious war, both against Spain and the United 
States; this mockery of patriotism; these political philters to 
fugitive slaves and Indian outlaws; these perfidies and treach- 
eries of villains, incapable of keeping their faith even to each 
other; all in the name of South American liberty, of the rights 
of runaway negroes, and the wrongs of savage murderers; all 
comhined and projected to plunder Spain of her provinces and 
to spread massacre and devastation along the border of the 
United States; is all this sufficient to cool the sympathies of his 
Catholic Majesty's government excited by the execution of these 
"two subject® of a power in amity with the king?" The Spanish 
government is not at this day to be informed that, cruel as war 
in its mildest forms must be, it is, and necessarily must be, 
doubly cruel when waged with savages; that savages make no 
prisoners but to torture them; that they give no quarter; that 
they put to death without discrimination of age or sex. That 
these ordinary characteristics of Indian warfare have been ap- 
plicable in their most heart sickening horrors to that war, left 
us by Nicholls as his legacy, reinstigated by Woodbine, Arbuth- 



Appendices 355 

riot, and Amlbrister, and stimulated by the approbation, encour- 
agement, and aid of the Spanish commandant at iSt. M,arlvs, is 
proof required? Entreat the Spanish minister of state for a 
moment to overcome the feelings which details like these must 
excite; and to reflect, if possible, with composure upon the facts 
stated in the following extracts from the documents enclosed. 

Letter from sailing-master, Jairus Loomis to Commodore 
Daniel T. Patterson, August 13, 1816, reporting the destruction 
of the Negro Fort: "On examining the prisoners they stated 
that Edward Dianiels O. S., who was made prisoner in the boat 
on the 17th July, was tarred and burnt alive." 

Letter from Archibald Clarke to General Gaines, February 2'S, 
1817. (.Messages, Presidents to Congress, March 25, 1818, page 
9) : '^On the 24th instant the house of Mr. Garret, residing in the 
upper part of this county, near the boundary of Wayne county 
(Georgia), was attacked during his absence near the middle of 
the day, by this party (of Indians) consisting of about fifteen, 
who shot Mrs. Garret in two places and then dispatched her by 
stabbing and scalping. Her two children, one about three years, 
the other two months, were also murdered and the eldest scalped; 
the house was then plundered of every article of value and set 
on fire." 

Letter from Peter B. Cook (Arbuthnot's clerk) to Eliza 
Carney at Nassau, dated at Suh vahnee, January 19, 1818, giving 
an account of their operations with the Indians against the 
Americans; and their massacre of Lieutenant Scott and his 
party: 

"There was a boat that was taken by the Indians that had 
in thirty men, seven women, four small children. There were 
six of the men got clear and one woman saved and all of the 
rest of them got killed. The children were took by the leg and 
their brains dashed out against the boat." 

If the bare recital of scenes like these cannot be 'perused 
without shuddering, what must be the agonized feeling of those 
whose wives and children are from day to day and from night to 
night exposed to be the victims of the same barbarity? Has 
mercy a voice to plead for the perpetrators and instigators of 
deeds like these? Shall inquiry hereafter be made, why within 
three months after this event the savage Hamathli-Mico, upon 
being taken by the American troops, was by order of their com- 
mander immediately hung, let it be told that that savage was 
the commander of the party by which those women, were butch- 



3^6 The Purchase of Florida 

ered and those helpless infants were thus dashed against the 
hoat! 

Contending with such enemies, although humanity revolts 
at entire retaliation upon them and spares the lives of their 
feeble and defenseless women and children, yet mercy, herself, 
surrenders to retributive justice the lives of their lea'ding war- 
riors taken in arms and still more the lives of the foreign white 
incendiaries who, disowned by their own governments and dis- 
owning their own natures, degrade themselves beneath the sav- 
age character by voluntarily descending to its level. Is not this 
the dictate of common sense? Is it not the usage of legitimate 
warfare? Is it not consonant to the soundest authorities of 
national law? . . . "When at war (says Vattel) with a ferocious 
nation which observes no rules and grants* no quarter they may 
be chastised in the persons of those of them who may be taken; 
they are of the number of the guilty and by this rigor the 
attempt may be made of bringing them to a sense of the laws 
of humanity." And again: "As a general has the right of 
sacrificing the lives of his enemies to his own safety or that of 
his people, if he has to contend with an inhuman enemy, often 
guilty of such excesses, he may take the lives of some of his 
prisoners, and treat them as his own people have been treated." 
The justification of these principles is found in their salutary 
efficacy for terror and example. 

It is thus only that the barbarities of Indians can be suc- 
cessfully encountered. It is thus only that the worse than 
Indian barbarities of European impostors, pretending authority 
from their government, but always disavowed can be punished 
and arrested. Great Britain yet engages the alliance and co- 
operation of savages in war. iBut her government has invariably 
disclaimed all countenance or authorization to her subjects to 
instigate them against us in time of peace. Yet so it has hap- 
pened, that, from the period of our established independence to 
this day all the Indian wars with which we have been afflicted 
have been distinctly traceable to the instigation of English 
traders or agents. Always disavowed, yet always felt; more than 
once detected but never before punished; two of them, offenders 
of the deepest dye, after solemn warning to their government, and 
individually to one of them, have fallen, flagrante delicto, into the 
hands of an American general; and the punishment inflicted upon 
them has fixed them on high as an example, awful in its ex- 
hibition, but we trust auspicious in its results, of that which 



Appendices 357 

awaits unauthorized pretenders of European agency to stinaulate 
and interpose in wars ."between the United States and the In- 
dians within their control. 

This exposition of their origin, the causes and the character 
of the war with the Seminole Indians and part of the Creeks, 
combined with MacGregor's mock patriots and Nicholls's negroes 
which necessarily led our troops into Florida and gave rise to 
all those incidents of which Pizarro so vehemently complains, 
will, it is hoped, enable you to present other and sounder views 
of the subject to his Catholic Majesty's government. It will 
enable you to show that the occupation of Pensacola and St. 
Marks was occasioned neither by hostility to Spain nor with a 
view to extort prematurely the province from her possession; 
that it was rendered necessary by the neglect of Spain to per- 
form her engagements of restraining the Indians from hostilities 
against the United States and by the culpable countenance, en- 
couragement, and assistance given to those Indians in their 
hostilities by the Spanish government and commandant at those 
places; that the United iStates have a right to demand, as the 
president does demand, of Spain the punishment of those officers 
for this misconduct and he further demands of Spain a just and 
reasonable indemnity to the United States for the heavy and 
necessary expenses which they have heen compelled to incur, 
by the failure of Spain to perform her engagement to restrain the 
Indians aggravated by this demonstrated complicity of her com- 
manding officers with them in their hostilities against the United 
States. . . . 

That the two Englishmen, executed by order of General 
Jackson, were not only identified with the savages with whom 
they were carrying on the war against the United States, but 
that one of them was the mover and fomenter of the war, which, 
without his interference and false promises to the Indians of 
support from the British government, never would have hap- 
pened; that the other was the instrument of war against Spain 
as well as the United States; commissioned by MacGregor and 
expedited hy Wtoodbine, upon their project of conquering Florida, 
with these Indians and negroes; that as accomplices of the sav- 
ages and sinning against their better knowledge, worse than 
savages. General Jackson, possessed of their persons and of the 
proofs of their guilt, might, by the lawful and ordinary usages 
of war, have hung them both without the formality of a trial; 
that to allow them every possible opportunity of refuting the 



358 The Purchase of Florida 

proofs, or of showing any circumstances in extenuation of their 
crimes he gave them the benefit of trial by a court-martial of 
highly respectable officers; that the defense of one consisted 
solely and exclusively of technical cavils at the nature of part of 
the evidence against him and the other confessed his guilt; finally 
that in restoring Pensacola and St. Marks to Spain the president 
gives the most signal proof of his confidence, that hereafter her 
engagement to restrain by force the Indians of Florida from all 
hostilities against the United States will be effectually fulfilled — 
that there will be no more murders, no more robberies within 
our borders by savages, prowling along the Spanish line and 
seeking shelter within it, to display in their villages the scalps 
of our women and children, their victims, and to sell with 
shameless effrontery the plunder from our citizens in Spanish 
forts and cities - — that we shall have no more apologies from 
Spanish governors and commandants of their inability to perform 
the duties of their office and the solemn contracts of their coun- 
try, no more excuses for compliances to the savage enemies^ of the 
United 'States from the dread of their attacks upon themselves, 
no more harboring of foreign impostors upon compulsion — that 
strength sufficient will be kept in the province to restrain the 
Indians by force and officers empowered amd entrusted to employ 
It effectually to maintain the good faith of the nation by the 
effective fulfilment of the treaty. 

The duty of this government to protect the persons and 
property of our fellow citizens on the borders of the United 
States is imperative; it must be discharged; and if after all the 
warnings that Spain has had — if after the prostration of all her 
territorial rights, neutral obligations by Nicholls and his banditti 
during war, and all her treaty stipulations by Arbuthnot and 
Ambrister abetted by her own commanding officers during peace 
to the cruel annoyance of the United States ■ — if the necessities 
of self defense should again compel the United States to take 
possession of the Spanish forts and places in Florida, declare 
with the frankness and candor that becomes us, that another 
unconditional restoration of them must not be expected; that 
even the president's confidence in the good faith and ultimate 
justice of the Spanish government, will yield to the painful ex- 
perience of continual disappointment; and that after unwearied 
and almost unnumbered appeals to them for the performance of 
their stipulated duties, in vain, the United States will be reluct- 
antly compelled to rely for the protection of their borders upon 
themselves alone, John Qm.NCY Adams. 



APPENDIX D. 

17&5. 
TRIEiAiTY OOF" FRI'ENIDlSHIP, IjIMITS, AND NlAiVrG-ATIION. 

OONCLXJDED OCTOBEK 27, 1795; RATIFICATIONS EXCHANGED AT ARANJtIEZ 

APEiL 25, 179i6; peoclaimed august 2, 1796. 

His Catholic Majesty and the United States of America, 
desiring to consolidate, on a permanent basis, the friendship and 
good correspondence which happily prevails between the two 
parties, have determined to estaJhlish, by aj convention, several 
points, the settlement whereof will be productive of general ad- 
vantage and reciprocal utility to both nations. 

With this intention, his Catholic Majesty has appointed the 
most excellent Lord Don Manuel de Godoy, and Alvarez de 
Faria, Rios, Sanchez, Zarzosa, Prince de la Paz, Duke de la 
Alcudia, Lord of the Soto de Roma, and of the state of Albala, 
Grandee of Spain of the first class, perpetual Regidor of the city 
of Santiago, Knight of the illustrious Order of the Golden 
Fleece, and Great Cross of the Royal and distinguished Spanish 
Order of Charles the V., Commander of Valencia del Ventoso, 
Rivera, and Acenchal in that of Santiago, Knight and Great 
Cross of the religious Order of St. John; Counsellor of State; 
Superintendent General of the Posts and Highways; Protector of 
the Royal Academy of the Noble Arts, and of the Royal Societies 
of Natural History, Botany, Chemistry, and Astronomy; Gentle- 
man of the King's Chamber in employment; Captain General of 
his Armies; Inspector and Major of the Royal Corps of Body 
Guards, &c., &c., &c., and the President of the United States, 
with the advice and consent of their Senate, has appointed 
Thomas Pinckney, hj citizen of the United States, and their 
Envoy Extraordinary to His Catholic Majesty. And the said 
Plenipotentiaries have agreed upon and concluded the following 
articles : 



360 The Purchase of Florida 



AETICLE 1. 

Tliere shall be a firm and inviola'ble peace and sincere friend- 
ship between His Catholic Majesty, his successors and subjects, 
and the United States and their citizens, without exception of 
persons or places. 

ARTICLE 2. 

To prevent all disputes on the subject of the boundaries which 
separate the territories of the two high contracting parties, it is 
hereby declared and agreed as follows, to-wit: The southern 
boundary of the United States, which divides their territory 
from the Spanish colonies of Bast and Wiest Florida, shall be 
designated by a line beginning on the river Mississippi, at the 
northernmost part of the thirty-first degree of latitude north of 
the equator, which from thence shall be drawn due east to the 
middle of the river Appalachicola, or Catachouche, thence along 
the middle thereof to its junction with the Flint; thence straight 
to the head of St. Mary's River, and thence down the middle 
thereof to the Atlantic Ocean. And it is agreed that if there 
should be any troops, garrisons, or settlements of either party in 
the territory of the other, according to the above mentioned 
boundaries, they shall be withdrawn from the said territory 
within the term of six months after the ratification of this 
treaty, or sooner if it be possible; and that they shall be per- 
mitted to take with them all the goods and effects which they 
possess. 

ARTICLE 3. 

In order to carry the preceding article into effect, one com- 
missioner and one surveyor shall be appointed by each of the 
contracting parties, who shall meet at the Natchez, on the left 
side of the river Mississippi, before the expiration of six months 
from the ratification of this convention, and they shall proceed 
to run and mark this boundary according to the stipulations of 
the said article. They shall make plats and keep journals of 
their proceedings, which shall be considered as part of this 
convention, and shall have the same force as if they were inserted 
therein. And if on any account it should be found necessary 
that the said commissioners and surveyors should be accom- 
panied by guards, they shall be furnished in equal proportions by 



Appendices 361 

the commanding officer of His Majesty's troops in the tvfo 
Moridas, and the commanding officer of the troops of the United 
States in their southwestern territory, who shall act by common 
consent, and amicably, as well with respect to this point as to 
the furnishing of provisions and instruments, and making every 
other arrangement which may be necessary or useful for the 
execution of this article. 

AETICLE 4. 

It is likewise agreed that the western boundary of the 
United States which separates them from the Spanish colony of 
Liouisiana, is in the middle of the channel or bed of the River 
Mississippi, from the northern (boundary of the said States to 
the completion of the thirty-first degree of latitude north of 
the equator. And His Catholic Majesty has likewise agreed that 
the navigation of the said river, in its whole 'breadth from its 
source to the ocean, shall be free only to his subjects and the 
citizens of the United States, unless he should extend this priv- 
ilege to the su'bjects of other powers by special convention. 

ARTICLE 5. 

'The two high contracting parties shall, by all the means in 
their power, maintain peace and harmony among the several 
Indian nations who inhabit the country adjacent to the lines 
and rivers, which, by the preceding articles, form the boundaries 
of the two Floridas. And the better to obtain this effect, both 
parties oblige themselves expressly to restrain by force all hos- 
tilities on the part of the Indian nations living within their 
boundaries; so that Spain will not suffer her Indians to attack 
the citizens of the United States, nor the Indians inhabiting 
their territory; nor will the United States permit these last 
mentioned Indians to commence hostilities against the subjects 
of His Catholic Majesty or his Indians in any manner whatever. 

Ahd whereas several treaties of friendship exist between 
the two contracting parties and the said nations of Indians, it 
is hereby agreed that in future no treaty of alliance, or other 
whatever (except treaties of peace), shall be made by either 
party with the Indians living within the boundary of the other, 
but hoth parties will endeavor to make the advantages of the 
Indian trade common and mutually heneflcial to their respective 



362 The Purchase of Florida 

subjects' and citizens, observing in all things the most complete 
reciprocity; so that both parties may obtain the advantages 
arising from a good understanding with the said nations, without 
being subject to the expense which they have hitherto occasioned. 

AETICtE 6. 

Each party shall endeavor, by all means in their power, to 
protect and defend all vessels and other effects belonging to the 
citizens or subjects of the other, which shall be within the extent 
of their jurisdiction by sea or by land, and shall use all their 
efforts to recover, and cause to be restored to the right owners, 
their vessels and effects which may have been taken from them 
within the extent of their said jurisdiction, whether they are 
at war or not with the power whose subjects have taken posses- 
sion of the said effects. 

ARTICLE 7. 

'And it is agreed that the subjects of each of the contracting 
parties, their vessels or effects, shall not be liable to any embargo 
or detention on the part of the other, for any military expedition 
or other public or private purpose whatever; and in all cases of 
seizure, detention, or arrest for debts contracted, or offenses 
committed by any citizen or subject of the one party within the 
jurisdiction of the other, the same shall be made and prosecuted 
by order and authority of law only, and according to the regular 
course of proceeding usual in such cases. The citizens and 
subjects of both parties shall be allowed to employ such advo- 
cates, solicitors, notaries, agents, and factors, as they may 
judge proper, in all their affairs, and in all their trials at law, 
in which they may be concerned before the tribunals of the other 
party; and such agents shall have free access to be present at 
the proceedings in such causes, and at the taking of all examin- 
ations and evidence which may be exhibited in the said trials. 

ARTICLE 8. 

'In case the subjects and inhabitants of either party, with 
their shipping, whether public and of war, or private and of 
merchants, be forced, through stress of weather, pursuit of 
pirates or enemies, or any other urgent necessity, for seeking 



Appendices 363 

of shelter and harbor, to retreat and enter into any of the 
rivers, hays, roads, or ports belonging to the other party, they 
shall be received and treated with all humanity, and enjoy all 
favor, protection, and help, and they shall be permitted to refresh 
and provide themselves at reasonable rates, with victuals and all 
things needful for the sustenance of their persons, or reparation 
of their ships and prosecution of their voyage; and they shall 
no ways be hindered from returning out of the said ports or 
roads, but may remove and depart when and whither they please, 
without any let or hindrance. 

ABTICLE 9. 

All ships and merchandize, of what nature soever, which 
shall be rescued out of the hands of any pirates or robbers on 
the high seas, shall be brought into some port, in order to be 
taken care of, and restored entire to the true proprietor, as soon 
as due and suflBcient proof shall be made concerning the property 
thereof. 

ARTICLE 10. 

"Wlhen any vessel of either party shall be wrecked, foundered, 
or otherwise damaged, on the coasts or within the dominion of 
the other, their respective subjects or citizens shall receive, as 
well for themselves as for their vessels and effects, the same 
assistance which would be due to the inhabitants of the country 
where the damage happens, and shall pay the same charges and 
dues only as the said inhabitants would be subject to pay in a 
like case; and if the operations of repair should require that the 
whole or any part of the cargo be unladen, they shall pay no 
duties, charges, or fees on the part which they shall relade and 
carry away. 

ARTICLE 11. 

The citizens and subjects of each party shall have power to 
dispose of their personal goods, within the jurisdiction of the 
other, by testament, donation, or otherwise, and their represen- 
tatives being subjects or citizens of the other party, shall succeed 
to their said personal goods, whether by testament or ah intestato 
and they may take possession thereof, either by themselves or 
others acting for them, and dispose of the same at their will, 



364 The Purchase of Florida 

paying such dues only as the inhabitants of the country wherein 
the said goods are, shall be subject to pay in like cases. 

And in case of the absence of the representative, such care 
shall be taken of the said goods, as would be taken of the goods 
of a native in like case, until the lawful owner may take measures 
for receiving them. And if questions shall arise among several 
claimants to which of them the said goods belong, the same 
shall be decided finally :by the laws and judges of the land 
wherein the said goods are. And where, on the death of any 
person holding real estate within the territories of the one party, 
such real estate would by the laws of the land descend on a 
citizen or subject of the other, were he not disqualified by being 
an alien, such subjects shall be allowed a reasonable time to sell 
the same, and to withdraw the proceeds without molestation, and 
exempt from all rights of detraction on the part of the govern- 
ment of the respective states. 

ARTICLE 12. 

The merchant ships of either of the parties which shall be 
making into a port belonging to the enemy of the other party, 
and concerning whose voyage, and the species of goods on board 
her, there shall be just grounds of suspicion, shall be obliged to 
exhibit as well upon the high seas as in the ports and havens, not 
only her passports, but likewise certificates, expressly showing 
that her goods are not of the number of those which have been 
prohibited as contraband. 

AETICLE 13. 

For the better promoting of commerce on both sides, it is 
agreed, that if a war shall break out between the said two 
nations, one year after the proclamation of war shall be allowed 
to the merchants in the cities and towns where they shall live, 
for collecting and transporting their goods and merchandizes; 
and if anything be taken from them or any injury be done them 
within that term, by either party, or the people or subjects of 
either, full satisfaction shall be made for the same by the 
government. 

ARTICLE 14. 

No subject of His Catholic Majesty shall apply for, or take 
any commission or letters of marque, for arming any ship or 



Appendices 365 

ships to act as privateers against the said United States, or 
against the citizens, people, or inhahitants of the said United 
States, or against the property of any of the inhahitants of them, 
from any Prince or State with which the said king shall be at 
war. And if any person of either nation shall take such com- 
missions or letters of marque, he shall he punished as a pirate. 

ARTICLE 15. 

It shall be lawful for all and singular the subjects of His 
Catholic Majesty, and the citizens, people, and inhabitants of the 
said United States, to sail with their ships with all manner of 
liberty and security, no distinction being made who are the pro- 
prietors of the merchandizes laden thereon, from any port to the 
places of those who now are, or hereafter shall be, at enmity 
with His Catholic Majesty or the United States. It shall be like- 
wise lawful for the subjects and inhabitants aforesaid, to sail 
with the ships and merchandizes aforementioned, and to trade- 
with the same liberty and security from the places, ports, and 
havens of those who are enemies of both or either party, without 
any opposition or disturbance whatsoever, not only directly 
from the places of the enemy aforementioned, to neutral places, 
but also from one place belonging to an enemy, to another place 
belonging to an enemy, whether they be under the jurisdiction 
of the saime prince or under several; and it is hereby stipulated 
that free ships shall also give freedom to goods, and that every- 
thing shall be deemed free and exempt which shall be found 
on board the ships belonging to the subjects of either of the 
contracting parties, although the whole lading, or any part there- 
of, should appertain to the enemies of either; contraband goods 
being always excepted. It is also agreed that the same liberty 
be extended to persons who are on board a free ship, so tha>t 
although they be enemies to either party, they shall not be made 
prisoners or taken out of that free ship, unless they are soldiers 
and in actual service of the enemies. 

AETICUE 16. 

iThis liberty of navigation and commerce shall extend to all 
kinds of merchandizes, excepting those only which are distin- 
guished by the name of contraband; and under this name of 
contraband or prohibited goods, shall be comprehended arms. 



366 The Piurchase of Florida 

great guns, bombs, with, the fusees, and other things belonging 
to them, cannon-ball, gun-powder, match, pikes, swords, lances, 
spears, halberds, mortars, petards, granades, saltpeter, muskets, 
musket-balls, bucklers, helmets, breast plates, coats of rnail, and 
the like kind of arms proper for arming soldiers, musket-rests, 
belts, horses with their furniture, and all other warlike instru- 
ments whatever. These merchandizes which follow shall not 
be reckoned among contraband or prohibited goods: That is to 
say, all sorts of cloths, and all other manufactures woven of any 
wool, flax, silk, cotton, or any other materials whatever; all 
kinds of wearing apparel, together with all species whereof they 
are used to be made; gold and silver, as well coined as uncoined, 
tin, latton, copper, brass, coals, as also wheat, barley, oats, and 
any other kind of corn and pulse; tobacco and likewise all man- 
ner of spices, salted and smoked flesh, salted fish, cheese and 
butter, beer, oils, wines, sugars, and all sorts of salts, and in 
general all provisions which serve for the sustenance of life. 
Furthermore all kinds of cotton, hemp, flax, tar, pitch, ropes, 
cables, pails, sail-cloths, anchors, and any parts of anchors; also 
ships' masts, planks, wood of all kind, and all other things 
proper either for building or repairing ships, and all other 
goods whatever which have not been worked into the form of 
any instrument prepared for war, by land or by sea, shall not be 
reputed contraband, much less such as have been already wrought 
and made up for any other use; all which shall be wholly reck- 
oned among free goods, as likewise all other merchandizes and 
things which are not comprehended and particularly mentioned 
in the foregoing enumeration of contraband goods; so that they 
may be transported and carried in the freest manner by the sub- 
jects of both parties, even to places belonging to an enemy, S'uch 
towns or places being only excepted as are at that time besieged, 
blocked up, or invested. And except the cases in which any ship 
of war or squadron shall, in consequence of storms or other acci- 
dents at sea, be under the necessity of taking the cargO' of any 
trading vessel or vessels, and furnish themselves with neces- 
saries, giving a receipt, in order that the power to whom the said 
ship of war belongs may pay for the articles so taken according 
to the price thereof, at the port to which they may appear to have 
been destined by the ship's papers; and the two contracting pai'- 
ties engage, that the vessels shall not be detained longer than may 
be absolutely necessary for their said ships to supply themselves 
with necessaries; that they will immediately pay the value of the 



Appendices i,6j 

receipts, and indemnify the proprietor for all losses "whicli lie may- 
have sustained in consequence of such a transaction. 

ARTICLE 17. 

To the end that all manner of dissensions and quarrels may- 
lye avoided and prevented on one side and the other, it is agreed 
that in case either of the parties hereto should be engaged in a 
■war, the ships and vessels belonging to the subjects or people 
of the other party must be furnished with sea-letters or pass- 
ports expressing the name, property, and bulk of the ship, as 
also the name and place of habitation of the master or com- 
mander of the said ship, that it may appear thereby that the 
ship really and truly belongs to the subjects of one of the parties, 
which passport shall be made out and granted according to the 
form annexed to this treaty. They shall likewise be recalled 
every year, that is, if the ship happens to return home within 
the space of a year. 

ilt is likewise agreed, that such ships being laden, are to be 
provided not only with passports as above mentioned, but also 
with certificates, containing the several particulars of the cargo, 
the place whence the ship sailed, that so it may be known wheth- 
er any forbidden or contraband goods be on board the same; 
which certificates shall be made out by the officers of the place 
whence the ship sailed in the accustomed form. And if any one 
shall think it fit or advisable to express in the said certificates 
the person to whom the goods on board (belong, he may freely 
do so. Without which requisites they may be sent to one of the 
ports of the other contracting party, and adjudged by the com- 
petent tribunal, according to what is above set forth, that all 
the circumstance of this omission having been well examined, 
they shall be adjudged to be legal prizes, unless they shall give 
legal satisfaction of their property by testimony entirely equiv- 
alent. 

ARTICLE 18. 

If the ships of the said subjects, people, or inhabitants, of 
either of the parties shall be met with, either sailing along the 
coasts or on the high seas, (by any ship of war of the other, or by 
any privateer, the said ship of war or privateer, for the avoiding 
of any disorder, shall remain out of cannon-shot, and may send 
their boats aboard the merchant ship, which they shall so meet 



368 The Purchase of Florida 

■witli, and may enter her to number of two or three men only, 
to whom the master or commander of such ship or vessel shall 
exhibit his passports, concerning the property of the ship, made 
out according to the form inserted in this present treaty; and 
the ship, when she shall have showed such passports, shall be 
free and at liberty to pursue her voyage, so as it shall not be 
lawful to molest or give her chase in any manner, or force her to 
quit her intended course. 

AETICLE 19. 

Consuls shall be reciprocally established, with the privileges 
and powers which those of the most favored nations enjoy, 
in the ports where their consuls reside or are permitted to be. 

AETICUE 20. 

It is also agreed that the inhabitants of the territories of 
each party shall respectively have free access to the courts of 
justice of the other, and they shall be permitted to prosecute 
suits for the recovery of their properties, the payment of their 
debts, and for obtaining satisfaction for the damages which 
they may have sustained, whether the persons whom they may 
sue be subjects or citizens of the country in which they may be 
found, or any other persons whatsoever, who may have taken 
refuge therein; and the proceedings and sentences of the said 
courts shall (be the same as if the contending parties had been 
subjects or citizens of the said country. 

ARTICLE 21. 

In order to terminate all differences on account of the losses 
sustained by the citizens of the United States in consequence 
of their vessels and cargoes having been taken by the subjects 
of His Catholic Majesty, during the late war between Spain 
and France, it is agreed that all such cases shall be referred to 
the final decision of commissioners, to be appointed in the fol- 
lowing manner. His Catholic Majesty shall name one commis- 
sioner, and the president of the United States, by and with the 
advice and consent of their senate, shall appoint another, and 
the said two commissioners shall agree on the choice of a third, 
or if they cannot agree so, they shall each propose one person. 



Appendices 369 

and of the two names so proposed, one shall he drawn by lot 
in the presence of the two original commissioners, and the per- 
son whose name shall be so drawn shall be the third commis- 
sioner; and the three commissioners so appointed shall be 
sworn impartially to examine and decide the claims in ques- 
tion, according to the merits of the several cases, and to justice, 
equity, and the laws of the nations. The said commissioners 
shall meet and sit at Philadelphia,; and in the case of the death, 
sickness, or necessary absence of any such commissioner, his 
place shall be supplied in the same manner as he was first ap- 
pointed, and the new commissioner shall take the same oaths, 
and do the same duties. 'They shall receive all complaints and 
applications authorized by this article, during eighteen months 
from the day on which they shall assemlble. They shall have 
power to examine all such persons as come before them on oath 
or affirmation, touching the complaints in question, and also to 
receive in evidence all written testimony, authenticated in such 
manner as they shall think proper to require or admit. The 
award of the said commissioners, or any two of them, shall be 
final and conclusive, both as to the justice of the claim and the 
amount of the sum to be paid to the claimants; and His Cath- 
olic Majesty undertakes to cause the same to be paid in specie, 
without deduction, at such times and places, and under such 
conditions as shall be awarded by the said commissioners. 

ARTICLE 22. 

The two high contracting parties, hoping that the good cor- 
respondence and friendship which happily reigns between them 
will be further increased by this treaty, and that it will contri- 
bute to augment their prosperity and opulence, will in future 
give to their mutual commerce all the extension and favor 
which the advantage of both countries may require. 

And in consequence of the stipulations contained in the fourth 
article. His Catholic Majesty will permit the citizens of the Unit- 
ed States, for the space of three years from this time, to deposit 
their merchandize and effects in the port of New Orleans, and 
to export them from thence without paying any other duty than 
a fair price for the hire of the stores; and His Majesty promises 
either to continue this permission, if he finds during that time 
that it is not prejudicial to the interests of Spain, or if he should 
not agree to continue it there, he will assign to them on another 

24 



370 The Purchase of Florida 

part of tke banks of the Mississippi an equivalent establish- 
ment. 

AETICLE 23. 

The present treaty shall not be in force until ratified by the 
contracting parties, and the ratifications shall be exchanged in 
six months from this time, or sooner if possible. 

In witness whereof we, the underwritten Plenipotentiaries 
of His Catholic Majesty and of the United States of Aimerica, 
have signed this present treaty of friendship, limits, and naviga- 
tion, and thereunto afiixed our seals respectively. 

Done at San Lorenzo el Real, this seven and twenty day of 
October, one thousand seven hundred and ninety-five, 
(seal) Thomas Pinckney. 

(seal) El Pkincipe de la Paz. 



APPENDIX E. 

1819. 

TREtAfTY OIF AiMITY, SETTUEfMENT, AND LdMITS. 

CONCLUDED FEBEUAKY 22, 1819; EATIFICATIONS EXCHANGED AT WASH- 
INGTON FEBRUAEY 22, 1821; PROCLAIMED FEBRUAEY 22, 18'21. 

The United States of America and His Catliolic Majesty, de- 
siring to consolidate, on a permanent basis, the friendship and 
good correspondence which happily prevails between the two 
parties, have determined to settle and terminate all their dif- 
ferences and pretensions, by a treaty, which shall designate, with 
precision, the limits of their respective bordering territories in 
North America. 

With this intention the President of the United States has 
furnished with their full powers John Quincy Adams, Secretary 
of State of the said United States; and His Catholic Majesty has 
appointed the Miost Eixcellent Lord Don Luis de Onis, Gonzales, 
Lopez y Vara, Lord of the town of Rayaces, Perpetual Regidor of 
the Corporation of the city of Salamanca, Elnight Grand Cross 
of the Royal Vendee, Knight Pensioner of the Royal and Dis- 
tinguished Spanish Order of Charles the Third, Member of the 
Supreme Assemlbly of the said Royal Order; of the Council of His 
Catholic Majesty; His Secretary, with Exercise of Decrees, and 
His Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary near the 
United States of America; 

And the said Plenipotentiaries, after having exchanged their 
powers, have agreed upon and concluded the following articles: 

ARTICLE 1. 

There shall be a firm and inviolable peace and sincere friend- 
ship between the United States and their citizens and His Cath- 
olic Majesty, his successors and subjects, without exception of 
persons or places. 



372 The Purchase of Florida 

ASJllGLE. 2. 

His Catholic Majesty cedes to the United States, in full 
property and sovereignty, all the territories which belong to him, 
situated to the eastward of the Mississippi, known by the name 
of East and West Florida. The adjacent islands dependent on 
said provinces, all public edifices, fortifications, barracks, and 
other buildings, which are not private property, archives and 
documents, which relate directly to the property and sovereignty 
of said provinces, are included in this article. The said archives 
and documents' shall be left in possession of the commissaries or 
oflBcers of the United States, duly authorized to receive them. 

ARTICLE 3. 

The boundary line between the two countries, west of the 
Mississippi, shall begin on the Grulf of Mexico, at the mouth of 
the river Sabine, in the sea, continuing north, along the western 
bank of that river, to the 32d degree of latitude; thence, by a 
line due north, to the degree of latitude where it strikes the Rio 
, Roxo westward, to the degree of longitude 100 west from Lion- 
don and 23 from Washington; then, crossing the said Red River, 
and running thence, by a line due north, to the river Arkansas; 
thence, following the course of the southern bank of the Ar- 
kansas, to its source, in latitude 42 north; and thence by that 
parallel of latitude, to the South Sea. The whole being as laid 
down in Melish's map of the United States, published at Phila- 
delphia, improved to the first of January, 181?. But if the source 
of the Arkansas River shall be found to fall north or south of 
latitude 42, then the line shall run from the said source due 
south or north, as the case may be, till it meets^ the said par- 
allel of latitude 42, and thence, along the said parallel, to the 
South iSea. All the islands in the Sabine, and the said Red and 
Arkansas rivers, throughout the course thus described, to belong 
to the United States; but the use of the waters, and the naviga- 
tion of the Sabine to the sea, and of the said rivers Roxo and 
Arkansas, throughout the extent of the said boundary, on their 
respective banks, shall be common to the respective inhabitants 
of both nations. 

The two high contracting parties agree to cede and renounce 
all their rights, claims, and pretensions, to the territories de- 
scribed by the said line, that is to say: The United States' hereby 



Appendices 373 



cede to His Catholic Majesty, and renounce forever, all their 
rights, claims, and pretensions, to the territories lying west and 
south of the above described line; and, in like manner. His 
Catholic 'Majesty cedes to the said United States all his rights, 
claims, and pretensions to any territories east and north of the 
said line, and for himself, his heirs, and successors, renounces 
all claim to the said territories forever. 

ARTICLE 4. 

To fix this line with more precision, and to place the land- 
marks which shall designate exactly the limits of both nations, 
each of the contracting parties shall appoint a commissioner and 
a surveyor, who shall meet before the termination of one year 
from the date of the ratification of this treaty at Natchitoches, 
on the Red River, and proceed to run and mark the said line, 
from the mouth of the Sabine to the Red River, and from the 
Red River to the river Arkansas, and to ascertain the lati- 
tude of the source of the said river Arkansas, in conformity to 
what is above agreed upon and stipulated, and the line of lati- 
tude 42, to the South iSea; they shall make out plans, and keep 
journals of their proceedings, and the result agreed upon by 
them shall "be considered as part of this treaty, and shall have 
the same force as if it were inserted therein. The two govern- 
ments' will amicably agree respecting the necessary articles to 
be furnished to those persons, and also as to their respective 
escorts, should such be deemed necessary. 

ARTICLE 5. 

The inhabitants of the ceded territories shall be secured 
in the free exercise of their religion, without any restriction; and 
all those who may desire to remove to the Spanish dominions 
shall be permitted to sell or export their effects, at any time 
whatever, without being subject, in either case, to duties. 

ARTICLE '6. 

The inhabitants of the territories which His Catholic Majesty 
cedes to the United States, by this treaty, shall be incorporated 
in the Union of the United States, as soon as may be consistent 
with the principles of the Federal Constitution, and admitted to 



374 T^^^ Purchase of Florida 

the enjoyment of all the privileges, rights, and immunities of the 
citizens of the United States. 

ARTICLE 7. 

The officers and troops of His Catholic Majesty, in the ter- 
ritories herehy ceded by him to the United States, shall he with- 
drawn and possession of the places occupied by them shall be 
given within six months after the exchange of the ratifications 
of this treaty, or sooner if possible, by the officers of His Catholic 
Majesty, to the commissioners or officers of the United States 
duly appointed to receive them; and the United States shall fur- 
nish the transports and escort necessary to convey the Spanish 
officers and troops and their baggage to the Havana. 

ARTICLE 8. 

Ail the grants of land made before the 24th of January, 
1818, by His Catholic Majesty, or by his lawful authorities, in 
the said territories ceded by His Majesty to the United States, 
shall be ratified and confirmed to the persons in possession of 
the lands, to the same extent that the same grants would be 
valid if the territories had remained under the dominion of His 
Catholic Majesty. But the owners in possession of such lands, 
who, by reason of the recent circumstances of the Spanish na- 
tion, and the revolutions in Europe, have been prevented from 
fulfilling all the conditions of their grants, shall complete them 
within the terms limited in the same, respectively, from the 
date of this treaty; in default of which the said grants shall be 
null and void. All grants made since the said 24th of Janu- 
ary, 1818, when the first proposal, on the part of His Catholic 
Majesty, for the cession of the Ploridas was made, are hereby 
declared and agreed to be null and void. 

ARTICLE 9. 

The two high contracting parties, animated with the most 
earnest desire of conciliation, and with the object of putting an 
end to all differences which have existed between them, and of 
confirming the good understanding which they wish to be for- 
ever maintained between them, reciprocally renounce all claims 
for damages or injuries which they, themselves, as well as their 



Appendices 375 

respective citizens and subjects, may have suffered until the time 
of signing this treaty. 

The renunciation of the United States will extend to all the 
injuries mentioned in the convention of the 11th of August, 
1802. 

2. To all claims on account of prizes made by French pri- 
vateers, and condemned by French consuls, within the territory 
and jurisdiction of Spain. 

3. To all claims of indemnities on account of suspension of 
the right of deposit at New Orleans in 18'02. 

4. To all claims of citizens of the United States upon the 
government of Spain, arising from the unlawful seizures at sea, 
and in the ports and territories.,^ Spain, or the Spanish colonies. 

5. To all claims of citizen's of the United States upon the 
Spanish government, statements of which, soliciting the inter- 
position of the government of the United States, have been pre- 
sented to the department of state, or to the minister of the Unit- 
ed iStates in Spain, since the date of the convention of 1802, 
and until the signature of this treaty. 

The renunciation of His Catholic Majesty extends — " 

1. To all the injuries mentioned in the convention of the 
11th of August, 1802. 

2. To the sums which His Catholic Majesty advanced for 
the return of Captain Pike from the Provinces Internas. 

3. To all injuries caused by the expedition of Miranda, that 
was fitted out and equipped at New York. 

4. To all claims of Spanish subjects upon the government of 
the United States arising from unlawful seizures at sea, or within 
the ports and territorial jurisdiction of the United States. 

Finally, to all the claims of subjects of His Catholic Majesty 
upon the government of the United States in which the inter- 
position of His Catholic Majesty's government has- been solicited, 
before the date of this treaty and since the date of the conven- 
tion of 1802, or which may have been made to the department of 
foreign affairs of His Majesty, or to his minister in the United 
States. 

And the high contracting parties, respectively, renounce all 
claim to indemnities for any of the recent events or transactions 
of their respective commanders and officers in the Floridas. 

The United States will cause satisfaction to be made for the 
injuries, if any, which, by process of law, shall be established 
to have been suffered by the Spanish officers, and individual 



376 The Purchase of Florida 

Spanish inhabitants, by the late operations of the American army 
in Florida. 

ARTICLE 10. 

The convention entered into between the two governments, 
on the 11th of A^ugust, 1802, the ratifications of which were 
exchanged the 21st of December, 1818, is annulled. 

ARTICLE 11. 

The United States, exonerating Spain from all demands in 
future, on account of the claims of their citizens to which the 
renunciations herein contained extend, and considering them 
entirely cancelled, undertake to make satisfaction for the same, 
to an amount not exceeding five millions of dollars. To ascer- 
tain the full amount and validity of those claims, a commission, 
to consist of three commissioners, citizens of the United States, 
shall be appointed by the president, by and with the advice and 
consent of the senate, which commission shall meet at the city 
of Washington, and, within the space of three years from the 
time of their first meeting, shall receive, examine, and decide 
upon the amount and validity of all the claims included within 
the descriptions above mentioned. The said commissioners shall 
take an oath or affirmation, to be entered on the record of their 
proceedings, for the faithful and diligent discharge of their 
duties; and, in case of the death, sickness, or necessary absence 
of any such commissioner, his place may be supplied by the ap- 
pointment, as aforesaid, or by the president of the United' States, 
during the recess of the senate, of another commissioner in his 
stead. The said commissioners shall be authorized to hear and 
examine suitable authentic testimony concerning the same. And 
the Spanish government shall furnish all such documents and 
elucidations as may be in their possession, for the adjustment of 
the said claims, according to the principles of justice, the laws 
of nations, and the stipulations of the treaty between the two 
parties of 27th of October, 1795; the said documents to be speci- 
fied, when demanded, at the instance of the said commissioners. 

The payment of such claims as may be admitted and adjusted 
by the said commissioners, or the major part of them, to an 
amount not exceeding five millions of dollars, shall be made by 
the United States, either immediately at their treasury, or by 
the creation of stock, bearing an interest of six per cent, per 



Appendices 377 

annum, payalble from the proceeds of sales of public lands within 
the territories hereby ceded to the United States, or in such other 
manner as the congress of the United .States may prescribe by 
law. 

The records of the proceedings of the said commissioners, 
together with the vouchers and documents produced before them, 
relative to the claims to be adjusted and decided upon by them, 
shall, after the close of their transactions, be deposited in the 
department of state of the United States; and copies of them, 
or any part of them, shall be furnished to the Spanish govern- 
ment, if required, at the demand of the Spanish minister in the 
United States. 

ARTICLE 12. 

The treaty of limits and navigation, of 1796, remains con- 
firmed in all and each one of its articles excepting the second, 
third, fourth, twenty-first and the second clause of the twenty- 
second article, which, having been altered by this treaty, or 
having received their entire execution, are no longer valid. 

With respect to the fifteenth article of the same treaty of 
friendship, limits, and navigation of 17-95, in which it is stipulated 
that the flag shall cover the property, the two high contracting 
parties agree that this shall be so understood with respect to those 
powers who recognize this principle; but if either of the two 
contracting parties shall be at war with a third party, and the 
other neutral, the flag of the neutral shall cover the property 
of enemies whose government acknowledge this principle, and not 
of others. 

ARTICLE 13. 

Both contracting parties, wishing to favor their mutual 
commerce, by affording in their ports every necessary assistance 
to their respective merchant vessels, have agreed that the sailors 
who shall desert from their vessels in the ports of the other, 
shall be arrested and delivered up, at the instance of the consul, 
who shall prove, nevertheless, that the deserters belonged to the 
vessels that claimed them, exhibiting the document that is cus- 
tomary in their nation; that is to say, the American consul in 
a Spanish port shall exhibit the document known by the name 
of articles, and the Spanish consul, in American ports, the roll 
of the vessel; and if the name of the deserter or deserters who 
are claimed shall appear in the one or the other, they shall be 



378 The Purchase of Florida 

arrested, held in custody, and delivered to the vessel to which 
they shall belong. 

ARTICLE 14. 

The United States hereby certify that they have not received 
any compensation from France for the injuries they suffered from 
privateers, consuls, and tribunals on the coasts and in the ports 
of Spain, for the satisfaction of w^hich provision is made by this 
treaty; and they will present an authentic statement of the 
prizes made, and of their true value, that Spain may avail herself 
of the same in such manner as she may deem just and proper. 

ARTICLE 15. 

The United States, to give to His Catholic Majesty a proof 
of their desire to cement the relations of amity subsisting be- 
tween the two nations, and to favor the commerce of the sub- 
jects of His Catholic Majesty, agree that Spanish vessels, coming 
laden only with productions of Spanish growth and manufac- 
tures, directly from the ports of Spain, or of her colonies, shall 
be admitted, for the term of twelve years, to the ports of Pen- 
sacola and St. Augustine, in the Floridas, without paying other 
or higher duties on their cargoes, or of tonnage, than will be 
paid by the vessels of the United States. During the said term 
no other nation shall enjoy the same privileges within the ceded 
territories. The twelve years shall commence three months after 
the exchange of the ratifications of this treaty. 

ARTICLE 16. 

The present treaty shall be ratified in due form, by the 
contracting parties, and the ratifications shall be exchanged in 
six months from this time, or sooner if possible. 

In witness whereof we, the underwritten Plenipotentiaries 
of the United States of America and of His Catholic Majesty, 
have signed, by virtue of our powers, the present treaty of amity, 
settlement, and limits, and have thereunto affixed our seals, re- 
spectively. Done at Wlashington this twenty-second day of Feb- 
ruary, one thousand eight hundred and nineteen. 

(seal) John Quincy Adams. 

(&eal) Ltris de Onis. 



Appendices 379 

RATIFICATION BY HIS CATHOLIC MAJESTY, ON THE TWENTY-FOUBTH 
DAY OF OCTOBEB, IN THE YEAB OF OUB lORD ONEI THOU- 
SAND EIGHT HUNDRED AND TWENTY. 

Ferdinand the 'Seventh, by the Grace of God and by the 
constitution of the Spanish monarchy. King of Spain. 

Whereas on the twenty-second day of February, of the year 
one thousand eight hundred and nineteen last past, a treaty was 
concluded and signed in the city of Washington, between Don 
Luis de O^nis, my Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipoten- 
tiary, and John Quincy Adams, Esquire, Secretary of State of 
the United States of America, competently authorized by both 
parties, consisting of sixteen articles, which had for their ob- 
ject the arrangement of differences and of limits between both 
governments and their respective territories, which are of the 
following form and literal tenor: 

(Here follows the foregoing treaty, word for word.) 

Therefore, having seen and examined the sixteen articles 
aforesaid, and having first obtained the consent and authority 
of the General Cortes of the nation with respect to the cession 
mentioned and stipulated in the 2nd and 3rd articles, I approve 
and ratify all and every one of the articles referred to, and the 
clauses which are contained in them; promising, on the faith 
and word of a King, to execute and observe them, and to cause 
them to be executed and observed entirely as if I myself had 
signed them; and that the circumstance of having exceeded the 
term of six months, fixed for the exchange of the ratifications in 
the 16th article, may afford no obstacle in any manner, it is my 
deliberate will that the present ratification be as valid and firm, 
and produce the same effects, as if it had been done within the 
determined period. Desirous at the same time of avoiding any 
doubt or ambiguity concerning the meaning of the 8th article of 
the said treaty, in respect to the date which is pointed out in it 
as the period for the confirmation of the grants of lands in the 
Floridas, made by me, or by the competent authorities in my 
royal name, which date was fixed in the positive understanding 
of the three grants of land made in favor of the Duke of Alagon, 
the Count of Punonrostro, and Don Pedro de Vargas, being an- 
nulled by its tenor, I think proper to declare that the said three 
grants have remained and do remain entirely annulled and in- 
valid; and that neither the three individuals mentioned, nor 
those who may have title or interest through them, can avail 



380 The Purchase of Florida 

themselves of the said grants at any time or in any manner: under 
which explicit declaration the said 8'th article is to be under- 
stood as ratified. !ln the faith of all which I have commanded 
the issuance of these presents. Signed hy my hand, sealed with 
my secret seal, and countersigned by the underwritten my 
Secretary of the Department of State. 

Given at Madrid, the twenty-fourth of October, one thousand 
eight hundred and twenty. 

Fernajstdo. 

EJvAEiSTO Perez de Castro. 



APPENDIX F, 



BIBLIOGRAPHY. 



MSS. State Department. 

Instructions to our Ministers. 

Domestic Letters. 

Letters from Ministers Abroad to the Secretary of State. 

Secretary of State to Foreign Ministers. 

MISIS. State Department, Negotiation Books. 

" " " Foreign Letters. 

American State Papers. 
MSiS. State Department, Letters of William Short. 

" " " Letters of David Humphreys. 

" " " Letters of Thomas Pinckney. 

American State Papers, Foreign Affairs. 
" " " Military Affairs. 

" " " Indian Affairs. 

Annals of Congress, Vol. XXXiri. Debates on Seminole War. 
Wharton's Diplomatic History of the American Revolution. 
Wharton's International Law. 
Wbolsey's International Law. 
Vattel's Law of Nations. 
Hall's International Law. 
Fiske's Critical Period of American History. 
Trescott's Diplomacy of Washington's and Adams's Terms. 
Jefferson's Wbrks. 
Hamilton's Works. 
Hamilton's Republic. 
Gallatin's Works. 
Jefferson Papers. 
John Quincy Adams's Diary. 

MteMaster's History of the People of the United States. 
Schouler's History of the United States. 
Hildreth's History of the United States. 



382 The Purchase of Florida 

Adams's History of the United States. 

Benton's Thirty Years' View. 

Campbell's Colonial Florida. 

Williams's History of Florida. 

Memoirs of Florida. R. H. Rerick and Fleming. 

Fairbanks's History of Florida. 

Green's History of Florida. 

Liowry's History of 'Mississippi. 

Stevens's History of Greorgia. 

Parton's Jackson. 

Sumner's Life of Jackson. 

Alexander Hamilton. Henry Cabot Lodge. 

James Monroe. D. C. Oilman. 

Thomas Jefferson. J. T. Morse, Jr. 

James Madison. S. H. Gay. 

John Quincy Adams. J. T. Morse, Jr. 

Life of J. Q. Adams. Josiah Quincy. 

Memoirs of J. Q. Adams. Chas. Francis Adams. 

Baton's Jackson. 

Niles Register. 

Memoranda of a Residence at the Court of London. Richard 

Rush. 
Von Hoist's Constitutional and Political History of the United 

States. 
Acquisition of Florida. American Historical Magazine, Vol. XIX, 

pp. 28'6-301. Hon. J. L. M. Curry. 
Mistake Made as to the East Boundary of Louisiana (1814). 

Benj. Vaughan 



INDEX 



AbbadiAj d', 129. 

Acadia, 143. 

Adaes River, 150, 29 9. 

Adaes, Nuestra Senora de los, 
post, 159. 

Adams, John, 54. 

Adams, John Quincy, 74, 79, 89, 
90, 95, 324, 328; member of 
, joint commission to go to St. 
Petersburg, 202 ; talies part of 
Jaclvson in cabinet debate, 
267-270 ; extract from diary of, 
268-269 ; terms of adjustment 
between Spain and United 
States proposed by, 276-277; 
disputes between De Onis and, 
277-278 ; comments upon offer 
of England to mediate, 279 ; 
desirous of recognizing Soutli 
American colonies, 280 ; 
makes inquiry regard- 

ing England's attitude to- 
ward colonies, 280 ; De Onis 
protests to, against course of 
Jackson, 282-283 ; answer of, 
to De Onis, 283-284; reply of 
De Onis to, 284-285; sends to 
Pizarro full statement of 
American case, 286-291; ap- 
preciation of document, and 
its success, 291-293 ; describes 
opinion in England regarding 
Jackson campaign, 295 ; letter 
to, from Erving regarding 
propitious time for treaty, 
296-297 ; opinion about De 
Onis, 298-299 ; treats with De 
Onis concerning boundaries, 
299-300 ; demands cancellation 
of land grants in Florida, 300 ; 
reply of De Onis to, 300-301 ; 
requests England to join Unit- 
ed States in recognizing South 
American colonies, 301-303 ; 
recommends provisional seiz- 
ure of Florida, 303-304; De 
Neuville intermediary between 
iDe Onis and, 304 ; opposition 
to, in cabinet, 304-305 ; final 
negotiations between De Onis 
and, 305-307 ; comments of, 
upon treaty provisions, 307- 
30'8 ; De Onis and, discuss 
question of land grants in 
Florida, 309 ; sends instnac- 
tions to Forsyth, 311-312 ; 
presidential aspirations of, 
:313 ; reply of, to Vives, 315 ; 
further discussions of, with 
Vives, 315-318; replies to 



Vives concerning consent of 
cortes, 318 ; assumes air of in- 
difference, 318 ; diary of, in 
Jackson's estimation, 320 ; 
principle followed by, in his 
negotiations, 330. 

Adams, Samuel, 17. 

Addington, Henry, 112. 

Adet, Pierre Auguste, 98. 

Aix-la-Chapelle, 297. 

Alabama, 173, 227, 321. 

Alabama claims, 219. 

Alabama River, 203, 204. 

Alagon, Duke of, 309. 

Alexander, Emperor of Russia, 
202, 274. 

Alexander, Colonel , 211. 

Allegheny Mountains, 35, 3'6, 54. 

Amaya, , Mexican plotter, 

219. 

Ambrister, Ro'bert, 2 53, 288, 
295, 296, 328; captured by 
Jackson, 249 ; trial and exe- 
cution of, 250-252 ; debate in 
congress over, 2 56-26 7, Adams 
justifies execution of, 289-290, 
291. 

Amelia Island, 79, 191, 193, 194, 
197, 202, 205, 238, 240, 244, 
277, 278, 288, 295, 327; char- 
acter of inhabitants of, 231- 
2 32 ; under MacGregor, 232- 
234 ; Aury takes possession of, 
23 5-236 ; surrendered to Am- 
ericans, 23 6. 

America, 20, 25, 26, 27, 28, 30, 
37, 44, 50, 57, 60, 63, 71, 88, 
92, 96, 123, 139, 162, ,253, 2,62, 
273, 314. See also United 
States, and North and South 
America. 

Ames, Fisher, S3, 326. 

Amit channel, 53. 

Andre, Major John, 263. 

Anville, Jean Baptiste Bourguig- 
non d', 141. 

Apalache, 124. 

Appalachian Mountains, 26, 28. 

Appalachicola River, 32, 144, 
148, 227, 228, '22,9, 230, 23'8, 
244. 

Aranda, Don Pedro Abarca y 
IBolea, Count d'. '29, 58. 

Arbuthnot, Alexander, 245, 253, 
287, 292, 295, 296, 328; busi- 
ness of, in Florida, 246-247; 
writes to his son from St. 
Marks, 247 ; captured by Jack- 
son, 248 ; Jackson places 
blame upon, for escape of Bo- 



384 



The Purchase of Florida 



Arbuthnot, continued — 

leek, 249; trial and execution 
of, 250-252 ; debate in con- 
gress over, 256-267 ; accusa- 
tion of, by Adams, 286 ; 
Adams justifies execution of, 
289-290, 291. 

Arkansas River, 299, SO*, 307. 

Armstrong, General John, 160, 
161, 177, 178, 204; receives in- 
structions from IMadison re- 
specting French construction 
of Louisiana purchase treaty, 
134-136 ; Talleyrand writes to, 
respecting same, 138-140 ; with 
Monroe, advises decisive meas- 
ures, 152-153; rejects Talley- 
rand's proposals regarding 
GPlorida, 162 ; transmits to 
America offer of Napoleon, 
162 ; Monroe sends instruc- 
tions to, 168. 

Arnold, Benedict, 172. 

Arroyo Hondo, 2 99. 

Ashley, Colonel Richard H., de- 
mands surrender of Fernan- 
dina, 193. 

Atlantic Ocean, 33, 110, 183, 288, 
330. 

Aury, Louis, 232 ; career of, 234- 
235 ; takes possession of Am- 
elia Island, 235-236; surren- 
ders Fernandina, 236. 

Austria, 273. 

Bagot, Sir Charles, 270, 278, 
279, 301; opinion of Jackson, 
296. 

Bahamas, the, 247. 

Baltimore, 1214, 22'5, 226, 232. 

Barataria, 211, 232. 

Barbary states, 36, 4fi, 259. 

Barfeg-Marbois, Francois de, 112, 
134, 158. 

Barnabue, Juan B., protests 
against occupation of Florida, 
r89 ; complains of violations 
of neutrality by United States, 
190 ; replies to complaints of 
United States against De 
Onis, 214. 

Barrancas, Fort, 205, 206, 209, 
,'243, 244, 255, 259, 282, 288. 

Basle, peace of (1795), 69; 
treaty of, 74. 

Baton Rouge, 160, 174, 184, 185, 
186, 210. 

Bayard, James A., 202. 

Bayonne, i312. 

Belle River, 194. 

Beloxi, 144. 

Benton, Thomas Hart, ooposes 
treaty of 1819, 321-322.' 

Bermudas, the, 21. 

Bernado, , Mexican rev- 
olutionist, 219. 

Bib-b, W^illiam "Wyatt, 242. 

Bidwell, Barnabas, 164. 

Big Creek, 241. 

Blennerhassett's Island, 170. 



Blount, Colonel William, 88, 92, 
201, 209, 26'5; his scheme, 80- 

81 ; his trial and acquittal, 81- 

82 ; D'Trujo demands punish- 
ment of, 84. 

Boleck ("Billy Bowlegs"), 227, 
247, 249. 

Bonaparte, Joseph, 179, 182, 190, 
213, 227. 

Bonaparte, Napoleon. See Na- 
polpon Bonaparte. 

Boone, Daniel, 48. 

Bourbons, the, 30, 281; Family 
Compact of, 141. 

Bournonville, General, French 
ambassador at Madrid, 116, 
r25, 139, 140. 

Bowdoin, James, 175 ; advises 
decisive measures in Louis- 
iana negotiations, 152; ap- 
pointed minister to iSpain, 159 ; 
Madison sends instructions to, 
168 ; advises seizure of Flori- 
da, 176-177. 

"Bowlegs, Billy". See Boleck. 

Bowles, General William Augus- 
tus, 51 ; commits hostilities 
against Florida, 92-93. 

Bowyer, Fort, 202, 207. 

Brazil, 273, 274. 

Breckinridge, General James, 
151. 

Brent, Thomas L., 214, 215. 

Breton, Cape, 143. 

Brissot de Warville, Jean Pierre, 
74. 

Brown, James, a United States 
senator, 321. 

Buenos Ayres, 182, 190, 199, 
212, 218, 280, 282, 302, 303, 
316. 

Bulgary, Count, 312. 

Bunker Hill, 17. 

Burr, Aaron, 175, 214, 263; con- 
spiracy of, 170-171 ; connec- 
tion with Wilkinson, 171 ; trial 
and acquittal of, 173-174. 

Butler, Percival, a Western lead- 
er, 74. 

Butler, Captain, a privateer, 210. 

Butler, Lieutenant Robert, 323. 

Cadiz, 212, 275, ,310. 

Calcasieu River, 158, 299. 

"Caledonia." the, 22'5. 

Calhoun, John C, 238, 240, 241, 
242, 243, 244, 303 ; takes part 
in cabinet debate concerning 
Jackson, 267-270 ; writes to 
Jackson, 294. 

Callava, Don Jose, a Spanish 
commissioner, 324. 

Campbell, Hugh 193. 194. 

Canada, 21, 27, 62, 78, 120, 143, 
201, 212. 

Caraccas, 182, 190. 

Clarmagnole. term applied to 
D'Yrujo, 87. 

Carmichael, William, 66, 67 ; re- 
ceives instructions from Jef- 



Index 



38s 



ferson, '53-54, 55-56 ; appoint- 
ed commissioner plenipoten- 
tiary in Spain, 57 ; instructions 
from Jefferson to, 58 ; leaves 
Spain, '59. 

Carolina, 34. 

Carolinas, the, 40. 

Carondolet, Marquis of, 174 ; 
writes of Western settlements, 
54-55 ; asks aid against Genet, 
62 ; excuses delay in transfer- 
ring posts, 77-78. 

"Carron," the, 206, 208. 

Cartagena, 207, 218, 231, 234. 

Castlereagh, Lord, 202, 253, 278, 
279. 

Cedar Keys 'Bay, 247. 

Cevallos, Don Pedro, 100, 105, 
109, 112, 116, 149, 168, 215, 
218, 277 ; statement to Pinck- 
ney not justifying iLouisiana 
purchase, 115 ; refuses to ap- 
prove treaty submitted by 
fPinckney, and transfers nego- 
tiations to Washington, 156- 
157 ; discusses terms with 
Monroe, 158-159 ; grants full 
power to De Onis to treat, 
271-272. 

Charles I, 34. 

Charles V, 7,5, 120, 179, 276. 

Charleston, 18, 60. 

Charlotte, 'Fort, 202. 

Chase, Samuel, 263. 

"iChasseur," the, 225. 

Chattahoochee River, 33, 96, 229. 

Cherokees, the, 41. 

Chickasaw 'Bluff (Memphis), 3 5, 

Chickasaws, the, 41, 203. 

"Childers," the, 208. 

Chili, 302. 

Choctaws, the, 41, 203, 230. 

Christian, Pass, 202, 230. 

Cincinnati, 34. 

Claiborne, William Charles Cole, 
119, 120, 137, 160, 174, 186, 
187 ; named governor of Lou- 
isiana, lis ; receives orders to 
dismiss Spanish officials, 161- 
162 ; warned fey Jackson 
against Wilkinson, 172-173; 
organizes government of West 
Florida for United States, 
184-1'85. 

Clark, George Rogers, 48, 61, 
62, 63, 64, 74, 171. 

Clarke, General Elijah, 51, 61, 
79 ; disturber on Florida bor- 
der, 63-64. 

Clay, Henry, 262, 265, 305, 309, 
321 ; denounces course of 
Jackson in debate, 259-261 ; 
attacks administration for 
failure to recognize South 
American colonies, 281 ; at- 
tacks treaty of 1819, 319-320. 

Clinch, Colonel Duncan L., 229, 
230. 

Cobb, William C, 265 ; opens 
25 



discussion concerning execu- 
tion of Arbuthnot and Am- 
brister, 256-259 ; introduces 
three amendments, 259. 

Cobbett, William, sketch of, 85- 
8:6; reviles D'Yrujo, 85-87; 
charged with libel, 87. 

Coffee, General William, 210. 

Colorado River, 147, 148, 149, 
158, 159, 162, 168, 272, 276. 

Columbia River, 305. 

"Comet," the, 22 5. 

Cook, white man captured by 
Jackson, 249. 

Copenhagen, 260. 

Ooppinger, Don Jose, governor 
of Florida, 323, 324. 

Cow F-ord, 192. 

Crawford, William H., 192, 240, 
241, 265, 267, 270, 303, 330; 
opposes Adams in cabinet, 
304-305. 

Creeks, the, 223, 228, 251, 254, 
261, 286 ; treaty with Georgia, 
38-39 ; treatment of, by pion- 
eers, 40-41 ; treaty with Unit- 
ed States, 49-50 ; futile, 
51-52 ; war upon Unit- 
ed States, 203 ; destroy Fort 
Mimms, 203 ; routing of, by 
Jackson, 203-204; join the 
Seminoles, 227. 

Crozat, Antoine, 120. 

Cuba, 16, 100, 133, 141, 142, 182, 
189, 205, 221. 

Culvo, 'Marquis de Casa, 161. 

Cumberland River, 201. 

Cumberland settlements, 47. 

Daniels, a sailor, 289. 
Decatur, Commodore Stephen, 

265. 
Delassus, Don Carlos Debault, 

183. 
Delaware River, term applied to 

the Mississippi, 94. 
Del Norte River. See Rio del 

Norte. 
De Onis. See 'Onis, de. 
Dickinson, John, a member of 

continental congress, 21. 
Dover cutter, seized by Spanish, 

6«. 
Doyle, Edmund, 251. 
Drake, Sir Francis, 36. 
D'Yrujo. See Trujo, Marquis 

Casa d'. 

Bast Florida. See Florida, 

East Indies, 207. 

Eaton, John H., senator from 
Tennessee, 313. 

Ellicott, Andrew, 78, 84; com- 
missioned to run Florida 
boundary line, 76 ; stirs trou- 
ble, 76; D'Yrujo complains of, 
77 ; statement of, regarding 
extent of Louisiana, 137-138. 

Elliott, a colonial governor, 34. 



386 



The Purchase of Florida 



Enghien, Due d', 260. 

England, 18, 19, 20, 25, 26, 27, 
28, 29, 30, 31, 33, 34, 48, 49, 
53, 56, 58, 59, 62, 65, 66, 72, 
74, 80, S3, 86, 106, 107, 108, 
112, 115, 138, 141, 142, 150, 
151, 170, 175, 183, 187, 211, 
214, 219, 221, 224, 227, 228, 
248, 252, 260, 268, 271, 281, 
296, 297, 304, 312, 313, 326, 
328, 330; warned against ac- 
quisition of Louisiana and 
Florida, 54 ; Spain tires of al- 
liance with, 69-70 ; declares 
war against Spain, 71 ; at wai 
with Spain, 79; proposed alli- 
ance of, with United States 
against France and Spain, 87- 
89 ; failure of scheme, 90-91 ; 
determines boundaries of East 
and West Florida, 143-144; 
plan of alliance of Unit- 
ed States with, frustrated, 
161 ; prospect of war with, 
177 ; possibility of occupation 
of Florida by, 178 ; declaration 
of war against, 197 ; probabil- 
ity of occupation of Florida 
by, 200 ; mastery of, over 
Spain, 204-205 ; assisted by 
authorities in East Florida 
against United States, 205 ; 
seizure of Pensacola by, un- 
der Nicholls, 205-206; rumor 
of cession of Florida to, 218 ; 
assumption of Jackson regard- 
ing, 246 ; indignation in, over 
course of Jackson, 253-254; 
Russia withdraws Spain from, 
273 ; relations of Spain with, 
274-275 ; offers to mediate be- 
tween Spain and United 
'States, 278-279 ; policy of, as 
to South American colonies, 
280 ; opinion in, regarding 
Jackson campaign, 295 ; re- 
quested to join United States 
in recognizing South Ameri- 
can colonies, 301-303. See 
also Great fBritain. 

Epoes, John W., senator from 
Virginia, 265. 

Erie, Lake, 29. 

Brving, George W., 176, 180, 
271, 285, 286, 307; quits Ma- 
drid, 214-215; named minister 
to Spain, 215; writes concern- 
ing attitude of Spain toward 
United States, 272-273; con- ■ 
cerning Russian-Spanish un- 
derstanding, 273-274 ; concern- 
ing relations of Spain with 
other European powers, 274- 
275 ; negotiates with Pizarro, 
275 ; describes Spanish council 
of state, 276 ; writes concern- 
ing favorable attitude of 
Spain, 278 ; out of patience 
with De Onis, 278 ; Adams 
writes to, concerning Eng- 



land's offer to mediate, 279 ; 
describes character of Pizar- 
ro and D'Yrujo, 2 96 ; an- 
nounces propitious time for 
making treaty, 2 96-297; ad- 
vises seizure of Florida, pend- 
ing negotiations, 305 ; sends 
information concerning land 
grants in Florida, 309 ; suc- 
ceeded by Forsyth, 310. 

Escambia River, 210, 244. 

Estafanos, Jose, 226. 

Estrada, governor of Florida, 
197. 

Europe, 19, 54, 56, 57, 58, 68, 
96, 107, 140, 148, 150, 176, 
181, 189, 199, 202, 205, 206, 
211, 218, 220, 221, 227, 293, 
294, 295, 303, 315, 316, 326, 
32 8; excitement in, over 
course of Jackson, 252-2ai ; 
favors Spain against colonies, 
281. 

Eustis, General William, 192. 

"Fairt," the, 225. 

Fatio, Philip, S6. 

Fauchet, Jean Antoine Joseph, 

62, 70. 
Fayetteville, 244. 

Ferdinand VII, 179, 180, 181, 
183, 199, 202, 213, 215, 216, 
217. 

Fernandina, 191, 195, 234, 235;, 
surrender of, demanded oy 
Ashley, 193 ; surrendered lo 
patriots, 194 ; delivered to Am- 
ericans, 194 ; captured by 
MacGregor, 232 ; surrendered 
to u-Vmericans by Aury, 236. 

Flint River, 29, 33, 229, 237. 

Florida (Floridas, the), 21, 22, 
23, 24, 34, 35, 39, 40, 45, 51, 
52, 53, 54, 56, 57, 58, 60, 61, 

63, 78, 79, 83, 88, 89, 90, 91, 
92, 96, 97, 124, 125, 136, 137, 
142, 143, 144, 146, 147, 150, 
151, 152, 153, 155, 159, 1;60, 
161, 162, 163, 164, 175, 186, 
187, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 
205, 207, 210, 212, 216, 2,23, 
227, 228, 231, 232, 233, 236, 
239, 240, 243, 246, 247, 251, 
252, 255, 258, 265, 266, 267, 
268, 279, 281, 282, 283, 284, 
285, 289, 291, 294, 301, 308, 
310, 313, 314, 318, 319, (329, 
330 ; importance of, 9 ; diplo- 
matic history of, neglected, 9 ; 
sources, 9-10. General char- 
acter of early history of, 15- 
16 ; attacked by southern colo- 
nists, 16 ; ceded to Great Brit- 
ain, 16 ; loyal to England dur- 
ing Revolution, 17 ; traded for 
Jamaica to Spain, 18-19 ; al- 
lotted to Spain in peace nego- 
tiations, 30 ; northern boun- 
dary of, 31-32 ; complaints 
against American settlers, 37- 



Index 



387 



38 ; continuous border dis- 
turbances, 41 ; rumors of pro- 
posed conquest of, 42 ; com- 
missioner to run boundary 
line, 76 ; violations of Spanish 
territory in, S4-S5 ; United 
States fears cession of, to 
France, 98-99; United States 
decides to purchase, 100 ; 
letter of Pinckney, pro- 
posing to purcliase, 100- 
104 ; not ceded to France, 
105-106 ; Jefferson sends spec- 
ial mission to negotiate pur- 
chase of, 106-107 ; Pinckney 
renews offer to purchase, 107- 

108 ; refusal of Spain, lOS- 

109 ; Napoleon in relation to, 
109-110 ; plan of United States 
to purcliase from France, 111- 
112 ; circumstances favorable, 
and overtures continued, 115- 
117 : Talleyrand on extent of, 
138-140; extent of, under 
Spain, 141 ; Jefferson secures 
appropriation for purchase of, 
165 ; move tm popular, 165-166 ; 
Napoleon desires Spain to 
sell, 176 ; Bowdoin advises 
seizure of, 176-177 ; terms of- 
fered to Spain under prospect 
of war with England, 177 ; 
possibility of occupation of, by 
England, 178 ; Foronda com- 
plains of violation of Spanish 
sovereignty in, 1 7 9-1 SO ; ex- 
tent of authority of United 
States in, ISS ; Barnabue pro- 
tests against occupation of, 
189 ; Spain una'ble to maintain 
order in, 199 ; probability of 
occupation of, by England, 
200 ; Westerners rejoice at 
projected seizure of, 200-201 ; 
Jackson sets out for, with 
Tennessee volunteers, 201 ; 
Jackson ordered to return, 
201-202 ; joint commission to 
St. Petersburg to discuss 
question of, 2 02; Jackson pre- 
pares to invade, 204 ; incur- 
sions into, from Georgia, 211; 
Morris suggests possibility of 
purchase of, 217-218; rumor 
of cession of, to England, 218 ; 
De Onis discusses boundaries 
of, 221-222 ; negotiation be- 
tween Monroe and De Onis 
concerning, 272 ; negotiations 
between Pizarro and Erving 
concerning, 275 ; demand of 
Adams that Spain maintain 
sufficient force in, 287-288; 
invasion of, justified by 
Adams, 28 8 ; Pizarro com- 
ments upon Jackson's inva- 
sion of, 295 ; reoccupied by 
Spain, 298 ; United- States de- 
mands cancellation of land- 
grants in, 300 ; cession of, de- 



manded by United States as 
satisfaction for claims, 300 ; 
Adams recommends provision- 
al seizure of, 303-304 ; Erving 
advises seizure of, pending ne- 
gotiations, 305 ; ceded to Uni- 
ted States in treaty of 1819, 
307 ; DeOnis and Adams dis- 
cuss question of land-grants 
in, 309 ; statement of Jack- 
son regarding, 320-321 ; Jack- 
son appointed governor of, 
3 J3 ; Jackson's conduct in, 
324-325; justice of acquisi- 
tion of, by United States con- 
sidered, 326-328. See ■ also 
Florida, East, and Florida, 
West. 

Florida, East, 73, 101, 110, 111, 
141, 145, 146, 147, 148, 168, 
179, 190, 196, 217, 221, 222, 
224, 231, 240, 242, 244, 271, 
276, 284, 319, 324; D'Yrujo 
protests against United States 
legislating in, 124 ; boundary 
of, as determined by England, 
143-144 ; conditions in, as 
found by Matthews, 191; plan 
of Matthews to annex to Uni- 
ted States, 191-192 ; insurrec- 
tion in, against Spain, 192 ; 
establishment of republic in, 
by revolutionists, 193 ; patri- 
ots of, refuse to retire at 
American demand, 197 ; seiz- 
ure of British ships in, 197 ; 
right of United States to oc- 
cupy, 198 ; senate declines to 
countenance seizure of, 201 ; 
orders issued for evacuation 
of, 202-203; authorities of, as- 
sist English against United 
States, 205 ; delivery of, to 
United States, 323. See also 
Florida. 

Florida, West, 27, 29, 31, 32, 
34, go, 38, 73, 101, 103, 110, 
111, 147, 148, 150, 156, 168, 
174, 176, 190, 191, 198, 200, 
203, 217, 218, 255, 271, 282, 
319, 326 ; D'Yrujo protests 
against United States assum- 
ing authority over, 124; right 
of United States to, 124-126 ; 
right of Spain to, 136-138 ; 
question considered, 141-145; 
boundary of, as determined by 
(England, 143-144; Jefferson 
and Madison, on ownership 
of, 144 ; Livingston advises 
Madison to seize, 146; news 
from, reaches Jefferson, 160- 
161 ; people of, seek liberation 
from Spanish government, 
177-178 ; revolt against Spain 
in, 182-184 ; insurgents ask for 
annexation to United States, 
184 ; United States takes pos- 
session of, 184 ; insurgents of, 
overcome, 185-186 ; debate in 



388 



The Purchase of Florida 



Florida, West, continued — 
senate concerning, 187 ; right 
of United States to, 188-189; 
disposition of, by Congress, 
199; invasion of, by United 
States, 202 ; DeOnis discusses 
right of Spain to, 221-222; 
further arguments concerning 
ownership of, 224-225; Jacli- 
son provides government for, 
2 50. See also Florida. 
Florida Blanca, Count de, 26, 28. 
Folch, governor of Florida, 186, 

187, 188, 190. 
Foronda, Valentine de, succeeds 
D'Yrujo, 168; complains of ir- 
regularities in south and 
southwest, 179-180. 
Forsyth, John, 314, 318, 321; 
succeeds 'Erving, 310 ; de- 
mands ratification of treaty, 
■310; Adams sends instructions 
to, 311-312. 
Foster and Blam vs. United 

■States, 189. 
Fowltown, 237, 238, 247, 252, 

290, 292. 
Fox River, 184. 

France, 21, 25, 33, 43, 44, 45, 
52, 59, 61, 62, 6(3, 64, 65, 66, 
68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 78, 86, 
98, 100, 103, 104, 105, 106, 
109, 111, 116, 118, 119, 120, 
125, 126, 128, 129, 130, 131, 
132, 137, 13'8, 139, 140, 143, 
144, 146, 152, 153, 155, 159, 
160, 166, 171, 175, 187, 221, 
224, 225, 271, 275, 313, 326, 
327, 328, 330; unfavorable 
clesigns respecting America, 
28-29 ; position of, in boun- 
dary disputes between United 
States and Spain, 29-30; pro- 
poses to assist Spanish-Amer- 
ican colonies, 57-58 ; proposed 
alliance of United 'States with 
(England against Spain and, 
87-89; failure of scheme, 90- 
91 ; takes advantage of Spain, 
95-96; secures Louisiana, 108; 
motives therefor, 110 ; trans- 
fers Louisiana to United 
States, and protest of Spain, 
112-113 ; statement of case, 
113-115 ; gives construction of 
Louisiana purcliase treaty, 
unfavorable to United States, 
133-136; in Family Compact 
of the iBourbons, 141-142 ; 
sides with Spain in Louisiana 
"boundary dispute, 148 ; Span- 
ish rejection of treaty propo- 
sitions owing to French coun- 
sels, 150 ; policy thereof, 151 ; 
hostile to United States in 
Spanish negotiations, 158 ; 
opinion in, regarding Jack- 
son's campaign, 294-295 ; anx- 
ious to secure settlement be- 



tween Spain and United 
States, 296-297. 

Francis, or Hillis Hago, an In- 
dian prophet, 228, 245, 248, 
260. 

Francisville, 185. 

Franklin, Benjamin, 2 3, 26. 

Fromentin, Judge Elgin, quar- 
rel of Jackson with, 324. 

Gadsden, Fort, 244. 

Gadsden, Lieutenant James, 249, 
(Captain) 250, 262, 266. 

Gaines, General Edmund, 229, 
230, 237, 238, 240, 244, 251, 
277, 290. 

Gallatin, Albert, 160; member 
of joint commission to go to 
St. Petersburg, 202 ; writes of 
opinion in France regarding 
Jackson's campaign, 294-295. 

Galpington, treaty of (1785), 38. 

Galveston, 234, 278, 313. 

Garcon, a Choctaw chief, 231. 

Gardoqui, Diego, Spanish min- 
ister, 36, 37, 40, 42, 44; re- 
ports to Spanish court con- 
cerning Mississippi, 56 ; treats 
with United States commis- 
sioners, 59 ; conduct of, in 
United States, 213-214. 

Garret, Mrs., killed by Indians, 
289. 

Gayoso, governor of Louisiana, 
68, 76, 78. 

Genet, Edmond Charles, 171 ; 
arrival of, in America, 60 ; 
designs of, 60-62; failure of, 
62; results of work of, 63-64. 

George II, 31. 

Georgia, 17, 29, 31, 34, 41, 51, 
60, 61, 63, 79, 85, 92, 123, 152, 
192, 197, 209, 211, 220, 222, 
227, 228, 236, 241, 244, 250, 
255, 310, 821, 327; position of, 
during Revolution, 18 ; makes, 
treaty with Creeks, 38-39 ; in- 
cursions into Florida, 39 ; or- 
ganizes government in Span- 
ish territory, 39-40 ; resolves 
to occupy East Florida, 198. 

Gerry, Elbridge, 89. 

Ghent, treaty of, 247, 251, 286, 
319 

Gibraltar, 21, 24, 26, 96, 153, 
259. 

Godoy, Don Manuel de, 58, 59, 
66, 73, 75, 179. 

Gough, Reverend Thomas, 215. 

Grand Pr6, 19. 

Grandpre, Louis, 184. 

Great Britain, 16, 19, 20, 21, 2l3 
24, 27, 31, 32, 54, 58, 65, 68 
72, 73, 89, 90, 106, 110, 111 
112, 113, 114, 116, 117, 128 
129, 130, 132, 133, 141, 144 
170, 177, 178, 184, 212, 221 
227, 240, 245, 253, 254, 258 
273, 279, 280, 281, 286, 288 



Index 



389 



290, 297, 301, 303, 308. See 

also England- 
Green, Thomas, 40. 
Guadeloupe River, 161. 
Guillemard, , a Spanish 

engineer, 77. 
Guioso. See Gayoso. 
Gunn, James, 90. 
Gutierres de Lara, Bernardo, 

211, 219. 

Hamblt, -William, 2 51. 
Hamilton, Alexander, 64, 88, 

173, 174, 325; seeks to become 

leader in liberation of South 

America, 89-90 ; failure of 

scheme, 90-91. 
Hammond, Samuel, 61. 
Hancock, John, 17. 
Harmar, General Josiah, 43. 
Harper, Robert G., 89. 
Harris, General, of Georgia 

militia, 211. 
Hartford, 241. 
Havana (the Havanna), 38, 1)36, 

141, 142, 169, 186. 
Havre de Grace, 68. 
Hawkins, Colonel Benjamin, 227, 

236. 
Henderson, General Pleasant, 

39. 
"Hermes," the, 206, '207, 208. 
Herrera, Joseph Manuel de, 218, 

234. 
Hillis Hago. See Francis. 
Himollemico, 248, 260. 
Holland, 70. 
Holmes, John, representative 

from Massachusetts, 2 59. 
"Hornet," the, sloop of war, 310. 
Horseshoe, battle of, ■ 204. 
Houston, Sam, 170. 
Howard, Benjamin, 196. 
Howe, General Robert, 17. 
Hubbard, , sheriff of New 

York, 234. 
Hudson River, term applied to 

Mississippi, 94. 
Humbert, Jean Joseph Amable, 

211, 219. 
llumphreys, GDavid, 91, 95. 
Huron, Lake, 29. 

Iberian Peninsula, 204. 

Iberville River, 53, 127, 129, 
130, 131, 138, 140, 143, 188. 

Illinois River, 29, 84, 139. 

Indiana Territory, 137, 183. 

Indians, treatment of, by pio- 
neers, 39-41 ; drilling of, into 
British soldiers, 207. 

Ingersoll, Jared, 154. 



Jackson, 



-, newspaper ed- 



itor, accuses D'Yrujo of at- 
tempted bribery, 166-167. 
Jackson, Andrew, 62, 228, 281, 
284, 292, 295, 298, 303, 304, 
310 ; relations with Aaron 
iBurr, 170 ; warns Claiborne 



against Wilkinson, 172-173; 
sets out for Florida with vol- 
unteers, 201 ; ordered to re- 
turn, 201-202 ; annihilates 
Creek nation, 203-204; pre- 
pares to invade Florida, 204 ; 
provokes quarrel with govern- 
or of Pensacola, 204 ; unsuc- 
cessful attack of Nicholls 
upon, 207-208 ; issues procla- 
mation, 208-209 ; storms Pen- 
sacola, 209 ; at New Orleans, 
210; permits Gaines to over- 
awe occupants of Negro Fort, 
22 9; assumes command 
against Seminoles, 238-239 ; 
real object of, 239 ; famous 
letter of, to Monroe, 240 ; his- 
tory of letter according to, 
241-242 ;. responsibility of ad- 
ministration for acts of, 242- 
243 ; assembles army in Ten- 
nessee, 244 ; disregard of in- 
ternational law by, 244-245 ; 
characteristic order of, to Mc- 
Keever, 245-246 ; pursues In- 
dians to St. Marks, 246 ; inac- 
curate assumptions of, 246 ; 
seizure of iSt. Marks by, 247- 
248 ; captures Arbuthnot, 248 ; 
hangs Francis and HimoUeini- 
co, 248-249; is baffled in at- 
tack upon headquarters of Bo- 
leck, and places blame upon 
Arbuthnot, 2 49; captures Am- 
brister, 2 49; provides govern- 
ment for West Florida, 250 ; 
trial and execution of Arbuth- 
not and Ambrister under, 250- 
252 ; responsibility of, for 
their death, 2 52 ; excitement 
in Europe over course of, 252- 
2 53 ; indignation in England 
over, 253-254; enters Pensa- 
cola, 254-255; correspondence 
of, with Rabun, 2 55 ; debate in 
congress respecting course 
of, 256-264; false prin- 
ciple of, 2 57; summary of 
arguments against, 261-262; 
letter of, to secretary of war, 
262 ; defenders of, 262-263 ; 
popular feeling with, 263-264; 
sustained in house, 264 ; re- 
port in senate unfavoralDle to, 
264 ; threats of, against his 
opponents, 264-265 ; flatterers 
of, 2 6 5-266; sample of letters 
to, 266 ; statement of Parton 
concerning debate, 267 ; dis- 
cussion of course of, in cab- 
inet, 267-270; DeOnis protests 
to Adams against course of, 
282-283; Spain demands rep- 
aration for injuries inflicted 
by, 285-286; Adams justifies 
invasion of Florida by, 287- 
288, and execution of Arbuth- 
not and Ambrister by, 291 ; 
Monroe and Calhoun write to. 



390 



The Purchase of Florida 



Jackson, Andrew, continued — 
293-294 ; Bagot's opinion of, 
296 ; writes concerning Span- 
ish breach of faith, 313-314; 
statement of, regarding Tex- 
as and Florida, '320-321; ap- 
pointed governor of Florida, 
323 ; quarrel of, with Fro- 
mentin, 324 ; conduct of, as 
governor, 324-325; justice of 
course of, in Florida consid- 
ered, 32 8. 

Jackson, Fort, 204, 229; treaty 
of, 204, 227, 236, 247, 260, 
261, 286. 

Jacksonville, 38, 192. 

Jamaica, traded to England for 
Florida, 19. 

Jaudenes, M. de, a Spanish rep- 
resentative, 64, 66. 

Jay, John, 22, 23, 24, 25, 29, 
30, 36, 68; ambassador to 
Madrid, 19 ; sees advantages 
of treaty with Spain, 43-44; 
argues with Gardoqui, 44 ; 
recommends treaty for term 
of years, 44-46 ; asserts right 
to Mississippi, 46-47 ; Spain 
declines treaty, 47. 

Jay treaty, 70, 71, 73, 79, 86, 89. 

Jefferson, Thomas, 49, 57, 59, 
60, 63, 64, 67, 74, 93, 109, 119, 
121, 124, 125, 168, 178. 185, 
188, 293, 322, '325; argues 
right to navigate Mississippi, 
52-53 ; instruction to Carmi- 
chael, 53-54, 55-56 ; curious 
argument of, 56 ; instructs 
Carmichael and Short, 58 ; 
sends special mission to ne- 
gotiate purchase of Florida 
and Louisiana, 106-107; opin- 
ion of, in West Florida con- 
troversy, 144 ; writes on Mis- 
sissippi and the Floridas, 151- 
152 ; consults with cabinet and 
others respecting treaty with 
Spain, 159-160 ; receives news 
from disputed territory, 160- 
161 ; his plan of alliance with 
England frustrated, 161 ; de- 
cides to appeal to France for 
help, 161 ; orders Governor 
■Claiborne to dismiss Spanish 
officials, 161-162; submits 
propositions of France to Con- 
gress, 163 ; breaks with Ran- 
dolph, 164 ; secures appropria- 
tion for purchase of Florida, 

165 ; move unpopular, 165- 

166 ; relation of, to conspir- 
acy of Aaron Burr, 173-174 ; 
advocates war with Spain, 175. 

Jena, battle of, 176, 181. 
Johnson, Richard M., 262, 321. 
Jones, William, 85. 

Kalb, Johann de, 257. 
Kanawha River, 29. 
Kemper, Nathaniel, 174. 



Kemper, Reuben, 186. 

Kentuckv, 47, 60, 61, 62, 64, 94, 
95, 119, 137, 172, 174, 219, 
220, 244, 321; proposes to de- 
clare her independence, 42 ; 
press of, supports West Flori- 
da revolutionists, 183 ; pro- 
clamation of Nicholls to peo- 
ple of, 206. 

King. Rufus, 88, 89, 157. 

King, Colonel William, in Jack- 
son's army, 250. 

Knoll, John, 85. 

Knox, Henry, 40, 41, 51. 

Lacock, Abner, 241, 264, 265. 

La Fayette, Marquis de, 30, 52, 
259. 

Lafitte, Jean, 2 07. 

Lanans, post, 169. 

Laussat, Peter Clement, a 
French envoy, 119, 13 7. 

Laval, Major Jacint, 194. 

Law, John, 120. 

Lawrence, Major William, 207. 

Lexington, 17. 

Lincoln, Levi, 92. 

Liston, Robert, S3, 84, 89. 

Livingston, Edward, 154. 

Livingston, Robert R., 2 6, 105, 
106, 134, 138, 151. 160, 176, 
325; receives instructions re- 
specting Louisiana, 104 ; re- 
specting purchase of Florida 
and New Orleans, 109-112 ; re- 
ceives from Madison Ameri- 
can construction of Louisiana 
purchase treaty, 126-133 ; ad- 
vises Madison to seize West 
Florida, 146. 

London. 69, 86, 88, 89, 117, 157, 
159, 161, 205, 228, 246, 247, 
253. 288, 295, 299. 

Loomis, Jainis, 230. 

Lopez, Don Jose, 193, 194. 

Louis XIV, 120. 

Louis XV, 120. 

Louis XVI, 5 8. 

Louisiana, 21, 35, 37, 52, 53, 54, 
58, 60. 61, 62, 63, 64, 70, 78, 
79. 84, 89, 90, 91, 117, 124, 
125, 149, 150, 151, 152, 157, 
162, 163, 165, 169, 174, 175, 
182, 183, 199, 205, 209, 211, 
218, 220, 224, 225, 273, 276, 
308, 321, 325; United States 
fears cession of, to France, 98- 
99 ; letter of Pinckney, pro- 
posing to purchase part of, 
100-104 ; Jefferson sends spe- 
cial mission to negotiate pur- 
chase of, 106-107 : ceded to 
France, lOS ; Napoleon in re- 
lation to, 109-110 ; motives of 
France in securing, 110; 
iSpain protests against trans- 
fer of, to United States, 112- 
113 ; statement of case, 113- 
115 ; formal transfer of pos- 
session to United States, 118- 



Index 



391 



120 ; previous owners, 120 ; 
■belief that it would revert to 
Spain, 121 ; Madison on Amer- 
ican construction of treaty of 
purchase, 126-133 ; Madison 
on French construction of 
same, 134-136 ; arguments of 
Spain respecting same, 136- 
138 ; Talleyrand on ex- 
tent of, 138-140; question 
considered, 141-145 ; all boun- 
daries uncertain, 146 ; Monroe 
advises bold course in negoti- 
ations respecting boundaries 
of, 146-147 ; western boundary 
of, discussed by Monroe and 
Cevallos, 158-159 ; news from, 
reaches Jefferson, 160-161 ; 
eastern boundary of state of, 
188 ; proclamation of Nicholls 
to people of, 20 6; DeOnis dis- 
cusses boundaries of, 221-222 ; 
justice of acquisition of, from 
France considered, 326. 

Louisiana, West, 128, 129. 

Luengo, Don Francisco Casa y, 
240,'287. 

Luzerne, Chevalier de la, 30. 

MacDonald, Colonel James, 211. 

MacGregor, Gregor, '2 88; cap- 
tures Fernandina, 232 ; char- 
acterization of, 2 32-233 ; sails 
for New iProvidence, 234. 

McGillivray (half-breed), 39; 
makes treaty with United 
States, 49-50 ; has secret un- 
d<^rstanding with United 

• States, 50 ; stipulations of 
treaty of, never carried out, 
51-52. 

Mcintosh, General John H., 38, 
192, 193, 194, 222, 250. 

McKean, Joseph B., 87, 154. 

McKee, Colonel John, appointed 
commissioner for the Flori- 
das, 188 ; instructions to, 190- 
191. 

McKeever, 'Captain Isaac, 245, 
247, 248. 

MoMinns, Joseph, governor of 
Tennessee, 266. 

McQueen, Peter, 245. 

Macomb, General Alexander, 
261. 

Madison, James, 66, 93, 98, 105, 
106, 122, 137, 146, 148, 151, 
152, 158, 159, 160. 166, 184, 
185, 192, 198, 199, 202. 309, 
325 ; writes on importance of 
Mississippi. 9 4-95 ; instruc- 
tions to Pinekney, respecting 
Florida, 116 ; respecting Lou- 
isiana purchase, 117-118 ; 
gives American construction 
of treaty, 126-133 ; writes to 
Armstrong respecting French 
construction of treaty, 13 4- 
136 ; opinion of, in TVest Flor- 



ida controversy, 144 ; instruc- 
tions about resorting to force, 
149 ; sends instructions to 
Armstrong and Bowdoin, for 
negotiating treaty with Spain, 
168; sends new instructions, 

169 ; protests against Span- 
ish hostilities in southwest, 

170 ; refuses invitation of Na- 
poleon for United States to 
participate in war against 
England, 179 ; asks congress 
for authority to occupy the 
Floridas, 186 ; congress grants 
authority to, and he appoints 
commissioners to carry out 
the law, 187-188 ; disavows 
acts of 'Matthews, 196 ; pre- 
pares to forestall England 
in occupation of Florida, 200. 

Madrid, 19, 20, 22, 56, 57, 58, 
59, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 93, 94, 
95, 105, 106. 116, 117, 125, 
135, 139, li47, 148, 149, 150, 
154, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 
166, 176, 179, 180, 182, 215, 
217, 271, 272, 273, 275, 277, 
288, 310, 312, 314. 

Maine, 319. 

Majorca, 273. 

Marmenton River, 158. 

Marshall, John, 89, 95, 173. 

Martens, Georg Friedrich von, 
263. 

Massachusetts, 159. 

Matagorda, 161, 2 11-? 

Matthews, General George, 195, 
197 ; appointed commissioner 
for the Floridas. 188 ; instruc- 
tions to, 190-191 ; plans to an- 
nex East Florida to United 
(States, 191-192; activity of, in 
stirring up revolution, 192- 
193 ; accused by Spanish of 
invading their territory, 194 ; 
acts of, disavowed by Madi- 
son, 196. 

Maurepas, Lake, 138, 143, 144. 

Mazot, Don Jose, 287. 

Mediterranean, the, 153, 156, 
165, 273. 

Mermen teau River, 299. 

Merry, Anthony, English min- 
ister, plotting witli Burr, 170. 

Mexico (New Spain), 21, 55, 89, 
170, 171, 173, 180, 182, 201, 
205, 210, 212, 218. 219, 220, 
221, 227, 232, 233, 234. 235, 
236, 267, 301. 313, 325, 330. 

Mexico. Gulf of, 23, 24. 35, 42. 
55, 62, 74, 100, 106, 122, 138, 
144, 149, 158, 183, 188, 224, 
262, 275, 299. 

Michigan, Lake, 29. 

Mimms, Fort, destruction of, by 
the Creeks, 203. 

Mina, Xavier, 225. 

Minorca, 18, 273. 

Mil-ales, Don Juan, a Spanish 



392 



The Purchase of Florida 



oommissioner, account of 
American affairs, 2 0. 

Miranda, General Francisco, 
150, 173, 231 ; in plot to free 
Spanish - American colonies, 
88-90 ; organizes expedition 
against Spanish possessions, 
174-175. 

Mississippi district, 94, 160, 163. 

Mississippi River, 32, 33, 34, 35, 
36, 38, 39, 42, 43, 44, 45, 48, 
55, 56, 57, 59, 61, 62, 65, 67, 
68, 70, 76, 81, 84, 88, 93, 94, 
97, 98, 101, 103, 104, 106, 107, 
109, 110, 111, 112, 120, 124, 
125, 126, 127, 129, 130, 131, 
137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 
143, 144, 146, 147, 149, 152, 

157, 158, 159, 161, 162, 165, 

169, 171, 180, 182, 187, 188, 
199, 201, 207, 224, 272, 275, 
276, 304, 308, 321, 325; im- 
portance of, 9 ; free navigation 
always demanded by United 
States, 22; reasons, 23-25; 
Spain takes forcible posses- 
sion, 25-26 ; in peace negotia- 
tions between United States 
and Great Britain, 27-2 8 ; rea- 
sons for Spain's pretensions, 
29 ; free navigation given to 
United States in treaty of 
1783, 30; disputed by Spain, 
37; right to, asserted by Jay, 
46-47 ; claim to, upheld by 
Spain, 47 ; Jefferson's argu- 
ments, 52-53 ; Pinckney nego- 
tiates with Spain about navi- 
gation of, 72 ; right at last 
recognized in treaty of 1795, 
73 ; right necessary to reten- 
tion of "West in Union, 74. 

Mississippi Territory, 118, 119, 
121, 160, 161, 163, 183, 184, 
187, 199. 

Mississippi Valley, 20, 30, 63, 
70, 200. 

Missouri River, 55, 79, 147, 157, 

158, 159, 299, 305. 

Mitchell, David Bradie, 200, 
289 ; appointed in place of 
Matthews. 196 ; instructions 
to, 197 ; sends to Savannah for 
aid, 197 ; succeeded by Pinck- 
ney, 198 ; statement of, re- 
garding Seminole disturbanc- 
es 236 237. 

Mobile, 144"', 169, 180, 185, 186, 
199, 201. 202, 203, 204, 205, 
207, 209, 210, a38. 

Mobile Bay, 207. 

Mobile River, 96, 103, 107, 124, 
137, 139, 146, 149, 161, 169, 

170, 203 ; United States leg- 
islation for territory east and 
west of. 122. 

Monroe, James, 106, 117, 160, 
'161, 168, 176, 209, 213, 214, 
219, 239, 271, 303, 304, 309, 
313, 320, 325, 328; receives in- 



structions respecting purchase 
of Florida and New Orleans, 
109-112 ; writes to Bournon- 
ville respecting Louisiana 
purchase treaty, 140 ; advises 
bold course in Louisiana ne- 
gotiations, 146-147 ; sent to 
Madrid to negotiate questions 
at issue, 147 ; instructions to, 
147-148 ; final propositions to 
Spain for treaty, 149 ; propo- 
sitions of, rejected, 150 ; with 

> Armstrong, advises decisive 
measures, 152-153 ; ordered to 
Madrid, 157 ; instructions of, 
157-158 ; makes offer of 
treaty, 158-159 ; recalled, 159 ; 
writes to Howard respecting 
American neutrality, 196 ; in- 
dignant at requests to receive 
De Onis, 216-217; answer of, 
to Be Onis, 222-223; respect- 
ing revolted provinces, 223- 
22 4; further arguments by, 
224-225; famous letter of 
Jackson to, 240 ; history of 
letter according to, 240-241 ; 
responsibility of administra- 
Ition of, for Jackson's acts, 
242-243; opposes Jackson in 
cabinet, 267-270; negotiations 
of, with De Onis, 2 72; letter 
of, to appease Jackson, 2 9'3- 
294 ; desires recognition of 
South American colonies, 301 ; 
willing to make concessions 
to Spain, 306. 

Montmorin, Count de, 20, 26, 52, 
53. 

Moosa, Fort, 195. 

Morales, Don Francisco de, a 
iSpanish officer, 232. 

Morris, Anthony, 214, 215, 217, 
218. 

Moultrie, "William, 61. 

Muhlenburg, Major Peter, 238. 

Multnomah, River, 306. 

Muskogee Indians, 34. 

Nacogdoches, 161, 169. 

Napoleon Bonaparte, 63, 106, 
107, 115, 119, 120, 124, 125, 
139, 143, 161, 168, 180, 182, 
187, 199, 200, 211, 260, 281; 
relation of, to Louisiana and 
Florida, 109-110; policy of, in 
backing Spain's rejection of 
treaty propositions, 151; offer 
of, to Armstrong regarding 
Florida, 162 ; desires settle- 
ment of Spanish - American 
difficulties, 175-176 ; loses in- 
terest therein, 176 ; United 
States refuses invitation of, to 
take part in war against Eng- 
land, 178-179; struggle of 
Spain against, 181 ; "Napoleon 
Propaganda," 226-227. 

Nashville, 201, 239, 242, 244. 



Index 



393 



Natchez, 34, 40, 61, 76, 77, 79, 
80, 84, 92. 

Natchitoches River, 150, 159, 
169, 299. 

Negro Port, 244, 286, 288, 289, 
292 ; occupation of, by fugitive 
negroes, 228 ; destruction of, 
by Gaines, 229-231. 

Neuville, Hyde de, 306, 308; in- 
termediary between Adams 
and Oe Onis, 304. 

New Feliciana, 182, 183, 186. 

Newfoundland, 21. 

Newgate, 86. 

New Granada, 182, 2133. 

New Madrid, 35, 48, 84. 

New Mexico, 62, 63. 

New Orleans, 38, 42, 43, 48, 52, 
54, 56, 57, 60, 62, 63, 72, 76, 

.> 78, 80, 95, 96, 104, 105, 106, 
107, 108, 109, 110, 118, 119, 
124, 125, 126, 137, 140, 150, 
158, 162, 185, 186, 198, 201, 
'202, 209, 211, 218, 222, 226, 
229, 235, 246, 263, 272, 276, 
321, 32 2; importance of, 9; 
privilege of deposit in, grant- 
ed to United States, 73 ; clos- 
ing of port of, by Spanish, 
93-94 ; war imminent in con- 
sequence, 97-98; plan of Uni- 
ted States, to purchase from 
France, 111-112 ; opposition 
in, to American sovereignty, 
120-121; suggestion to estab- 
lish Spanish paper in, 176- 
177 ; headquarters of revolu- 
tionary plotters and filibust- 
ers, 180; battle of, 210. 

New Providence, 234, 252, 290. 

New York City, 49, 50, 51, 214, 
231. 

Nicholls, Colonel Edward, 209, 
246, 247, 288; seizure of Pen- 
sacola by English under, 205- 
206 ; proclamation of, to peo- 
ple of Louisiana and Ken- 
tucky, 206 ; attack of, upon 
Jackson at Mobile, 207-208; 
course of, in Florida, 227-228 ; 
pretensions of, ridiculed by 
Adams, 286. 

Nicholson, Joseph H., 164. 

NilCs, Hezekiah, summarizes 
attitude of public toward 
Jackson, 263-264. 

Nogales, 84. 

Norfolk, 22 6. 

North America, 20, 21, 70, 73, 
74, 315, 330. 

North Carolina, 41, 42. 

North Fort, 42. 

Nova Scotia, 21, 143. 

Nuestra Senora de los Adaes. 
Bee Adaes. 

Oconee lands, 49. 
Ogechee River, 17. 
Oglethorpe, James Edward, 34. 



Ohio River, 29, 30, 35, 139, 171, 
201. 

Ohio (state), 137, 321. 

Onis, Chevalier Luis de, 180, 181, 
215, 216, 270, 275, 279, 303, 
308, 314, 319; protests against 
occupation of Fernandina, 
195 ; against conduct of in- 
surgent representatives, 210- 
211; United States refuses to 
recognize, 213 ; complaint of 
United States against conduct 
of, 21)3-214; acceptance of, as 
Spanish minister by United 
States, 217 ; enters series of 
protests against conduct of 
United States, 218-220 ; writes 
concerning shortsightedness 
of United States in aiding 
Mexican insurgents, 220 ; ex- 
plains violation of neutrality 
of Florida in war of 1812, 220- 
221 ; discusses boundaries of 
Louisiana and Florida, 221- 
222 ; answer of Monroe to, 
222-224; further arguments 
by, 224 - 225 ; complaints 
against filibustering expedi- 
itions, 225-226; granted full 
powers to treat, by Cevallos, 
271-272; negotiations of, with 
'Monroe, 272 ; disputes be- 
tween Adams and, 277-278; 
Erving out of patience with, 
278 ; protests to Adams 
against course of Jackson, 
282-283; answer of Adams to, 
283-284; reply of, to Adams, 
284-285; Adams's opinion of, 
298-299; meets with opposi- 
tion from king's council, 299 ; 
treats with Adams concern- 
ing boundaries, 299-300 ; re- 
plies to Adams's demand for 
cancellation of land grants, 
300-301; De Neuville inter- 
mediary between Adams and, 
i30.4 ; final negotiations be- 
tween Adams and, 305-307; 
Adams and, discuss question 
of land grants in Florida, 309 ; 
succeeded by Vives, 310; 
statements of, regarding land 
grants, 311. 

Orleans, territory of, 184, 187, 
188 

Osage River, 147, 157, 299. 

Otis, Harrison G., 90. 

Ouisconsin .River, 84. 

Overton, John, 242. 

Pacific Ocean, 300. 

Panama, Isthmus of, 88. 

Panton and Company, 50, 51. 

Paris, 66, 68, 74, 86, 89, 104, 
105, 106, 135, 142, 152, 158, 
160, 161, 168, 176, 253, 294, 
312; treaty of (1763), 16, 24; 
treaty of (1783), 31, 33; 
treaty of (1803), 189. 



394 



The Purchase of Florida 



Parma, duchy of, 105, 125, 273; 
duke of, 112. 

Parton, James, 267, 29*3. 

Pascagoula River, 122. 

Pass Christian. See Christian, 
Pass. 

"Patricia Mexicana," the, 226. 

Patterson, Daniel, 207, 229. 

Pearl River, 186, 188, 199. 

Peive, Major , Mexican 

revolutionist, 219. 

Pennsylvania, 98. 

Pensacola, 35, 62, 121, 124, 169, 
174, 201, 203, 204, 207, 208, 
210, 224, 228, 231, 243, 244, 
246, 250, 253, 259, 260, 261, 
267, 268, 269, 282, 283, 284, 
285, 292, 294, 328; seizure of, 
Iby English under Nicholls, 
205-206 ; stormed 'by Jackson, 
209; Jackson enters, 254-255; 
seizure of, justified by Adams, 
287. 

Percy, Captain William H., 
English officer, 206, 207. 

Perdido River, 125, 127, 128, 
129, 131, 132, 144, 146, 148, 
157, 160, 185, 187, 188, 190, 
199, 233, 276. 

Peter Porcupine, 85 ; works of. 
86. 

Philadelphia, 20, 59, 70, 71, 73, 
S'5, 86, 91, 166, 214. 

Pickering, Timothy, 79, 80, 85, 
86, 88, 89, 92, 98; turns over 
Spanish protest to British 
minister, 83 ; quarrels Vi'ith 
D'Yrujo, 83-84. 

Pike, Zebulon M., 185. 

Pinckney, Charles, 89, 94, 105, 
106, 109, 112, 115, 140, 148, 
159, 160, 168, 176, 325; ar- 
ranges convention of 1802, 96- 
97 ; letter of, proposing to 
purchase Florida, 100-104 ; of- 
fer renewed, 107-108 ; contin- 
ues overtures respecting Flor- 
ida, 116-117 ; receives in- 
structions from Madison re- 
specting Louisiana purchase, 
117-118; final propositions of, 
to Spain, 149 ; propositions of, 
rejected, 150 ; writes concern- 
ing Spain's motive in holding 
Florida, 150-151 ; advises stir- 
ring up public feeling, 153 ; 
submits treaty to Cevallos, 
156 ; breaks off negotiations 
156-157 ; recalled, 157. 

Pinckney, General Thomas, 200 ; 
appointed minister plenipoten- 
tiary in iSpain, 6 7 ; receives in- 
structions from Randolph, 67- 
68; treats with Spain, 71-72: 
rewarded for treaty of 1795, 
74 ; succeeds Mitchell in East 
Florida, 198 ; withdraws from 
Ainelia Island, 202. 
Pitt, William, 88, 171. 
Pittsburg, 210. 



Pizarro, Don Jos6, 279 ; nego- 
tiates with Erving, 275 ; offers 
to ratify convention of 1802, 
2 78 ; demands reparation for 
injuries inflicted by Jackson, 
285-286; Adams sends full 
statement of American case 
to, 286-291 ; appreciation of 
document, and its success, 
291-293 ; comments upon the 
Florida affair, 295 ; character- 
ization of, by Erving, 296. 

Poindexter, George, 262. 

Political Register (newspaper), 
166. 

Ponceau, Steplien du, 154. 

Pontchartrain, Lake, 138, 144. 

Pope, Percy Smith, 84. 

Porcupine, Peter. See Peter 
Porcupine. 

Porcupine's Gazette, 85, 86. 

Portugal, 98, 27v3, 274. 

Potomac River, term applied to 
Mississippi, 94. 

Priere, Major, Mexican revolu- 
tionist, 219. 

Prussia, 69. 

Pulaski, Casimir, 257. 

Punon Rostro, Count de, 309. 

Quixote, term applied to D'Yru- 
jo, 86. 

RabuNj William, governor of 

Georgia, correspondence of 

Jackson with, 2 55. 
Raleigh, Sir Walter, 269. 
Randolph, Edmund, 64, 69, 98; 

instructions to Short, 65-66 ; 

to Pinckney, 67-68. 
Randolph, John, of Roanoke, 

16 5; opposes purchase of 

Florida, 163 ; breaks with Jef- 
ferson, 164. 
Ravarra, attempts to assassinate 

Erving, 215. 
Rawle, William, 154. 
Rayneval, de, private 

secretary to Vergennes, 29. 
Red River, 150, 157, 159, 299, 

300, 306, 322. 
Red Stick Indians, 204, 245, 286. 
"Retrocede," construction of 

terin in Louisiana purchase 

treaty, 132-133. 
"Revenge," the, 210. 
Rhea, John, elected pi'esident by 

West Florida insurgents, 184. 
Rhea, John, connection of, with 

famous letter of Jackson, 

240-243. 
Richmond, 173. 
Rio Bravo, the, 146, 147, 148, 

152, 153, 158, 159, 221. 
Rio Colorado. See Colorado 

River. 
Rio Del Norte, the, 221, 3 IS. 
Rio Grande, the, 161, 272, 300. 
Robertson, James, 48, 74. 
Robinson, Dr. John H., 219; 



Index 



395 



lorganizes assistance to Mexi- 
can insurgents, 210-211. 

''Romp," the, 225. 

Rush, Dr. Benjamin, 86. 

Rush, Richard, 253, 280, 295. 

Russia. 113, 114, 116, 275, 328; 
proffers to mediate between 
Spain and United States, 202 ; 
understanding of, witli Spain, 
273-274. 

Sabine River, 146, 157, 160, 
201, 300, 303, 307, 311, 316, 
319, 320. 

St. Augustine, 197, 198, 200, 201 
232, 233, 234, 239, 323; during 
the Revolution, 17-18 ; in- 
vested by patriots, 195. 

St. Ferdinand, West Florida dis- 
trict, 186. 

St. Helena, West Florida dis- 
trict, 181, 186. 

St. John's Plains, convention of, 
183. 

St. John's River, 34, 192, 19'3. 
197, 232. 

St. Joseph, post, 2 6. 

St. 'Lawrence, river, 143 ; gulf 
of, 143. 

St. Louis, post, 26, 61, 84. 

St. Marks, Fort, 243, 245, )246, 
250, 259, 260, 282, 284, 285, 
289, 32 8; seizure of, by Jack- 
son, 247-248 ; justified by 
Adams, 287. 

St. Mary's (town), 191, 193, 197. 

St. Mary's River, 17, 33, 34, 63, 
201 ; Matthews stirs up insur- 
rection along, 19 1-1 93. 

St. Michael, Fort, 205, 206. 

St. Petersburg, 202. 

San Antonio, 160. 

San Domingo, 71, 107, 175, 234. 

San Feliciana, West Florida 
district, 183. 

San Ildefonso, treaty of, (1800), 
112, 115, 120, 125, 140, 144, 
148, 221. 225. 

San Lorenzo el Real, treaty of 
1795, 73. 

Santa Fe. 62. 

"Santa Maria," the, 226. 

Santivanes, Chevalier de, 140. 

"Saratoga," the, '2,10. 

Savannah, 197, 205. 

Scopholltes, 18. 

Scott. Lieutenant Martin, 248, 
290 ; massacre of party of, by 
Seminoles, 237-238. 

Scott, Fort, 229, 2|30, 237, 238, 
241, 244. 

Sebastian, Jiidge, 48. 

Seminoles, 35, 230, 231, 240, 245, 
283, 286, 290, 292, 324; 
treaty with United 'States, 49- 
50 ; futile, 51-52 ; joined by the 
■Creeks, 227 ; Nicholls con- 
cludes alliance with, 227 ; 
outrages of, upon settlers, 
236-237; collision at Fowl- 



town between Americans and, 
237 ; massacre party of Lieu- 
tenarit Scott, 237-23 8 ; Jackson 
assurhes command against, 
238-239; ending of war with, 
249-250; war summarized, 
256; war subject of congress- 
ional investigation, 256-267; 
justice of war considered, 328. 

Sevier, Colonel John, 40, 48, 74. 

Short, William, 52, 67 ; ap- 
pointed commissioner pleni- 
potentiary in Spain, 57; in- 
structions from Jefferson, 58 ; 
left as ehargg in Madrid, 59; 
receives instructions from 
Randolph, 65-66; writes to 
secretary of state, 70. 

Skipwith, Fulwar, 185. 

Smith, Robert, 160, 186 ; in- 
structions to Matthews and 
McKee, 191. 

Smyth, Alexander, 2 62. 

"Sophie," the, 208. 

South America, 65, 74, 90 91 
175, 233, 279, 294; Spanish! 
:.0; revolts against Spain in, 
182 ; United States assists 
revolted colonies in, 199 ; De 
Onis cemplains of aid fur- 
nished to colonies in, 218-219; 
justice of complaints, 226 ; ef- 
forts of colonies of, for recog- 
nition by United ^States, 280 ; 
Europe sides with Spain 
agamst colonies of, 281 ■ 
United States favorably in- 
chned toward, 281; 'England 
requested to recognize colonies 
9f, (301-303; question of Span- 
ish provinces in, discussed by 
Vives and Adams, 314-318; 
United States recognize colon- 
ies of, 325; justice of course 
of United States toward, con- 
sidered, 328-329. 

South Carolina, 60, 61, 89 

South Pass, 111. 

South Sea, 307, (308. 

Spain, 9, 16, 19, 23, 24, 25 26 
~27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33,' 36,' 
37, 38, 43, 44, 45, 46, 49, 50 
52, 53, 55, 60, 61, 63, 64, 65 
72, 85, 92, 98, 100, lft3, 104 
105, 106, 107, 116, 117, 118 
119, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127' 
128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133' 
134, 135, 138, 139, 140, 143' 
144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149 
151, 152, 156, 160, 161, 162' 
164, 165. 166, 168, 171, 172 
184, 186, 187, 189, 194, 196 
197, 198, 200, 206, 209 213 
214, 219, 220, 221 22'' '''4' 
225, 227, 229, 232,' 236* 24o' 
253, 255, 258, 262, 268, 269' 
271, 280, 282, 283, 284 294* 
295, 299, 303, 304, (309,' Sll^ 
323 ; policy of, with regard 
to American colonies, 20 ; 



396 



The Purchase of Florida 



Spain, continued — 

joins Prance against England, 
21; claims of, after 1783, 34- 
35; declines treaty with 
United States, 47 ; sovereignty 
of, accepted by American set- 
tlers, 48 ; defeated in West- 
ern intrigues, 48 ; invites fresh 
negotiations with United 
States, 56-57 ; circumstances 
unfavorable to United States, 
'58-59 ; failure of negotia- 
tions with, 59 ; negotiations 
reopened, 66-67 ; encroach- 
ments upon American com- 
merce, 6 8 ; tires of English al- 
liance, 69 ; desirous of treaty 
with United States, 69-70; 
England declares war against, 
71 ; concludes treaty with 
United 'States (1795), 73; 
motives for treaty, 73-74 ; 
government of; controlled by 
Godoy, 75 ; attempts to defeat 
execution of treaty of 1795, 
77-78; at war with England, 
79 ; misunderstandings with, 
respecting treaty of 1795, 79- 
80 ; refuses to vacate forts, 
82 ; proposed alliance of 
United States with England 
against France and, 87-89 ; 
failure of scheme, 90-91; 
claims of United States 
against, 95-96 ; convention of 
1812, 96-97; refuses to cede 
Florida to United States, 108- 
109 ; protests against transfer 
of Louisiana to United States, 
112-113 ; statement of case, 
113-115 ; arguments of, re- 
specting Louisiana purchase 
treaty, 136-138 ; in Family 
Compact of the Bourbons, 141- 
142 ; rejects propositions for 
treaty by United States, 150; 
motives therefor, 150 ; nego- 
tiates with United States 
concerning spoliation claims, 
153-155 ; Monroe offers terms 
of treaty to, 158-159 ; aggres- 
sive measures of, against 
United States in southwest, 
169-170, 174; complains of 
Miranda expedition, 175 ; un- 
willing to make treaty with 
United States, 176 ; terms of- 
fered to, by United States 
under prospect of war with 
England, 177; warned by 
United States of intention to 
prevent England from occu- 
pying Florida, 178; under 
Joseph Bonaparte, 179; re- 
port spreads in, that Napoleon 
intends to sell Florida to 
United States, 180 ; appoints 
De Onis as minister in Wash- 
ington, 180; struggle of, 
against Napoleon, 181; re- 



volts against, in South Ameri- 
can provinces, 182 ; revolt in 
West Florida against, 182- 
183 ; insurrection against au- 
thority of, in East Florida, 
192 ; unable to maintain order 
in Florida, 199 ; Russia prof- 
fers to mediate between Uni- 
ted States and, 202 ; mastery 
of England over, 204-205 ; vio- 
lates neutrality by aiding 
England, 205 ; complains of 
aid furnished to revolted 
colonies by United States, 
210 ; prospect of war with 
United States, 211-212; quib- 
bling with United States over 
recognition of ministers, 215- 
217; Erving writes concern- 
ing attitude of, toward United 
States, 272-273 ; concerning 
Russion-Spanish understand- 
ing, 273-274; concerning rela- 
tions of, with other European 
powers, 274-275 ; council of 
state of, described, 276 ; 
terms of adjustment between 
United States and, as pro- 
posed by Adams, 276-277; 
favorable attitude toward 
United States, 278 ; England 
, offers to mediate between 
United States and, 278-279 ; 
favored by Europe against 
colonies, 281 ; demands repar- 
ation for injuries inflicted by 
Jackson, 285-286; full state- 
ment of American case sent 
to, 286-291; appreciation of 
document, and its success, 
291-293; France anxious to 
secure settlement between 
United States and, 2 96-297; 
reoccupies Florida, 298 ; ces- 
sion of Florida demanded 
from, as satisfaction for 
claims, 300 ; United States 
professes neutrality in South 
American rebellions against, 
301-302 ; disposition in, re- 
garding treaty, 305 ; Monroe 
willing to make concessions 
to, 306 ; summary of treaty of 
1819, 307 ; comments of Adams 
upon treaty, 307-308 ; post- 
pones ratification of treaty, 
310 ; sends special minister to 
United States for explana- 
tions, 312 ; indignation in 
United States over course of, 
313 ; reasons of, in delaying 
ratiflcation, 314 ; reports of 
hostility of United States 
against, unfounded, 315-316 ; 
motives of United States in 
recognizing South American 
colonies of, 316-317 ; treaty 
of 1819 before congress, 318- 
320; treaty ratified by, 1321; 
justice of acquisitions from, 



Index 



397 



by United States considered, 

325-330. 
Steuben, Baron von, 257. 
Sullivan, John, 42. 
Sunbury, 17, 38. 
Superior, Lake, 29. 
Suwanee River, 247, 249. 

TalleyeanDj Charles Maurice, 
Prince of, 63, 89, 105, 106, 
134 ; writes to Armstrong re- 
specting extent of Louisiana, 
138-140 ; writes to Chevalier 
de Santivanes on same subject, 
140 ; Armstrong rejects pro- 
posals of, regarding Florida, 
162. 

Tallmadge, Benjamin, 262. 

Tammany Hall, 49. 

Tampico, 211. 

Tate, William, 61. 

Tatischoff, Dmitri Pavlovitch, 
[Russian minister at Madrid, 
273, 274, 275. 

Tauchipaho, 186. 

Tecumseh, 203. 

Tennessee, 47, 80, 81, 119, 137, 
152, 170, 200, 201, 203, 208, 
209, 219, 231, 239, 242, 250, 
266, 321 ; press of, supports 
West Florida revolutionists, 
183 ; Jackson assembles army 
in, for Florida campaign, 244. 

Tennessee, East, 203. 

Tennessee, W^est, 203, 244. 

Texas, 157, 160, 161, 170, 234, 
272, 27(3, 320, 321, 322. 

Thomas, Oeneral Philemon, takes 
Spanish fort at Baton Rouge, 
184 ; opposes possession of 
West Florida by United 
States, 18i5. 

Toledo, General Joseph Alvarez 
de, 211, 218, 219. 

Tombigbee River, 203. 

Tonyn, Fort, 17. 

Trader, Indian, characterization 
of, 38-39. 

Trimble, William A., 321. 

Trinity River, 160. 

"Triumph of Liberty," drama 
written in honor of Jackson, 
266. 

Turreau, Louis Marie, 170. 

Tuscany, 112, 113, 114. 

Twiggs, Major David E., 237. 

"Twopenny Trash," 86. 



United States, 9, 
25, 30, 31, 32, 
40 42, 43, 44, 
55, 60, 62, 63, 
77, 78, 81, 83, 
105, 106, 116, 
127 130, 131, 
140, 143, 146, 
151, 152, 157, 
168, 171, 172, 
184, 185, 186, 
194, 195, 196, 
209, 221, 222, 



19, 20, 23, 24, 
34, 35, 37, 38, 
45, 46, 48, 54, 
65, 71, 72, 74, 
84, 85, 86, 92, 
117, 118, 120, 
1)37, 138, 139, 
147, 148, 149, 
158, 159, 166, 
173, 175, 183, 
191, 192, 193, 
200, 203, 204, 
223, 224, 225, 



229, 231, 234, 236, 240, 244, 
245, 246, 247, 248, 250, 251, 
253, 254, 255, 271, 275, 282, 
283, 284, 298, 299, 305, 309, 
311, 314 ; makes overtures to 
Spain, 21-22 ; peace negotia- 
tions with England, 27-28; 
boundaries of, in treaty of 
17'8i3, 33 ; Spanish overtures to, 
36; difficulties of, with In- 
dians, 41 ; Spain declines 
treaty with, 47 ; treaty of, 
with Creeks and Seminoles, 
49-50 ; stipulations never car- 
ried out by, 51-52 ; Spain in- 
vites fresh negotiations with, 
'56-57 ; circumstances unfavor- 
able for treaty with Spain, 
58-59; failure of negotiations, 
59 ; negotiations reopened be- 
tween Spain and, 66-67 ; Spain 
encroaches upon commerce of, 
68; Spain desires treaty with, 
69-70; concludes treaty with 
Spain, 179 5, 73; misunder- 
standings as to its provisions, 
79-80 ; plans alliance with 
England against France and 
Spain, 87-89 ; failure of 
scheme, 90-91 ; claims of, 
against Spain, 95-96; conven- 
tion of 1812, 96-97 ; fears ces- 
sion of Florida and Louisiana 
to Spain, 98-99; decides to 
purchase Florida, 100 ; offers 
to purchase Florida, 100-104 ; 
offer renewed, 107-108; Spain 
refuses to cede Florida to, 
108-109 ; views of, concerning 
French purchase of Louisiana, 
109-110 ; plans to purchase 
Florida and New Orleans 
from France, 111-112 ; pur- 
chase of Louisiana by, unjust 
to Spain, 113-115; legislates 
for territory east and west of 
Mobile River, 122 ; remon- 
strance by D'Trujo, 122-124; 
right of, to West Florida, 124- 
126 ; French construction of 
Louisiana purchase treaty un- 
favorable to, 133-134; Spain 
rejects proposition for treaty 
from, 150; negotiations of, 
with Spain concerning spolia- 
tion claims, 153-155; reply of, 
to dscision by American tribu- 
nal, 155 ; approves convention 
of 1802, 155-156; plan of al- 
liance of, with England frus- 
trated, 161; cabinet of, sub- 
mits Napoleon's offer to con- 
gress, 162-163; Spanish hostil- 
ities against, in southwest, 
169-170 ; complains of Spanish 
aggression, 174; Spain unwil- 
ling to make treaty with, 176 ; 
offers terms for purchase of 
Florida under prospect of 
war with England, 177 ; pre- 



398 



The Purchase of Florida 



United States, continued — 
pares to prevent occupation of 
Florida by England, 17 S ; re- 
fuses to participate in war of 
of Napoleon against England, 
179 ; refuses to receive De 
Onis, 180-181 ; by act of con- 
gress, authorizes provisional 
occupation of Florida, 187- 
188 ; extent of authority of, 
in Florida, 188 ; right of, to 
West Florida, 188-189; Bar- 
nabue's complaints against, 
189-190 ; right of, to occupy 
East Florida, 198 ; assists 
South American colonies, 199 ; 
Russia proffers to mediate be- 
tween Spain and, 202 ; ' au- 
thorities of East Florida assist 
(English against, 205 ; Spain 
complains of aid furnished 
to revolted colonies by, 210; 
prospect of war with Spain, 
211-212 ; refuses to recognize 
De Onis, 213 ; complains of 
conduct of De Onis, 213-214; 
reply to, by 'Barnabue, 214; 
quibbling with Spain over 
recognition of ministers, 215- 
217; accepts DeOnis as minis- 
ter from Spain, 217; De Onis 
enters series of protests 
against conduct of, 218-220 ; 
justice of complaints against, 
relative to Spanish revolution- 
ists, 219 ; justice of De Onis's 
complaints against, concern- 
ing filibustering, 226 ; respon- 
sibility of administration of, 
for Jackson's acts, 242-243; 
debate in congress of, over 
Arbuthnot and Ambrister, 
256-267; discussion in cabinet 
of, concerning Jackson, 267- 
270 ; Erving writes concerning 
attitude of Spain toward, 272- 
273 ; adjustment between 
Spain and, as proposed by 
Adams, 276-277; more favor- 

. able attitude of Spain toward, 

278 ; England offers to medi- 
ate between Spain and, 278- 

279 ; efforts of South Ameri- 
can colonies for recognition by, 

280 ; favorably inclined toward 
colonies, 281 ; position of, with 
regard to Spain and Europe, 

281 ; Spain demands repara- 
tion by, for injuries inflicted 
Joy Jackson, 285-286; full 
statement of case of, by 
Adams, 286-291 ; appreciation 
of document and its suc- 
cess, 291-293; France anx- 
ious to secure settlement 
.between Spain and, 296-297; 
requires cancellation of land 
grants in Florida, 300 ; de- 
mands cession of Florida as 
satisfaction for claims, 300 ; 



England requested to join, in 
recognizing South American 
colonies, 301-30'3 ; treaty of 
1819, 307 ; comments of Adams 
upon treaty, 307-308 ; Spain 
postpones ratiflcation of 
treaty with, 310; Spain sends 
special minister to, for expla- 
nations, 312 ; indignation in, 
over course of Spain, 313 ; 
reports of hostility of, to 
Spain unfounded, 315-316 ; 
motives of, in proposing to 
recognize South American 
colonies, 316-317; treaty of, 
with Spain before congress, 
318-320; treaty of 1819 rati- 
fied by, 321 ; opposition to 
treaty in, 321-322; delivery 
of East Florida to, 32'3 ; recog- 
nizes South American colonies, 
3i2'5 ; justice of acquisitions 
from iSpain by, considered, 
325-330. 

Upper Arkansas River, 322. 

Uriquijo, Spanish prime minis- 
ter, 100. 

Urtui, , a Mexican revo- 
lutionist, 219. 

Varges, Don Pedro de, 309. 

Vattel, Emrich von, 2 58, 262. 

Venezuela, 182, 199, 220, 233, 
302. 

Vera Cruz, 180, 186. 

Vergennes, Charles Gravier, 
Count de, 26, 29, 30; foresees 
extension of United States, 
20-21. 

Vicksburg. See Walnut Hills. 

Virginia, 42, 177, 318. 

Vives, Don Francisco Dionisio, 
320; succeeds De Onis, 310; 
sent to United States for ex- 
planations, 312 ; demands ces- 
sation of filibustering expe- 
ditions, 314 ; reply of Adams 
to, 315 ; further discussions of, 
with Adams, 315-318 ; in- 
forms Adams that consent of 
cortes would be necessary for 
treaty, 318. 

Wabash Indians, 52. 

Wabash River, 43. 

Walnut Hills (Vicksburg), 34, 

35 ; evacuation of, by Spanish, 

92. 
Washington, George, 47, 49, 54, 

57, 60, 62, 74, 89, 124, 263; 

term applied to Hamilton, 90. 
Washington, 97, 98, 135, 157, 

169, 174, 179, 186, 189, 195, 

200, 209, 238, 241, 247, 252, 

264, 267, 275, 282, 300, 304, 

308, 310, 314, 324. 
Weathersford, an Indian chief, 

205. 
Wellesley, Sir Henry, 278, 279. 
Westerners, hatred of the 

"down-river Spanish," 35-36 ; 



Index 



399 



dissatisfaction of, 42-43 ; 
stirred up by Spanish, 47; 
danger of separating from 
East, 47-49 ; Spanisli intrigues 
defeated, 4S ; increasing dis- 
turbances, 54-55; Carondolet 
writes about, 54-5 5; indigna- 
tion of, at closing of port of 
New Orleans, 94-95 ; rejoice 
at projected seizure of the 
(Floridas, 200-201. 

West Florida. See Florida, 
West. 

West Indies, SS, 110. 

West L/Ouisiana. See Louisiana, 
West. 

White, John IB., 266. 

White River, 2 99. 

Wilkinson, General James, 48, 
74, 137, 160, 200, 201, 207, 
32 6 ; part of, in transfer of 
Louisiana, 119 ; connection of, 
with Aaron Burr, 171 ; char- 
acter of, 171-172 ; Jackson 
warns Claiborne against, 172- 
173 ; receives orders to ocqupy 
West Florida, 202. 

Williams, Thomas H., 321. 

Wilson, prepares to attack 
Louisiana, 98. 

Wirt, William, 268, 270, 304. 

Woodbine, Captain , Eng- 
lish officer, 245, 252, 289; 
drills Indians into British sol- 
diers, 207 ; takes part in at- 
tack upon Fort Bowyer, 208. 



Worthington, William, secre- 
tary of East Florida under 
Jackson, 324. 

"X. Y. Z. Dispatches/' 89. 

Yazoo (Yassous) River, 32, 144; 
land frauds, 39. 

Yellow River, 210. 

Yrujo, Marquis Casa d', 79, 80, 
94, 97, 108, 113, 153, 176, 180, 
297, 305, 310 ; makes com- 
plaint of Ellicott, 77 ; quar- 
rels with Pickering, 83-84 ; de- 
mands punishment of Blount, 
84 ; reviled by Porcupine's 
Gazette, 85-87; United States 
seeks recall of, 91-92 ; com- 
plains of Bowles, 92-93 ; com- 
plains of Wilson, 98 ; remon- 
strates against United States 
legislating for territory east 
and west of River Mobile, 
122-124 ; on Louisiana pur- 
chase treaty, 136-137; submits 
spoliation claims to American 
tribunal, 154-155 ; accused of 
bribing editor of Political 
Register. 166-167; succeeded 
by Foronda, 168; plotting 
with Burr, 170 ; conduct of, 
in United estates, 214 ; named 
foreign minister, 296 ; Erving 
writes concerning, 296. 

ZuNiGA, Maurice de, 283. 



Americana 

Catalog of the Publications of 

The Burrows Brothers Company 

Cleveland, Ohio 

(and London) 



Principal Contents 

Haworth's Hayes-Tilden Controversy. 

Indian Captivity Series, 5 volumes. 

Douglas' Old France. 

The Leonard Narrative. 

Orth's American Politicians. 

Eliot's Logic Primer. 

Paullin's Navy of the Revolution, 

Guardia's Costa Rican Tales. 

Avery's History of the United States. 

The Jesuit Relations. 

Severance's The Niagara Frontier. 

The B B Reprints. 

Hutchins' Topographical Description. 

Wafer's Panama. 



"... the enterprising publishers are doing an in- 
valuable service to the literature of Americarn history."— 
The Dial, March 16, '04. 



25J4 



II 



Burrows Brothers Company 



The following pages contain a list of the Publi- 
cations devoted to American history issued by The 
Burrows Brothers Company, Cleveland, Ohio. 
Prices with few exceptions are net, in accordance 
with the regulations of the American Publishers' 
Association. Volumes preceded by an * are in 
limited editions. 



Alsop (George)... XII 
Avery (Elroy 

McKendree X 

Blackhawk XIX 

Boone (Daniel).. XIX 
Bourne ( Edward 

Gaylord) XII 

Brady (Cyrus 

Townsend). . . .XIV 
Budd (Thomas). XIII 
Denton (Daniel). .XII 
Douglas (James) ... IV 
Douglas (Stephen A.) 

XVII 

Eames (Wilberforce) 

VIII 

Eastburn (Robert) XII 

Eliot (John) VIII 

Gilbert (Beajamin) XV 
Guardia (Ricardo 

Fernandez) V 

Haworth XVIII 

Hicks (Frederick 

Charles) VII 

How (Nehemiah) XVI 
Hutchins (Thomas) 

....VII 

Jeffries (Ewel)..XVI 
Jesuit Relations. . .IX 
Johnston (Charles) 

....XVII 

Jones ( Charles C, Jr.) 

XIX 



Leeth ( John). .. .XVI 
Leonard (Zenas). . . IV 
Lincoln (Abraham) 

XVII 

Mereness (Newton D.) 

XII 

Miller ( John) .. .XIII 
Miner (William 

Harvey) XIX 

Neumann (Felix) .XII 
Orth (Samuel P.).. Ill 
Paltsits (Victor Hugo) 

XII-XVI 

Paullin (Charles Oscar) 

VIII 

Rafinesque(C. D.).XI 
Severance ( Frank H.) 

x-xv 

Shepard (Frederick J.) 

XIII 

Sparks (Edwin Erie) 

XVII 

Spears (John R.)..XV 
Stevens (Frank E.) 

XIX 
Thomas (Gabriel) XIV 
Thwaites (Reuben 

Gold) IX-XVI 

Wafer (Lionel) .. .VI 
Wagner (W. F.)...IV 
Winship (George 

Parker) VI 

Wolley (Charles).. XII 



Catalog of Their Publications 1 1 1 



Orth (Samuel P.). Five American Politicians. 

Burr — Doug-las — Clay — Clinton — Van Buren. 
Size, 7>^x5^; 447 pages, photogravure portraits, 
cloth {postage .10) $2.00 

American Politics examined in the light of present 
day administration may be said to comprise two distinct 
features, i. e., personality and principle. The machinery 
of modern politics had its inception in the desire of certain 
men to carry out issues and fulfil ambitions highly neces- 
sary to their own advancement and success. There have 
been many distinct successes in this peculiar field but it 
has been Dr. Orth's object to show the beginnings of this 
essentially American phase of political life. Each of the 
five great names contributed some special feature. 

To Aaron Burr may be given the credit of the first 
American political machine. It has survived the century 
as Tammany Hall. His romantic life and tragic death add 
a double interest to the story of his political career. 

DeWitt Clinton was the founder of the Spoils System, 
the earliest and most pernicious of all forms of graft. 
The life of the man was a series of paradoxes; the strong 
and weak points constantly in contrast one with the other, 
and his final transformation from a "spoils" nolitician to 
one of our greatest constructive statesmen forms an in- 
structing as well as interesting chapter in our history. 

The system originated by Clinton was deftly carried 
by another to Washington. The story of Martin Van 
Buren is one of careful plotting and clever manipulation ; 
his ousting of Jackson to become President, and the 
methods used by him to avoid snares and pitfalls is as 
fascinating as a romance. 

A Master and Victim of Compromise and Coalition, 
Henry Clay stands pre-eminent. Five times he stood for 
the presidency, either before the convention or the people, 
only to be defeated. For half a century he was a leading 
actor on our political stage; the organizer of a powerful 
party; the originator of great issues. 

One other name— Stephen A. Douglas, Defender of 
State Rights, must be included, as denoting a man who 
lead the old Democracy into the land of promise and the 
realm of nationalism. His life was given to that period 
which determined for us whether we were to be a nation 
or a confederation. 

The book is written in a lucid, straightforward manner, 
the author's chief object being to bring out the foremost 
political episodes in ihe lives of the five men under con- 
sideration. 

The growth of the spoils system and party machinery; 
the origin of the caucus and its decline; the rise and de- 
velopment of the convention plan, and other details of 
modern politics are treated exhaustively from an historical 
standpoint and moreover the fundamental thought 
throughout the book is to show how all the diverse factors 
combined to aid in the development of the nation and how 
politics and statecraft have united continually in forming 
and preserving the Union, 



26 



IV Burrows Brothers Company 

Douglas (James, LL.D.) Old France in the 
New World. Quebec in the Seventeenth Century. 
Second Edition. Size, 6Xx8|4^; pages, 597; por- 
traits in photogravure and many full page half-tones, 
buckram, gilt, extra {postage .12) $2.50 

An admirable book on the making of Canada under 
the French rule, and especially of the begincings of Que- 
bec, Dr. Douglas having made a particular study of the 
old town 'and its associations. A scholarly and open 
minded account, fully illustrated, of the development of 
that great country to the north of us. With careful and 
comprehensive index. 

"The author follows the fortunes of the French settle- 
ment on the St. Lawrence with a firm grasp of the philoso- 
phy of its history, and with many entertaining details . .. 
and is a valuable addition to the increasing literature of 
the subject.— A^. F. Tribtme. 

"The illustrations, plans, maps and facsimiles are 
numerous, exceedingly well executed, and historically 
valuable." — Cleveland Flahi Dealer. 

"It contains a wealth of information, part of which is 
new and what is not is told in such an attractive manner 
as to give it all the charm of Vi.o\^ &\ty ." —Qiiebec Chrotticle. 

"Dr. Douglas adds a very substantial and comprehen- 
sive volume to the literature of the subject ... in fact he 
has achieved a work of value." — New York Times Satur- 
day Review. 

"The historj' of Canada is well worth reading, and the 
book contains one of the best indexes ever seen in a vol- 
ume of this kind, filling some fifty -four pages. The work 
is handsomely printed and bound, and the frontispiece is 
a photogravure of the study for a portrait of Cardinal 
Richelieu, by Phillippe de Champaigne, in the National 
Gallery." — Boston Transcript. 

"Old France in the New World" will be invaluable to 
all those who wish to study, in the formative period, the 
people who now form one-third of the population of the 
Dominion." — Manitoba Free Press. 

Descriptive circular on application. 

*Leonard (Zenas). Narrative of Adventures, 
1839. Edited by W. F. Wagner. Size 6x9, pages 
317; map, portraits, cloth {postage .14) $5.00 

Since Washington Irving gave us "Capt. Bonneville" 
and "Astoria" the interest in the Great West has been un- 
abated. Lewis and Clark were the pioneers through the 
country which Leonard describes and here for the first 
time is presented in accurate print, one of the most re- 
markable records of early western adventure (on the prai- 
ries and in the Rockies) ever experienced by individuals. 
The first description of the Yosemite is here given, of the 
redwoods of Mariposa and the big trees of the (then) Cali- 
fornia Territory. Leonard became a member of the 



Catalog of Thei7' Publications V 



Walker Expedition and later in 1834, joined Capt. Bonne- 
ville at bait Lake, becoming intimate with the celebrated 
Joe Meek and the renegade Edward Rose, of Astorian 
fame. 

The introduction and very numerous and excellent 
annotations are by Dr. W. F. Wagner. There are maps, 
tine portraits, and an index of great value. The original 
work is one of extreme scarcity and its authenticity is iu 
°o ■^■ay to be doubted. A limited number of copies are 
offered for sale. The present and coming interest in the 
^''^<^^? country adds greatly to the value of this book. 
T j.^^^ journal tells a great deal about the western 
Indian Txvo&^."—A7nerican Hist. Review. 

"This reprint is fully and capably annotated. The 
value of tne publication is increased by an exhaustive 
index . . . and a map showing the location of the Cali- 
fornia missions in \im-\m.i"— Cedar Rapids Republica?i. 

A good account is given of the California territory, 
its climate, soil, mountains, streams, crops and native 
Indians."— A^. Y. Times Sat. Review. 

Quardia ( Ricardo Fernandez) Cuentos Ticos. 

Short stories of Costa Rica. Translated from the 
Spanish by Gray Casement, with an introduction 
and many half-tone illustrations. Size 5 x T^^:; 
pages 293, cloth, {postpaid) $2.00 

Costa Rica has its own literature and the above collec- 
tion— a typical one— of Central American stories has been 
carefully and smoothly translated by Gray Casement a 
close student of the Latin-American life, and one who 
makes a strong bid for the future of these southern re- 
publics. Guardia is considered the leading exponent of 
belles-lettres in Costa Rica and his work has exerted a 
strong influence over his countrymen. Here for the first 
time he is put in English and the illustrations and lengthy 
introduction by the translator make the book unique in 
the position which it tills. 

"Some of the stories are humorous, some tragic; but 
all show power and present life vividly."— A'ew York Stm. 

"Senor Guardia is considered one of the leading lit- 
erary men of Costa Rica, if not of Central America. 
The unusual merit of he short stories in this collection 
makes the reader desirous of knowing more of his work 
Mr. Casement, who is responsible for the translation, 
has performed a difficult task in a very satisfactory man- 
ner." — New Orleans Picayune. 

"Mr. Casement has been able to retain in his transla- 
tion the effect of the language in which the stories were 
written. He has kept the idiomatic terms of expression 
as nearly as possible and the touches of local color make 
one of their most pleasing (X^2X\X\&?.." —Cleveland Leader. 

"Here is a unique book indeed * * * Tales like these 
are not to be found elsewhere."— 7%« Emporia {Kansas) 
Bulletin. 



VI Burrows Brothers Company 

"The stories are not only g-ood — they are very good. 
In fact they will remind the reader of the brilliant sketches 
of Selma Lagerlof, the Swedish impressionist. One feels 
after reading the book through that he has been making a 
voyage of discovery, that he has never known Costa Rica 
before more than a geographical name and a possible 
space on the map of that neck of woods known as Central 
America — but that now he knows it well. * * * The 
short novels that Mr. Casement has translated for us are 
cut as clean as a cameo. There is not an amateurish line 
in them." — Cleveland Tovun Topics. 

"Mr. Casement's account of the little republic is more 
thorough and satisfactory than any we have met with."— 
Cleveland Plain Dealer. 

* * * "In 'El Clavel' (The Pink) is told the story of a 
country girl who vainly loves a well-to-do gentleman of 
the city; although here and there reminiscent of Castilian 
story tellers, the' tales and the style in which they are re- 
lated, make one wish to know more of Senor Guardia and 
his works." — Neiso York Times Sat. Revieuu. 

Descriptive circular on application. 



*Wafer (Lionel). A New Voyage to America. 

Edited by George Parker Winship, Size 6x9, 
pages 212, two folding maps and three folding 
plates, cloth {postage .12) $3.50 

A reprint of one of the most valuable early treatises 
on Central America and the Isthmus. Published in 1699, 
the volume has been one of great rarity until now pre- 
sented with all the original plates, maps and a new chart 
of the country as it is today. Invaluable as a contribution 
toward our canal literature and the annotations which 
have been added by Mr. Winship, relating to the ethnol- 
ogy and anthropology of the country, greatly enhance its 
worth. Edition of 600 copies. 

"The publishers have done their full share to produce 
a book quite in keeping with their v/ell established repu- 
tation. The original edition of the work is so scarce that 
students . . . have hitherto had little opportunity of con- 
sulting it." — American Anthropologist. 

"In the elegant reprints to which the Burrows Brothers 
Co., Cleveland, Ohio, has devoted itself, timely is Lionel 
Wafer's 'New Voyage, etc' The very competent editor, 
Mr. George Parker Winship . . . has supplemented the 
text of the narrative with notes drawn from buccaneer 
literature of the time. . . . The original illustrations are 
given in facsimile, together with the British Admiralty 
map." — The Nation. 

"The work is not only one which should be in every 
library of Americana, but is highly interesting to the lay 
reader."— C. F. Lummis, in Out West. 

"The introduction and annotations of the reprint are 
valuable contributions to history and anthropology."— 
Boston Transcript. 



Catalog of Their Piiblications VII 

"As an example of the bookmaker's art, this reprint is 
almost ideal and the editorial work fully bears out Mr. 
Winship's reputation for careful scholarship." — American 
Hist. Review. 

"Mr. Winship's contribution is a scholarly piece of 
work." — N. Y. Times Sat. RevieiiJ. 

"A delightful story of old buccaneering days, told by 
a real buccaneer . . . His account should be read with 
interest now that the Panama canal promises to become a 
reality."— A^. Y. Sun. 

*Hutchlns (Thomas). A Topographical Des= 
cription of Virginia, Pennsylvania, Maryland, 
etc. Edited by Frederick Charles Hicks. Size 
9^ X 6^, pages 143, folding maps, portrait and 
plates, cloth $4.00 

On handmade deckle edge paper, super 

extra {postage .i6) $6.00 

Thomas Hutchins, the author, occupies a unique place 
in the history of American cartography, being the only in- 
cumbent of the civil office of "Geographer of the United 
States," the position ceasing to exist after his death in 
1789. 

While directed by him there were executed the first 
public surveys under the auspices of the Government. 
He is entitled to commendation not only because of this 
fact but for the reason of his honorable connection of over 
twenty-tu'O years, as an officer in the British army, eigh- 
teen of which were given to the Engineer Department. 

His observations covering the entire southern and 
western country from West Florida to the Lakes, are em- 
bodied in several maps and two books, the earlier of which 
is now offered to the public in an accurate reprint. The 
prefatory remarks indicate that the volume is intended 
more particularly to explain the larger map entitled "The 
new map of the western parts of Virginia, Pennsylvania, 
Maryland and North Carolina," etc., published separately 
but of the same date as the book. This chart, 35 x 45 inches 
in size, together with the folded maps included in the 
volume, are reproduced with absolute accuracy. Strange 
as it may seem, the life of Hutchins who in many respects 
was vitally connected with the history of the American 
Colonies, their struggle for independence, and their de- 
velopment after it was attained, has never been written. 
As an introduction to the volume, the editor, Frederick 
Charles Hicks, formerly of the Library of Congress, haa 
prepared, entirely from original sources, an extended ac- 
count of the man, supplemented by a bibliography of his 
published and unpublished writings. The Topographical 
Description is copiously annotated and the whole pro- 
vided with a complete index. Included is the particularly 
important and exceedingly scarce Journal of Patrick 
Kennedy, together with a list of the different nations and 
tribes of Indians then scattered throughout those parts. 
As an addition to our cartographical literature the work is 



VIII Burrows Brothers Company 

most acceptable, but in presenting a life drawn from offi- 
cial documents, unpublished correspondence and rov- 
ernment records, many new facts are for the first time 
made public and much of importance, heretofore un- 
known, is gfiveo to the student and historian. 

"Mr. Hicks has made scholarly use of the opportunity 
which he had for several years as a member of the staff of 
the Congressional LiihTsciy."— Bulletin Amer. Geog: Society. 

"The publishers whose reprints of neglected and 
well nigh forgotten historical documents deserve not 
only praise but substantial recognition, have done well in 
reviving the memoirs and work of Hutchins. . . . We re- 
gret that the edition is limited, as it is a book which should 
be in every public library." — The Nation. 

"An admirable reproduction of a pioneer survey of 
the Ohio valley. ... It is a thoroughly creditable per- 
formance." — A^. Y. Sun. 

"Mr. Hicks has taken his task seriously, using goo4 
source material and collecting his information with com- 
mendable care." — Atner. Hist. Reviow. 

A descriistive circular on application. 

*Eliot (John). The Logick Primer. Edited 
by Wilberforce Eames. Size 5}^ x 6^; pages 94, 
facsimiles, cloth, extra {postage .lo) $6.00 

A reprint of one of the scarcest pieces of Americana, 
of which there now exists but one original copy in the 
British Museum. Has both the Indian and English text 
and is edited by Wilberforce Eames of the Lenox 
Library. A few copies only remain out of an edition of 150. 

"Mr. Eames is an acknowledged authority on matters 
pertaining to Eliot, and his work will be appreciated by a 
large number of students and collectors who have known 
the volume only by report."— A'ijTe' York Ti^nes Sat. Revie-m. 

"The little book contains an excellent introduction by 
Mr. Wilberforce Eames of the Lenox lAhxKxy ." —American 
Anthropologist. 

Paullin (Charles Oscar). The Navy of the 
American Revolution. Size IYt. x 5^, pages 426, 
frontispiece, cloth, {postage .lo) $1.25 

A volume of the highest importance dealing with 
American naval history in away entirely unlike that used 
by any previous historian. The work is divided into two 
periods, the first dealing exclusively with the Continental 
Navy or the fleets of the federal government, the second 
with the several State's navies. Two chapters are de- 
voted to the valuable naval services of Deane, Franklin, 
Lee and Adams in France. For the first time the duties 
which devolved upon Washington, Benedict Arnold, the 
American Commissioners at Paris and the Continental 
agents at Washington and New Orleans are made clear, 
as concerned their duty toward the navy. The initial 
essay considers the Continental Navy under its first and 
only Commander-in-chief, Esek Hopkins; the celebrated 



Catalof^ of Their Publications IX 

fight of Jones off Flamborough Head; the bloody en- 
gagement between the Trut7ibull a.nd. M'^a^, andthe mem- 
orable cruise of that redoubtable Irishman, Commodore 
John Barrj', in 1782-1783 are briefly recounted. A critical 
and exhaustive bibliography is contained in an appendix, 
also a list of the commissioned officers of the Continental 
Navy and Marine Corps. The list of Ships supplements 
and corrects that by Lieut. T. F. Emmons, while the total 
number of officers' names given is 303 or exactly two hun- 
dred more than contained in Hamersly. As a concise, 
accurate and readable volume on the subject, treating of 
the period covered, this little book cannot be excelled. 
Descriptive circular on application. 

*Jesuit Relations (The). Travels and Ex= 
plorations of the French Missionaries among 
the Indians. Edited by Reuben Gold Thwaites, 
73 volumes. Size 6x9. Average number of pages 
per volume 300, many, (colored) portraits and 
full page plates, buckram, deckle edge. Per vol- 
ume $3,50 

Travels and Explorations of the French Jesuit Mis- 
sionaries among the Indians of Canada and the Northern 
and Northwestern States of the U. S., 1610-1791. Taken 
from the French, Latin and Italian originals, both manu- 
script and printed, with a complete English translation. 
Portraits, maps, and facsimiles. Of the limited edition 
(750 sets) a few only remain for sale. Price to be ad- 
vanced at publisher's option. 

"The most important historical enterprise ever under- 
taken." — John Fiske. 

•'The beginnings of American literature."— Literary 
Vi'^orld. 

"The greatest literary event of the yeax."— Chicago 
Tribune. 

"Of the greatest importance for the student of history 
and the student of Indian manners."— Cri/zc. 

"The documents on which is based the early history 
of America." — Literature. 

"A work no library should fail to have on its shelves." 
— Canadian Bookseller. 

"Among our first and best authorities."— Z>ia:/. 

"The most important historical undertaking of recent 
years "— /. N. Lamed. 

"It makes an epoch in the historical literature of North 
America." — American Historical Review. 

"The most valuable addition to early American his- 
tory that the present decade will see."— Buffalo Enquirer. 

"The most important addition to the shelf of access- 
ible American hmtory. "—Litetary World. 

"An immense boon to succeeding generations (and 
consequently will be called for much more largely in a 
few years, when it will be unobtainable)." — The Month. 

Descriptive circular on application. 



X Burrows Brothers Company 

Avery (Eiroy McKendree). A History of 
the United States and Its People. 12 volumes, 
size 6X X 9^, about 400 pages, per volume, col- 
ored maps and plates, cloth, super extra $ 6.25 
Half morocco $12.50 

Full levant morocco $17.50 

In the treatment of his vast and complicated subject, 
the author has succeeded, to a remarkable degree, in com- 
bining simplicity with fullness, at the same time preserv- 
ing the proper relation of parts to each other and to the 
whole, and quite certainly no work has yet appeared that 
has so masterfully studied the art of condensation. In 
accomplishing this Doctor Avery has given color and 
lucidity to his narrative. It takes time to thus write his- 
tory from the standpoint of exclusion as well as inclusion, 
but the sure result is that the ideas are not lost in a mere 
jumble of words. 

"The wealth of colored maps is especially commend- 
able." — Literary Digest. 

"Even a cursory turning of the leaves for purposes of 
examination constantly presents a temptation to pause 
and read a bit here and there.'' — Brooklyn Eagle. 

"A work that cannot fail to attract the public attention 
and to compel the favorable judgment even of critics who 
are prone to look askance at the popular Yvmioxy."— Boston 
Transcript. 

"A work which will take high rank with the histories 
of our country. . . . Dr. Avery writes in a clear, vigorous 
style and his narration, void of confusing reference notes, 
is admirable." — Boston Herald. 

"There is certainly need of a popular history of the 
United States, better proportioned and more authoritative 
then Bryant and Gay, and more comprehensive than 
Fiske. This need Dr. Elroy iM. Avery has sought to sup- 
ply in his 'History of the United States and its People.'— 
The Nation. 

Severance (Frank H.) Old Trails on the 
Niagara Frontier. Second edition. Size 6x9; 
pages 270, map, cloth {postage .12 ) $2.50 

Drawn in every instance from such authoritative 
sources as State Archives, early manuscripts, the Haldir 
mand Papers and other Canadian channels, and woven 
together after infinite research, the volume has made fo- 
itself a place in American local history, though in literary 
scope it may be called universal. The New York Press 
termed the first edition "one of the mos<- attractive 
books of the year." 

Frank H. Severance, the author, has long made a study 
of Eastern pioneer life and has worked carefully and thor- 
oughly on the subject. A few of the chapters taken in 
the order given present plainly the field covered. 

The "Cross Bearers" treats of the Jesuit Missionaries 
who came to the region, starting with Dallion, in 1626, 



Catalog of Their Ptiblications XI 

"The Paschal of the Great Pinch" is an extract from 
the hitherto unknown memoirs of the Chevalier de Trey- 
gay, of Fort Denonvile (now called Niagara), in 1687, and 
"With Bolton at Fort Niagara," gives an interesting epi- 
sode in the life of Lieut. Col. Mason Bolton, of the 34th 
Royal Artillery. 

"What Befell David Ogden" tells the story of one of 
the thirty-two persons brought captive by the Indians 
from 1778 to 1783 to Fort Niagara. 

In the "Journals and Journeys of an Early Buffalo 
Merchant" the life of John Lay, who went to that place in 
1810, is narrated. One of the most interesting of all chap- 
ters is thafentitled "The Misadventures of Robert JVIarsh" 
during his extraordinary travels. Increditable as it may 
seem, the actual distance covered by this individual was 
77,000 miles, amid hardships and perils, Indians and wild 
beasts, yet he lived and told the tale. One of the last but 
far from least interesting events described under the title 
of "Underground Trails" is that portion of the volume 
devoted to the flight of the slaves. As a summary the 
work may be called without hesitancy a contribution, 
valuable not only as such, but as a faithful descriptive 
narration of events and filling a long felt want in the an- 
nals of border life. 

"The book is very handsomely gotten up, and the 
story form in which the information is put will attract a 
public that is more than local." — A'^. Y. Szm. 

"... a work valuable to all interested in early Ameri- 
can history." — A^. Y. World. 

"The scholarship, accuracy and local knowledge 
shown in the treatment of these events described give the 
book more than a parochial interest." — The Nation. 

"... many articles of interest are to be found in the 
volume." — A'^ Y. Times Sai. Review . 

Rafinesque (C. D.) Ichthyologia Ohiensis. 

Size %}i X 9, cloth, top gilt, deckle edges. . . . (Out 
of print. ) 

"It is therefore a source of gratification to note a ver- 
batim reprint of this, the foundation work on fresh water 
xchihYology .—Chicago Evening Post. 

The "B B" Reprints. A select series, devoted 
entirely to the scarcest pieces of early American 
history or travel and especially designed for the 
collector or student. Each volume is beautifully 
executed and published in a style fitting it to be 
permanently preserved. Printed on Dickinson 
hand-made paper in large clear type, bound in 
Burrows boards, deckle edges, uncut, in format, a 
small quarto. Each issue strictly limited to 250 
copies, numbered, and 15 copies on Japanese vel- 
lum, numbered and signed by the editors. 



XII Btirt'ows Brothers Company 

Denton ( Daniel ) . A Brief Description of 
New York. Edited by Felix Neumann. Size 
6x9; pages 63, antique boards, (out of print.) 

This volume was written during 1670 by one Daniel 
Denton, an ofHcer of the law, in Jamaica, in Queens 
County, on Long Island, and is a vivid and clear descrip- 
tion of New York city and of the surrounding country, 
(including the present State of New Jersey) of that 
period, i'he intiabitants, their customs, habits and con- 
ditions are also carefully noted, the Indians are men- 
tioned quite exhaustively, and the whole forms a narra- 
tive of great historical interest 

"Aside from its physical peculiarities, the subject mat- 
ter is of much interest to the collector of Americana or 
the student of the youth of his country." — Reader Maga- 
zine. 

"The publishers are to be complimented on the ex- 
cellent make up of the volume."— A^. Y. Times Sat. Review. 

"It is a vivid and clear description of New York City 
and the surrounding country including New Jersey, as it 
was in that ■p^xxod,.'" —Cimiulative Book Index. 

"The introduction is an admirable piece of biblio- 
graphical writing in point of thoroughness, and adds to 
the value of the new edition, which presents a facsimile of 
the title page of the oxi^xnsX."— Outlook. 

*WolIey ( Rev. Cliarles) . A Two Years' Jour- 
nal in New York. Edited by Prof. Edward Gay- 
lord Bourne. Size 6x9, pages 75, two plates, an- 
tique boards, deckle edges (postage .06) $2.00 

The Rev. Charles WoUey (or Wooley) accompanied 
Sir Edmund Andros to New York as his chaplain in 1678. 
At the expiration of two years he returned to England 
and published, in 1701, his "Journal," to which much value 
is attached, particularly as concerns the Indians. His 
knowledge regarding the trade of New York at that date, 
and the prices of furs and other commodities, is of great 
interest 

An original copy is worth about $1,000. 

"This reprint of his narrative is valuable as there are 
but few of the original copies in existence."— A''. Y. Press. 

"The introductions are ample and satisfactory." — 
Amer. Hist. Revieiu- 

"The introduction to the Journal is by Prof. Bourne, 
of Yale University, and leaves little to be desired."— ^aZ/i- 
more Sun. 

*Alsop (George). A Character of the Pro= 
vince of Maryland. Edited by Newton D. Mere- 
ness, Ph. D. Size 6x9; pages 113, portrait of 
author and facsimiles, antique boards, deckle 
edges {postage .08) $2.00 



Catalog of Their Publications XIII 

The work of an indented servant in that State and 
gives on the whole, a description of favorable circum- 
stances of the then existing conditions. The work in the 
original is one of excessive rariry, and this reprint is in 
every way exact and correct in detail. 

"... an admirable specimen of typography, and 
makes an interesting historical document accessible to 
the general public."— A^. Y. Sun. 

"The editing by Dr. Mereness leaves little to be de- 
sired." — Baltimore Sun. 

"The booklet is of value to the student of our colonial 
history, and will give the reader a whiff of the spirit and 
atmosphere of the days of the Restoration."— 77?^ Critic. 

*MilIer (Rev. John). A Description of the 
Province and City of New York. Edited by 
Victor Hugo Paltsits. Size 6x9; pages 185, fac- 
similes and folding plans, antique boards, deckle 
edges [postage .og) $2.00 

This work was not printed at the time of its composi- 
tion (1695). The original manuscript found its way from 
the archives of the Bishops of London to the hands of 
George Chalmers, the Scottish antiquary. It was sold 
afterwards to Thomas Rodd, a London bookseller, who 
first published it in 1843. and this was later used by Gowans 
in 1862. It is now in the British Museum. The text is 
transcribed in loco, and a sketch of the author given for 
the first time. 

"Printing and binding are in every way worthy of 
what the publishers style 'the definitive edition.' "— A'^. E. 
Hist, and Gen'^ Register. 

"... a curious and interesting volume." — Brooklyn 
Eagle. 

"By placing these old prints within the reach of mod- 
ern students and readers, the enterprising publishers are 
doing an invaluable service to the literature of American 
history." — The Dial. 

"... their elegant series of American historical re- 
prints " — The Nation. 

"The bibliographical and historical footnotes are very 
valuable. " — L iterary Collector. 

*Budd (Thomas). Good Order Established in 
Pennsylvania and New Jersey. Edited by Frede- 
rick J. Shepard, size 6x9; pages 80, fac-simile, 
antique boards, deckle edges {postage .06) $2.00 

Not only a very important early view of these States, 
but the original has the distinction of being the first book 
printed in America by William Bradford. Budd was a 
resident of Burlington, N. J., in 1678, and an extensive 
landowner. The book gives a good account of the coun- 
try and its resources and would be today termed a treatise 
written for the use of emigrants. A translation of "The 
Dying Words of Ockanichon," an Indian who died at 



XIV Burrows Brothers Company 

Burlington, is appended. This latter tract recently sold, 
in the original, at auction for $1,450 00, and Budd for £125, 
in London. 

"The publishers deserve thanks for their handsome 
reprint of a book which is accounted among the very 
rarest of Americana." — Reader Magazitie. 

"Contains a great deal of information, and Mr. Shep- 
ard's introduction is scholarly and full of interest."— jV. Y. 
Sun. 

*Thomas (Oabriel.) Pennsylvania and West= 
New Jersey in America. Edited by Cyrus Town- 
send Brady. Size 6x9; pages 83, antique boards, 
deckle edges {postage .06) $2.00 

Little did this author realize the worth of his contri- 
bution, either as such or from a standpoint of financial 
value. At the date of its inception and composition, the 
writer is believed to have been a citizen of London, hav- 
ing previously resided in America for a period of about 
fifteen years, and the information contained in the book 
gives the result of his own experience and observation. 
In its general make-up the second portion of the book de- 
voted to West-New-Jersey, is in every way similar to that 
preceding. Descriptions, exceedingly valuable to the 
student of contemporary history are lengthy and full of 
rich material, notices of the soil and climate and particu- 
larly the portions which refer to the native Indians, are 
of inestimable value. As to the scarcity of the original, 
little need be said. Its present day market valuation as a 
rare book is fully that of a thousand dollars, one having 
been recently ofliered for more than this amount by a 
prominent dealer. 

"The original is extremely rare and the reprint, 
though limited, is timely." — Atiier. Hist. Review, 

"In typography and binding the volume is notable for 
modest elegance." — Chicago Evening Post. 

All of the above reprints contain facsimiles of the 
original title pages, maps and illustrations. It is hoped 
that eventually there will be included some rare tracts or 
volumes dealing with many of the early States, each dis- 
tinctive in itself, and attended biographically and biblio- 
graphically by competent authorities. 

Other volumes to be announced later. 

Narratives of Indian Captivities. A series 
of five volumes devoted to some of the scarcest and 
rarest works of this character. As a collection, 
the publishers once more put before the American 
public many accounts of the adventures, battles, 
imprisonments, and escapes of our forefathers, 
which though published and read in days long past, 
are now almost impossible to procure. . . Uni- 
formity as to the number of copies of each work 



Catalog of Their Publications XV 

prevails throughout the series, both on hand made 
paper and vellum, and each volume is numbered. 
The binding of the set is a uniform fine quality of 
cloth, the de luxe copies being untrimmed and 
with paper label. 

*Qilbert (Benjamin). The Captivity and 
Sufferings of Benjamin Gilbert and his Family, 

1780=83. Edited by Frank H. Severance. Size 
8X X 5 14^; pages 204, map and four plates, cloth, 
extra, deckle edges {postage .ij) $3,50 

On Imperial Japanese vellum $5.00 

A most useful book to students of the Niagara region 
and its history, and of New York State as a whole, aside 
from offering much in the way of extraordinary adven- 
ture to the general reader. The work was written by 
William Walton, to whom the facts were told by the Gil- 
berts after their release. Included is a facsimile of two 
of the original title pages, a remarkable woodcut from 
the first issue and a newly drawn map of the region trav- 
ersed, also a complete index. 

"Mr. Severance is just the man to edit a reprint of 
this work. Its publication should interest local people 
greatly." — Niagara Falls Gazette. 

"Their journeyings and adventures are interesting 
and cast a curious light on the frontier life of the time." — 
N. Y. Sun. 

"A straightforward, simple, direct narrative. . . . " — 
Buffalo Express. 

*Eastburn (Robert). A Faithful Narrative 
During His Late Captivity. Edited by John R. 
Spears. Size 8X x 6^, facsimile, cloth, extra, 
{postage .07) $2.00 

On Imperial Japanese vellum $3.50 

This is one of the rarest of Indian captivities in tbe 
original, being exceeded in that quality only by Dicken- 
son's God ^s Protecting Providence, and Gyle's Odd Adven- 
tures and Captivity. The narrative is one of extreme im- 
portance because of its being an original authority relat- 
ing to the war that destroyed the French power in North 
America. The excellent character of the author and his 
high standing among the pioneers and early settlers of 
Pennsylvania must also be taken into account. 

"Mr. Spears has enhanced the value of the book by 
his illuminating introduction and his copious annota- 
tions." — Chicago Evening Post. 

"Eastburn's hardships were severe but he was equal 
to them."— 7Vi7^20«. 

"The narrative is printed with the old spelling and 
notes."— 7V^. Y. Times Sat. Review. 



XVI Burrows Brothers Company 

*Leeth (John). A Short Biography of— 
With an Account of His Life Among the ln= 
dians. By Ewel Jeffries, edited by Reuben Gold 
Thwaites. Size 8X x 5^, pages 70, facsimile, cloth 
extra {postage .07) $2.00 

On Imperial Japanese Vellum $3.50 

Leeth's narrative is from every viewpoint well worth 
the reprinting. The introduction by Dr. Thwaites is 
lengthy and lucid, giving all particulars concerning the 
old fur trader and his Indian experiences. The hero him- 
self was in his seventy-seventh year when these recollec- 
tions were reduced to writing by Jeffries and his memory 
was unusually accurate for a man of his humble walk in 
life. The story is on the whole an accurate matter of 
fact recital of the often thrilling personal experiences of 
a typical trader and hunter in the then Indian Territory 
of Pennsylvania and Ohio — his numerous expeditions, his 
intimate relations with the savages; and his captivity and 
life in their camps, chiefly during the stirring period be- 
tween 1774 and 1790. 

"The story of his adventures is a wonderful record of 
hardships and suffering, of indomitable bravery and rigid 
honesty. — Chicago Evening Post. 

*How (Nehemiah). Narrative of his Captiv= 
ity at Great Meadow Fort. Edited by Victor 
Hugo Paltsits. Size 8X x 5^; pages 72, facsimiles, 
cloth, extra {postage .06) $2.00 

On Imperial Japanese Vellum $3.50 

The excessively rare original tract, consisting of 
twenty-four pages, was first published in Boston, one.year 
after the death of How, which event occurred while he 
was a prisoner at Quebec. It is now reprinted for the 
first time vebatim et literatim et punctuatim, from a fine 
uncut copy (the Brinley) in the New York Public Library, 
with a lengthy and complete introduction, valuable foot- 
notes and an index. 

Mr. Paltsits has also supplied with the above, a gene- 
alogy of the author and brought to light many hidden 
facts which, though known, have not heretofore been 
authenticated, explaining and pointing out vagaries in 
New England and specially Vermont history, which will 
be of incalculable assistance to the future worker in this 
field. A facsimile of the orginal title-page is included. 
Nehemiah How was born in 1693 at Marlborough, Mass., 
and died while captive in Quebec, May 25, 1747. His nar-' 
rative abounds in interest and is both lucid and accurately 
written. As a contemporary view of New England and 
southeastern Canada, it is of great value. 

"The setting given the narrative in its new appear- 
ance is of the same excellence as the other volumes in 
this series of reprints. — The Dial. 



Catah^ of Their Publications XVII 

"A diary of the twenty-eight pages, meager in his- 
torical material but worthy of a reprint because of its 
Ta.Titj."—Amer. Hist. Review. 

Opinion in a letter from Prof. William F. Ganong; Smith 
College, Northampton, Mass.: "I have read it through with 
care and deep interest,— the latter arising in part from 
the narrative itself and in part from the way in which the 
subject is handled, and clarified by the editor. The 
whole work seems to me just a model of what such a 
work ought to be— not only in the editing, but also in the 
form and typography, including the verj' copious index." 
— Signed. 

* Johnston (Charles). Narrative of Incidents 
Attending his Capture. Edited by Edwin Erie 
Sparks, Ph. D. Size %% x Sl^T; pages 156, fac- 
simile, cloth, extra {postage .og) $2.50 
On Imperial Japanese Vellum $4.00 

Althougn consiaeraDiy snorter tnan many ot the nar- 
ratives offered from time to time by the early pioneers, 
this volume has many features which commend its peru- 
sal and which are of value and interest to the general 
reader as well as the student. During 1789, at the age of 
twenty-one years, Charles Johnston left a point near 
Petersburg, Virginia, for the State of Kentucky for the 
purpose of taking some depositions. His capture by the 
Indians took place during the summer of the year men- 
tioned, and he was taken into the present State of Ohio 
and there kept prisoner until ransomed by a French 
Trader from Detroit. Eventually he made his way back 
to Virginia by way of New York. Some interesting inter- 
national questions of that day touching upon the reten- 
tion of American forts by the British, are fully and care- 
fully treated. Ths sum paid for Johnson's release was 
eventually returned to the French trader by the United 
States Government. This book is fully annotated, the 
identifications of all proper names carefully attended to, 
and full explanations given by Professor Sparks, of the 
University of Chicago, author of ''The Expansions of the 
American People" , '' Fortnative Incidents in American Dip- 
lomacy ", etc., etc. 

Other volumes in this series will be announced later, 
and will probably deal more especially with the western 
country as we know it today, the Rockies and the Pacific 
coast. 

A descriptive circular on application. 

Lincoln and Douglas Debates, in the Cam- 
paign of 1858 in Illinois. Size 10x7^; pages 
415, buckram {postage .22) $3.50 

Stephen A. Douglas, an exponent of views dissimilar 
and opposed, used all the force of splendid oratory and 
brilliant scholarship, but to no avail, as events have 
proven. 



XVIII Burrows Brothers Company 

The speeches during: the celebrated campaign in 
Illinois, and the two great speeches of Lincoln in Ohio, are 
masterpieces. The work is fully indexed with great care 
and the original edition of 1860 is now so •carce as to be 
practically unprocurable. 

Haworth (PaulL. ) The Hayes=Tilden Dis= 
puted Presidential Election of 1876. Size 
8x5^; pages 365. Buckram {postage .12) 

Net $1.50 

To the handling of this subject the author has devoted 
an enormous amount of the best work of a specially 
trained historical student's mind, and while his method is 
highly complete in a technical way, showing thorough 
scholarship, his style is also bright, picturesque, and in- 
teresting, showing thus .not only that he has collected his 
materials with the highest degree of thoroughness, but 
also that he possesses the ability to co-ordinate the same 
and thus furnish to his readers something more than the 
mere building materials of history— a finished historical 
construction. The author's task was very difficult. It is 
practically safe to assert that up to ten years ago it would 
have been impossible, even with the best will in the 
world, to make so unbiased and thorough a study of the 
question as IVIr. Haworth has done, and it would seem 
equally certain that at no time in the future will it be pos- 
sible to secure such jPifrjo^a/ assistance as has been given 
to Mr. Haworth by a large number of parties directly 
connected in some way with one side or the other of this 
controversy. 



Catalog of Their Publications XIX 

Remainders of Publications Owned or 
Controlled 

BY 

The Burrows Brothers Company 

Cleveland and London 



*Boone ( Daniel ) . A Bibliography of Writ^- 
ings Concerning. By William Harvey Miner. 
Size 1% x5X', pages 32, (interleaved) antique 
boards {postage .06) $2.00 

Jones (Charles C., Jr. ) . History of Georgia. 
2 vols. Size 9^x6^; pages 556+640, portraits, 
plates, maps, buckram, uncut. ($10.00) {express- 
age .4^^) $6.00 

Stevens (Frank E.). The Black Hawk 
War. Including a Review of Black Hawk's Life. 
Size 10}4xl}i; pages 323, more than 300 portraits 
and views, cloth. ($5.50) (postage .24) $4.00 

Omar Khayyam — The Rubalyat of. Newly 
paraphrased by Ruel William Whitney, with slight 
foreword by C. C. M. Jr. Illustrations by F. H. M. 
Size 6^x5; illuminated wrappers, in special en- 
velope, (postpaid.) $1.00 

Circulars oj each of the above volumes may be had 
on application. 



LIBRARY OF CONGRESS 




014 499 588 



